WOLF v. NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION
Filing
21
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/29/2012. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MATTHEW S. WOLF, on behalf of
himself and all others
similarly situated,
Civil No. 10-3338 (NLH/KMW)
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
NISSAN MOTOR ACCEPTANCE
CORPORATION,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Michael John DeBenedictis, Esquire
DeBenedictis & DeBenedictis L.L.C.
20 Brace Road
Suite 350
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034
Thomas T. Booth, Jr., Esquire
Law Offices of Thomas T. Booth, Jr., L.L.C.
129 W. Evesham Road
Voorhees, New Jersey 08043
Attorneys for Plaintiff Matthew S. Wolf
William H. Grae, Esquire
The Chartwell Law Offices, L.L.P.
75 Main Street
Suite 201
Millburn, New Jersey 07041
Attorney for Defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance Corporation
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Matthew
Wolf’s motion [Doc. No. 17] for reconsideration.
Plaintiff seeks
reconsideration of the Court's June 22, 2011 Opinion and Order
[Doc. Nos. 15, 16] granting Defendant Nissan Motor Acceptance
Corporation’s (hereinafter, “Nissan”) motion to stay this matter
and compel arbitration and referring this matter to arbitration.
(Pl.’s Br. in Supp. of His Mot. for Recons. [Doc. No. 17-1]
(hereinafter, “Pl.’s Recons. Br.”), 1.)
Specifically, “Plaintiff
... requests reconsideration of [the Court’s] [O]pinion ... to
the extent” that Opinion is based upon AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), which was submitted by Nissan
as supplemental authority in support of the motion to stay and
compel arbitration after the briefing had closed.
Br. 1.)
(Pl.’s Recons.
The Court has considered the parties submissions,1 and
decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
78.
For the reasons expressed below, Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration is denied.
I.
BACKGROUND
A.
Plaintiff’s Claims
In this action, Plaintiff brings a putative class action
against Nissan alleging violations of the Servicemembers Civil
1. The Court specifically considered the supplemental letter
briefs [Doc. Nos. 19, 20] submitted by Plaintiff and Nissan on
March 20, 2012 and March 23, 2012 respectively, which highlight
recent developments in the relevant case law.
2
Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 501 et seq, as well as a claim for
conversion.
(Op. [Doc. No. 15] 1-3, June 22, 2011.)
As
previously set forth in the Court’s June 22, 2011 Opinion,
Plaintiff, a captain in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the
United States Army Reserves, “entered into an agreement to lease
a 2007 Nissan Infiniti G35 Sedan for thirty-nine months” on or
around November 25, 2006.
(Id. at 2.)
Upon entering the lease
agreement, Plaintiff “paid $595 in ‘capitalized cost reduction’”
which was considered as “an advance toward the lease's rent.”
(Id. at 2-3.)
Similarly, Plaintiff also opted to prepay for
several other items which he could have elected to pay on a
monthly basis.
(Id. at 3.)
Approximately one year later,
Plaintiff was called into active military service, and as a
result, Plaintiff invoked the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act
(“SCRA”) and returned the leased vehicle to Nissan on or about
October 30, 2007.
(Id.)
As set forth in his complaint, Plaintiff contends that “the
SCRA entitles military service members, like himself, to a
prorated refund of lease payments made in advance.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that although he invoked the SCRA and provided
the proper notices, Nissan would not refund any prorated
“capitalized cost reduction” payments initially made by
Plaintiff.
(Id.)
Relevant here, the lease agreement between the
parties “contained an arbitration clause mandating that all
3
claims are subject to arbitration.”
(Id. at 2.)
In June of
2010, Plaintiff filed the complaint in this action seeking to
bring a putative class action suit against Nissan for conversion
and violations of the SCRA.
B.
(Id. at 3.)
Nissan’s Motion to Compel Arbitration
Rather than answer Plaintiff’s complaint, on September 17,
2010, Nissan moved to stay the proceedings in this Court and to
compel Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims under the Federal
Arbitration Act, (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. §§ 3, 4, as set forth in the
arbitration clause of the parties’ lease agreement.
(See
generally Def.’s Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Compel Arbitration and
to Stay Proceedings [Doc. No. 5-1] 1-2.)
Plaintiff filed a brief
in opposition to Nissan’s motion on December 9, 2010, and
Defendant filed a reply brief in support of the motion on
December 20, 2010.
Approximately four (4) months after the briefing on Nissan’s
motion to stay and compel arbitration was complete, the Supreme
Court of the United States issued an opinion in AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
In AT&T Mobility, the
Supreme Court considered “whether the FAA prohibits States from
conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration agreements
on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures” and
addressed the question of whether Section 2 of the FAA preempted
a California state-law rule which classified “most
4
collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable.”
131 S. Ct. at 1744, 1746.
In ruling on these
issues, the Supreme Court reversed the determination by the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, wherein the Ninth Circuit previously
concluded that the California state-law rule at issue was not
preempted by the FAA.
Id. at 1745, 1753.
The Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility concluded that while the
saving clause of Section 2 of the FAA2 “preserves generally
applicable contract defenses” it does not “preserve state-law
rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the
2.
Section 2 of the FAA provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or
a contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to
submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or
refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2.
The final phrase of Section 2, referred to as a saving
clause, “permits arbitration agreements to be declared
unenforceable ‘upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract.’” AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at
1746. “This saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be
invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses, such as
fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that
apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the
fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.” Id. (citation
omitted).
5
FAA's objectives.”
Id. at 1748.
According to the Supreme Court,
“[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”
Id.
Thus, the Supreme Court
held that the California state-law rule at issue stood “as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress ... [and was] preempted by the FAA.”
Id. at 1753 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Based on the April 27, 2011 opinion in AT&T Mobility, Nissan
filed a letter brief on May 11, 2011, arguing that AT&T Mobility
“wholly forecloses” Plaintiff’s argument that the class waiver in
the parties’ lease agreement is unconscionable and therefore
unenforceable under New Jersey Law.
14] 1, May 11, 2011.)
(Def.’s Letter Br. [Doc. No.
Nissan thus argued that “[t]o the extent
New Jersey law would find [Nissan’s] waiver unenforceable, the
FAA preempts New Jersey law[, thus] [t]he parties arbitration
agreement should be enforced, and [Nissan’s] motion to compel
arbitration should be granted.”
(Id. at 3.)
The docket reflects
that Plaintiff failed to respond to Nissan’s letter brief, and
thus did not object to Nissan’s arguments regarding the holding
in AT&T Mobility and the FAA preempting New Jersey state law.
C.
The June 22, 2011 Opinion and Order
By Opinion and Order dated June 22, 2011, the Court granted
Defendant’s motion to stay the proceedings before this Court and
6
to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims.
(See generally Op.
[Doc. No. 15], June 22, 2011; Order [Doc. No. 16], June 22,
2011.)
As a threshold issue, the Court determined that, despite
the “general breadth” and “expansive” nature of the arbitration
clause, the arbitrability of the reasonableness and validity of
the arbitration clause itself was an issue to be determined by
the Court, and not the arbitrator.
22, 2011.)
(Op. [Doc. No. 15] 9-11, June
Accordingly, the Court proceeded to consider
Plaintiff’s central challenges to the arbitration clause.
(Id.
at 11.)
In this regard, Plaintiff made two arguments relevant to the
present motion for reconsideration.3
First, Plaintiff argued
that the arbitration clause was unconscionable based on the
“purposes and policies underscoring the SCRA[,]” which is
designed to free members of our Armed Forces from civilian
obligations to the extent that those obligations may distract or
3. Plaintiff also argued that the entire arbitration agreement
was unconscionable on the basis of a fee-shifting provision and a
provision regarding costs on appeal. (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 17, June
22, 2011.) The Court found that these provisions were
“unconscionable and unenforceable to the extent they may be
construed and applied to require [Plaintiff] to shoulder the
entire financial burden of the arbitration and, ... the appeal of
his claims.” (Id. at 18-19.) However, the Court found that the
unconscionability of these provisions did “not invalidate the
entire arbitration agreement[,]” and only the unconscionable
provisions would be stricken and severed from the remainder of
the agreement. (Id. at 19.) Plaintiff does not seek
reconsideration of this portion of the Court’s June 22, 2011
Opinion. (See, e.g., Pl.’s Recons. Br. 2, 9-10, 13-15.)
7
interfere with our service members’ military service and
objectives.
(Id. at 12.)
According to Plaintiff the purposes
and policies underlying the SCRA require the invalidation of a
class action waiver provision like the one in the parties’ lease
agreement.
(Id.)
On this issue, however, the Court concluded
that “the SCRA, by its own words and provisions, does not bar or
otherwise invalidate a class action or arbitration waiver
provision.”
(Id.)
The Court specifically recognized that the
SCRA was “a clearly worded statute[,]” and that it could not
“modif[y] or nullif[y] a contractual agreement mutually adopted
by private parties” in the absence of “direct authority” within
the SCRA “that precludes waivers of class-wide proceedings.”
(Id.)
The Court also noted that in light of AT&T Mobility, the
Court could not infer “the SCRA’s tacit supersession or
predominance over” the Federal Arbitration Act.
(Id. at 13.)
Second, Plaintiff also argued that the arbitration clause
was unconscionable under New Jersey law relying on the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s decision in Muhammad v. Cty. Bank of Rehoboth
Beach, 912 A.2d 88 (N.J. 2006), and the Third Circuit’s decision
in Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009).4
(Op. [Doc. No. 15] 17, June 22, 2011).
The Court considered this
3. In opposing Nissan’s original motion, Plaintiff argued that
“the Third Circuit and the New Jersey Supreme Court have clearly
established[] [that] the FAA does not preclude an examination
into whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable under New
Jersey law.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 13.)
8
argument, but, in light of AT&T Mobility, the Court could not
“find any public interest articulated in this case, either in
connection with the SCRA or New Jersey law, [that] overr[ode] the
clear, unambiguous, and binding class action waiver included in
the parties’ arbitration agreement.”
(Id. at 17.)
The Court
went on to recognize that “New Jersey precedent notwithstanding,
the Court [was] bound by the controlling authority of the United
States Supreme Court.”
II.
(Id.)
STANDARD
In this district, motions for reconsideration are governed
by Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), which provides in relevant part, that
"[a] motion for reconsideration shall be served and filed within
14 days after the entry of the order or judgment on the original
motion by the Judge or Magistrate Judge."
L. CIV. R. 7.1(i).
Rule 7.1(i) further provides that the party moving for
reconsideration must submit a "brief setting forth concisely the
matter or controlling decisions which the party believes the
Judge or Magistrate Judge has overlooked[.]"
L. CIV . R. 7.1(i).
A motion for reconsideration under Rule 7.1(i) is "'an extremely
limited procedural vehicle,' and requests pursuant to th[is]
rule[] are to be granted 'sparingly.'"
Langan Eng'g & Envtl.
Servs., Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., No. 07-2983, 2008 WL 4330048,
at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2008) (citing P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt.
9
LLC v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.J. 1992)).
The purpose of a motion for reconsideration "'is to correct
manifest errors of law or fact or to present newly discovered
evidence.'"
Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v.
Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
In seeking reconsideration, the moving party bears a heavy burden
and the motion can only be granted if the party "shows at least
one of the following grounds: (1) an intervening change in the
controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that was
not available when the court granted the motion for summary
judgment; or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or fact
or to prevent manifest injustice."
Id.
However, reconsideration is not appropriate where the motion
only raises a party's disagreement with the Court's initial
decision.
Florham Park Chevron, Inc. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.,
680 F. Supp. 159, 163 (D.N.J. 1988); see also Schiano v. MBNA
Corp., No. 05-CV-1771, 2006 WL 3831225, *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2006)
("Mere disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that
the Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law, ..., and
should be dealt with through the normal appellate process[.]")
(citations omitted); United States v. Compaction Sys. Corp., 88
F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (D.N.J. 1999) ("Mere disagreement with a
court's decision normally should be raised through the appellate
process and is inappropriate on a motion for
10
[reconsideration].").
Accordingly, "courts in this District
routinely deny motions for reconsideration that simply re-argue
the original motion."
Altana Pharma AG v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.,
No. 04-2355, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 1, 2009).
III. ANALYSIS
In the present motion,5 Plaintiff argues that
reconsideration is proper and should be granted because the Court
overlooked “matters relating to the contractual terms” as well as
“decisions relat[ing] to this Court’s ability to void a class
action waiver under federal law and state law[.]”
Br. 4.)
(Pl.’s Recons.
According to Plaintiff, proper consideration of these
matter and decisions reasonably would have altered the result
reached in the June 22, 2011 Opinion.
(Id.)
Plaintiff identifies two specific issues the Court should
reconsider in the present motion: (1) “[w]hether AT&T Mobility
forecloses the Application of State Law to an Arbitration
Agreement When Such Application Neither Manufactures a Result
5. Local Rule 7.1(i) requires that a brief offered in support of
a motion for reconsideration “set[] forth concisely the matter or
controlling decisions which the party believes the Judge ... has
overlooked[.]” L. Civ. R. 7.1(i) (emphasis added). Here, we are
of the view that the brief in support of Plaintiff’s motion is
anything but concise. Despite Plaintiff’s arguable failure to
comply with the requirement of Rule 7.1(i), the Court has fully
considered all of Plaintiff’s arguments, however nuanced they may
be, in denying the present motion for reconsideration. For the
sake of clarity and brevity, the Court does not set forth each
argument in this Opinion.
11
Inconsistent with the Parties’ Express Agreement nor
Fundamentally Alters the Dispute Resolution Process Against the
Wishes of the Parties[?]” and (2) Plaintiff’s contention that
“this Court has the authority to void the class action waiver in
arbitration even in the absence of express statutory authority
under the SCRA[.]”
(Id. at 9, 13.)
Plaintiff also asserts that
contrary to the June 22, 2011 Opinion, “the application of New
Jersey precedent to void the class action waiver is not preempted
by AT&T Mobility under the facts of this case[.]”
(Id. at 2.)
With respect to the first issue, Plaintiff argues generally
that “application of Muhammad does not stand as an obstacle to
the intent of Congress as embodied in the FAA[.]”
(Id. at 9.)
Plaintiff asserts that unlike the circumstances of AT&T Mobility,
the parties here “consented to the application of state law” and
have contractually stipulated that if the “class action waiver is
otherwise voidable under [New Jersey’s] public policy, the
parties hav[e] consented to proceed[] in court and not as an
individual arbitration[.]”
(Id. at 9-10.)
Plaintiff contends
that a proper and complete reading of the parties’ agreement
demonstrates that Plaintiff is simply “seeking to hold Nissan to
its contractual assent to representative litigation proceeding in
court.”
(Id. at 11.)
Thus, Plaintiff argues that “the parties
have an agreement that if the class action waiver is voidable
(under Muhammad) then the parties agree to proceed as a class
12
action in court.”
(Id.)
Plaintiff’s argument is multi-layered - asserting that (1)
the Court may properly find the class action waiver
unconscionable under New Jersey law, and thus voidable from the
lease agreement, despite the Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T
Mobility; and (2) to the extent the Court finds the class action
waiver is voidable under New Jersey law, the parties may still
proceed with class wide claims in court.
However, Plaintiff’s
argument – that he maintains the right to proceed with class wide
claims for relief in the judicial forum, as opposed to the
arbitration forum - has previously been considered and rejected
by the Court.
In opposing Nissan’s original motion to compel arbitration,
Plaintiff specifically argued that the “class action waiver ...
only applie[d] to arbitration[.]” (Pl.’s Opp’n 4; see also id. at
11 n.6 (“The class action waiver is not ‘symmetrical’; that is,
it only applies if the arbitration forum is selected, not the
judicial forum.”);6 id. at 12 (arguing that Nissan is “attempting
6. Footnote six continues: “In other words, Nissan did not draft
... [a] contract that contains a blanket class action waiver
regardless of the forum, rather under the guise of a forum
selection clause, Nissan has attempted to contractually confer
upon itself the right to reto-actively ‘defeat’ a putative class
action appropriately filed under the lease in federal court, by
selecting the arbitration forum, then denying the putative class
access to any and all of the arbitration forum’s claim
aggregation procedures that are otherwise available to the
class.” (Pl.’s Opp’n 11 n.6.)
13
to switch this putative class from the forum within which [the
lease agreement] permits class actions [i.e., the judicial forum]
to the forum within which [the lease agreement] does not permit
class actions [i.e., the arbitration forum][.]”); id. at 2
(stating that because “the lease agreement specifically provides
[that] class actions are to be venued in court, and not in
arbitration, plaintiff brought this matter in the present
forum.”)).
The Court fully considered this argument, which attempts to
carve out a specific exemption from the arbitration provision
allowing for class actions brought in court as opposed to in
arbitration.7
This argument, and its slight variation as argued
in the present motion, are insufficient to warrant
reconsideration of the Court’s prior finding that the “class
action waiver” was “clear, unambiguous, and binding ... [as]
included in the parties’ arbitration agreement.”
15] 17, June 22, 2011.)
(Op. [Doc. No.
The Court previously noted the “general
7. While Plaintiff initially argued that the class action waiver
only applied to class wide proceedings brought in arbitration,
but not in court, Plaintiff later contradicted his own argument.
At subsequent points in Plaintiff’s opposition, Plaintiff
contended that “[t]his case is about a contractual provision that
precludes all class-wide remedies for any car leased from
defendant.” (See Pl.’s Opp’n 16) (emphasis added). Plaintiff
specifically noted that in Muhammad the “central issue” was the
fact that the “class-action waiver precluded a class action
‘whether in arbitration or in court litigation.’” (Id.) (citation
omitted). Plaintiff then argued that this “is precisely what the
[class action waiver] at issue in this matter, on its face,
mandates.” (Id.)
14
breadth” of the arbitration provision, which provides that “‘any
claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise
... shall, at your or our election be resolved by neutral,
binding arbitration and not by court action[,]’” and found that
provision was “indeed expansive[.]”8
(Id. at 9.)
In this motion for reconsideration, Plaintiff merely
presents his disagreement with the Court’s determination that the
arbitration provision — and by extension its class action waiver
— are broad and expansive.
Plaintiff is simply re-arguing that
the same narrow interpretation of the class action waiver he
presented in opposition to Nissan’s original motion should govern
this action.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet the standard
to warrant reconsideration of the Court’s June 22, 2011 Opinion
on this issue.
Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff argues that despite the
Supreme Court’s holding in AT&T Mobility, the Court may, properly
apply New Jersey precedent to void the class action waiver
because Muhammad is not preempted by the FAA,9 this argument has
8. The only limitation the Court found with regard to the
expansive breadth of this arbitration provision was that the
provision “lacked sufficient specificity and clarity” to “inform
a potential consumer that even the validity of the arbitration
clause itself must be decided by the arbitrator” as opposed to
the Court. (Op. [Doc. No. 15] 9-10, June 22, 2011.)
9. Plaintiff contends that Defendant initially “[c]onced[ed] the
application of Muhammad” and “took the straightforward legal
position that New Jersey would enforce the class action
waiver[.]” (Pl.’s Recons. Br. 1 n.1.) Plaintiff argues that
15
been completely foreclosed to Plaintiff by controlling precedent
from the Supreme Court and now from the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals.
On remand from the Supreme Court after AT&T Mobility,
the Third Circuit in Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225 (3d
Cir. 2011), specifically determined that the FAA preempts the New
Nissan “did not raise any preemption-based arguments regarding
[the] state precedent at issue here ... under the FAA.” (Id.)
Plaintiff is correct in noting that Nissan did not make an FAA
preemption argument in the original motion to compel arbitration,
but Plaintiff overstates the import of Nissan’s apparent failure
to assert preemption at the outset.
At the time Nissan filed the motion to compel arbitration on
September 17, 2010, controlling precedent from the Third Circuit
held that the FAA did not preempt the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
holding in Muhammad. See Homa v. American Express Co., 558 F.3d
225, 229-30 (3d Cir. 2009). Subsequently, the Supreme Court
decided AT&T Mobility on April 27, 2011, and pursuant to that
opinion, vacated a May 2010 opinion and order entered by the
Third Circuit which relied on the holding in Homa. See Cellco
P’ship v. Litman, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011).
On remand, the Third Circuit considered anew “whether the FAA
preempts the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Muhammad.”
Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 655 F.3d 225, 230 (3d Cir. 2011). In
August of 2011, the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Litman
holding that Homa had been abrogated by the Supreme Court’s
decision in AT&T Mobility and that Muhammad’s holding was in fact
preempted by the FAA. Id.
Accordingly, at the time Nissan filed the motion to compel
arbitration, Homa precluded from Nissan from arguing that the FAA
preempted Muhammad. Had Defendant asserted a preemption based
argument at the outset when Homa precluded the same, Nissan or
its counsel could reasonably have been subject to sanctions for
violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b)(2) by asserting
legal contentions which were not warranted by existing law. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
Moreover, within just two weeks of the Supreme Court’s ruling
in AT&T Mobility, Defendant submitted a letter brief [Doc. No.
14] specifically asserting a preemption argument because, for the
first time, the law reasonably supported Nissan’s position.
Plaintiff chose not to file any response or objection to Nissan’s
letter brief outlining the holding in AT&T Mobility.
16
Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Muhammad.
230.
Litman, 655 F.3d at
The Third Circuit explained that the holding in AT&T
Mobility is “both broad and clear: a state law that seeks to
impose class arbitration despite a contractual agreement for
individualized arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore
preempted by, the FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration
‘is desirable for unrelated reasons.’”
Litman, 655 F.3d at 231
(citing AT&T Mobility, 131 S. Ct. at 1753).
Thus, Plaintiff in
this action can no longer rely on Muhammad, as the Third Circuit
has clearly held the FAA preempts10 this New Jersey precedent.11
With respect to Plaintiff’s argument the Court has the
authority to void the class action waiver in the arbitration
10. The Third Circuit recently reaffirmed the broad holding in
Litman and concluded that under AT&T Mobility, a Pennsylvania law
similar to the New Jersey law in Muhammad was also preempted by
the FAA. Quilloin v. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc., --F.3d. ---, No. 11-1393, 2012 WL 833742, at *9 (3d Cir. Mar. 14,
2012).
11. Additionally, to the extent Plaintiff contends that the
lease agreement stipulates that if the class action waiver is
voidable under New Jersey law, the parties may proceed with
litigation in court, Litman similarly forecloses that argument.
The plaintiffs in Litman made virtually the same argument, which
the Third Circuit explicitly rejected. 655 F.3d at 231 n.8
(“Second, [the plaintiffs] argue that they should be allowed to
proceed to litigation because the Agreements' say that ‘if for
some reason the prohibition on class arbitrations ... is deemed
unenforceable, then the agreement to arbitrate will not apply.’
... As [the plaintiffs] see it, that provision was triggered by
Muhammad. However, because Muhammad is preempted by the FAA, it
is inapplicable here and cannot trigger that provision.”)
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument in this case also fails.
17
provision even in the absence of express statutory authority
under the SCRA, the Court specifically addressed this issue in
ruling on Nissan’s original motion.
Plaintiff fails to submit
any authority binding on this Court that warrants reconsideration
on this issue.
The Court previously noted that if “the SCRA
guarantee[d] service members the right to a class-wide proceeding
to vindicate their statutory benefits, then that [was] not ...
made apparent to the Court.”
2011.)
(Op. [Doc. No. 15] 14, June 22,
Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the SCRA guarantees
the right of servicemembers to enforce their rights under this
statutory scheme by virtue of a class-wide proceeding.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff's motion fails
to set "forth concisely the matter or controlling decisions
which" Plaintiff believes the Court overlooked.
7.1(i).
See L. CIV. R.
It is clear that the present motion for reconsideration
simply represents Plaintiff's disagreement with the Court's
initial decision and constitutes an attempt to re-argue
Plaintiff’s prior opposition arguments.
Plaintiff’s disagreement
alone is insufficient to establish that the Court overlooked
relevant facts or controlling law in granting summary judgment
for Defendant.
See Schiano, 2006 WL 3831225, *2 ("Mere
disagreement with the Court will not suffice to show that the
Court overlooked relevant facts or controlling law, ..., and
should be dealt with through the normal appellate process[.]")
18
(citations omitted).
Furthermore, denial of Plaintiff's motion
for reconsideration is appropriate given that the motion simply
re-argues the same contentions asserted by Plaintiff in
opposition to Nissan’s original motion to compel arbitration.
See Altana Pharma AG, 2009 WL 5818836, at *1.
In light of the
recognition in this District that a motion for reconsideration is
"an extremely limited procedural vehicle" and that such requests
should be granted "sparingly", the Court finds that Plaintiff
fails to meet the standard for reconsideration, and the motion
for reconsideration must be denied.
See Langan, 2008 WL 4330048,
at *1.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration [Doc. No. 17] is denied.
An order consistent
with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: March 29, 2012
At Camden, New Jersey
/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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