PRALL v. BOCCHINI et al

Filing 265

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/25/2014. (dmr)(n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TORMU E. PRALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELLE R. RICCI, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 10-1228
(JBS/KMW)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Tormu E. Prall, Pro Se
700294B/650739
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Sarah G. Crowley
Office of Mercer County Counsel
640 South Broad Street
Trenton, NJ 08650
Attorney for Defendants Williams, Wilkie, Nurse Pete S./Peter
Schroeder
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge
On August 29, 2013, Defendants Williams, Wilkie, Peter
Schroeder and John Doe Mercer County Corrections Center Officers
(“the County Defendants”) filed a motion for summary judgment (Docket
Items 219-223). On September 30, 2013, Plaintiff filed opposition
to the County Defendants’ motion (Docket Item 233) and his own motion

for summary judgment (Docket Item 232). On October 4, 2013, the County
Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition and opposition
to Plaintiff’s motion (Docket Item 235).
This Court has reviewed the motion papers and supporting
documentation.

For the reasons set forth below, the County

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted; Plaintiff’s
motion for summary judgment will be denied.
BACKGROUND
A.

Statement of Facts
As supported by the Certifications filed by the County

Defendants (see Docket Item 219 and attachments), on December 12,
2009, Plaintiff, known as a dangerous and assaultive inmate, was
housed at the Mercer County Correctional Center (“MCCC”). In
violation of MCCC policy, he was accused of removing a typewriter
ribbon from the typewriter he had been using during his recreation
time. When MCCC staff discovered the violation, a Code was called.
Plaintiff was asked to return the ribbon and responded with verbal
threats and curses. Plaintiff then refused to be handcuffed and
stated that anyone who came into his cell would be assaulted or
killed. See Certification of Correctional Officer Wilke, Docket Item
219-8 at ¶ 7.
The situation escalated and a Code for additional assistance
was called. Four corrections officers entered Plaintiff’s cell and
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Plaintiff immediately became combative and assaultive. He was taken
to the floor, cuffed, and removed from the cell by the officers, who
then retrieved the typewriting ribbon. See id. at ¶ 8.
Following the incident, Plaintiff was taken to the medical
department and cleared by medical staff.

Plaintiff made no

indication that he needed medical care or was in any pain, and no
outward signs of injury were present. Because Plaintiff began making
grandiose statements about being “the Lord” and pontificating on the
injustices of the world, he was referred to the mental health unit.
Since his visit to the medical unit that day and subsequently, mental
health, after December 15, 2009, Plaintiff was not seen in medical
or mental health again. See Certification of Nurse Polyak, Docket
Item 222 at ¶¶ 5-7.
Plaintiff’s complaint, amended complaint, and second amended
complaint, filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allege that the County
Defendants, Williams, Wilke, and Nurse Pete (Schroeder), used
excessive force against him and were deliberately indifferent to his
medical needs, in violation of the Eighth Amendment.1 He asserts that
the typewriter ribbon incident was “a pretextual disturbance . . .
staged to justify attacking Prall.” (Docket Item 232, Plaintiff’s
Brief at p. 6).
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All additional claims against county defendants and employees have
been dismissed by Opinion and Order dated September 23, 2011 (Docket
Items 31, 32).
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B.

The County Defendants’ Motion
In their motion for summary judgment currently before this

Court, the County Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary
judgment because Plaintiff has not met the legal standard for claims
based on use of excessive force. (Brief, Docket Item 223, p. 16).
The County Defendants argue that proper policy was followed
throughout the incident; that Plaintiff was aware of the policy
utilized when his cell was entered because he was provided an MCCC
Inmate Handbook; and that Plaintiff was aware of the library policy
concerning typewriter ribbon because he was provided an MCCC Inmate
Handbook and because he was a frequent grievance filer concerning
law library policy. The County Defendants argue that the appropriate
actions were taken in light of the Plaintiff’s reactions (refusing
to be handcuffed, becoming combative and verbally threatening) and
history (known as an assaultive and combative inmate).
Further, the County Defendants argue that they were not
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s medical needs because
Plaintiff did not complain of any medical needs, and regardless,
Plaintiff was examined by medical and mental health personnel.
C.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff’s motion (Docket Item 232) focuses on the time of the

incident, as listed by an officer in an incident report. Plaintiff
asserts that, “There is no way that Officer DiMattia and Sergeant
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J. McCall could have asked Prall to finish up his typing at 11:40
a.m., since his 9:30 to 10:30 a.m. recreation had long expired some
seventy minutes earlier.” (Docket Item 232, Motion for Summary
Judgment, at p. 5). He further asserts that the County Defendants’
Statement of Facts in the Brief supporting the County Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is “nothing more than creative
self-contradictions plainly tailored to contrive issues of fact not
borne out by the record.” (Id.). Again, Plaintiff asserts that the
“attack” on him was pretextual. Therefore, he argues, “the amount
of force that was used had nothing to do with maintaining or restoring
discipline” and he is entitled to summary judgment (Id. at p. 7).
DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review
A court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A dispute is “genuine” if, based on the evidence in the record, a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact
is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. A court
will view evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
and draw “all justifiable inferences” in that party's favor. Hunt
v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552 (1999). See also Scott v. Harris,
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550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (The district court must “view the facts
and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
party opposing the summary judgment motion.”).
B.

Eighth Amendment Standard
The Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments of convicted

prisoners that are “cruel and unusual.” Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d
210, 216 (3d Cir. 2010). An Eighth Amendment claim includes an
objective component, whether the deprivation of a basic human need
is sufficiently serious, and a subjective component, whether the
officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. See
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). The objective component
is “contextual and responsive to ‘contemporary standards of
decency.’” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992) (quoting Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). The subjective component
“follows from the principle that ‘only the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain implicates the Eighth Amendment.’” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297).
“What is necessary to establish an ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain,’ ... varies according to the nature of the alleged
constitutional violation.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5 (quoting Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
1.

Excessive Force Claims

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Whether force used against a prisoner was excessive depends on
“whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (3d
Cir. 2009) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
In assessing whether the force used was appropriate, the Court
considers the need for the application of force and its relationship
to the amount of force used as well as the injury inflicted. See id.
In Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1992), the Supreme
Court found that unlike conditions of confinement claims and
deliberate indifference claims, which both require conduct exceeding
a certain threshold of depravity, claims of excessive force need not
meet any particular threshold of harm. Id. at 9. This is because,
“in the excessive force context, society's expectations are
different. When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use
force to cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are
violated. This is true whether or not significant injury is evident.”
Id. (emphasis added). The Supreme Court added that not “every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of
action.” Id. But this is because not every malevolent touch
constitutes a capricious infliction of pain. As indicated by the
cases the Supreme Court cites for this proposition, the court was
distinguishing excessive force from mere battery, which applies to
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any unwanted touching, even that which does inflict pain. See Johnson
v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Third Circuit also explained, “the Eighth Amendment
analysis must be driven by the extent of the force and the
circumstances in which it is applied; not by the resulting injuries.”
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 648 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations
omitted). “Requiring objective or independent proof of minor or
significant injury would ignore this teaching and place protection
from injury, instead of protection from wanton force, at the hub of
the Eighth Amendment.” Id.; see also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102,
108 (3d Cir. 2000); Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 771 (3d Cir.
1979). In each case, courts must examine the necessity of the force
in addition to the extent of the injury to determine whether the force
was used maliciously to cause harm. See Smith, 293 F.3d at 649 (“[D]e
minimis injuries do not necessarily establish de minimis force.”).
According to MCCC policy, when it is necessary to use force to
control inmates, the minimum force possible will be used.
(Certification of Bearden, ¶ 7.) The MCCC utilizes a “Use of Force
Continuum” reactive to the inmate’s actions. (Id.) Readily
identifiable “codes” are used to aid staff when problems arise (Id.).
On the day in question, officers responded to Code 1 (anticipation
of problem developing and alerting officers to standby)
(Certification of Fioravanti, ¶ 7). When Plaintiff refused to return
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the typewriter ribbon and threatened officers, the code system
escalated to Code 6 (need assistance). (Id.). During the incident
in question, after Code 6 was called, the officers entered
Plaintiff’s cell, handcuffed him, and removed the typewriter ribbon.
(Id.).
Plaintiff states in his Declaration that he was “put in a choke
hold . . . and [they] held my hands and stepped on both of my feet
with their boots.” He further states that he was “placed in leg
shackles and handcuffed

. . . behind the back, and then walked .

. . to the infirmary.” (Plaintiff’s Declaration, Docket Item 232,
p. 4).
Here, according to the record provided, the Court finds that
even assuming Plaintiff’s version of the facts, that while force was
used, as a matter of law there was no excessive use of force to violate
the Constitution. The record reflects that the policies and
procedures of MCCC were appropriately carried out, and considering
Plaintiff’s reaction to the officers and Plaintiff’s history as a
volatile inmate, the officers acted appropriately in restraining
Plaintiff. The certifications of the various officers involved in
the incident support this conclusion. See Certification of Ellis,
Docket Item 219-5 at ¶ 6; Certification of Bearden, Docket Item 219-6
at ¶ 8; Certification of Wilke, Docket Item 219-8 at ¶ 6;
Certification of Williams, Docket Item 219-9 at ¶ 6; Certification
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of Fioravanti, Docket Item 219-7 at ¶ 6. Further, this Court finds
that, in accordance with the law cited above, in examining the
necessity of the force and extent of force used, the force was not
used “maliciously” or “sadistically” to cause harm; rather, no
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the officers responded
unreasonably given the severity of the situation.
This Court finds that in the context of Plaintiff’s claim
alleging use of excessive force, there are no genuine issues of
material fact as to what occurred on December 12, 2009. The precise
time when Plaintiff finished his typing during recreation period is
immaterial to this claim. Plaintiff’s assertion that “a pretextual
disturbance was staged to justify attacking Prall and false reports
were written to cover up the incident . . . . establishes that force
was applied maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm” is a conclusory allegation unsupported by the record.
(See Plaintiff’s Brief, Docket Item 232, p. 6). Summary judgment must
be granted to the County Defendants on this claim.
2.

Medical Care Claims

Where the claim is one alleging the failure to provide medical
care, as alleged by Plaintiff here, the core inquiry is whether the
defendants' actions constituted “deliberate indifference” to an
inmate's serious medical needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
Deliberate indifference is shown if a defendant “intentionally
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den[ies] or delay[s] access to medical care or intentionally
interfere[es] with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104–05.
Furthermore, deliberate indifference can be manifested by
“persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of
permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir.
1990). Moreover, “[s]hort of absolute denial, if necessary medical
treatment is ... delayed for non-medical reasons, a case of
deliberate indifference has been made out.” Monmouth Cnty. Corr.
Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 1987)
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). A medical need is serious if it “has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or ... so obvious that a lay person
would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). However, “[a]llegations of
medical malpractice or mere disagreement as to the proper medical
treatment are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”
Szemple v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry, 451 F. App’x 187, 191 (3d Cir.
2011) (citing Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004)).
In this case, it is undisputed that Plaintiff was taken to the
medical department after the incident. Plaintiff admits this fact
in the Declaration attached to his motion (Docket Item 232,
Declaration, pp. 4-5). However, while the record reflects that
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Plaintiff had no complaints of medical issues at the medical
department, Plaintiff alleges that he complained of pain and soreness
to his body, a loud ringing in his ear, and extreme weakness (Id.
at p. 5), but that medical records were falsified to cover up his
complaints (Id. at pp. 6-7).
Despite Plaintiff’s allegation that he did complain of medical
issues after the incident, this Court finds that this does not warrant
a material fact in order to preclude summary judgment. It is
well-established that a mere “scintilla of evidence,” without more,
will not give rise to a genuine dispute for trial. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
Further, a court does not have to adopt the version of facts
asserted by the nonmoving party if those facts are “utterly
discredited by the record [so] that no reasonable jury” could believe
them. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 373, 380 (2007). In the face of
such evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate “where the
record ... could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
nonmoving party....” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Here, the record provided demonstrates proof after proof that
Plaintiff was taken to medical, examined, and cleared by medical
staff with no signs of injury. See Certification of Wilke, Docket
Item 219-8, ¶ 8; Certification of Williams, Docket Item 219-9, ¶ 8;
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Certification of Bearden, Docket Item 219-6, ¶ 11; Certification of
Fioravanti, Docket Item 219-7, ¶ 7; Certification of Ellis, Docket
Item 219-5, ¶ 9. In addition, the certification of medical staff,
which attaches Plaintiff’s medical records, demonstrates that
Plaintiff did not have any medical complaints after the incident.
See Certification of Nurse Polyak, Docket Item 222 (stating at ¶ 5:
“Plaintiff made no indication that he had any medical need, request,
or complaint of pain/injury whatsoever. Specifically, Plaintiff did
not complain of any muscle pain, head injury, or ringing in his
ear(s).” And stating at ¶ 6: “Based upon my examination, Plaintiff
had no obvious, outward sign of injury.” And providing medical
records at Exhibit A).
Even assuming that Plaintiff made the complaints as he suggests
in his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff’s medical care claim
would fail, as the evidence in the record (and to some extent,
Plaintiff’s own admission) demonstrates that he was seen in medical
and examined and cleared. Had Plaintiff made the complaints that he
asserts concerning his medical care, his allegation of improper care
still does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation under
the Eighth Amendment. At most, Plaintiff’s allegations would suggest
only his personal dissatisfaction with the level of medical care,
which is not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)(describing deliberate difference
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as “somewhere between the poles of negligence at one end and purpose
or knowledge at the other”); Christy v. Robinson, 216 F. Supp.2d 398,
413-14 (D.N.J. 2002)(stating that courts “will generally not find
deliberate indifference when some level of medical care has been
offered to the inmate”); Andrews v. Camden County, 95 F. Supp.2d 217,
228 (D.N.J. 2000)(stating a prisoner’s subjective dissatisfaction
with his medical care does not in itself indicate deliberate
indifference).
Therefore, this Court finds no material facts in dispute and
holds that as a matter of Eighth Amendment law, there is no triable
issue concerning Plaintiff’s medical care claim. Summary judgment
must be granted to the County Defendants on this claim.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the County Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (Docket Item 219) is granted, and Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment (Docket Item 232) is denied. An appropriate
Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
Date

March 25, 2014

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