INGRAM v. ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY

Filing 7

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/23/11. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
v.
:
:
ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FAC. :
:
Defendant.
:
:
SELLERS INGRAM,

Civil No. 10-1375 (NLH)
OPINION

APPEARANCES:
SELLERS INGRAM, #01-181075, Plaintiff Pro Se
New Jersey State Prison
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
HILLMAN, District Judge:
Sellers Ingram, a prisoner who was formerly incarcerated at
Atlantic County Justice Facility (“ACJF”), filed a Complaint
without prepayment of the filing fee.1

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

This Court dismissed the federal claims and declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, but granted leave to file an amended
complaint.

Plaintiff timely filed an Amended Complaint under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against Joseph Bondinsky, Warden of ACJF.

This

Court will dismiss the Amended Complaint without prejudice to the
filing of a final amended complaint.

1

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at New Jersey State
Prison. See N.J. Dept. of Corrections, Inmate Locator,
https://www6.state.nj.us/DOC_Inmate/details?x=1023993&n=0 (July
26, 2010).

I.

BACKGROUND

The sole defendant in the original Complaint was ACJF, which
this Court construed as the County of Atlantic County.

This

Court dismissed the Complaint because Plaintiff did not allege
facts showing that a custom or policy of Atlantic County caused
violation of his constitutional rights.

See Monell v. Dept. of

Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978);
McTernan c. City of York, Pa., 564 F. 3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009).
The Amended Complaint names the Warden of ACJF.

Plaintiff

asserts the following facts:
Three points are presented in this amended
complaint: (1) law library access by design
of Administrator A.C.J.F. falls below
standard of N.J. State law 10A:31-15.1 N.J.
Administrative code; (2) Menu falls below
standard outlined 10:31-10.1 and 10.3 and
10.5 serving meals and 10.12(b) budgeting
purchase; (3) sanitation standard pursuant to
10:31-11.3 N.J.A.C. is not in effect at
A.C.J.F., if schedules and checklist are
provided they are erroneous/fictitious
documents.
Facts in support of points, supra
(1) A.C.J.F.’s legal access is fill out
request form for legal reference material
with social worker “untrained in law” who
forwards to another civilian employee with
the moniker “Westlaw” who is also “untrained
in law” but finds material on Website.
Rendering criminal defendant helpless against
the time constraints of adjudication process
to provide effective defense or to know how
to assess whether court appointed attorney
has provided effective defense. Defendant
does not bare burden of knowing state laws
without legal access to full scope of
2

criminal process which runs the gambit of
N.J. Statutes Annotated 2C section, N.J.
Rules Governing Court, N.J. Rules of
Evidence, N.J. Super, N.J. Reports at the
bare minimum. There is no one in the
facility to instruct an inmate on this
terrai[]n. Also defendant (Administrator)
has used outdated rule to misappropriate
funds pursuant to 10A:31-6.13 N.J.A.C..
Inmates are charged [$].75 per page for
copies . . . . Clear abdication of law by
Administrator (Joseph Bondinsky) and
appointed personal accounting (fiscal). Who
has the money? Has a crime taken place?
When will said money be reimbursed? How long
and how many have been victimized? Court
access is mandated by the United States
Constitution . . .
(2) Menu is not calorie constructed by
standards of National Academy of Sciences
with recommended daily allowance. Pursuant
to 3 points, supra. See 10A:31-10.3(d)
special diets not receiving supplement of
equal nutritional value. How can I an inmate
prove this to you in a complaint void of the
court mandating evaluation. Question inmates
at large.
(3) Sanitation inspection doesn’t exist in
A.C.J.F.. I concede first and state daily
cleaning supplies provided. No inspection
follows. There is 5 year old fungus on
shower walls. I have never seen them
inspected. A correction officer taking count
does not possess the scientific knowledge for
inspecting standards of federal, state and
local safety & health codes.
(Dkt. 6 at 4-7.)
For violation of his constitutional rights, Plaintiff seeks
injunctive relief and one million dollars in damages.
8.)

3

(Dkt 6 at

II.

STANDARD FOR DISMISSAL

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action
in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a
prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or
entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court
determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), hammered the
“final nail-in-the-coffin” for the “no set of facts” standard set
forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 which was
previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a
claim.

See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.

2009).

The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the

United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009),
where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:

2

The Conley court held that a district court was permitted
to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if “it
appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
4

Two working principles underlie our decision
in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice .
. . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does
not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted).
Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has required district courts
to conduct a three-part analysis when reviewing a complaint for
dismissal for failure to state a claim:

5

To determine the sufficiency of a complaint
under the [Iqbal] pleading regime . . . , a
court must take three steps: First, the
court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court
should identify allegations that, “because
they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at
1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded
factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)
(footnote omitted).
The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se
pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).

This Court applies

this standard even after Iqbal.
III.

DISCUSSION

A court’s initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements
[Plaintiff] must plead” in order to state a claim of liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

See Iqbal, 129 S Ct. at 1947-48.

Section 1983 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law,
6

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two
elements:

(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state
law.
A.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Conditions of Confinement
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that sanitation

at ACJF is inadequate, with “5 year old fungus on shower walls,”
Plaintiff has never seen an inspection by local or state
inspectors, and the “menu is not calorie constructed by standards
of National Academy of Sciences with Recommended Daily
Allowance.”

(Dkt. 6 at 6, 7.)

This Court presumes that

Plaintiff was confined at ACJF as a pretrial detainee and
construes the Amended Complaint as attempting to assert a
conditions of confinement claim under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.3

3

“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with
which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment
without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional
guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537, n.16 (1979) (quoting Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72, n.40 (1977)); see also City of
Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244
(continued...)
7

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
punishment of a pretrial detainee prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law.

See Bell v.

Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d
150, 166 (3d Cir. 2005).

As the Supreme Court explained,

if a particular condition or restriction of
pretrial detention is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective, it does
not, without more, amount to “punishment.”
Conversely, if a restriction or condition is
not reasonably related to a legitimate goal if it is arbitrary or purposeless - a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may
not constitutionally be inflicted upon
detainees qua detainees.
Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 (footnote and citation omitted).
The maintenance of security, internal order, and discipline
are essential goals which at times require “limitation or
retraction of . . . retained constitutional rights.”
U.S. at 546.

Bell, 411

“Restraints that are reasonably related to the

institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not,
without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if
they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee
would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting
trial.”

Id. at 540.

The Fourteenth Amendment standard of

unconstitutional punishment, like the Eighth Amendment’s cruel

3

(...continued)
(1983).
8

and unusual punishments standard, contains both an objective
component and a subjective component:
Unconstitutional punishment typically
includes both objective and subjective
components. As the Supreme Court explained
in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . . .
(1991), the objective component requires an
inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious” and the subjective
component asks whether “the officials act[ed]
with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind[.]” Id. at 298 . . . . The Supreme
Court did not abandon this bipartite analysis
in Bell, but rather allowed for an inference
of mens rea where the restriction is
arbitrary or purposeless, or where the
restriction is excessive, even if it would
accomplish a legitimate governmental
objective.
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F. 3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007).
Under the Due Process Clause, prison officials must satisfy
inmates’ “basic human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety.”
U.S. 25, 32 (1993).

Helling v. McKinney, 509

To satisfy the objective component of a

conditions of confinement claim, a detainee must show that he was
subjected to genuine privation and hardship over an extended
period of time.

See Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (confining pretrial

detainees “in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time might
raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to
whether those conditions amounted to punishment”).

With respect

to diet, the Constitution requires “that prisoners be served

9

‘nutritionally adequate food that is prepared and served under
conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health
and well being of the inmates who consume it’ [and] under certain
circumstances a substantial deprivation of food may well be
recognized as being of constitutional dimension.”

Robles v.

Coughlin, 725 F. 2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (cited with approval in
Lindsey v. O’Connor, 327 Fed. App’x 319, 321 (3d Cir. 2009))
(quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F. 2d 559, 571 (10th Cir. 1980)).
“[A] prisoner’s diet must provide adequate nutrition, but prison
officials cannot be held liable under the [constitutional
standard] unless the prisoner shows both an objectively serious
risk of harm and that the officials knew about it and could have
prevented it but did not.” Mays v. Springborn, 575 F. 3d 643, 648
(7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).4

Objectively, “[w]hether the

deprivation of food falls below this [constitutional] threshold
depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation.”

Berry v.

Brady, 192 F. 3d 504, 507 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Talib v.
Gilley, 138 F. 3d 211, 214 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998)).
The allegations in this Amended Complaint do not satisfy the
objective component of a conditions of confinement claim under §

4

See also Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F. 3d 1210, 1227 (10th
Cir. 2006); Thompson v. Gibson, 289 F. 3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir.
2002); Shrader v. White, 761 F. 2d 975, 986 (4th Cir. 1985).
10

1983.5

Plaintiff alleges that there are no inspections by

outside inspectors, the showers have fungus, and the diet does
not satisfy the recommended daily allowance of the National
Academy of Sciences.

Plaintiff does not specify how long he was

confined at ACJF and, aside from fungus in the showers, Plaintiff
does not describe the allegedly inadequate conditions.

Nor does

Plaintiff describe the diet he was served at ACJF or otherwise
plead facts showing that he suffered the effects of malnutrition.
Plaintiff’s allegations are too conclusory to show that the
deprivation of adequate nutrition had a sufficiently serious
effect on Plaintiff’s health to satisfy the objective component
of the conditions of confinement claim under the Iqbal pleading
standard.6

Plaintiff’s allegations do not satisfy the objective

component because the Amended Complaint does not show that he was
subjected to genuine privation and hardship over an extended
period of time.

See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978)

5

Plaintiff asserts that the conditions of confinement do
not comply with the New Jersey Administrative Code. To the
extent he bases his federal claims on violations of New Jersey
regulations or laws, the claims fail under § 1983. See, e.g.,
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008) (“But the arrest
rules that the officers violated were those of state law alone,
and . . . it is not the province of the Fourth Amendment to
enforce state law”).
6

See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[T]he pleading standard
Rule 8 announces does not require detailed factual allegations,
but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation . . . . Nor does a complaint suffice if it
tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
11

(“the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether
the confinement meets constitutional standards.

A filthy,

overcrowded cell and a diet of ‘grue’ [providing 1000 calories
per day] might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel
for weeks or months”); Hubbard, 538 F. 3d at 235 (triple celling
of pretrial detainees and use of floor mattresses did not violate
Due Process because the inmates “were not subjected to genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time”);
Piskanin v. Hammer, 269 Fed. App’x 159, 162-63 (3d Cir. 2008)
(placement of pretrial detainee on suicide watch for brief six
day period, during which time he could not contact counsel or
file a habeas petition, did not amount to punishment prior to
adjudication of guilt); Foreman v. Lowe, 261 Fed. App’x 401 (3d
Cir. 2008) (detainee’s confinement in maximum security did not
violate due process).

This Court will dismiss this claim without

prejudice to the filing of a second and final amended complaint.7
B.

Access to Courts
Plaintiff complains that legal access is inadequate because

it consists of submitting a written request for legal reference
material to the social worker, who, despite her lack of legal

7

If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint stating a
due process claim, he should include specific facts regarding the
duration and the conditions of confinement. See Pressley v.
Blaine, 352 Fed. App’x 701 (3d Cir. 2009) (In determining whether
a protected liberty interest exists, the court must consider:
(1) the duration of the confinement; and (2) the conditions of
that confinement in relation to other prison conditions).
12

training, attempts to find the material on Westlaw.

This Court

construes these allegations as an attempt to assert a First
Amendment access to courts claim.
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, inmates and
detainees retain a right of access to the courts.

See Lewis v.

Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F. 3d 198,
205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, Stover v. Beard, 129 S. Ct. 1647
(2008).

“Where prisoners assert that defendants’ actions have

inhibited their opportunity to present a past legal claim, they
must show (1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury’ - that they
lost a chance to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying
claim; and (2) that they have no other ‘remedy’ that may be
awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the
present denial of access suit.”

Monroe at 205 (quoting

Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).

“The

complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough
to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must describe
the ‘lost remedy.’” Monroe at 205-206 (quoting Christopher at
416-17).

For example, in Monroe, the Third Circuit affirmed

dismissal of an access to the courts claim for failure to state a
claim:
In this case, the defendants confiscated all
of the plaintiffs’ . . . legal materials,
including their legal briefs, transcripts,
notes of testimony, exhibits, copies of
reference books, treatises, journals, and
personal handwritten notes. In their initial
13

pleadings, the plaintiffs’ claim rested
solely on the ground that the defendants
confiscated their legal materials, contraband
and non-contraband alike. That claim, on its
face, was insufficient to state a claim under
Harbury. So too were their subsequent
amendments, which alleged that they lost the
opportunity to pursue attacks of their
convictions and civil rights claims but did
not specify facts demonstrating that the
claims were nonfrivolous. Nor did they
maintain that they had no other remedy to
compensate them for their lost claims. Even
liberally construing their complaints as we
must do for pro se litigants, they do not
sufficiently allege that they have suffered
actual injury.
Monroe, 536 F. 3d at 206 (citations and footnote omitted).
The Amended Complaint before this Court suffers the same
pleading deficiencies as the complaints in Monroe.

Plaintiff

does not assert facts showing that, due to deficiencies in access
to legal research materials, he lost a non-frivolous legal claim,
and he does not assert facts showing he had no other remedy.
Accordingly, this Court will dismiss the First Amendment access
to courts claim.

See Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J. Dept. of

Law & Public Safety-Div. of State Police, 411 F. 3d 427, 444-45
(3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing denial of access claim for failure to
specify causes of action lost).
C.

Personal Property
Plaintiff complains that officials charge a copying fee of

$0.75 per page when copies should cost only five or seven cents
per page.

The Court construes these allegations a potential

14

claim of deprivation of property without due process of law.
However, this due process property claim fails as a matter of law
because the New Jersey Tort Claims Act (“NJTCA”), N.J. STAT. ANN .
§ 59:1-1 et seq., provides all the process that is due.

The

NJTCA provides an adequate post-deprivation judicial remedy to
persons, including inmates such as Plaintiff, who believe they
were wrongfully deprived of property at the hands of prison or
jail officials.

See Holman v. Hilton, 712 F.2d 854, 857 (3d Cir.

1983); Asquith v. Volunteers of America, 1 F. Supp.2d 405, 419
(D.N.J. 1998), aff'd 186 F.3d 407 (3d Cir. 1999).

Because the

NJTCA is an available post-deprivation remedy providing all the
process which is due, Plaintiff’s due process claim regarding the
loss of money for copying fails and will be dismissed with
prejudice.
D.

Id.

Amendment of Complaint
This Court is dismissing with prejudice the due process

claim for property loss, and Plaintiff will not be granted leave
to file an amended complaint with regard to the copying fees.
However, because Plaintiff may be able to cure the defects in the
conditions of confinement claim and the access to courts claim by
filing an amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this Court
will grant Plaintiff 30 days to file same.8

8

Once an amended complaint is filed, prior versions of the
complaint no longer perform any function in the case and cannot
(continued...)
15

V.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, this Court will dismiss the Amended
Complaint, without prejudice to the filing of a second and final
amended complaint.

/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

August 23 , 2011

At Camden, New Jersey

8

(...continued)
be utilized to cure defects in the amended complaint. See 6
Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d
§ 1476 (1990) (footnotes omitted). This means that Plaintiff
should set forth all factual allegations as to each claim and
defendant in the second amended complaint, if he elects to file
same.
16