WOOD v. MAIN
Filing
42
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 6/6/11. (js)
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
PHILLIP WOOD,
Petitioner,
v.
JOHN E. MAIN,
Respondent.
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Civil No. 10-2075 (JHR)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
PHILLIP WOOD, #15067
Anne Klein Forensic Center
P.O. Box 7717
West Trenton, New Jersey 08628
JENNIFER L. BENTZEL, ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR
ROBERT D. BERNARDI, BURLINGTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR
49 Rancocas Road
Mt. Holly, New Jersey 08060
RODRIGUEZ, Senior District Judge
Presently before the Court is a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 challenging the constitutionality of two State court orders entered on July
21, 2000, and October 18, 2002, in the Law Division of the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Burlington County, in In re Commitment of Phillip A. Wood, No. A-5731-04T4,
2007 WL 4356135 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Dec. 12, 2007), cert. denied, 194 N.J. 444
(2008) (table). This Petition presents a novel question implicating the seminal case of
State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236 (1975). The issue confronting the Court is whether a
suspension of a Petitioner’s Krol status followed by a term of incarceration vitiates the
Court’s ability to reinstate Krol. Put differently, Petitioner contends that his
intermittent incarceration is evidence that he was no longer in need of medical
treatment as prescribed by Krol and, therefore, the State court did not have the
authority to civilly commit upon the conclusion of his penal confinement.1
For the reasons expressed below and because Petitioner was released from
confinement pursuant to Krol, 68 N.J. 236, on April 18, 2010 (Dkt. No. 25-2), the Court
will dismiss the Petition and deny a certificate of appealability.
I. BACKGROUND
At the age of nineteen and after an argument with his father about money,
Petitioner set fire to the family home while his family was inside sleeping. All family
members escaped by jumping from second floor windows, except Petitioner’s twomonth old nephew, who died in the fire. Petitioner was charged with felony murder and
aggravated arson in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County.
In 1981, he was found not guilty of these crimes by reason of insanity (“NGI”). See In re
Wood, 2007 WL 4356135, at *1. As a result, Petitioner was involuntarily committed to
Ancora Psychiatric Hospital as an NGI acquittee, and received periodic review hearings,
in accordance with Krol, 68 N.J. 236.2
1
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s habeas claim because he was
in custody on Krol status when he filed the § 2254 Petition and he alleged that the procedures
used to detain him at the expiration of his penal sentence violated due process and equal
protection.
2
“When a person accused of a crime is acquitted by reason of insanity, the accused may
be held in continued confinement if the person is a danger to self or others and is in need of
medical treatment. We describe such a person as being on Krol status.” In re Commitment of
W.K., 159 N.J. 1, 2 (1999).
2
On August 5, 1999, while confined at Ancora, Petitioner was charged with setting
fire to bed linens. See In re Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *1. On December 22, 1999,
Petitioner was charged with aggravated assault of his female psychiatrist. Id. Based on
Petitioner’s guilty plea, on May 3, 2000, the Law Division sentenced him to three years
in prison on the assault charge and to a concurrent 18-month sentence on a criminal
mischief charge. Id.
On July 21, 2000, the Burlington County Law Division entered an order (one of
the orders challenged in this § 2254 Petition) in the Krol proceeding which suspended
Petitioner’s Krol hearings while he was serving his prison sentence for the aggravated
assault conviction. In addition, the Law Division ordered the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (“NJDOC”) to notify the court 90 days prior to Petitioner’s parole or release
for the purpose of scheduling a Krol hearing. (Dkt. No. 25-3, pp. 97-98.)
Petitioner’s release was scheduled for November 4, 2002 and, by way of letter
dated August 2, 2002, the NJDOC advised the prosecutor that professional staff
evaluated Petitioner and determined that he was not currently in need of involuntary
commitment on the grounds of mental illness or dangerous to himself, others, or
property within the reasonably foreseeable future, as required by N.J. Stat. Ann. §§
2C:47-5 and 30:4-82.4. (Dkt. No. 25-3, pp. 108-09.) The letter further stated that, since
Petitioner was on Krol status, a Krol hearing should be scheduled prior to his release.
Id.
Following a hearing on October 18, 2002, during which arguments of counsel
were heard and reports of NJDOC staff psychiatrists were considered, the Law Division
entered a second order (the second order being challenged in the instant § 2254
3
proceeding) in the Krol proceeding. This order vacated the July 21 order, which
suspended hearings while Petitioner was in the care and custody of the NJDOC, and
directed that Petitioner be transported to Ancora for review of his Krol status. (Dkt. No.
25-3, pp. 99-100.)
On December 2, 2002, an evidentiary hearing was held to determine if Petitioner
should be confined under Krol as an NGI acquittee of the 1981 murder and arson
charges. (Dkt. No. 25-6.) After hearing testimony of the psychiatrist, the court ruled
Petitioner be confined under Krol. (Id. at p. 16.) Prior to the conclusion of the hearing,
Petitioner argued that, if he needed to be committed under Krol, then he “certainly
wouldn’t have been capable of staying in prison for three years without any problems,
perfectly sane, then they turn me off like a light bulb and I’m crazy under insanity status
all over again . . . . That’s a legal contradiction.” (Id. at p. 22.) Petitioner asked the
court why his status couldn’t be reduced to civil commitment status from Krol status.
(Id. at 23.) The court responded that Petitioner’s Krol status could remain for up to 30
years and that Petitioner’s doctor determined him to be mentally ill and recommended
that he remain on Krol status. (Id. at pp. 23-24.)
Petitioner appealed the orders dated July 21, 2002, and October 18, 2002, to the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. See In re Wood, 2007 WL
4356135 at *1. Petitioner alleged that his constitutional rights were violated when the
Superior Court suspended his Krol hearings while he was in prison for the assault
conviction. Id. at *2. On December 12, 2007, the Appellate Division affirmed both
orders in an unpublished opinion. The court noted that state law requires periodic
reviews of NGI commitment “no later than (1) three months from the date of the first
4
hearing, and (2) nine months from the date of the first hearing, and (3) 12 months from
the date of the first hearing, and (4) at least annually thereafter, if the patient is not
sooner discharged.” Id. The court went on to conclude that even “if Wood had been
afforded a Krol hearing while imprisoned, he would not have been released, even if it
were determined he was no longer a danger to self or others. Because there was no
purpose to be accomplished by a Krol review while Wood was incarcerated, a relaxation
of R. 4:74-7 was appropriate, did not violate Wood’s constitutional rights, and was in
accordance with his consent.” Id. at *3. The Appellate Division also rejected Wood’s
argument that his transfer to prison for service of the new criminal sentence
necessitated termination of his Krol status because he was no longer mentally ill.3
On March 12, 2008, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied Wood’s petition for
certification. See In re Wood, 945 A.2d 1288 (2008) (table). On September 5, 2008,
3
The court reasoned as follows:
Krol found that due process and equal protection required persons
found NGI to be treated similarly to civil committees. As such,
persons found NGI should not be institutionalized unless necessary
to prevent danger to self or the community. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(c)
echoes this sentiment by ensuring that “[n]o person committed
under this section” be placed in a correctional institution rather
than a treatment facility for the crime which they were found NGI.
The Legislature clearly did not intend to create a loophole for NGI
committees to circumvent their maximum period of Krol
confinement by forcing the State to choose whether to keep a
committee on Krol status or to prosecute him for an offense which
may result in a relatively short sentence. It is clear the Legislature
intended the prohibition in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8(c) to be with reference
to the offense for which the committee was found NGI and not for
other criminal acts.
In re Wood, 2007 WL 4356135 at *3 (internal citations omitted).
5
Petitioner filed his first § 2254 Petition in the United States District Court challenging
the July 21, 2000 and October 18, 2002 orders. The District Court dismissed the first
petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on February 20, 2009.4 See Wood v. New
Jersey, Civ. No. 08-4515, 2009 WL 448777 (D.N.J. Feb. 20, 2009). Then, Petitioner was
released from incarceration on November 5, 2009 and recommitted under the NGI
standard under Krol. By order filed March 31, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court
terminated Petitioner’s NGI Krol status as of April 18, 2010, and ordered the Anne Klein
Forensic Center to immediately evaluate Petitioner to determine whether or not he
should be committed pursuant to the New Jersey Civil Commitment Law, N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 30:4-27.1 et seq. (Dkt. No. 25-2, p. 26.)
A hearing was conducted and Petitioner was civilly committed effective April 18,
2010, pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.15 (a) which provides that “[i]f the court
finds by clear and convincing evidence that the patient needs continued involuntary
commitment to treatment, it shall issue an order authorizing the involuntary
commitment of the patient and the assignment or admission of the patient . . . .” In the
4
The District Court noted that because Petitioner did not challenge his March 5,
2007 conviction and sentence, and because “the habeas petitioner [must] be ‘in custody’
under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition is filed, . . . the
question here is whether either of the challenged orders imposes an imminent restraint
on Petitioner’s liberty when his criminal sentence expires.” Wood v. New Jersey, 2009
WL 448777 at *4-5 (internal citations omitted). The Court concluded that because the
outcome of Petitioner’s Krol status hearing could have resulted in Petitioner being
released when his sentence expired, the challenged orders “do not impose any future
restraint on Petitioner’s liberty because future confinement at Ancora is not inevitable.
Thus, Petitioner is not ‘in custody’ as a result of the challenged orders, and this Court
lacks jurisdiction over the Petition challenging the constitutionality of those orders.” Id.
at *6.
6
meantime, the Present § 2254 Petition was filed on April 1, 2010 (17 days before his NGI
status commitment expired). The Clerk received it on April 7, 2010. Petitioner
challenges his detention on Krol status as a result of the July 21, 2000, and October 18,
2002, Law Division orders on the following ground:
GROUND ONE: The trial court erroneously suspended Mr.
Woods Krol hearings pending release from prison in
violation of Due Process and/Equal Protection of law of the
14th Amendment on July 21, 2000, the Hon. Victor
Friedman (JSC) signed a consent order suspending Krol
review hearings pending expiration of Mr. Woods prison
sentence. On October 17, 2002, after Mr. Woods expiration
of the prison sentence, the Hon. Thomas S. Smith, JSC,
ordered that Mr. Wood be transported to Ancora State
Psychiatric Hospital for a psychiatric evaluation. After the
Dept. of Corrections had determined he was not in need of
commitment.
(Dkt. No. 1, p. 6.)
Respondents filed an Answer arguing that the Petition is moot because
Petitioner’s Krol status terminated on April 18, 2010, while this Petition was pending,
and alternatively, that the Petition should be denied on the merits. Petitioner filed a
Reply and a motion for appointment of counsel.
II. DISCUSSION
The Petition before this Court challenges Petitioner’s confinement as a result of
the Law Division orders which suspended Krol status hearings while Petitioner was
incarcerated (the July 21, 2000 order), and reinstated Krol status hearings 90 days prior
to his release from prison (the October 18, 2002 order). Petitioner argues in essence
that his new criminal conviction and three year penal incarceration rebutted the
inference which arose from the 1981 NGI verdict that he was mentally ill. He further
7
argues that, when he was released from penal incarceration, due process and equal
protection required the state to either release him or to civilly commit him under the
clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to civil commitments (rather than the
preponderance of evidence standard applicable to NGI acquittees on Krol status).5
Petitioner’s argument is not without some force. As will be further discussed,
Petitioner’s claim lies in the tension between the holdings of Baxstrom v. Herold, 383
U.S. 107 (1966), holding that due process requires a state to release a prisoner at the
expiration of his incarceration unless it civilly commits him under the procedures
applicable to civil commitments, and Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983),
holding that the preponderance of the evidence standard satisfies due process for
indefinite commitment of NGI acquittees. Before reconciling the merits of Petitioner’s
claim with Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court must first consider whether
Petitioner’s due process and equal protection claims became moot when New Jersey
terminated his NGI Krol status on April 18, 2010, and then civilly committed him under
5
Under New Jersey law, the only difference between civil commitment and NGI
commitment is the burden of proof. See In re Commitment of M.M., 871 A.2d 707 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2005). Defendants committed after an NGI finding are reviewed on a periodic
basis under the same standards as those applied to civil commitments, “except that the burden for
establishing the need for continued commitment is by a preponderance of the evidence, whereas
in a civil commitment proceeding it is by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at 710. The lesser
burden of proof continues during the maximum period for which imprisonment could have been
imposed . . . for the charges on which the defendant has been acquitted by reason of insanity . . .
.” Id. After expiration of the ordinary maximum term, the state’s burden of showing a
continuing need for civil commitment rises to the “clear and convincing evidence” standard set
forth in N.J. Stat. Ann. §30:4-27.15(a) from the “preponderance of the evidence” standard under
Krol and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:4-8b(3). Id. at 711 n.3 (citing In re Commitment of W.K., 731
A.2d 482, 483 (N.J. 1999))
8
the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to civil committees under N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 30:4-17.15(a).
A. Mootness
Article III of the Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to “cases
or controversies” between parties. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. “This case-or-controversy
requirement subsists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and
appellate. . . . The parties must continue to have ‘a personal stake in the outcome’ of the
lawsuit.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990). “This means
that, throughout the litigation, the plaintiff must have suffered, or be threatened with,
an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.” Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
In Spencer v. Kemna, the Supreme Court considered whether a habeas petition
challenging the revocation of the petitioner’s parole became moot when the petitioner
completed the entire term of imprisonment underlying the parole revocation. The Court
acknowledged that a habeas challenge to a criminal conviction is not necessarily mooted
by expiration of the sentence but noted that the petitioner attacked “only the wrongful
termination of his parole status.” Spencer, 523 U.S. at 8. The Court explained that
“[t]he reincarceration that he incurred as a result of that action is now over, and cannot
be undone. Subsistence of the [habeas case] requires, therefore, that continuing
‘collateral consequences’ of the parole revocation be either proved or presumed.” Id.
The Court rejected the argument that collateral consequences of the revocation of parole
9
would be presumed and then considered and rejected each alleged concrete injury infact suggested by the habeas petitioner. Specifically, the Court rejected petitioner’s
contention that the revocation of parole could be used to the petitioner’s detriment in
any future proceeding as speculative,6 rejected the interest in vindicating reputation as
legally insufficient, and rejected the contention that the absence of a federal remedy to
vindicate alleged constitutional violations was sufficient to avoid mootness. The Court
also rejected the argument that a habeas challenge to the revocation of parole fell within
the exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are capable of repetition, yet
evading review. “He has not shown (and we doubt that he could) that the time between
parole revocation and expiration of sentence is always so short as to evade review. Nor
has he demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that he will once again be paroled and have
that parole revoked.” Id. at 18 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, Petitioner alleges that New Jersey should have used the civil
commitment standard of clear and convincing evidence to determine whether he was
mentally ill, and therefore required hospitalization due to dangerousness upon the
expiration of his penal incarceration for a crime committed while he was on Krol
commitment. Essentially, Petitioner argues that New Jersey’s use of the preponderance
of the evidence standard to evaluate whether he should be civilly committed was
unconstitutional. In light of the fact that Petitioner’s NGI Krol status expired after he
filed the present Petition and he was subsequently civilly committed under the clear and
6
See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14-15 (noting that alleged collateral consequences that are
“contingent upon [petitioner’s] violating the law, getting caught, and being convicted” are too
speculative to avoid mootness since they are “a possibility rather than a certainty or even a
probability”).
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convincing evidentiary standard, the Court must determine whether the present habeas
Petition is moot — because it challenges the use of the preponderance of the evidence
standard used to civilly commit him on December 2, 2002 after his criminal sentence
expired. Now that Petitioner has been civilly committed under the more onerous clear
and convincing evidentiary standard , this Court must consider whether any concrete
injury-in-fact is attributable to his previous commitment on NGI Krol status under the
preponderance of the evidence standard.
The negative consequences flowing from the allegedly wrongful continuation of
Petitioner’s Krol status when he was released from penal incarceration would have
existed in any event, since even if Krol status had terminated when Petitioner was
criminally convicted, such termination could not eliminate the fact that in 1981,
Petitioner was found NGI and committed as an NGI acquittee from 1981 until the time
of the criminal conviction. Thus, these negative consequences are not sufficient to
constitute injury-in-fact attributable to the use of Krol status procedures to commit
Petitioner at the expiration of his penal incarceration.
Moreover, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that his petition qualifies for an
exception to the mootness doctrine for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading
review. First, Petitioner cannot show that the time between a conviction for a crime
committed during NGI commitment and the expiration of the NGI status term is always
so short as to evade review. See Spencer, 523 U.S. at 17-18. Given that he could have
been convicted and penally incarcerated early in his Krol term, Petitioner cannot satisfy
the first requirement for this mootness exception, because the challenged action in its
duration is not always too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration. See
11
id. Petitioner also fails to satisfy the second requirement. Given that the there is no
reasonable expectation that Petitioner will again be found NGI and he will again be
convicted of a crime during his NGI commitment, Petitioner’s claim does not fall within
the exception. See id.7
Finally, on a practical level, Petitioner was recently civilly committed under the
clear and convincing evidentiary standard. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-17.15(a). Thus,
even if the Court found that New Jersey erroneously employed the preponderance of the
evidence standard to commit him at the expiration of his penal sentence, there is no
relief to be had by Petitioner. A favorable ruling by the Court would result in an order
directing respondents to release Petitioner unless they commit him under the clear and
convincing evidence standard. And that is exactly what happened when Petitioner’s Krol
status expired on April 18, 2010— Petitioner has already been committed under the clear
and convincing evidentiary standard in accordance with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-17.15(a).
Spencer requires this Court to address the issue of collateral consequences in
terms of the “likelihood” that a favorable decision would redress the alleged injury and
prohibits reliance on speculative collateral consequences which are no more than “a
possibility rather than a certainty or even a probability.” Spencer, 532 U.S. at 14-16;
accord Burkey v. Marberry, 556 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2009). Petitioner has not shown
a collateral consequence that persists today and is likely to be redressed by a favorable
7
This Court is aware that after service of his penal sentence and recommitment under the
NGI standard in 2002, Petitioner was convicted of another crime, he served another penal
sentence, and he was again re-committed under the NGI standard. However, this does not show
that there presently exists a reasonable expectation that he will again be found NGI and again
commit a crime on NGI status. Such a scenario was rejected as too speculative in Spencer.
12
judicial decision. Therefore, Petitioner’s habeas petition became moot when his NGI
status expired on April 18, 2010. As Petitioner has not satisfied the requirements for the
mootness exception for cases that are capable of repetition yet evading review, this
Court is constrained to dismiss the habeas petition as moot. See, e.g., United States v.
Williams, 373 Fed. App’x 186 (3d Cir. 2010) (prisoner’s unconditional release from
confinement mooted appeal from order revoking supervised release in which he
challenged sufficiency of evidence to support violation of supervised release and
reasonableness of above-guideline sentence); Burkey, 556 F.3d at 148 (petitioner’s
release from custody mooted habeas challenge to the failure to grant early release for
successful completion of drug abuse treatment program, even though it was possible
that sentencing court could reduce term of supervised release if he prevailed, since “the
possibility that the sentencing court will use its discretion to modify the length of
Burkey’s term of supervised release . . . is so speculative that any decision on the merits
by the District Court would be merely advisory”); United States v. Robinson, 39 Fed.
App’x 723 (3d Cir. 2002) (appeal from order denying § 2255 motion to correct sentence
of imprisonment stemming from revocation of supervised release became moot when
appellant was released from imprisonment imposed for revocation of supervised
release).8
8
The Supreme Court’s brief opinion in United States v. Juvenile Male, 130 S. Ct. 2518
(2010), also supports this Court’s mootness ruling. In that case, a juvenile was adjudicated
delinquent in 2005 for engaging in sexual acts with a person under twelve years of age, which
would have been a federal crime if committed by an adult, prior to the enactment of the federal
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, which applied to sex offenders convicted of
offenses for which registration is required prior to its enactment in 2006. In 2007, the district
court sentenced the juvenile to an additional six-month term of detention to be followed by
juvenile supervision until his twenty-first birthday and ordered him to register as a sex offender
13
B. Merits
Alternatively, Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief because the Appellate
Division adjudicated his claims on the merits, and the adjudication was not an
unreasonable application of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Where a federal claim was “adjudicated on the merits” in state court
proceedings,9 as in this case, the writ must be denied unless adjudication of the claim
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States, or resulted in a decision
that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “This is a difficult to
meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands
under the aforesaid act as a condition of his supervision. The Ninth Circuit vacated the sexoffender registration requirements of the juvenile supervision order on the ground that retroactive
application of the Act violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, and the government sought certiorari to
review this determination. The Supreme Court noted that, because the juvenile’s term of
supervision expired when he turned 21, “and thus he no longer is subject to those sex-offenderregistration conditions. As such, this case likely is moot unless respondent can show that a
decision invalidating the sex-offender registration conditions of his juvenile supervision would
be sufficiently likely to redress ‘collateral consequences adequate to meet Article III’s injury-infact requirement.’” Juvenile Male, 130 S. Ct. at 2519 (citing Spencer, 523 U.S. at 14).
9
“An ‘adjudication on the merits’ has a well settled meaning: a decision finally resolving
the parties' claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim advanced,
rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.” Rompilla v. Horn, 355 F.3d 233, 247 (3d Cir.
2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), reversed on other grounds sub nom.
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). A state court may render an adjudication on the merits
of a federal claim by rejecting the claim in an order unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the
reasons relief has been denied. See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (noting
that “a state court need not cite or even be aware of [Supreme Court] cases . . . . Where a state
court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be
met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief. This is so
whether or not the state court reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim it found
insufficient”) (citations omitted).
14
that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.
Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A decision is
“contrary to” a Supreme Court holding within 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), if the state court
“contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases” or if it
“confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of th[e
Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.” Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). Under the “‘unreasonable application’ clause of § 2254(d)(1),
a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the State court identifies the correct
governing legal principle from th[e Supreme] Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies
that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413.
In this case, the Appellate Division determined that application of the NGI
commitment standard of proof governed Petitioner’s commitment upon expiration of
his short prison sentence for crimes committed while he was detained on NGI status.
There are several United States Supreme Court cases that inform the Court’s discussion
of Petitioner’s claim. In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), the Supreme Court
held that a state violates equal protection by civilly committing a prisoner at the
expiration of a penal term of incarceration without providing the same procedures as
those provided for civil commitment of a person who is not completing a prison
sentence. Id. at 110. In that case, the State argued that it “has created a reasonable
classification differentiating the civilly insane from the ‘criminally insane,’ [defined] as
those with dangerous or criminal propensities.” Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111. The Court
acknowledged that such a distinction may be reasonable “for purposes of determining
the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the
15
context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at all.” Id. at 111-12
(noting that “there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a
person who is nearing the end of a penal term from all other civil commitments”). The
Court held that an inmate may not be committed upon the expiration of a prison
sentence applying a standard lower than the civil commitment standard. See Id. at 11114. As a result, an allegedly mentally ill convicted criminal is entitled to release at the
end of his term unless the State commits him in a civil proceeding. Id.
In 1975, the Supreme Court ruled that the continued compulsory confinement in
a mental hospital of a mentally ill person who is no longer dangerous violates the
person’s due process right to freedom from bodily restraint. See O’Connor v.
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (“Nor is it enough that Donaldson’s original
confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis . . . because even if his
involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not constitutionally continue
after that basis no longer existed.”). And, in 1979, the Court held that Due Process
requires the state to prove by clear and convincing evidence that an individual is
mentally ill and that he requires hospitalization because he is dangerous to himself or
others before he may be committed to a mental institution. Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418 (1979). “We conclude that the individual’s interest in the outcome of a civil
commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state
to justify confinement by proof more substantial than a mere preponderance of the
evidence.” Id. at 427.
However, in Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court distinguished Addington
and Baxstrom and held an NGI acquittee may be committed under a preponderance of
16
the evidence standard. Jones, 463 U.S. at 359. Jones was arrested in the District of
Columbia for attempting to steal a jacket from a department store (a misdemeanor
punishable by a maximum one-year sentence), and on March 12, 1976, he was found
NGI and committed. Id. A release hearing was conducted on February 22, 1977. Id. at
360. Because Jones had already been hospitalized for longer than the maximum period
he could have spent in prison if he had been convicted, he demanded that he be released
or recommitted pursuant to the civil commitment standards. Id. at 360. The District of
Columbia Superior Court reaffirmed the findings of mental illness and dangerousness
made by a preponderance of the evidence at the previous hearing and denied Jones’s
request for a civil commitment hearing. Id. Jones appealed, and the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed en banc. Id. at 361. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Jones argued that the due process standards set forth in Addington were not met
in his case because the finding of present mental illness and dangerousness was
established only by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 362. Jones argued that “the
Government’s only conceivably legitimate justification for automatic commitment is to
ensure that insanity acquittees do not escape confinement entirely, and that this interest
can justify commitment at most for a period equal to the maximum prison sentence the
acquittee could have received if convicted.” Id. at 362-63. Because Jones had been
hospitalized for longer than the one year he might have served in prison, he asserted
that “he should be released unconditionally or recommitted under the District’s civilcommitment procedures.” Id. at 363.
The Court emphasized that Jones did not dispute that he remained mentally ill
and dangerous, and noted that it was not deciding “whether the District’s procedures for
17
release are constitutional.” Id. at 363 n.11. First, the Court determined that the finding
of insanity at the criminal trial is sufficiently probative of mental illness and
dangerousness to justify commitment. Id. at 364. The Court acknowledged that “[t]he
fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a
criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness. . . . Indeed, this concrete evidence
generally may be at least as persuasive as any predictions about dangerousness that
might be made in a civil-commitment proceeding.” Id. The Court also said that it would
not be unreasonable to determine that the inference of continuing mental illness is
supported by an insanity acquittal. Id. at 366 (“It comports with common sense to
conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a
criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment.”).
Next, the Court rejected Jones’ argument that his continued commitment by a
preponderance of the evidence was an unconstitutional violation of Addington’s civil
commitment requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 367. The
Court noted that there are “important differences between the class of potential civilcommitment candidates and the class of insanity acquittees that justify differing
standards of proof.” Id. Importantly, when the acquittee himself advances that his
criminal act was the product of mental illness, there is a diminished risk that he is being
committed for mere idiosyncratic behavior. Id. The Court went on to hold that “ . . .
concerns critical to our decision in Addington are diminished or absent in the case of
insanity acquittees. Accordingly, there is no reason for adopting the same standard of
proof in both cases.” Id. (footnotes, citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
18
Finally, the Supreme Court rejected Jones’ argument that he was entitled to
release because he had been hospitalized for a period longer than he could have been
incarcerated if convicted. Id. at 368. The Court explained that the purpose of
incarceration is “to reflect society’s view of the proper response to commission of a
particular criminal offense, based on a variety of considerations such as retribution,
deterrence, and rehabilitation. The State may punish a person convicted of a crime even
if satisfied that he is unlikely to commit further crimes.” Id. at 368-69. On the contrary,
“[t]he purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil
commitment, is to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from
his potential dangerousness. The committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.” Id. at 368. However, “because it is
impossible to predict how long it will take for any given individual to recover - or indeed
whether he ever will recover - Congress has chosen, as it has with respect to civil
commitment, to leave the length of commitment indeterminate, subject to periodic
review . . . .” Id. “The length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal sentence therefore
is irrelevant to the purposes of his commitment.” Id. at 369.10 The Court summarized
its holding as follows:
10
In a footnote, the Supreme Court distinguished Baxstrom and its progeny on the grounds
that “[n]one of those cases involved an insanity acquittee, and none suggested that a person under
noncriminal confinement could not be hospitalized in excess of the period for which he could
have served in prison if convicted for the dangerous acts he had committed.” Jones, 463 U.S. at
369 n.19. “The inherent fallacy of relying on a criminal sanction to determine the length of a
therapeutic confinement is manifested by petitioner’s failure to suggest any clear guidelines for
deciding when a patient must be released.” Id.
19
We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime
by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the
Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to
confine him to a mental institution until such time as he has
regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or
society.
Id. at 370.
Under Jones, a state may commit a NGI acquittee by showing mental illness and
dangerousness by a preponderance of the evidence, and that due process does not
require Addington’s clear and convincing standard. Two facts underscore the holding in
Jones: “the defendant committed an act that constitutes a criminal offense, and . . . he
committed the act because of mental illness.” Jones, 463 U.S. at 363. “The fact that a
person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act
certainly indicates dangerousness.” Id. at 364. Accordingly, an NGI verdict supports an
inference of continuing mental illness because “[i]t comports with common sense to
conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him to commit a
criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment.” Id. at 366.
The Supreme Court distinguished Jones in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992). On October 12, 1984, Terry Foucha was found NGI of aggravated burglary and
illegal discharge of a firearm, and was committed to a forensic hospital. Id. at 74. In
1988, doctors recommended release because, although Foucha had suffered from drug
induced psychosis when he committed the crime, he had recovered from that temporary
condition. Id. at 74-5. Relying on Jones, the state court determined that neither due
process nor equal protection was violated by permitting continued confinement of an
NGI acquittee based on dangerousness alone. Id. at 75. While acknowledging that
20
“insanity acquittees may be initially held without complying with the procedures
applicable to civil committees,” the Court emphasized that “the period of time during
which an insanity acquittee may be held in a mental institution is not measured by the
length of a sentence that might have been imposed had he been convicted; rather, the
acquittee may be held until he is either not mentally ill or not dangerous.” Foucha, 504
U.S. at 76 n.4. The Court noted that, unlike in Jones, “[i]n this case, Louisiana does not
contend that Foucha was mentally ill at the time of the trial court’s hearing. Thus, the
basis for holding Foucha in a psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee has
disappeared, and the State is no longer entitled to hold him on that basis.” Id. at 77.
“Even if the initial commitment was permissible, it could not constitutionally continue
after that basis no longer existed.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Significant with respect to Mr. Woods’ claim, the Supreme Court noted:
Here . . , the State asserts that because Foucha once
committed a criminal act and now has an antisocial
personality that sometimes leads to aggressive conduct, a
disorder for which there is no effective treatment, he may be
held indefinitely. This rationale would permit the State to
hold indefinitely any other insanity acquittee not mentally ill
who could be shown to have a personality disorder that may
lead to criminal conduct. The same would be true of any
convicted criminal, even though he has completed his prison
term. It would also be only a step away from substituting
confinements for dangerousness for our present system
which, with only narrow exceptions and aside from
permissible confinements for mental illness, incarcerates
only those who are proved beyond reasonable doubt to have
violated a criminal law.
21
Id. at 82-83 (internal citations omitted). Therefore, the Court held that the indefinite
detention of insanity acquittees who are not mentally ill but who do not prove they
would not be dangerous to others is constitutionally impermissible. Id.
Petitioner’s constitutional claim lies in the tension between Jones, Foucha,
Baxstrom, and Addington, but it is not squarely governed by any one Supreme Court
holding. The question is whether Petitioner’s criminal conviction for crimes committed
while he was detained as a NGI acquittee showed that he had regained his sanity, so that
Foucha, Addington, and Baxstrom clearly required New Jersey to either release him
upon expiration of the criminal sentence or establish that he was mentally ill and
dangerous by clear and convincing evidence. Under § 2254(d)(1), “an unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.”
Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). “A state court’s
determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as
fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Id. at
786 (internal quotation marks omitted). Determining the reasonableness of the state
court’s application of the rule of law requires consideration of the specificity of the rule.
“The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in caseby-case determinations. It is not an unreasonable application of clearly established
Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been
squarely established by [the Supreme] Court.” Id. (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Although this Court might find that the New Jersey courts were constitutionally
incorrect in using the NGI preponderance standard at the expiration of Petitioner’s
22
penal term (because the conviction of Petitioner showed that he was sane and rebutted
the NGI presumption of mental illness), the New Jersey courts’ adjudication of
Petitioner’s due process and equal protection claim was not an unreasonable application
of Jones. See Ernst J. v. Stone, 452 F. 3d 186, 196 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that New
York courts’ application of preponderance of evidence standard, instead of clear and
convincing evidence standard, in re-commitment proceeding of NGI acquittee who was
released subject to order of conditions at initial hearing, was not unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent under § 2254(d) because “[n]either the
Supreme Court’s holding in Jones nor its holding in Foucha directly addresses the
circumstances of this case”); Francis S. v. Stone, 221 F. 3d 100 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding
that application of preponderance of evidence standard to re-commit NGI acquittee
released on order of conditions because he was twice found not dangerous was not
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent). “Because our cases give no clear
answer to the question presented, let alone one in [Petitioner’s] favor, it cannot be said
that the state court unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.” Wright v.
Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
The New Jersey courts’ rejection of Petitioner’s due process and equal protection claim
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court holdings. As a
result Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief under § 2254(d).11
C. Certificate of Appealability
11
This Court denies Petitioner’s motion for appointment of counsel because same is not
in the interest of justice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B); Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d 247, 263
(3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 988 (1992).
23
Because Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right, no Certificate of Appealability will issue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c). See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(1).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court dismisses the Petition, denies the motion for
appointment of counsel, and denies a Certificate of Appealability.
/s/ Joseph H. Rodriguez
JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ
United States District Judge
DATED: June 6, 2011
24
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