FLORES v. PREDCO SERVICES CORP et al
Filing
63
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 11/28/2012. (dmr)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
LUIS BELTRAN FLORES,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10-1320 RMB/AMD
v.
PREDCO SERVICES CORP., et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
Appearances:
Louis J. Devoto
Rossetti & Devoto, PC
20 Brace Road, Suite 115
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Kevin G. Dronson
Kent & McBride, P.C.
1040 King Highway North, Suite 600
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
-andWilliam R. Moye
Thompson, Coe, Cousins & Irons, L.L.P.
One Riverway, Suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77056
Attorneys for Defendants
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
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This matter requires the Court to decide, in essence,
whether the sins of an attorney should be visited upon his
client.
Here, those sins are the disturbing criminal conduct of
Plaintiff’s counsel, Ray Marchan (“Marchan”), who was convicted
of bribing former Texas state court judge Abel Limas (“Limas”).
Complicating this matter is the fact that this Court previously
relied upon Marchan’s conduct before Limas in denying Defendants’
prior motion to dismiss and allowing the case to proceed.
Defendants DVCC Services Corporation and McElroy Machine &
Manufacturing Company (“Defendants”) contend that Marchan’s
criminal conviction calls this Court’s prior ruling into question
and have moved for reconsideration [Docket No. 45] of this
Court’s prior Opinion and Order denying Defendants’ motion to
dismiss [Docket Nos. 15, 16].
For the reasons that follow, this
Court concludes that Plaintiff’s counsel’s criminal should not be
visited upon Plaintiff and that counsel’s conduct does not
warrant reversal of this Court’s prior Opinion and Order.
I.
Background
A brief recitation of the facts is appropriate.
On January
3, 2007 Plaintiff Luis Beltran Flores (“Plaintiff”), represented
by Marchan, filed suit in Texas state court based on injuries he
suffered while working as a seaman in the Gulf of Mexico specifically the loss of most of his right arm. Almost a year
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later, on December 17, 2007, Plaintiff amended his initial
complaint to add claims against the Defendants.
The Defendants
moved for dismissal on February 5, 2008 based on lack of personal
jurisdiction.
That motion was denied by trial court Judge Limas
on August 7, 2008.
However, Defendants appealed Judge Limas’
decision and, on February 11, 2010, the Texas Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court.
It found that, contrary to Judge
Limas’ decision, the Texas court lacked personal jurisdiction
over the Defendants, resulting in dismissal of Defendants from
the case.
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on March 12, 2010.
On
August 27, 2010, Defendants moved to dismiss arguing that
Plaintiff’s claims were time-barred.
In an Opinion and Order
dated March 11, 2011, this Court concluded otherwise.
The Court
found that, although Plaintiff had failed to file this action
within the three-year statute of limitations, as required, that
failure was excused.
The Court held that the statute of
limitations was equitably tolled by Plaintiff’s prior timely, but
mistaken, filing of the claims asserted here in Texas state
court.
It held that Plaintiff’s filing, and maintenance of the
action, in Texas was reasonable, in large part, because Plaintiff
reasonably relied on the decision of the Texas trial court judge,
former judge Limas, who had found that the court had personal
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jurisdiction over the Defendants.
On March 18, 2011, Defendants moved for reconsideration of
the Court’s Opinion and Order.
denied.
On July 29, 2011, that motion was
On January 27, 2012, Defendants filed a second motion
for reconsideration based on its discovery of new evidence, not
previously presented to this Court, of a criminal and corrupt
relationship between Marchan and Limas. At that time, Defendants
informed the Court that Limas had pled guilty to accepting bribes
from attorneys and that Marchan had been indicted by a federal
grand jury for bribing Limas.
Defendants’ reconsideration motion, and this matter, were
administratively terminated, on April 3, 2012, to allow for the
conclusion of criminal proceedings against Marchan and, at the
conclusion of those proceedings, further briefing.1
A jury
subsequently convicted Marchan of bribing Limas during the time
period in which Limas ruled in favor of Plaintiff on personal
jurisdiction.
Notably, however, there is no evidence before this
Court that: (1) Limas accepted bribes in connection with
Plaintiff’s claims; or (2) that Plaintiff himself knew of, and/or
participated in, Marchan’s corrupt relationship with Limas.
II. Standard
1
The motion, and this matter, are now RESTORED to the
calendar.
4
Because Defendants’ motion for reconsideration was filed on
January 27, 2012, over 14 days after this Court’s initial Opinion
and Order of March 11, 2011, and because it is based on newly
discovered evidence, this Court construes it as a motion for
relief from an order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
and not as a motion for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule
7.1. Porro, Jr. v. New Jersey Meadowlands Commission, 163 F.
App’x 154, 156 (3d Cir. 2006)(construing motion for
reconsideration as one under Rule 60(b), which authorizes
reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence for up to one
year after an order); Stroud v. Boorstein, No. 10-3355, 2012 WL
309631, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 31, 2012)(construing motion for
reconsideration as one under 60(b), where it was made more than
14 days after dismissal order, in light of Local Rule 7.1, which
provides for 14 days for motions for reconsideration); Smith v.
Ruzzo, No. 07-450, 2009 WL 349162, at *2 n. 1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9,
2009)construing motion for reconsideration as one under 60(b)
where it was made more than 10 days after order, in light of 10
days time limit provided by local rule for motions for
reconsideration); Local Civil Rule 7.1 (providing for 14 days for
motions for reconsideration).
While Rule 60(b) allows for
reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence (F.R.C.P.
60(b)), as claimed here, it “is a provision for extraordinary
5
relief and may be raised only upon a showing of exceptional
circumstances.”
Mendez v. Sullivan, No. 12-1821, 2012 WL
2899313, at *2 (3d Cir. July 17, 2012).
III. Analysis
Defendants contend that, in light of the newly discovered
evidence described above, Plaintiff’s reliance on Limas’ decision
was unreasonable and, therefore, Plaintiff failed to exercise
reasonable diligence in pursuing his claims, as required for
equitable tolling, and reconsideration is warranted. Holland v.
Florida, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2565 (2010)(holding that equitable
tolling requires the exercise of reasonable diligence).
Court agrees with Defendants to an extent.
This
A corrupt
relationship between counsel and a judge fatally undermines any
claims of reasonable reliance, by counsel, on decisions by the
judge in question.
This is true even where, as here, there is no
evidence that the corrupt relationship played a role in the
outcome in question.
A corrupt relationship between a judge and
an attorney broadly contaminates the propriety of a judge’s
decisions with respect to matters involving the attorney and the
reasonableness of the attorney’s reliance on those decisions.
This Court nonetheless parts company with the Defendants’
ultimate conclusion - that equitable tolling is unwarranted - for
two reasons.
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A.
Equitable Tolling Based On Plaintiff’s Mistaken Filing
in Texas Continues To Be Warranted.
First, equitable tolling continues to be warranted based on
Plaintiff’s mistaken filing in Texas because Marchan’s criminal
misconduct does not undermine the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s
conduct, as claimed by Defendants.
In the analogous attorney negligence misconduct context, the
Supreme Court has recognized that serious attorney misconduct
that amounted to abandonment would warrant tolling.
S.Ct. at 2564.
Holland, 130
The Supreme Court reasoned that “[c]ommon sense
dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively
responsible for the conduct of an attorney who is not operating
as his agent in any meaningful sense of the word.”
Maples v.
Thomas, 132 S.Ct. 912, 923 (2012)(citing and quoting Holland, 130
S.Ct. at 2568).
The same logic and common sense dictate the result here.
Absent evidence that Plaintiff was aware of Marchan’s criminal
misdeeds, and there is no evidence of that here, Marchan cannot
be said to have been acting as Plaintiff’s agent with respect to
Marchan’s criminal misconduct and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot be
held constructively responsible for Marchan’s misconduct.
Accordingly, while it would have been unreasonable and
inexcusable for Marchan to rely on Limas’ decision, it would not
undermine the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s own reliance on it.
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B.
Equitable Tolling Is Independently Warranted Based On
Marchan’s Misconduct.
Second, in addition to equitable tolling being warranted
based on Plaintiff’s mistaken filing in Texas, it would also be
warranted based on Marchan’s criminal misconduct.
Though there are no “mechanical rules” in determining
whether equitable tolling is warranted, and courts must instead
be flexible to ensure that they do equity under the particular
circumstance, generally, equitable tolling requires that the
plaintiff demonstrate “two elements: (1) that he has been
pursuing his right diligently, and (2) that extraordinary
circumstances stood in his way.” Pabon v. Mahanoy, 653 F.3d 385,
399 (3d Cir. 2011); Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2566 (quotation and
citation omitted)(Alito, J., concurring).
In assessing the
former, “[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes
is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.”
Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2565 (quotation and citation omitted).
Here, both elements necessary for equitable tolling are met.
First, this Court previously found that Plaintiff pursued his
rights with reasonable diligence and, as discussed above,
Defendants’ new evidence does not disturb this conclusion.
Second, it must be the case that Marchan’s criminal misconduct
would qualify as an extraordinary circumstance based on
applicable legal precedent and the facts here. Legally, the
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Supreme Court has previously recognized that even negligent
attorney misconduct may constitute an extraordinary circumstance
warranting equitable tolling. Id. at 2564 (2010)(holding that
serious negligent attorney misconduct may be an appropriate basis
for equitable tolling).
Given that serious negligent conduct may
qualify as extraordinary circumstances, and the Court’s mandate
to do equity, it logically follows that serious criminal attorney
misconduct could, and indeed should, also qualify as an
extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling.
Factually, but for Marchan’s corrupt relationship with Limas,
there is no question it would have been reasonable for Plaintiff
to rely on Limas’ decision.
IV. Conclusion
For all these reasons, Defendants’ motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated:
November 28, 2012
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