CRISDON v. NJ DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Filing
34
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying 30 Motion to Vacate ; dismissing as moot 32 Motion to Expedite. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/2/2012. (tf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MYRON N. CRISDON,
Civil No. 10-2911 (NLH/AMD)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
v.
NJ DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Myron N. Crisdon
531 N. Seventh Street
Camden, New Jersey 08102
Pro Se Plaintiff
Jenifer Louise Campbell, Esquire
State of New Jersey
Division of Law
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
25 W. Market Street
P.O. Box 112
Trenton, New Jersey 08625
Attorney for Defendant New Jersey Department of Education
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter having coming before the Court by way of
Plaintiff Myron Crisdon’s motion [Doc. No. 30] brought pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)1 seeking to vacate the
1. Although Plaintiff indicates that this motion is brought
pursuant to the New Jersey Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court
notes that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern in this
instance, and therefore the Court construes Plaintiff’s motion
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
judgment entered against Plaintiff on April 13, 2011, and by way
of Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 32] seeking an expedited ruling
on Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b) motion; and
Plaintiff having alleged in his complaint that Defendant,
the New Jersey Department of Education, failed to issue him a
high school diploma after he met the high school graduation
requirements in the spring of 2006 resulting in Plaintiff’s
inability to pursue his dream of becoming a professional
basketball player; and
Plaintiff having filed, prior to service of the complaint,
both a motion [Doc. No. 4] for summary judgment and a motion
[Doc. No. 5] to expedite the ruling on the summary judgment
motion; and
Plaintiff having also filed an appeal (hereinafter, “the
first appeal”) with the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit with respect to these motions [Doc. Nos. 4, 5]
before the motions were ruled upon by this Court; and
The Court noting that during the pendency of Plaintiff’s
first appeal, Defendant was served with process and subsequently
filed a motion [Doc. No. 16] to dismiss the complaint on the
basis that Plaintiff’s claims were barred by sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment; and
The Third Circuit having issued a mandate on February 14,
2011 dismissing Plaintiff’s first appeal for lack of
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jurisdiction; and
This Court having subsequently denied without prejudice the
motions [Doc. Nos. 4, 5] for summary judgment and for expedited
review, and having further provided Plaintiff thirty days to
respond to Defendant’s motion [Doc. No. 16] to dismiss; and
Plaintiff having failed to file a response to Defendant’s
motion [Doc. No. 16] to dismiss within the thirty days provided
by the Court; and
The Court, by Memorandum Opinion and Order dated April 13,
2011, having granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, finding that
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant were barred by the Eleventh
Amendment; and
The Court noting that Plaintiff neither appealed, nor sought
reconsideration, of the April 13, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and
Order at that time; and
Plaintiff having subsequently filed a second motion for
summary judgment and an amended brief in support thereof, [Doc.
Nos. 21, 22] in August of 2011, approximately four months after
the Court had already granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss,
attempting to oppose that motion [Doc. No. 16]; and
The Court, by Memorandum Opinion and Order dated November 9,
2011, having denied Plaintiff’s second motion for summary
judgment, finding that it was untimely, and that Plaintiff did
not provide any excuse for his failure to timely oppose the
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motion to dismiss other than his mistaken belief that the filing
of a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court
stayed, or otherwise prevented this Court from ruling on the then
pending motion in this case; and
Plaintiff having filed a second notice of appeal [Doc. No.
27] in this action on December 8, 2011 appealing the Court’s
November 9, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order denying Plaintiff’s
motion [Doc. No. 21] for summary judgment; and
By Opinion dated March 1, 2012, the Third Circuit having
affirmed this Court’s November 9, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and
Order denying Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 21] for summary
judgment; and
The Third Circuit having found that Plaintiff’s motion [Doc.
No. 21] for summary judgment “essentially alleged legal error” on
the part of this Court in granting Defendant’s motion to dismiss;
and
The Third Circuit having concluded that this Court did not
err in construing Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 21] for summary
judgment as a motion for reconsideration and denying it as
untimely under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i); and
The Third Circuit having also found that Plaintiff was
similarly not entitled to relief under either Rule 59(e) –
because his motion was filed well beyond the twenty-eight day
deadline, or under Rule 60(b) – because, while timely,
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Plaintiff’s motion simply alleged legal error which alone is
insufficient to vacate a judgment; and
The Court noting that while Plaintiff’s second appeal was
pending before the Third Circuit, on March 8, 2012, Plaintiff
filed the present motion [Doc. No. 30] seeking to vacate the
April 13, 2011 Memorandum Opinion and Order granting Defendant’s
motion [Doc. No. 16] to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint; and
Plaintiff alleging in his affidavit in support of the
instant motion [Doc. No. 30] to vacate that the Court violated
Plaintiff’s “due process rights, acted negligently, and rendered
a void judgment by granting the [Defendant’s] motion to dismiss
[the] complaint for lack of jurisdiction[,]” (see Pl.’s Aff.
[Doc. No. 30] 1); and
Plaintiff further asserting the following “beliefs” in
support of his motion to vacate the Court’s April 13, 2011
Memorandum Opinion and Order: (1) local governments are not
immune from damages flowing from constitutional violations and
cannot assert the good faith of their agents as a defense; (2)
state law sovereign immunity and state limitations on damages
cannot protect local governments from liability under Section
1983; (3) qualified immunity insulates officials from liability
for conduct that does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known; (4) Defendant New Jersey Department of Education is
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considered a legal person; (5) Plaintiff’s case should not have
been dismissed for failure to state a claim because it did not
“appear[] beyond doubt that the plaintiff [could] prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief[,]”2 (Id. at 1-2); and
The Court also noting that Plaintiff attached to present
motion to vacate, a copy of his previous motion [Doc. No. 21] for
summary judgment and the brief in support thereof; and
The Court construing Plaintiff’s motion to vacate and the
attached prior summary judgment motion and brief as another
attempt by Plaintiff to offer arguments in opposition to
Defendant’s motion [Doc. No. 16] to dismiss the complaint which
was previously granted based on the Eleventh Amendment; and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) providing that “[o]n
motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party ... from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2)
newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud ..., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an
2. The standard Plaintiff sets forth regarding dismissal of a
complaint comes from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). However, the Conley standard
is no longer controlling as Conley was subsequently abrogated by
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007), which set forth a stricter plausibility
standard regarding dismissal.
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opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based on an earlier
judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it
prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason
that justifies relief[;]” and
The Court noting that Plaintiff brings the present motion
under subsections one, four, and six regarding mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, a void judgment, and
the catch-all provision; and
The Court finding, after a thorough review of the motion
[Doc. No. 30], that Plaintiff fails to set forth a sufficient
basis for vacating the April 13, 2011 dismissal of the complaint
because Plaintiff does not specify the existence of any mistake,
inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; and
The Court nothing that Plaintiff’s motion makes only a
passing, conclusory allegation that the Court’s April 13, 2011
judgment was void at the time it was rendered; and
The Court further finding that Plaintiff fails to offer a
sufficient argument to support his conclusion that the April 13,
2011 judgment was void; and
The Court having determined that Plaintiff’s motion to
vacate simply seeks to reargue the same legal errors Plaintiff
asserted in the prior motion [Doc. No. 21] for summary judgment;
and
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The Court finding, as did the Third Circuit, that a Rule
60(b) motion is not meant to be used as a substitute for an
appeal, see United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (2003),
and cannot serve as a basis for challenging the April 13, 2011
Memorandum Opinion and Order simply because Plaintiff alleges
legal error by the Court; and
The Court further finding that the legal issues in this case
have been litigated and decided, and therefore the Court must
again reject Plaintiff’s repeated attempt to relitigate issues
already determined by the Court and affirmed on appeal.
Accordingly,
IT IS on this
2nd
day of
November
, 2012, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 30] to vacate the
April 13, 2011 judgment entered against him shall be, and hereby
is, DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 32] seeking to
expedite a ruling on the motion to vacate shall be, and hereby
is, DISMISSED AS MOOT.
/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
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