PRALL v. BOCCHINI et al
Filing
356
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/23/2016. (dmr)(n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
TORMU E. PRALL,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 10-1228 (JBS-KMW)
v.
JOSEPH L. BOCCHINI, JR., et
al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
TORMU E. PRALL
700294B/650739
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Plaintiff Pro Se
ALEX ZOWIN, ESQ.
STATE OF NEW JERSEY OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
25 Market Street, P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Attorney for Defendants Jimmy Barnes, J. Dominguez, James
Drumm, Chris Holmes, J. Ilardi, Suzanne Lawrence, Officer
McNair, Officer Moura, William J. Moleins, Kenneth Nelsen,
Ruben Ortiz, Michelle R. Ricci, Charles Warren, and
Sergeant Lindsey
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of
Defendants Jimmy Barnes, J. Dominguez, James Drumm, Chris
Holmes, J. Ilardi, Suzanne Lawrence, Officer McNair, Officer
Moura, William J. Moleins, Kenneth Nelsen, Ruben Ortiz, Michelle
R. Ricci, Charles Warren, and Sergeant Lindsey’s (“Defendants”)
for Summary Judgment on the final remaining claims of the
complaint. Docket Entry 354. Pro se Plaintiff Tormu E. Prall did
not file any opposition to the motion. The motion is being
considered on the papers pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b), and
shall be granted for the reasons set forth below.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural History
Plaintiff, a prisoner at New Jersey State Prison (“NJSP”),
filed a civil complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on or about
March 8, 2010. Complaint, Docket Entry 1. Since that time,
several defendants and claims have been added and dismissed, the
complete history of which is set forth in detail in this Court’s
prior opinions and orders. The history relevant to the instant
motion is set forth below.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 10, 2012, NJSP Officers
Ilardi and McNair, Sergeant Lindsey, and two unknown officers
forced Plaintiff to perform oral sex on them. Motion for
Injunction, Docket Entry 81 ¶ 1. He also alleged Officer
Dominguez and one of the unknown officers “ransacked”
Plaintiff’s cell and threw away or confiscated Plaintiff’s legal
documents related to this case before the sexual assault
occurred, leaving Plaintiff’s cell in a “shambles.” Id. ¶ 2.
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Plaintiff further alleged that Sergeant Gilmartin and other
unknown custody supervisors failed to contact the Special
Investigation Division (“SID”) about the incident, failed to
summon medical staff to provide medical treatment for Plaintiff,
and failed to prevent the officers under their command and
control from starving Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 3.
Plaintiff alleged in a later motion that the investigation
conducted by SID was a “sham,” and that the SID officers told
him that nothing would come of his allegations of sexual
assault. Declaration in Support of Motion, Docket Entry 84 ¶ 4.
He also alleged that Disciplinary Hearing Officer C. Ralph
approached his cell on March 13, 2012, and told him that she was
present to find Plaintiff guilty on disciplinary charges.
Plaintiff replied that he had never been served with
disciplinary charges, at which time she allegedly told Plaintiff
that “her good friends Michelle R. Ricci, William J. Moleins,
Chris Holmes, James Drumm, Ron Wagner, James Keil, Captain
Ortiz, Prison Administrator Charles Warren, Education Supervisor
Shirley Stephens, Social Worker Crystal Raupp, School Teacher
Ishmael, Mental Health Doctor Flora J. Defilippo, and her good
friends” in the Attorney General’s Office “asked her to sanction
[Plaintiff] to administrative segregation.” Id. ¶¶ 5-6. He then
stated Officer Dominguez and two unknown officers came to his
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cell, beat him, made him ingest hallucinating drugs, and again
forced him to perform oral sex on them. Id. ¶ 8.
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint
(“SAC”) without leave of court. SAC, Docket Entry 135. Plaintiff
attempted to re-introduce claims that were previously dismissed,
add new parties, and add new claims regarding his allegations of
physical abuse. The new claims included the allegations that on
March 10, 2012, Officers Dominguez and Moura ransacked his cell,
followed by Sergeant Lindsey, Officer McNair, Officer Ilardi and
two unknown correctional officers forced Plaintiff to perform
oral sex on them. Id. ¶ 123. Plaintiff further alleged that
Officers Dominguez, Moura, and Ilardi, as well as Sergeant
Gilmartin and unknown nurses and custody supervisors, refused to
provide Plaintiff medical treatment and covered up the incident
until it was reported to the SID on March 11, 2012. Id.
Plaintiff also raised a retaliation claim, asserting he received
disciplinary sanctions at the direction of defendants Holmes,
Ricci, Barnes, Moleins, Warren, Nelsen, Lawrence, and
unidentified Attorney General staff in order to punish him for
pursuing this litigation. Id. ¶ 124.
This Court permitted portions of the second amended
complaint to proceed and directed the DOC and newly-added
defendants to respond to Plaintiff’s new allegations of physical
and sexual abuse, denial of medical care, and retaliation.
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December 21, 2012 Order, Docket Entry 164. On December 26, 2012,
this Court partially granted a previously-filed motion for
summary judgment and dismissed all claims against the DOC
Defendants except the newly added physical and sexual abuse,
denial of medical care, and retaliation charges. December 26,
2012 Order, Docket Entry 167.
Throughout this litigation, Plaintiff sought to obtain
access to the footage of the video taken outside of his cell on
March 10, 2012. After being informed the video could not be
produced as it had been overwritten, Plaintiff filed a motion
for sanctions against all defendants. Docket Entry 241 at 3.
Magistrate Judge Karen M. Williams granted Plaintiff’s motions
for sanctions in the form of an adverse jury inference, Docket
Entry 280, and Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration on
June 26, 2014, Docket Entry 285. While the motion for
reconsideration was pending, Defendants filed motions for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of physical and sexual
abuse. Docket Entry 298. The Court denied the motion for summary
judgment as Defendants were subject to the spoliation inference
at the time; however, the Court granted leave to refile the
motion in the event Magistrate Judge Williams granted the motion
for reconsideration. Slip Opinion, Docket Entry 317 at 37-38.
Magistrate Judge Williams ultimately granted the motion for
reconsideration on September 14, 2015. Docket Entry 336.
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Shortly thereafter, Defendants refiled their motion for
summary judgment on the physical and sexual abuse claims. Docket
Entry 339. Plaintiff filed opposition to the motion. Docket
Entry 345. The Court granted the motion on March 29, 2016.
Docket Entry 349. On March 31, 2016, the DOC Defendants
requested permission to file a motion for summary judgment on
the only remaining claims: denial of medical care and
retaliation. Docket Entry 351. The Court granted the request,
and the instant motion was filed on April 8, 2016, Docket Entry
354. Plaintiff did not file opposition to the motion for summary
judgment.
B. Statement of Facts
1.
Allegations in Pleadings
In the sole remaining claims from Plaintiff’s second
amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts that on March 10, 2012, the
DOC Defendants refused to provide Plaintiff medical treatment
after the alleged physical and sexual assault. SAC ¶ 123.
Plaintiff also alleges he received disciplinary sanctions in
retaliation for pursuing this litigation. Id. ¶ 124. He stated
Hearing Officer Ralph informed him that her friends “Holmes,
Ricci, Barnes, Moleins, Warren, Nelsen, Lawrence, and Attorney
General staff” asked her to sanction Plaintiff because he was
pursuing this litigation. Id.
2. Defendants’ Statement of Material Facts
6
On March 10, 2012, Officer Dominguez ordered Plaintiff to
return to his cell after using the shower. Defendants’ Statement
of Material Facts (“DSOF”), Docket Entry 354-2 ¶ 3. Plaintiff
twice refused to comply, but eventually did return to his cell.
Id. ¶¶ 3-4. When he arrived at his cell, however, he placed a
jar of Vaseline in between the cell door and door-jamb,
preventing the door from closing and locking. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. He
refused to remove it, and Officer Dominguez called for
assistance from his supervisor, Sergeant Lindsey. Id. ¶ 7.
Sergeant Lindsey responded to the scene along with Officers
McNair and DiMichele, and directed Plaintiff to remove the jar;
Plaintiff refused. Id. ¶¶ 8-9; Defendants’ Exhibit D, Docket
Entry 354-7 at 10. The officers then ordered Plaintiff to leave
his cell. DSOF ¶ 10. Plaintiff exited the cell, and the officers
proceeded to inventory the cell before requesting permission to
place him on pre-hearing detention (“PHD”) status. Id. ¶¶ 11-12.
Lieutenant Mendez initially approved the request, and
Administrator Warren later also approved the request via
telephone. Id. ¶ 12; Exhibit D at 9-10. Sergeant Gilmartin
delivered a copy of the disciplinary charges to Plaintiff the
next day. DSOF ¶ 18; Exhibit D at 3; Plaintiff’s Deposition
Transcript, Defendants’ Exhibit B, Docket Entry 345-5 at 83:1824, 84:16-17.
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Nurse Carol Milroy attempted to evaluate Plaintiff prior to
his placement in PHD on March 10; however, Plaintiff refused to
be evaluated. DSOF ¶¶ 13-14; Exhibit D at 14. She did a visual
inspection and saw no visible injuries. DSOF ¶¶ 15-16. Plaintiff
was strip-searched and returned to his cell. Id. ¶ 17; Exhibit D
at 25-27. She evaluated Plaintiff again on March 11. DSOF ¶ 19;
Defendants’ Exhibit C. Plaintiff denied any physical injuries at
that time, and Nurse Milroy did not observe any. DSOF ¶ 20;
Exhibit C at 2-4.
Hearing Officer Ralph conducted Plaintiff’s disciplinary
hearing on March 13, 2012. DSOF ¶ 21; Exhibit D at 5. Plaintiff
denied placing the jar in the doorway, but she determined
Plaintiff was guilty of tampering with or blocking any locking
device, prohibited act *.154; and refusing to obey an order of a
staff member, prohibited act .256. DSOF ¶ 22; Exhibit D at 5-7;
21-23. Plaintiff was sanctioned with 15 days in detention, 90
days in administrative segregation, 60 days loss of commutation
time, and 15 days loss of recreation privileges. Exhibit D at
40. Plaintiff appealed the determination on March 15, 2012, and
the decision was affirmed on March 31, 2012. DSOF ¶¶ 23-24;
Exhibit D at 34-39. Plaintiff did not ask the New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division to review the charges or
sanctions. DSOF ¶ 25.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). A dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving
party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome
of the suit under the applicable rule of law, and disputes over
irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of
summary judgment. Id.
The non-moving party “need not match, item for item, each
piece of evidence proffered by the movant, but must simply
present more than a mere scintilla of evidence on which a jury
could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Boyle v. Cnty.
of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). “Where the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for
the nonmoving party,” no genuine issue for trial exists and
summary judgment shall be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (internal
citation omitted). The Court will view any evidence in favor of
the nonmoving party and extend any reasonable favorable
9
inferences to be drawn from that evidence to that party. See
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007).
DISCUSSION
Defendants are moving for summary judgment on the final
remaining claims of the SAC: denial of medical care and
retaliation. Plaintiff, proceeding in this case pro se, has not
filed any opposition to the instant motion. Plaintiff's failure
to respond “is not alone a sufficient basis for the entry of a
summary judgment.” See Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd.
of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 1990). The Court must
still determine whether granting summary judgment is
appropriate. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(3) (“If a party fails
to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly
address another party's assertion of fact ... the court may
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials
... show that the movant is entitled to it.”). The Court does,
however, deem Defendants' facts undisputed for the purposes of
this motion. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2); Local Civ. R. 56.1(a).
A. Denial of Medical Care
Plaintiff alleges he was denied medical care after the
alleged physical and sexual assault on March 10, 2012.1 As a
1
Although Plaintiff claimed another assault occurred on or about
March 13, 2012, the SAC only alleges he was denied medical care
between the March 10 assault and the reporting of the assault to
SID on March 11. SAC ¶ 123.
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convicted and sentenced prisoner, Plaintiff’s right to adequate
medical care is protected by the Eighth Amendment.
In order to show a violation of the Eighth Amendment,
Plaintiff must demonstrate (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior on the part of prison officials that constitutes
deliberate indifference to that need. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003). Deliberate indifference is more
than mere negligence, and may be found where the prison official
(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) intentionally delays
necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or
(3) deliberately prevents a prisoner from receiving needed
medical treatment. See Pierce v. Pitkins, 520 F. App’x 64, 66
(3d Cir. 2013) (citing Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
In support of their motion for summary judgment, Defendants
have submitted portions of Plaintiff’s medical records from the
relevant time period. Exhibit C. Nurse Milroy’s notes indicate
she was called to Plaintiff’s cell to perform a medical
evaluation on March 10, 2012. Id. at 8. According to the report,
she observed Plaintiff standing fully-dressed in the shower area
with no apparent physical injuries. Id. As he was being removed
from the shower area, Plaintiff stated that he did not want to
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be evaluated by medical. Id. Nurse Milroy asked if he was
refusing to speak with her, and Plaintiff answered “yes.” Id.
When asked if he had any injuries, Plaintiff responded “‘[Y]es,
I have significant [injuries] to which I want to discuss later
without DOC here.’” Id. She told Plaintiff now was the time to
speak with her, and Plaintiff reiterated he would talk about it
“‘later.’” Id.
The records also reflect Nurse Milroy evaluated Plaintiff
in the medical clinic on March 11, 2012. Id. at 2-4. According
to her report, Plaintiff “ambulated without incident, denies any
physical injury at this time. [T]his writer did not see any
visible injuries on the [Plaintiff].” Id. at 4. According to the
report, Plaintiff did not clarify his previous remarks about
injuries or indicate he still had concerns that he wanted to
discuss at a later point in time. Id.
Based on the record before the Court, no reasonable jury
could conclude Defendants were deliberately indifferent to any
serious medical need. Even assuming for summary judgment
purposes that Plaintiff had a serious medical need on March 10,
2012, there is no support for the allegation that Defendants
intentionally refused to provide treatment, intentionally
delayed treatment, or deliberately prevented Plaintiff from
receiving needed medical treatment. See Pierce, 520 F. App’x at
66. The undisputed evidence before the Court indicates Nurse
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Milroy attempted to evaluate Plaintiff prior to him being placed
on PHD status on March 10, 2012, but he refused to be evaluated
at that point in time. Exhibit C at 8. Although he stated he was
injured and would talk about it “later,” id., the evidence
before the Court indicates he did not discuss his alleged
injuries with Nurse Milroy when he went to the clinic the next
day, id. at 4. In fact, he denied being injured at all. Id.
The record before the Court indicates a medical
professional spoke with Plaintiff twice within the relevant
period of time, and Plaintiff either refused to be treated or
denied anything was wrong. There is no support in the record for
Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants did anything to prevent
Plaintiff from receiving medical care other than Plaintiff’s
self-serving interrogatory answers. See Interrogatories,
Defendants’ Exhibit A, Docket Entry 354-4 ¶ 2. Even the
interrogatory answers are conclusory and lack any specific facts
as to how Defendants acted unconstitutionally. In the absence of
further support, those vague, conclusory statements are
insufficient to create an issue for trial. See Gonzalez v. Sec'y
of Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 678 F.3d 254, 263 (3d Cir. 2012);
United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185 (3d Cir.
2011)(noting that once moving party carries initial burden, “the
nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial” (internal citations and
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quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original)). As Plaintiff
has not submitted any evidence to this Court to contradict
Defendants’ evidence, no reasonable jury could find in his
favor, and Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
B. Retaliation
Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim as it is barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and its progeny. As a verdict in
Plaintiff’s favor on this claim would necessarily call into
question the validity of the disciplinary charges, Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment.
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that before a § 1983
plaintiff may “recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions
whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid,” he must first “prove that the conviction or sentence
has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a federal court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Id. at 486-87. The Court
extended the holding to prison disciplinary proceedings in
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997).
To succeed on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must prove
that Defendants filed disciplinary charges against him because
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of Plaintiff’s lawsuits against prison officials, not because he
actually refused to obey an order and prevented his door from
locking. He alleges Hearing Officer Ralph informed him that she
was going to impose sanctions on him not because he was guilty,
but because Defendants told her to. SAC ¶ 124. “The due process
requirements for a prison disciplinary hearing are in many
respects less demanding than those for criminal prosecution, but
they are not so lax as to let stand the decision of a biased
hearing officer . . . .” Edwards, 520 U.S. at 647. Were
Plaintiff to succeed on this claim, the validity of the
disciplinary proceedings are necessarily called into question.
Under Heck and Edwards, Plaintiff may not proceed on this claim
unless and until his disciplinary charges have been overturned.
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment is granted, and the second amended complaint
will be dismissed. An accompanying Order will be entered.
June 23, 2016
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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