PERRI v. RESORTS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. et al

Filing 68

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 66 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio on 10/17/2013. (TH, )

[Doc. No. 66]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

DOMINIC PERRI,
Civil No. 10-4489 (AMD)
Plaintiff,
v.
RESORTS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL,
INC.
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This

matter

comes

before

the

Court

by

way

of

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil

Procedure

59.

The

Court

has

considered

the

parties'

submissions and decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78.

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court

denies Plaintiff's motion.
The trial in this matter involved a claim for damages
by Plaintiff, Dominic Perri, for injuries allegedly sustained
when he fell from a stool at a casino owned and operated by
Defendant

Resorts

International

Hotel,

Incorporated.

Specifically, on September 2, 2008, Plaintiff was seated at a
stool in front of a slot machine at Resorts Casino in Atlantic

City, New Jersey, when the stool “gave way” and caused Mr. Perri
“to fall to the floor.” (Trial Brief (hereinafter, “Pl.'s Trial
Br.”)

[Doc.

“Def.'s

No.

Trial

28],

Br.”)

1;

see

[Doc.

also

No.

Trial

33],

Brief

1-2.)

(hereinafter,

Plaintiff

claimed

damages from Defendant for past medical bills, past and future
pain, suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment
of life. (See generally Complaint [Doc. No. 1], 6-7.)
Prior

to

trial,

Defendant

stipulated

to

(Joint Final Pretrial Order [Doc. No. 23], 5, 13.)

liability.
On May 20,

2013, the matter proceeded to trial before a jury on the issues
of causation and damages. 1 Plaintiff presented three witnesses
during the Plaintiff’s case.

Plaintiff’s partner Larry Richman

testified

regarding

Plaintiff’s

pain.

Christian

I.

Dr.

surgical
M.D.,

treatment

Transcript),

of

Fras,
spinal

testified

fall,

an

injury,

orthopedic

disorders,
regarding

and

continued

subspecialist

(Christian
Plaintiff’s

I.

in

Fras,

fall

and

injury. Dr. Fras testified with respect to the presence of an
injury
41:15),

to

Plaintiff's

testified

back,

that

the

(Id.

at

September

1

26:9-19,
2,

37:6-14,

2008

fall

38:8caused

The parties consented to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b),
and Rule 73.1 of the Local Civil Rules for the United States
District Court, District of New Jersey.
(See Consent to
Jurisdiction [Doc. No. 22], 1.)
2

Plaintiff’s injuries, (Id. at 26:20-27:10), and that Plaintiff's
injuries were consistent with Plaintiff’s assertions of pain.
(Id. at 45:17-56:1, 57:4-59:2.)

Dr. Fras also noted a 2006

complaint of back pain set forth in Plaintiff’s medical records.
(Id.

at

28:3-20,

29:17-22.)

Thereafter,

Plaintiff

testified

regarding his back injury, his pain and the injury’s effect on
his life. Defense counsel cross-examined Plaintiff and presented
two short surveillance videos taken of Plaintiff shortly after
the incident.
The
Trager,

an

defense

presented

one

witness,

orthopedic

(Stuart

Dr.

Transcript.)

surgeon.
testified

by

Trager

Dr.

L.

way

of

Trager,
video

concerning his medical evaluation of Plaintiff.
with

respect

regarding

a

treatment,

to

the

prior
(Id.

notation

fall

at

for

in

Plaintiff’s

which

33:10-34:8,

Plaintiff

34:16-35:2,

Stuart

L.

M.D.,

testimony

He testified

medical

records

sought

medical

35:12-35:17),

in

addition to testifying that Plaintiff's MRI showed evidence of a
chronic
that,

back
based

regarding

condition,
upon

his

whether

the

(Id.

at

review,
fall

38:3-39:5,
medical

on

On

May

21,

2013,

the

uncertainty

September

Plaintiff's current physical complaints.

39:22-40:21),

2,

2008

and

remained
caused

(Id. at 41:20-42:22.)

parties

presented

closing

arguments to the jury, (see Minute Entry [Doc. No. 56], 1), and
3

on

May

22,

2013,

the

Court

charged

the

jury.

(See

Jury

Instructions [Doc. No. 58], 13-18.) During deliberations, the
jury asked the Court the following question:

"Does a yes answer

for question #1 2 mandate a cash reward for both medical & pain
suffering? Or can we reward only one or the other?" (Jury Note
and Court Response [Doc. No. 59], 1.)

After a conference with

counsel on the record, but outside the presence of the jury, the
Court

ruled

provided

to

evaluated

that

following

jury:

the

the

"[e]ach

separately

in

written
claim

accordance

response

for

with

would

be

must

be

damages

the

instructions

I

previously gave you." (Id.)
On May 22, 2013, the jury found that "the injuries
claimed

by

the

Plaintiff

Dominic

Perri

were

caused

by

the

negligence of Resorts International Hotel, Inc. d/b/a Resorts
Casino & Hotel," (Jury Verdict Sheet [Doc. No. 60], 1), and
awarded Plaintiff $13,817.47 3 for Plaintiff's past medical bills,
but

zero

dollars

for

past

and

future

pain,

suffering,

2. Question one of the jury verdict sheet stated: "Has the
plaintiff Dominic Perri proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff Dominic
Perri were caused by the negligence of Resorts International
Hotel, Inc. d/b/a Resorts Casino & Hotel?" (Jury Verdict [Doc.
No. 60], 1.)
3. By letter dated June 5, 2013, the parties submitted a joint
proposed judgment in the amount of $2,310.44 (see Letter [Doc.
No. 63], 1), which judgment the Court entered on June 11, 2013.
4

disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life. (Id.)
Before the Court excused the jury, Plaintiff’s counsel made an
oral application for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 49. The Court denied the application and the
present motion followed. (See Minute Entry [Doc. No. 57], 1.)
In his motion for a new trial, Plaintiff asserts that,
"[t]hese

verdicts

by

the

jury

contained

irreconcilable

inconsistencies" and support the grant of a new trial. (Brief in
Support

of

Plaintiff’s

Motion

for

a

New

Trial

(hereinafter,

"Pl.'s Br.") [Doc. No. 66-1], 1-2, 4.) Plaintiff asserts that
"the

jury

returned

an

answer

wholly

inconsistent

with

the

remainder of the verdict when they found that - despite the
existence of all of the injuries claimed by [P]laintiff and the
necessity

of

[P]laintiff

all
did

of
not

[P]laintiff's
experience

past

pain,

medical

bills

suffering,

-

the

disability,

impairment, or lost enjoyment of life for one scintilla of a
second."

(Id.

at

3.)

Plaintiff

asserts

that

"[i]t

is

simply

inconsistent and irreconcilable for the jury to find that all of
the injuries claimed by [P]laintiff did indeed exist, but at no
time did those injuries cause any pain, suffering, disability,
impairment, or lost enjoyment of life." (Id. at 4) (emphasis in

(Clerk's Judgment [Doc. No. 64], 1.)
5

original.) In light of these allegedly inconsistent findings,
and in reliance on Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem. Hosp., 958 F.2d
525 (2nd Cir. 1992) and Love v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 841
A.2d 931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), Plaintiff seeks a new
trial. (Pl.'s Br. at 4.)
In response to the motion, Defendant asserts that "it
is not inherently inconsistent for a jury to award a plaintiff
his past medical expenses and not any amount for past pain and
suffering."

(Defendant's

Brief

in

Opposition

to

Plaintiff’s

Motion for a New Trial (hereinafter, "Def.'s Opp'n") [Doc. No.
67],

6.)

included
suffered

Defendant
the

notes

cause

any

of

that
the

significant

the

contested

injuries
pain

and

issues

whether

thereafter."

at

trial

"plaintiff

(Id.

at

5.)

Specifically, Defendant asserts that "[i]t was brought before
the

jury

experts

by
that

the

testimony

the

plaintiff

of

the

plaintiff

underwent

five

and

two

medical

physical

therapy

sessions and no other real treatment." (Id. at 5-6.) Defendant
further

asserts

that

"[i]t

was

shown

to

the

jury

plaintiff had a pre-existing condition." (Id. at 5.)

that

the

Therefore,

because “the jury clearly heard all testimony, understood the
instructions

and

deliberated

without

incident,”

Defendant

contends that the jury’s finding “must stand.” (Id. at 7.) In
support thereof, Defendant relies on Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores,
6

Inc., 967 F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), Penney v. Praxair,
Inc., 116 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1997), and Kerzner v. Global
Upholstery Co., Ltd., No. 95-1209, 1997 WL 727692, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 19, 1997). (See Def.’s Br. [Doc. No. 67], 4-5.)
Federal

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

59

sets

forth

the

conditions under which a new trial may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P.
59. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides in pertinent
part:
The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or
some of the issues--and to any party--as follows:
(A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law
in federal court[.]
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1).
In Monaco v. Camden, 366 F. App'x 330 (3d Cir. 2010),
the Third Circuit delineated the requisite inquiry with respect
to

whether

an

allegedly

inconsistent

verdict

warrants

a

new

trial. “[A] court may order a new trial based on inconsistent
verdicts only if ‘no rational jury could have brought back the
verdicts that were returned.’” Id. at 331 (quoting Pearson v.
Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and
citations omitted)). Specifically, “when one party challenges a
jury's verdicts as inconsistent, the court has an obligation
first to ‘attempt to reconcile the jury's findings’ to determine

7

‘whether the jury could have, consistent with its instructions,
rendered

the

challenged

verdicts.’”

Id.

at

331-32

(quoting

Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 109 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted); see also Gallick v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108,
119

(1963)

(“[I]t

is

the

duty

of

the

courts

to

attempt

to

harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of
them: ‘Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's
answers

to

special

interrogatories

consistent,

they

must

be

resolved that way.’”) (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)). Moreover,
“[i]n
must

undertaking
“‘view

the

to

read

facts

in

the

verdicts

the

light

consistently,”

most

favorable

courts
to

the

verdict.’” Monaco, 366 F. App'x at 332 (quoting Davignon, 524
F.3d at 109).
In

considering

the

standard

governing

inconsistent

verdicts, the Court must also review the nature of the action.
Where, as here, the issue involves a pain and suffering verdict,
the Court has “less freedom to scrutinize the jury’s verdict[,]”
Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir.
1991), because "[a] determination regarding pain and suffering
is 'peculiarly within the province of the jury.'" Kerzner v.
Global Upholstery Co., Ltd., No. 95-1209, 1997 WL 727692, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1997) (quoting Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d
8

1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1988)).
In this case, because the Court has jurisdiction by
way of diversity, the Court’s analysis begins by examining New
Jersey

"state

law

to

determine

the

adequacy

of

damages[.]"

Kerzner, 1997 WL 727692, at n.3. In this regard, the Court finds
the

New

Jersey

appellate

division's

holdings

in

Watts

v.

Procopio, No. L-2622-08, 2012 WL 4069477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Sept. 18, 2012) and Kozma v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 990 A.2d
679 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 19, 2010) instructive to the
Court’s analysis. In Watts, plaintiff sustained injuries from a
head-on

motor

vehicle

trial,

defendant

collision.

admitted

2012

liability.

WL

4069477,

Id.

at

Thus,

*1.

the

At

jury

considered whether the accident proximately caused the injuries
and the amount of any damages. Id. at *3. The jury found "that
plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she
sustained

injuries

that

were

proximately

caused

by

the

accident." Id. However, "[t]he jury answered 'zero,' by a five
to one vote, to the question: 'What amount of money will fairly
and reasonably compensate plaintiff for all injuries that were
proximately caused by the accident?'" Id. The lower court denied
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or additur, and an appeal
followed. Id. at *1. The New Jersey appellate division noted the
conflicting

testimony

with

respect
9

to

the

severity

of

the

injuries and the lasting effects of such injuries. Id. at *4-*5.
However, the court found that the record "satisfied [the court]
that the evidence was such that the jury could reasonably have
found that plaintiff sustained injuries as the result of the
collision at issue, but that the injuries were de minimis and
did

not

warrant

compensation.”

Id.

at

*5

(citing

Kozma

v.

Starbucks Coffee Co., 990 A.2d 679 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010)).

Specifically, the court noted that the jury could have

been influenced by, among other factors, the limited nature of
plaintiff’s medical treatment subsequent to the accident. Id. at
*4. Moreover, the appellate division rejected the applicability
of Love, see supra, in light of plaintiff’s failure to present
similar

inconsistencies.

Id.

at

*5.

Therefore,

the

appellate

division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
In Kozma, a slip and fall action, the "jury allocated
sixty

percent

of

the

negligence

and

proximate

cause

to

[the

defendant] and the balance of forty percent to plaintiff." 990
A.2d at 681. Notwithstanding this liability finding, the jury
unanimously

declined

to

award

plaintiff

any

compensatory

damages. Id. The lower court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial,

finding

[p]laintiff’s
treatment[,]

that

“the

injury

was

and

without

[j]ury

properly

temporary[,]”
limiting
10

the”

concluded
“healed

plaintiff’s

that

without
daily

activities. Id. at 682. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that “‘the
jury's disregard of the undisputed evidence that as a result of
the accident appellant suffered [an] injury to his left knee’"
entitled

plaintiff

to

a

new

trial.

Id.

Plaintiff

further

contended the “‘no damages’” verdict constitutes “‘an imperious
abdication of the jury's responsibility.’" Id. at 681 (internal
quotations

omitted).

The

appellate

division

disagreed,

noting

that “because juries infuse community notions of justice into
their verdicts, there is no sound basis upon which to disturb
the judgment of the Law Division[.]” Id. In so holding, the
appellate court noted plaintiff’s prior injuries, in addition to
plaintiff’s
disputed

incident.

plaintiff’s
noted

assertions

pain

purportedly

Id.

at

681-82.

allegations

of

continued

plaintiff’s

addition

of

to

protracted

plaintiff’s

However,
pain,

fifteen-hour

athletic

stemming
with
the

respect

court

automobile

endeavors

—

from

all

the
to

further
trip,

of

in

which

occurred subsequent to the incident. Id. at 682. Thus, “[g]iven
the long history of plaintiff's related prior injuries, the jury
was free to conclude either that plaintiff's current complaints
stemmed

from

that

legacy,

or

that

the

fall

at

[defendant’s

business] was inconsequential in affecting plaintiff's lifestyle
and

quotient

of

pain

and

suffering.”

Id.

As

in

Watts,

the

appellate division again rejected plaintiff's reliance on Love
11

and

affirmed

inconsistency

the

lower

court’s

whatsoever”

in

ruling,

light

of

finding

the

“no

"ample

jury

evidence”

presented by defendant. Id. at 684.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff relies on Love,
841 A.2d 931 (N.J. Super App. Div. 2004) and Brooks, 958 F.2d
525

(2nd

Cir.

1992).

Here,

however,

for

the

reasons

follow, the Court finds these cases distinguishable.

that

In Love,

the jury "determined that plaintiff was entitled to a damage
award for lost wages, i.e., that he had been disabled as a
result of the incident as to be unable to work, at least for a
period of time or to a limited extent." Love, 841 A.2d at 935.
However,

notwithstanding

connection

between

“the

finding

plaintiff’s

of

injuries

a

medically

and

the

causal

on-the-job

incident[,]” the jury did not award plaintiff any damages for
pain

and

suffering.

Id.

The

trial

court

denied

plaintiff’s

motion for a new trial. Id. at 932. On appeal, the New Jersey
appellate

division

found

that,

“[g]iven

the

finding

of

a

medically causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and the
on-the-job

incident,

and

considering

the

extended

medical

treatment that resulted, including a series of surgeries, it
follows that plaintiff was entitled to an award, as well, for
any pain and suffering that could be established.”

Id. In so

ruling, the appellate division concluded that, in light of the
12

evidence, “the jury might have been well warranted to take a
skeptical view of plaintiff's allegations of lasting injury or
long-term
question

pain
that

and

suffering[,]”

plaintiff

but

experienced

that,
some

“there

can

transitory

be

pain

no
and

suffering, at the very least, as a consequence of each of the
surgeries required, for the period of recovery, if not before
and beyond.” Id. The Love court held that, “the jury made no
award

whatsoever

those

logically

that

would

inescapable

fairly
periods

compensate
of

pain

plaintiff
and

for

suffering,

however brief they may have been perceived to be, or however low
a percentage of plaintiff's total pain and suffering the jury
may have attributed to the incident at issue in relation to the
pre-existing

injuries.”

Id.

Therefore,

the

appellate

division

reversed the trial court’s determination, and remanded the case
for a new trial. Id. at 937.

Unlike Love, Plaintiff's injuries

in this case required minimal medical treatment without the need
for surgery. 4

Therefore, though the appellate division in Love

concluded that the plaintiff’s surgery must have, at a minimum,
caused pain and suffering, no evidence presented in this case
necessitates a similar conclusion.

4.
In
Love,
the
plaintiff
testified
regarding
multiple
operations, in addition to "a decompression laminectomy at the
L4-5 and L5-S1 levels." Love, 841 A.2d at 934-35.
13

In Brooks, the original plaintiff's 5 wife died as a
result of a misdiagnosed illness, whereupon plaintiff filed suit
against

the

treating

physician

and

hospital.

Id.

at

526.

In

Brooks, the jury determined that the defendants "were negligent
and that their negligence proximately caused [decedent] to incur
medical expenses and pain and suffering, and caused pecuniary
loss to [decedent’s] next-of-kin." Id. The Brooks jury "awarded
damages for all of [decedent’s] medical expenses, but awarded
nothing for [decedent’s] uncontested pain and suffering" or "for
pecuniary loss or loss of consortium." Id. The District Court
for the District of Vermont denied plaintiff's motion for a new
trial,

but

the

Second

Circuit

reversed,

finding

it

"irreconcilably inconsistent for the jury to have awarded zero
damages for her contemporaneous, undisputed pain and suffering."
Id. at 530.

In so holding, the Second Circuit noted that,

"defendants did not dispute the evidence that [the decedent]
experienced
[decedent’s]

much

pain

and

deteriorating

suffering"

condition

and

"as
of

medical tests and procedures[.]" Id. at 527.

a
the

result

of

necessary

Unlike Brooks,

where the decedent’s suffering went undisputed, here, the extent

5.
The original plaintiff died before oral argument on the
appeal and was replaced by the executor of the original
plaintiff's estate. Brooks, 958 F.2d at 525 n.1.
14

of Plaintiff's pain and suffering constituted a contested issue
at trial. Defendant presented two surveillance videos to the
jury, which depicted Plaintiff walking and standing, and the
jury may have considered the videos in determining an absence of
pain

and

suffering.

In

addition,

in

light

of

the

evidence

presented by Defendant, the jury could have attributed any pain
and

suffering

experienced

by

Plaintiff

to

Plaintiff’s

pre-

existing back condition. Therefore, the contested nature of the
pain and suffering in this case presents a factually distinct
scenario from the uncontested pain and suffering considered in
Brooks.

Accordingly,

the

Court

also

finds

Brooks

distinguishable.
In addition to Watts and Kozma, the Court finds that
the

cases

cited

by

Defendant

to

be

more

analogous

to

the

circumstances presented in this case. (See Def.’s Br. [Doc. No.
67], 4, 5.) Specifically, in Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967
F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
a jury award for past and future medical expenses, absent a
corresponding award for pain and suffering because the evidence
supported

"a

jury

conclusion

that

[plaintiff’s]

problems

may

have been brought about by [other] causes[,]” particularly in
light of the fact that “the jurors simply may not have believed
the plaintiffs in all respects." Id. Similarly, in Penney v.
15

Praxair, Inc., 116 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth
Circuit

affirmed

a

jury

award

for

past

and

future

medical

expenses, but not for pain and suffering, “given the conflicting
evidence” regarding plaintiff’s injuries and the proximate cause
of such injuries. Id. Finally, in Kerzner v. Global Upholstery
Co., Ltd., No. 95-1209, 1997 WL 727692, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19,
1997),

the

court

noted

an

award

of

without

that

an
for

damages

“award
pain

of
and

medical

expenses

suffering

is

not

necessarily inconsistent.” Id.
In

considering

“attempt

to

reconcile

“whether

the

jury

Plaintiff’s
the

could

jury’s

have,

motion,

the

findings”

in

consistent

with

Court

must

determining

[the

Court’s]

instructions, rendered the challenged verdicts.” Monaco, 366 F.
App’x at 331-32 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The
Court charged the jury concerning “pain, suffering, disability,
impairment and loss of enjoyment of life.” (Jury Instructions
[Doc.

No.

58],

14.)

Specifically,

the

Court

instructed

the

jurors “to exercise sound judgment as to what is fair, just and
reasonable under all the circumstances” and to “consider the
testimony” of Plaintiff, in addition to “all the other evidence
presented by both parties on this subject, including, of course,
the testimony of the doctors who appeared.” (Id. at 17-18.) At
trial,

Defendant

specifically

disputed
16

the

extent

to

which

Plaintiff

experienced

pain

and

suffering,

in

addition

to

contesting the causation for such pain and suffering. In light
of

the

existing

medical
back

testimony

with
the

condition,

respect

to

Plaintiff’s

pre-

jury

could

reasonably

have

concluded that any pain and suffering resulted from those prior
injuries. Cf. Kozma, 990 A.2d at 683 (noting that "[gi]ven the
long history of plaintiff's related prior injuries, the jury was
free

to

stemmed

conclude
from

either

that

that

legacy,

or

plaintiff's
that

the

current

fall

at

complaints

[defendant’s

business] was inconsequential in affecting plaintiff's lifestyle
and quotient of pain and suffering"). Moreover, the two videos
submitted by Defendant could reasonably have indicated to the
jury that Plaintiff suffered no limitation on mobility. Cf. id.
at

682

Florida”

(noting
and

plaintiff’s

athletic

“fifteen-hour

endeavors

automobile

subsequent

to

the

trip

to

alleged

injuries). The record developed at trial further demonstrated
that

Plaintiff’s

injuries

required

minimal

medical

treatment

without the need for surgery or an otherwise invasive procedure.
Indeed,

subsequent

to

Plaintiff's

initial

treatment

at

the

hospital, Plaintiff’s injuries required little by way of followup treatment. (See Stuart L. Trager, M.D., Transcript, 24:625:3.) According to Defendant's expert, Plaintiff "denied seeing
any orthopedic doctors or musculoskeletal specialists."
17

(Id. at

25:4-6.) Cf. Watts, 2012 WL 4069477, at *4 (noting that "[t]he
[limited] infrequency of plaintiff's consultations with treating
physicians and absence of treatment could have influenced the
jury's

verdict").

Therefore,

though

the

jury

found

that

Defendant caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and held Defendant liable
for the “stipulated” medical expenses, 6 the jury verdict with
respect to pain and suffering can be reconciled by concluding
that

the

jury

discredited

the

testimony

of

Plaintiff

and

Plaintiff’s witnesses. See Monaco, 366 F. App'x at 332 (stating
that "[i]n undertaking to read the verdicts consistently, the
court must 'view the facts in the light most favorable to the
verdict.'") (citations omitted)); see also Kozma, 990 A.2d at
683 (noting that "[a] jury need not give controlling effect to
any or all of the testimony provided by experts, even in the
absence of evidence to the contrary").
As set forth supra, “[A] court may order a new trial
based on inconsistent verdicts only if ‘no rational jury could
have brought back the verdicts that were returned.’”
366

F.

App'x

undertaking

to

at

331

read

the

(citations
verdicts

6

omitted).

Monaco,

Moreover,

consistently,”

courts

“[i]n
must

Plaintiff’s medical expenses amounted to $13,817.47. However,
the parties stipulated that Plaintiff was entitled to recover
only $2,310.44. (See, e.g., Letter [Doc. No. 63], 1-2.)
18

“‘view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict.’”
Id. at 332 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court finds the
jury

verdict

is

not

inconsistent,

and

accordingly,

denies

Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
CONSEQUENTLY, for the reasons set forth above and for
good cause shown:
IT IS on this 17th day of October 2013,
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion [Doc. No. 66] for a
new trial shall be, and is hereby, DENIED.

s/ Ann Marie Donio
ANN MARIE DONIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

19