ASH v. TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO et al
Filing
35
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 12/18/2012. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[Dkt. Ent. 22]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
PAUL JAMES ASH,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10-1900 (RMB/JS)
v.
TOWNSHIP OF WILLINGBORO, et.
al.
Defendants.
OPINION
Appearances:
Justin Terence Loughry
LOUGHRY & LINDSAY, LLC
330 MARKET STREET
CAMDEN, NJ 08102
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Matthew B. Wieliczko
Michael J. Huntowski
ZELLER & WIELICZKO, LLP
120 HADDONTOWNE COURT
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08034
Attorneys for Defendants
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Defendants Township of Willingboro, Willingboro Director of
Public Safety Gregory Rucker, Willingboro Police Officers Iris
Cedeno (“Cedeno”), Jennifer Knecht (“Knecht”), and Jaime Jimenez
(“Jimenez”) (and collectively, the “Defendants”) have moved for
summary judgment.
For the reasons that follow, that motion is
GRANTED.
I.
Background
A.
Factual
On April 15, 2008, shortly after 8:00 p.m., Plaintiff Paul
James Ash, (“Plaintiff”), parked his car at Willingboro High
School in Willingboro, New Jersey in order to practice hitting
baseballs on the school’s athletic fields as he had done many
times prior to that evening. [Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Pl. Br.”), p. 2].
Cedeno noted Plaintiff’s car in the parking lot, thought it
looked suspicious, and approached to investigate it.
at 3].
Cedeno then activated her overhead lights.
[Pl. Br.
[Id.].
Plaintiff then emerged from his vehicle. [Id.]. According to
Cedeno, she directed Plaintiff to return to his vehicle and,
contrary to that instruction, Plaintiff walked to his trunk and
began removing items from the trunk, including a baseball bat.
[Id.].
In Cedeno’s view, Plaintiff’s conduct constituted a
criminal obstruction of her investigation.
[Transcript of
Deposition of Iris Cedeno (“Cedeno Tr.”) at 87:3-88:10].
According to Cedeno, Plaintiff’s holding of the baseball
bat and failure to follow her instructions caused her to fear
for her safety and, as a result, she called for backup and
directed Plaintiff to get away from the trunk and sit down on
the curb. [Cedeno Tr. at 82:10-14, 88:12-88:14, 97:7-98:23;
Transcript of Deposition of James Ash (“Ash Tr.”) at 53:15-25].
While Plaintiff refused to sit down, he did wait on the curb
standing up.
[Ash Tr. at 56:4-56:14; Cedeno Tr. at 98:19-99:6].
After at least one other Officer had joined Cedeno on the scene,
Plaintiff was arrested and was placed in handcuffs and seated on
the ground. [Cedeno Tr. at 99:20-21, 100:4-101:17].
The parties dispute Cedeno’s motivation for Plaintiff’s
arrest.
Cedeno maintains Plaintiff’s arrest was based on
Plaintiff’s obstruction of her investigation.
102:12-102:19].
[Cedeno Tr. at
Plaintiff claims that it was based on Cedeno’s
mistaken belief that Plaintiff was trespassing, as Cedeno
erroneously believed that the field closed at 8:00 p.m.
[Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment at 9 (“Cedeno, was in effect detaining Ash and
ultimately charging him for ‘trespass’ at 8 p.m. when the posted
signage gave permission to persons such as Mr. Ash to be there
until 10 p.m.”); Cedeno Tr. at 89:20-90:5].
After Plaintiff was arrested, Jimenez and Knecht arrived on
the scene.
[Transcript of Deposition of Jennifer Knect (“Knect
Tr.”) at 14:14-24; Transcript of Deposition of Jaime Jimenez
(“Jimenez Dep.”) at 14:20-22].
The parties dispute whether
Plaintiff then gave Cedeno permission to search the trunk of his
vehicle [Compare Plaintiff’s Response to Statements of Material
Facts by Defendants ¶ 2 with Cedeno Tr. at 104:22-105:5].
It is
undisputed, however, that Jimenez opened the car trunk from the
interior of the vehicle and Cedeno and Knecht conducted a
search. [Jimenez Tr. at 18:14-19:20; Knecht Tr. 17:25 to 23:5].
Ultimately, Cedeno recovered a gun from the trunk interior.
[Knecht Tr. at 23:1-5]. Plaintiff was subsequently charged with
unlawful possession of a weapon on school property, unlawful
transportation of a weapon, obstruction of the administration of
the law, and criminal trespass.
[Defendants’ Statement of
Undisputed Material Facts (“DSUMF”) at ¶ 2].
After consulting with counsel, Plaintiff entered into New
Jersey’s Pre-Trial Intervention program (“PTI”) to resolve the
charges against him.1 [Id. at ¶ 2]. Under the program, defendant
applicants are offered an opportunity to avoid regular
prosecution by accessing rehabilitative services or supervision
before trial. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12.
Plaintiff successfully
completed PTI by performing a number of work hours while
supervised by a probation officer and the charges against him
were dismissed. [DSUMF at ¶¶ 1-4].
B.
This Action
On April 14, 2010 Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court
premised on federal subject matter jurisdiction. [Dkt. Ent. 1].
The Complaint alleges three counts:
1
Plaintiff does not dispute that all of the charges were resolved
through PTI.
(1)
that Plaintiff’s arrest and the subsequent search of
Plaintiff’s vehicle and seizure of his gun violated
his constitutional rights and are actionable pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Compl. Count One];
(2)
that the same conduct violated Plaintiff’s New Jersey
State Constitutional rights [Compl. Count Two]; and
(3)
that Director of Public Safety Gregory Rucker and the
Township of Willingboro, (collectively, the
“Supervisory Defendants”) are federally liable for the
actions of the officers on the scene of the incident,
pursuant to Monell v. N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) (“Monell”), based on their alleged
failure to adequately train and supervise the officers
on the scene of the incident [Compl. Count Three].
Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts on May 11,
2012. [Dkt. Ent. 22].
II.
Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it will “affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law . . . .”
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson
A dispute is
“genuine” if it could lead a “reasonable jury [to] return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. at 248.
When deciding the existence of a genuine dispute of
material fact, a court’s role is not to weigh the evidence: all
reasonable “inferences, doubts, and issues of credibility should
be resolved against the moving party.”
Meyer v. Riegel Products
Corp., 720 F.2d 303, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 1983).
However, a mere
“scintilla of evidence,” without more, will not give rise to a
genuine dispute for trial.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
In the
face of such evidence, summary judgment is still appropriate
“where the record . . . could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party . . . .”
Matsushita Elec.
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
“Summary judgment motions thus require judges to ‘assess how
one-sided evidence is, or what a ‘fair-minded’ jury could
‘reasonably’ decide.’”
Williams v. Borough of West Chester,
Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Anderson, 477
U.S. at 265).
The movant “always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and
identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)).
Then, “when a properly supported motion for summary
judgment [has been] made, the adverse party ‘must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’”
56(e)).
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
The non-movant’s burden is rigorous: it “must point to
concrete evidence in the record”; mere allegations, conclusions,
conjecture, and speculation will not defeat summary judgment.
Orsatti v. New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir.
1995).
III. Discussion
This Court first addresses Plaintiff’s federal claims under
Counts 1 and 3.
It then addresses Plaintiff’s state law claims
under Count 2.
A.
Count 1
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Count 1 Section 1983
claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
This Court agrees.
In Heck, the Supreme Court barred claims under Section 1983
when the claims would amount to a collateral attack on a prior
criminal conviction. 512 U.S. at 481-489. Specifically, absent
proof that “a conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct
appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus,” a Section 1983 claim must be dismissed where it would
imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence. Walke v.
Cullen, No. 12-2153, 2012 WL 2512909, at *2 (3d Cir. July 2,
2012)(citing Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 486-487).
Under Third
Circuit law, completion of a pre-trial intervention program is
equivalent to a “conviction” for purposes of applying Heck.
Fernandez v. City of Elizabeth, No. 11-1294, 2012 WL 867993, at
*4-5 (3d Cir. March 15, 2012)(holding that completion of New
Jersey’s pre-trial intervention program is equivalent to a
conviction for the purposes of Heck analysis); See also Gilles
v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 210 (3d Cir. 2005)(holding that
Pennsylvania’s Accelerated Rehabilitation Disposition program is
analogous to a conviction for the purposes of Heck analysis).
Here, a successful prosecution of Plaintiff’s claims under Count
1 would necessarily imply the invalidity of the charges for
which he completed PTI.
First, a successful Fourth Amendment claim for false
arrest, whatever its motivation, would necessarily imply the
invalidity of Plaintiff’s obstruction and trespass charges, both
of which were conclusively resolved through PTI.
A successful
Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest requires that: (1) there
was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable
cause.
Ferry v. Barry, No. 12-009, 2012 WL 4339454, at *5
(D.N.J. Sept. 19, 2012).
In determining whether probable cause
existed at the time of the arrest, the “arresting officer’s
state of mind” and the charges “actually invoked by the
arresting officer” are irrelevant.
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543
U.S. 146, 153 (2004); Jaegly v. Couch, 459 F.3d 149, 154 (2d
Cir. 2006).
Courts must instead objectively assess whether, at
the time of the arrest and based on the facts known to the
officer, probable cause existed “as to any offense that could be
charged under the circumstances.”
Wright v. City of Phila., 409
F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005); Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42
F.3d 809, 819 (3d Cir. 1994).
Here, because probable cause may
be based on any offense that could be charged under the
circumstance, a successful claim of false arrest would
necessitate a finding that there was no probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff was criminally trespassing or obstructing
Cedeno’s investigation.
Wells v. Bonner, 45 F.3d 90, 95 (5th
Cir. 1995)(“If there was probable cause for any of the charges
made-here either disorderly conduct or resisting a search-then
the arrest was supported by probable cause, and the claim for
false arrest fails.”).
That finding would imply the invalidity
of Plaintiff’s trespassing and obstruction charges and is
therefore barred by Heck.
Id. (“Thus, Wells's proof to
establish his false arrest claim, i.e., that there was no
probable cause to arrest either for disorderly conduct or for
resisting a search, would demonstrate the invalidity of Wells's
conviction for resisting a search.”); Walke, 2012 WL 2512909, at
*2 (holding that unlawful arrest claim was barred by Heck where
a successful claim would imply the invalidity of the plaintiff’s
conviction for possession of cocaine and firearms); Ferry, 2012
WL 4339454, at *5 (finding that claim of false arrest failed
because it would imply lack of probable cause to make arrest
and, with it, invalidity of charge to which plaintiff
subsequently pled guilty); Brenner v. Twp. Of Moorestown, No.
09-219, 2011 WL 1882394, at *5-6 (D.N.J. May 17, 2011)(same).
Second, a successful claim of unlawful search and seizure
of the gun would necessarily invalidate the firearm charges
because those charges were solely based on the search for and
seizure of the gun. Crawford v. Frimel, 337 F. App’x. 211, 213
(3d Cir. 2009)(holding that Heck barred Fourth Amendment claim,
where allegedly unlawful search and seizure was basis for
subsequent drug conviction); James v. York Cnty. Police Dept.,
160 F. App’x. 126, 133-34 (3d Cir. 2006)(holding that Heck
barred 1983 claim of unlawful search and seizure where “arrest
and conviction were based on the evidence gathered” in the
allegedly illegal search and seizure); Gibson v. Superintendent
of N.J. Dep’t of Law and Public Safety Div., 411 F.3d 427, 452
(3d Cir. 2005)(recognizing that, where the only evidence for
conviction is tainted by a possible constitutional violation,
claim based on that constitutional violation would necessarily
imply invalidity of conviction).
Accordingly, both of Plaintiff’s claims under Count 1 are
barred by Heck.
Those claims are therefore DISMISSED with
prejudice.
B.
Count 3
Plaintiff’s claims under Count 3 are predicated on Monell.
Supervisory liability claims under Monell require an underlying
constitutional violation and, where the underlying violation is
barred by Heck, it cannot form the basis for a derivative Monell
claim. Munchinski v. Solomon, Nos. 06-4093, 07-1345, 2007 WL
3121331, at *2 (3d Cir. October 26, 2007)(holding that Heck bars
consideration of municipal liability claims “to the extent they
rely on the invalidity of [the plaintiff’s] conviction”);
Crawford v. Van Buren Cty, Ark., 678 F.3d 666, 669-70 (8th Cir.
2012)(barring claims against municipality pursuant to Heck);
Lynch v. Suffolk Cty. Police Dep’t, 348 F. App’x. 672, 675 (2d
Cir. 2009)(holding that, where Monell claim was “derivative” of
claims against individuals, and those claims were barred under
Heck, Monell claim was also barred); Segal v. City of New York,
459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006)(“Because the district court
properly found no underlying constitutional violation, its
decision not to address the municipal defendants' liability
under Monell was entirely correct.”); Jackson v. Cnty of Nassua,
No. 07-cv-245, 2010 WL 335581, at *8-9 (E.D.N.Y. January 22,
2010)(“In the instant case, because the Court finds as a matter
of law on summary judgment that Heck v. Humphrey prevents a
finding that a constitutional violation was committed against
plaintiff by any of the defendants, see supra, no Monell claim
can lie against the County of Nassau pursuant to § 1983.”);
Elliot v. McChefsky, No. 08-5429, 2009 WL 3150358, at *1-2 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 24, 2009)(barring claim against municipality under
Heck).
Here, Plaintiff’s Count 3 Monell claims are derivative of
Plaintiff’s Count 1 claims, which have been dismissed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Count 3 Monell claims must also be
dismissed.
Id.
Therefore, Count Three is DISMISSED with
prejudice.
B. Count Two
Having dismissed all of Plaintiff's federal claims, and
with this Court's subject matter jurisdiction premised on
federal question jurisdiction, this Court must determine whether
it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's
remaining state law claims. Flemming v. Nettleton, No. 10-cv1958, 2012 WL 5943644, at *4 (D.N.J. November 26, 2012)(citing
Kalick v. Northwest Airlines Corp., 372 F. App'x 317, 322 (3d
Cir. 2010)).
Absent extraordinary circumstances, district
courts should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
law claims. Id. (citing Shaffer v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Albert
Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)).
Because no extraordinary circumstances are evident here, this
Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims.
Fernandez, 468 F. App’x at 155
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims where federal Section 1983 claims had been dismissed
under Heck).
Accordingly, Count 2 is DISMISSED, without
prejudice.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Summary Judgment for the
Defendants is granted with and without prejudice as described
above.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: December 18, 2012
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