PROVENZANO v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
10
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/31/2011. (TH, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AMY PROVENZANO,
HON. JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10-4460 (JBS)
v.
OPINION
COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Robert Anthony Petruzzelli, Esq.
JACOBS, SCHWALBE & PETRUZZELLI, PC
Woodcrest Pavilion
10 Melrose Avenue Suite 340
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003
Attorney for Plaintiff
Paul J. Fishman
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY
By: Karen T. Callahan
Special Assistant United States Attorney
Social Security Administration
Office of the General Counsel
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Attorney for Defendant
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
I.
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), to review the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration, denying the application of
Plaintiff Amy Provenzano for Disability Insurance Benefits and
Supplemental Security Income.
At issue in this case is whether
there is substantial evidence in the record that was fully and
fairly developed to support the Administrative Law Judge's
("ALJ") determination that Provenzano's impairments were not
severe enough to qualify her as disabled under the Social
Security Act.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will
vacate and remand because the ALJ did not properly consider the
effects of Provenzano's medication on her residual functional
capacity.
II.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Amy Provenzano, was born on August 19, 1970 and
currently lives in Bridgeton, New Jersey.
Provenzano is a high
school graduate with vocational training in cosmetology.
174.
R. 43,
She worked in cosmetology on and off for ten or fifteen
years until August 8, 2006.
R. 44.
On December 24, 2006, Provenzano was injured in a motor
vehicle accident, and on February 14, 2007 she slipped and fell,
injuring herself.
R. 20-21.
On March 21, 2007, Provenzano filed
concurrent claims for disability insurance benefits and
Supplemental Security Income.
Provenzano alleged that the onset
of her disability was August 5, 2006 based on her bipolar
disorder, and also cited her more recent injuries as a result of
the motor vehicle accident and slip and fall incident.
2
R. 135-
47, 164, 169.
The Commissioner of Social Security has promulgated
regulations for determining whether a claimant is disabled.
C.F.R. § 416.920.1
20
It is the claimant's burden to show that he
or she is severely impaired, and either that the severe
impairment meets or equals a listed impairment and lasts for the
requisite duration, or that it prevents the claimant from
performing the claimant's past work.
Wallace v. Secretary of
Health and Human Services, 722 F.2d 1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).
If the claimant meets those burdens by a preponderance of the
evidence, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving that other
work is available for the claimant.
775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987).
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d
Ultimately, entitlement to benefits is
dependent upon finding the claimant is incapable of performing
work in the national economy.
On August 18, 2009, a hearing was held before an
administrative law judge (ALJ).
The ALJ found that Provenzano
1
The regulations require application of a five-step
sequential analysis. Step one is whether the claimant is not
working and otherwise meets the requirements for Social Security
aid. Step two is whether the claimant suffers from a severe
impairment. Step three is whether the severe impairment meets or
equals a listed impairment and has lasted or is expected to last
for a continuous period of at least twelve months. Step four is
whether the claimant is still able to perform work done in the
past despite the severe impairment. And step five involves an
assessment of the claimant's ability to perform work, age,
education, and past work experience to determine whether or not
the claimant is capable of performing other work which exists in
the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).
3
met the status requirements of the Act through December 31, 2010,
R. 149-156, and that Provenzano had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since August 5, 2006, the alleged onset date.
The ALJ also found that Provenzano suffers from severe
impairments, including lumbosacral sprain/strain and bipolar
disorder.
However, the ALJ determined that these impairments do not
meet or equal the criteria of any of the impairments listed in
the regulations.
And, rejecting some of Provenzano's testimony
about her limitations, R. 33., the ALJ found that Provenzano had
the residual functional capacity to perform exertional demands of
light work with limitations.2
The ALJ stated that Provenzano's
past relevant work as a hairstylist did not require the
performance of work functions precluded by her impairments.
The
ALJ also found, in the alternative, that there are jobs that
exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Provenzano could perform, such as Food and Beverage Order Clerk
and Addresser.
Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that
Provenzano was not disabled from August 5, 2006 through September
2
The ALJ qualified Provenzano's residual functional
capacity as maximum lifting of 20 pounds and frequent lifting of
10 pounds. Also, the ALJ found that Provenzano can stand and/or
walk for six hours in an eight hour workday; can sit for six
hours in an 8 hour workday; has no communicative, visual,
manipulative, or environmental restrictions; can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl,
but can never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds.
4
17, 2009.
The Appeals Council denied Provenzano's request for
review on July 17, 2010.
R. 1-3.
On this appeal, Provenzano makes several arguments
contesting the ALJ's findings.3
Provenzano argues: (1) that her
symptoms of pain should have been considered a severe impairment,
and that even if not itself an impairment, her pain limits her
residual functional capacity more than the ALJ found; (2) that
the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and weigh certain pieces of
medical evidence in determining Provenzano's residual functional
capacity; and (3) that the ALJ erred in finding that Provenzano's
residual functional capacity was sufficient, even as determined
by the ALJ, for her to return to work as a hairdresser or to
perform other jobs.
III.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
This Court is empowered by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the
Commissioner's decision to deny benefits.
See Ventura v.
Shalala, 55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
The Court must uphold
the Commissioner's factual findings where they are supported by
3
Plaintiff's brief
often with no more than a
unrelated paragraph. The
address each argument; to
unaddressed it is because
Plaintiff's submissions.
makes arguments in scattershot fashion,
conclusory sentence buried in an
Court has done its best to identify and
the extent any argument is left
it was not sufficiently developed in
5
"substantial evidence."
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001).
Substantial evidence means more than "a mere scintilla."
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
It
means "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion."
Id.
To facilitate this Court's review, the ALJ must set out a
specific factual basis for each finding.
Baerga v. Richardson,
500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975).
Additionally, the ALJ "must adequately explain in the record
[the] reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence."
Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
B. Pain as severe impairment
Provenzano appears to argue that the ALJ erred by not
considering her pain as a separate severe impairment.
is considered a symptom of other conditions.
But pain
Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066, 1070 (3d Cir. 1984).
See Green v.
Evaluation of
subjective complaints of pain therefore involves the
identification of some objective condition that could reasonably
produce the pain, and if identified, then an assessment of
whether that condition meets a listing, and if not, what
limitations that condition, including the symptoms of pain,
6
impose on an individual.
proceeded.
This is precisely how the ALJ
The ALJ concluded that the source of Provenzano's
pain, her lumbosacral sprain/strain, was a severe impairment
affecting her ability to perform basic work activities, but did
not meet or exceed a listed condition.
R. 15.
Then the ALJ
considered the severity of Plaintiff's pain and the extent to
which it limits her residual functional capacity, as discussed
below.
The Court discerns no error with respect to the ALJ's
treatment of Provenzano's pain in steps two and three.
C.
Assessment of residual functional capacity
Provenzano argues that the ALJ's opinion failed to properly
assess her residual functional capacity on a function-by-function
basis when determining her ability to return to work as a
hairdresser and to perform other work.
See SSR 96-8p(4).
In
fact, the ALJ did offer a function-by-function assessment of
Provenzano's physical and mental limitations.
The ALJ found
that:
The claimant retains the residual functional
capacity to perform the exertional demands of
light work, or work which requires maximum
lifting of twenty pounds and frequent lifting
often pounds (20 CFR 404.1567 and 416.967).
The claimant's capacity for light work is
diminished
by
significant
additional
limitations as she is able to lift/carry ten
pounds
frequently
and
twenty
pounds
occasionally; can stand and/or walk for six
hours in an eight hour workday; is able to sit
for six hours in an eight hour workday; has no
7
communicative,
visual,
manipulative,
or
environmental restrictions; can occasionally
climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, kneel,
crouch, and crawl, but can never climb
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; is able to
understand, remember and carry out detailed
instructions; can work in coordination with or
proximity to others without being distracted
by them; is able to interact appropriately
with
the
general
public;
can
accept
instructions and respond appropriately to
criticism from supervisors; is able to get
along
with
coworkers
or
peers
without
distracting them or exhibiting behavioral
extremes; can maintain socially appropriate
behavior and adhere to basic standards of
neatness and cleanliness; and is aware of
normal hazards and can take appropriate
precautions.
R. 33-34.
This description addresses all of the functions the
ALJ is required to consider under SSR 96-8p(4), as set forth in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1545.
Provenzano also makes several arguments regarding the ALJ's
support for these findings, which the Court will address pointby-point below.
Generally, the ALJ may not ignore his duty to
consider all the medical evidence and must provide adequate
reasons for dismissing or discarding evidence.
Ackers v.
Calahan, 997 F. Supp. 648 (W.D. Pa. 1998); Cotter v. Harris, 642
F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981).
And the ALJ may not substitute his
opinion for that of a physician without providing a basis for his
conclusions.
(D.N.J. 1997).
Schoenwolf v. Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 287
Instead, the ALJ is required to set forth a
"clear and satisfactory" explanation for the basis of his
8
decision.
Terwilliger v. Chater, 945 F. Supp 836 (E.D. Pa.
1996).
1.
Dr. Kessler
Upon examination of Provenzano in August 2007, Dr. Martin
Kessler diagnosed Provenzano with bipolar disorder and spinal
sprains from her accidents, advising total supervised home care
and limitations on Provenzano's physical activities.
R. 368.
He
assessed that the length of Provenzano's disability would be from
August 24, 2007 to October 24, 2007, at which time she will have
recovered.
R. 370.
Most of Dr. Kessler's notes are illegible,
so it is impossible to tell the particular basis for his findings
of temporary disability.
Dr. Kessler again saw Provenzano in December 2007 and found
that Provenzano would be unable to work from December 20, 2007 to
January 17, 2008.
After the December 2007 exam, in addition to
finding that Provenzano would be incapacitated for that temporary
period, Dr. Kessler found that Provenzano had a longer-term
orthopedic disability rating of "Class II," indicating a
functional capacity adequate to conduct normal activities despite
some handicap, discomfort or limited mobility of one or more
joints.
R. 357.
In May 2008, Dr. Kessler filled out a disability evaluation
form which stated that Provenzano's pain was severe enough to be
9
distracting to adequate performance of daily activities or work,
and would increase with physical activity.
R. 349.
Dr. Kessler
opined that Provenzano's pain limited her effectiveness for
sustained work activity and would remain a significant element in
her life.
R. 349.
Dr. Kessler also indicated that medication
side effects limited Provenzano's effectiveness in performing
work duties.
Id.
Provenzano first contends that the ALJ improperly dismissed
the reports that Provenzano was completely incapacitated.
Although the findings were explicitly about some temporary
disability, Provenzano contends that Dr. Kessler's reports
provide a "longitudinal picture" of Provenzano's impairments and
should be used as substantial evidence supporting Provenzano's
alleged disability.
But the ALJ was correct that Dr. Kessler's
reports finding that Provenzano was temporarily disabled do not
adequately support Provenzano's argument that she is disabled as
the term is used by the Social Security Act.
Under the Act, a
disability must last for twelve consecutive months.
See Barnhart
v. Walkton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002) (requiring that a plaintiff be
disabled for a period of twelve consecutive months).
Provenzano's argument that two non-consecutive periods of
temporary disability can be stitched together to create a
"longitudinal picture" of a permanent disability is unpersuasive,
especially in light of the fact that Dr. Kessler was
10
simultaneously assessing Provenzano's long-term condition, and
finding her to not have severely disabling long-term problems.
Provenzano also argues that the ALJ improperly ignored Dr.
Kessler's finding regarding pain.
But the ALJ acknowledged Dr.
Kessler's answers on the disability assessment form regarding
Provenzano's pain.
R. 23.
However, the ALJ determined that the
weight of the objective evidence ran contrary to Dr. Kessler's
assessment:
[T]here is a lack of objective clinical or
laboratory findings to support the degree of
limitation alleged [by Dr. Kessler]; the
record reveals no significant evidence of
neurologic compromise which would affect the
claimant's ability to stand, walk or sit to
the degree as indicated; the assessment is
inconsistent with specific observations and
opinions made on August 24, 2007 and December
1, 2007 by this doctor; his opinion is not
supported by radiological reports documenting
little in the way of significant findings; and
the alleged restrictions due to pain and
side-effects from medications are clearly not
substantiated by the totality of the record,
especially when considering the examination
findings of Dr. W. Scott Williams and
consultative examination reports by Dr. T.1.
Citta-Pietrolungo and Dr. Sharan Rampal in
October 2007.
R. 24.
With the exception of the issue of side effects of
medication, which is discussed below, there is substantial
evidence to support the ALJ's findings in weighing Dr. Kessler's
opinion.
11
2.
Dr. Gonzalez
In October 2007, Jo Anne Gonzalez, Ph.D, performed a mental
health examination of Provenzano.
Provenzano contends that the
ALJ overlooked some of the findings in Dr. Gonzalez's report and
downplayed her findings.
Provenzano told Dr. Gonzalez that she had no "pain-related"
behaviors, but was depressed, anxious and had manic-related
symptoms.
R. 301-02.
Dr. Gonzalez noted that Provenzano was
cooperative, her social skills were adequate, eye contact was
appropriate and she was well groomed.
Provenzano's thought
processes were coherent and goal-directed, and there was no
evidence of any delusions, hallucinations or paranoid tendencies.
While Dr. Gonzalez noted that Provenzano's affect and mood were
anxious, she also found that Provenzano was oriented to time,
place, person and situation.
Provenzano told Dr. Gonzalez that
she was capable of performing self-grooming, cooking simple
foods, managing her money, and socializing.
R. 302.
Summarizing Dr. Gonzalez's opinion, the ALJ found, "It
appears that based solely on the claimant's complaints, she cited
the claimant's prognosis was guarded, as the examination showed
no real problems."
This is correct, or at least a conclusion
based on substantial evidence.
In any case, Dr. Gonzalez's
findings do not contradict the ALJ's assessment of Provenzano's
residual functional capacity.
That the ALJ did not acknowledge
12
every finding made in Dr. Gonzalez's report is irrelevant, as the
ALJ is not obligated to provide a detailed description of all
medical treatment notes.
See Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34,
42 (3d Cir. 2001).
3.
Side effects of medications
Provenzano argues that the ALJ failed to evaluate the
negative side effects of her psychiatric medications.
Provenzano's treatment records and hearing testimony document her
complaints of experiencing fogginess, drowsiness and sedation
from her medications.
Provenzano argues that the ALJ's dismissal
of these complaints was done without proper explanation.
The
Court agrees, as explained below.
Although the ALJ acknowledged Provenzano's testimony that
her medications cause some side effects that may potentially
affect her capacity to work, R. 18-19, the ALJ dismissed this
evidence because of two medical reports noting a lack of side
effects.
R. 21, 26.
But the ALJ misread these reports.
The first report is the April 2007 assessment by Dr.
Kessler, which indicates that Provenzano was not suffering from
any side effects from medication at that time.
However, the
report is referring to a lack of side effects from Provenzano's
use of Tylenol and codeine, not to Provenzano's psychiatric
medications, which she began taking after April 2007.
13
R. 376.
Indeed, Dr. Kessler himself later opined that the medications'
side effects would have a significant affect on Provenzano's
ability to work.
R. 349.
The second report is a statement made
by Dr. Rajalia Prewitt on July 7, 2007 that Provenzano denied
having side effects from the Depakote she was prescribed during
her stay in a mental health facility.
R. 264.
This report also
predates the time when Provenzano began taking the combination of
Abilify, Zyprexa, and Depakote from which she reports drowsiness
and dizziness, among other side effects.
R. 430, 433, 440.
It is not entirely clear to the Court what Provenzano's
regime of medications included during the various periods at
issue in this claim for benefits, but it is clear that the ALJ
did not adequately assess that issue and consider the side
effects of this medication on Provenzano's residual functional
capacity.
Since the actual state of affairs is unclear to the
Court, the decision will be remanded.
On remand, the ALJ should
consider the side effects of Provenzano's medication in addition
to any limitations those effects have on her ability to perform
work, including her ability to work regularly on an assigned
schedule.
See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that the ALJ must analyze all of the evidence in the
record and provide an adequate explanation for disregarding
evidence in order to be affirmed).
14
4.
Dr. Bustos
Provenzano argues that the ALJ failed to consider the
entirety of a mental residual functional capacity assessment
performed by Dr. Nenuca Bustos, M.D., and ignored a section that
describes her limitations.
However, the ALJ properly considered
Dr. Bustos's report.
Dr. Bustos' assessment of Provenzano's mental residual
functional capacity, Section III of the report, found that
Provenzano had the ability to understand, remember, and carry out
instructions, as well as make simple decisions and relate to
others in low demand, simple work.
Ex. 11F.
However, Section I
or the "Summary Conclusion" of Dr. Bustos' report made several
findings that Provenzano was "moderately limited" in several
categories, including her ability to maintain attention and
concentration for extended periods.
Accordingly, Provenzano
argues that the ALJ erred by not addressing the findings of
moderate limitations in Section I of Dr. Bustos' report.
The ALJ did not err in only using Section III of the report
to determine Provenzano's mental RFC.
Section I may be assigned
little or no weight since it is "not the final RFC finding."
Molloy v. Astrue, Civ. No. 08-4801, 2010 WL 421090, at * 11
(D.N.J. Feb. 1, 2010) ("[Section I] of the examination form does
not constitute the RFC assessment but rather is merely a
worksheet to aid employees").
Rather, it is Section III of that
15
form which contains the physician's assessment of a plaintiff's
mental RFC.
See Liggett v. Astrue, No. 08-1913, 2009 WL 189934,
at *4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2009).
Moreover, the medical records do not contradict Dr. Bustos'
findings that Provenzano could understand, remember and follow
simple instructions, make simple decisions, and relate to others
in a low demand, simple work setting.
R. 316, 321.
This
assessment fully supports the ALJ's conclusions concerning
Provenzano's ability to perform unskilled sedentary work.
Accordingly, the record does not indicate that Provenzano's
mental abilities were more limited than what the ALJ found and
presented to the vocational expert.4
5.
Severity of pain
Provenzano contends that the ALJ improperly ignored both the
evidence of the severity of her pain as well as the effect that
less-severe pain would have on her ability to work.
However, it
is clear from the ALJ's opinion that the ALJ considered all the
relevant factors and made a conclusion based on substantial
4
It also follows that the ALJ was not required to provide
an explanation for why Dr. Bustos' specific findings were not
included in Provenzano's mental RFC because Dr. Bustos' findings
were consistent with the hypothetical posed to the vocational
expert.
16
evidence.5
After considering the objective record, the ALJ found
that Provenzano's alleged severity of pain was not supported by
objective medical evidence.
Specifically, the objective medical evidence includes
multiple examinations showing no herniation and normal lumbar
spine (Ex. 15F, 23F); the fact that Provenzano was only
prescribed relatively mild pain medication and had full range of
motion of the cervical spine and good range of motion of the
lumbar spine (Ex. 15F); evidence that Provenzano did not seek
treatment for her pain consistently, R. 29;6 and the fact that
Provenzano was independent in self-grooming, she cooked simple
foods, managed her money, socialized with friends, and enjoyed
watching television.7
5
The regulatory factors are: 1) claimant's daily
activities; 2) the location, duration, frequency, and intensity
of the pain and symptoms; 3) precipitating and aggravating
factors; 4) type, dosage, effectiveness and side effects of any
medications taken to alleviate the pain and symptoms; 5)
treatment other than medication; 6) any measures used to relieve
the pain or other symptoms; and 7) other factors concerning
functional limitations and restrictions due to pain and symptoms.
Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.2d 358, 362 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing §
404.1529(c)).
6
See Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1068 (3d Cir. 1992)
(finding that the ALJ's consideration of the fact that a claimant
did not seek medical treatment for pain was sufficient to
diminish claimant's credibility).
7
See Conklin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2010 WL 2680278, *6
(D.N.J. June 30, 2010) (upholding the ALJ's determination that
plaintiff's daily activities conflicted with her alleged severity
of pain, and thereby diminished plaintiff's credibility); Burns
v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002).
17
The ALJ determined that Provenzano's pain did not produce
any exertional or non-exertional limitation preventing her from
performing a broad range of light work.
R. 30.
There is
substantial evidence to support the ALJ's determination that
Provenzano's level of pain was not severe enough to impair her
beyond the level of functional capacity found by the ALJ.
See
Giese v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 251 F. App'x 799, 803 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding that the ALJ's rejection of claimant's subjective
allegations was supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ
weighed conflicting evidence and explained her rejection by using
multiple doctor reports).8
D.
Assessment of particular job listings
Provenzano argues that the ALJ should have found her unable
to perform work as a hairdresser because of the requirements
necessary to learn the job.
But the ALJ found that Provenzano
had already learned the skills necessary for the work in her
years previously employed as a hairdresser, and therefore did not
need to re-learn the necessary skills.
R. 31.
Provenzano also
argues that ALJ erred in finding that Provenzano has the RFC to
8
Provenzano also argues that the ALJ erred in disregarding
the vocational expert's response to the hypothetical
incorporating Provenzano's alleged severity of pain as a
limitation. But since the ALJ ultimately concluded that
Provenzano lacked such limitations, the expert's response was
irrelevant.
18
perform the exertional demands of light work "diminished by
significant additional limitations" because the ALJ did not
specify what those additional limitations are.
This argument is
meritless, as the ALJ specifically sets forth Provenzano's
additional limitations.
R. 33-34.
Provenzano also contends that the ALJ erred when finding
that Provenzano could, in the alternative, perform the jobs of
addresser or food and beverage clerk.
Provenzano asserts that a
conflict existed between the jobs identified by the vocational
expert and the description of those jobs in the Dictionary of
Occupational Titles in that the jobs require a reasoning level of
two, which exceeds her abilities.
The Dictionary of Occupational
Titles indicates that a Reasoning Development level of two only
requires a person to "[a]pply commonsense understanding to carry
out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions."
A job
requiring level two would not contradict the mandate that
Provenzano's work be simple, routine and repetitive.
While level
three reasoning has been found to be inconsistent with the
ability to perform only simple, routine, and repetitive tasks,
this Circuit recognizes that level two is consistent with an RFC
for simple repetitive work.
See Hackett v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d
1168, 1176 (finding that level three reasoning level is not
consistent with simple, repetitive work, but level two reasoning
level is consistent); see also Money v. Barnhart, 91 Fed. App'x
19
201, 215 (3d Cir. 2004) ("A reasoning requirement of two does not
contradict work that is "simple, routine and repetitive.").
IV.
CONCLUSION
Most of the ALJ's contested findings are supported by
substantial evidence.
The ALJ erred, however, when considering
the side effects of Provenzano's medications by relying on
statements from physicians that did not address the drugs in
question.
Because more fact-finding is needed on this issue, the
Court will vacate and remand this case to the ALJ.
The
accompanying Order will be entered.
August 31, 2011
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
United States District Judge
20
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