PERRI v. RESORTS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. et al
Filing
68
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER denying Plaintiff's 66 Motion for New Trial. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ann Marie Donio on 10/17/2013. (TH, )
[Doc. No. 66]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DOMINIC PERRI,
Civil No. 10-4489 (AMD)
Plaintiff,
v.
RESORTS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL,
INC.
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This
matter
comes
before
the
Court
by
way
of
Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil
Procedure
59.
The
Court
has
considered
the
parties'
submissions and decides this matter pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 78.
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court
denies Plaintiff's motion.
The trial in this matter involved a claim for damages
by Plaintiff, Dominic Perri, for injuries allegedly sustained
when he fell from a stool at a casino owned and operated by
Defendant
Resorts
International
Hotel,
Incorporated.
Specifically, on September 2, 2008, Plaintiff was seated at a
stool in front of a slot machine at Resorts Casino in Atlantic
City, New Jersey, when the stool “gave way” and caused Mr. Perri
“to fall to the floor.” (Trial Brief (hereinafter, “Pl.'s Trial
Br.”)
[Doc.
“Def.'s
No.
Trial
28],
Br.”)
1;
see
[Doc.
also
No.
Trial
33],
Brief
1-2.)
(hereinafter,
Plaintiff
claimed
damages from Defendant for past medical bills, past and future
pain, suffering, disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment
of life. (See generally Complaint [Doc. No. 1], 6-7.)
Prior
to
trial,
Defendant
stipulated
to
(Joint Final Pretrial Order [Doc. No. 23], 5, 13.)
liability.
On May 20,
2013, the matter proceeded to trial before a jury on the issues
of causation and damages. 1 Plaintiff presented three witnesses
during the Plaintiff’s case.
Plaintiff’s partner Larry Richman
testified
regarding
Plaintiff’s
pain.
Christian
I.
Dr.
surgical
M.D.,
treatment
Transcript),
of
Fras,
spinal
testified
fall,
an
injury,
orthopedic
disorders,
regarding
and
continued
subspecialist
(Christian
Plaintiff’s
I.
in
Fras,
fall
and
injury. Dr. Fras testified with respect to the presence of an
injury
41:15),
to
Plaintiff's
testified
back,
that
the
(Id.
at
September
1
26:9-19,
2,
37:6-14,
2008
fall
38:8caused
The parties consented to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b),
and Rule 73.1 of the Local Civil Rules for the United States
District Court, District of New Jersey.
(See Consent to
Jurisdiction [Doc. No. 22], 1.)
2
Plaintiff’s injuries, (Id. at 26:20-27:10), and that Plaintiff's
injuries were consistent with Plaintiff’s assertions of pain.
(Id. at 45:17-56:1, 57:4-59:2.)
Dr. Fras also noted a 2006
complaint of back pain set forth in Plaintiff’s medical records.
(Id.
at
28:3-20,
29:17-22.)
Thereafter,
Plaintiff
testified
regarding his back injury, his pain and the injury’s effect on
his life. Defense counsel cross-examined Plaintiff and presented
two short surveillance videos taken of Plaintiff shortly after
the incident.
The
Trager,
an
defense
presented
one
witness,
orthopedic
(Stuart
Dr.
Transcript.)
surgeon.
testified
by
Trager
Dr.
L.
way
of
Trager,
video
concerning his medical evaluation of Plaintiff.
with
respect
regarding
a
treatment,
to
the
prior
(Id.
notation
fall
at
for
in
Plaintiff’s
which
33:10-34:8,
Plaintiff
34:16-35:2,
Stuart
L.
M.D.,
testimony
He testified
medical
records
sought
medical
35:12-35:17),
in
addition to testifying that Plaintiff's MRI showed evidence of a
chronic
that,
back
based
regarding
condition,
upon
his
whether
the
(Id.
at
review,
fall
38:3-39:5,
medical
on
On
May
21,
2013,
the
uncertainty
September
Plaintiff's current physical complaints.
39:22-40:21),
2,
2008
and
remained
caused
(Id. at 41:20-42:22.)
parties
presented
closing
arguments to the jury, (see Minute Entry [Doc. No. 56], 1), and
3
on
May
22,
2013,
the
Court
charged
the
jury.
(See
Jury
Instructions [Doc. No. 58], 13-18.) During deliberations, the
jury asked the Court the following question:
"Does a yes answer
for question #1 2 mandate a cash reward for both medical & pain
suffering? Or can we reward only one or the other?" (Jury Note
and Court Response [Doc. No. 59], 1.)
After a conference with
counsel on the record, but outside the presence of the jury, the
Court
ruled
provided
to
evaluated
that
following
jury:
the
the
"[e]ach
separately
in
written
claim
accordance
response
for
with
would
be
must
be
damages
the
instructions
I
previously gave you." (Id.)
On May 22, 2013, the jury found that "the injuries
claimed
by
the
Plaintiff
Dominic
Perri
were
caused
by
the
negligence of Resorts International Hotel, Inc. d/b/a Resorts
Casino & Hotel," (Jury Verdict Sheet [Doc. No. 60], 1), and
awarded Plaintiff $13,817.47 3 for Plaintiff's past medical bills,
but
zero
dollars
for
past
and
future
pain,
suffering,
2. Question one of the jury verdict sheet stated: "Has the
plaintiff Dominic Perri proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the injuries claimed by the Plaintiff Dominic
Perri were caused by the negligence of Resorts International
Hotel, Inc. d/b/a Resorts Casino & Hotel?" (Jury Verdict [Doc.
No. 60], 1.)
3. By letter dated June 5, 2013, the parties submitted a joint
proposed judgment in the amount of $2,310.44 (see Letter [Doc.
No. 63], 1), which judgment the Court entered on June 11, 2013.
4
disability, impairment, and loss of enjoyment of life. (Id.)
Before the Court excused the jury, Plaintiff’s counsel made an
oral application for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 49. The Court denied the application and the
present motion followed. (See Minute Entry [Doc. No. 57], 1.)
In his motion for a new trial, Plaintiff asserts that,
"[t]hese
verdicts
by
the
jury
contained
irreconcilable
inconsistencies" and support the grant of a new trial. (Brief in
Support
of
Plaintiff’s
Motion
for
a
New
Trial
(hereinafter,
"Pl.'s Br.") [Doc. No. 66-1], 1-2, 4.) Plaintiff asserts that
"the
jury
returned
an
answer
wholly
inconsistent
with
the
remainder of the verdict when they found that - despite the
existence of all of the injuries claimed by [P]laintiff and the
necessity
of
[P]laintiff
all
did
of
not
[P]laintiff's
experience
past
pain,
medical
bills
suffering,
-
the
disability,
impairment, or lost enjoyment of life for one scintilla of a
second."
(Id.
at
3.)
Plaintiff
asserts
that
"[i]t
is
simply
inconsistent and irreconcilable for the jury to find that all of
the injuries claimed by [P]laintiff did indeed exist, but at no
time did those injuries cause any pain, suffering, disability,
impairment, or lost enjoyment of life." (Id. at 4) (emphasis in
(Clerk's Judgment [Doc. No. 64], 1.)
5
original.) In light of these allegedly inconsistent findings,
and in reliance on Brooks v. Brattleboro Mem. Hosp., 958 F.2d
525 (2nd Cir. 1992) and Love v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 841
A.2d 931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), Plaintiff seeks a new
trial. (Pl.'s Br. at 4.)
In response to the motion, Defendant asserts that "it
is not inherently inconsistent for a jury to award a plaintiff
his past medical expenses and not any amount for past pain and
suffering."
(Defendant's
Brief
in
Opposition
to
Plaintiff’s
Motion for a New Trial (hereinafter, "Def.'s Opp'n") [Doc. No.
67],
6.)
included
suffered
Defendant
the
notes
cause
any
of
that
the
significant
the
contested
injuries
pain
and
issues
whether
thereafter."
at
trial
"plaintiff
(Id.
at
5.)
Specifically, Defendant asserts that "[i]t was brought before
the
jury
experts
by
that
the
testimony
the
plaintiff
of
the
plaintiff
underwent
five
and
two
medical
physical
therapy
sessions and no other real treatment." (Id. at 5-6.) Defendant
further
asserts
that
"[i]t
was
shown
to
the
jury
plaintiff had a pre-existing condition." (Id. at 5.)
that
the
Therefore,
because “the jury clearly heard all testimony, understood the
instructions
and
deliberated
without
incident,”
Defendant
contends that the jury’s finding “must stand.” (Id. at 7.) In
support thereof, Defendant relies on Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores,
6
Inc., 967 F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), Penney v. Praxair,
Inc., 116 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1997), and Kerzner v. Global
Upholstery Co., Ltd., No. 95-1209, 1997 WL 727692, at *1 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 19, 1997). (See Def.’s Br. [Doc. No. 67], 4-5.)
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
59
sets
forth
the
conditions under which a new trial may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P.
59. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 provides in pertinent
part:
The court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or
some of the issues--and to any party--as follows:
(A) after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new
trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law
in federal court[.]
FED. R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1).
In Monaco v. Camden, 366 F. App'x 330 (3d Cir. 2010),
the Third Circuit delineated the requisite inquiry with respect
to
whether
an
allegedly
inconsistent
verdict
warrants
a
new
trial. “[A] court may order a new trial based on inconsistent
verdicts only if ‘no rational jury could have brought back the
verdicts that were returned.’” Id. at 331 (quoting Pearson v.
Welborn, 471 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations and
citations omitted)). Specifically, “when one party challenges a
jury's verdicts as inconsistent, the court has an obligation
first to ‘attempt to reconcile the jury's findings’ to determine
7
‘whether the jury could have, consistent with its instructions,
rendered
the
challenged
verdicts.’”
Id.
at
331-32
(quoting
Davignon v. Hodgson, 524 F.3d 91, 109 (1st Cir. 2008) (citations
omitted); see also Gallick v. Balt. & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108,
119
(1963)
(“[I]t
is
the
duty
of
the
courts
to
attempt
to
harmonize the answers, if it is possible under a fair reading of
them: ‘Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury's
answers
to
special
interrogatories
consistent,
they
must
be
resolved that way.’”) (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc.
v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364 (1962)). Moreover,
“[i]n
must
undertaking
“‘view
the
to
read
facts
in
the
verdicts
the
light
consistently,”
most
favorable
courts
to
the
verdict.’” Monaco, 366 F. App'x at 332 (quoting Davignon, 524
F.3d at 109).
In
considering
the
standard
governing
inconsistent
verdicts, the Court must also review the nature of the action.
Where, as here, the issue involves a pain and suffering verdict,
the Court has “less freedom to scrutinize the jury’s verdict[,]”
Williamson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1352 (3d Cir.
1991), because "[a] determination regarding pain and suffering
is 'peculiarly within the province of the jury.'" Kerzner v.
Global Upholstery Co., Ltd., No. 95-1209, 1997 WL 727692, at *1
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1997) (quoting Semper v. Santos, 845 F.2d
8
1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1988)).
In this case, because the Court has jurisdiction by
way of diversity, the Court’s analysis begins by examining New
Jersey
"state
law
to
determine
the
adequacy
of
damages[.]"
Kerzner, 1997 WL 727692, at n.3. In this regard, the Court finds
the
New
Jersey
appellate
division's
holdings
in
Watts
v.
Procopio, No. L-2622-08, 2012 WL 4069477 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. Sept. 18, 2012) and Kozma v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 990 A.2d
679 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Mar. 19, 2010) instructive to the
Court’s analysis. In Watts, plaintiff sustained injuries from a
head-on
motor
vehicle
trial,
defendant
collision.
admitted
2012
liability.
WL
4069477,
Id.
at
Thus,
*1.
the
At
jury
considered whether the accident proximately caused the injuries
and the amount of any damages. Id. at *3. The jury found "that
plaintiff had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that she
sustained
injuries
that
were
proximately
caused
by
the
accident." Id. However, "[t]he jury answered 'zero,' by a five
to one vote, to the question: 'What amount of money will fairly
and reasonably compensate plaintiff for all injuries that were
proximately caused by the accident?'" Id. The lower court denied
plaintiff’s motion for a new trial or additur, and an appeal
followed. Id. at *1. The New Jersey appellate division noted the
conflicting
testimony
with
respect
9
to
the
severity
of
the
injuries and the lasting effects of such injuries. Id. at *4-*5.
However, the court found that the record "satisfied [the court]
that the evidence was such that the jury could reasonably have
found that plaintiff sustained injuries as the result of the
collision at issue, but that the injuries were de minimis and
did
not
warrant
compensation.”
Id.
at
*5
(citing
Kozma
v.
Starbucks Coffee Co., 990 A.2d 679 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010)).
Specifically, the court noted that the jury could have
been influenced by, among other factors, the limited nature of
plaintiff’s medical treatment subsequent to the accident. Id. at
*4. Moreover, the appellate division rejected the applicability
of Love, see supra, in light of plaintiff’s failure to present
similar
inconsistencies.
Id.
at
*5.
Therefore,
the
appellate
division affirmed the lower court’s ruling.
In Kozma, a slip and fall action, the "jury allocated
sixty
percent
of
the
negligence
and
proximate
cause
to
[the
defendant] and the balance of forty percent to plaintiff." 990
A.2d at 681. Notwithstanding this liability finding, the jury
unanimously
declined
to
award
plaintiff
any
compensatory
damages. Id. The lower court denied plaintiff’s motion for a new
trial,
finding
[p]laintiff’s
treatment[,]
that
“the
injury
was
and
without
[j]ury
properly
temporary[,]”
limiting
10
the”
concluded
“healed
plaintiff’s
that
without
daily
activities. Id. at 682. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that “‘the
jury's disregard of the undisputed evidence that as a result of
the accident appellant suffered [an] injury to his left knee’"
entitled
plaintiff
to
a
new
trial.
Id.
Plaintiff
further
contended the “‘no damages’” verdict constitutes “‘an imperious
abdication of the jury's responsibility.’" Id. at 681 (internal
quotations
omitted).
The
appellate
division
disagreed,
noting
that “because juries infuse community notions of justice into
their verdicts, there is no sound basis upon which to disturb
the judgment of the Law Division[.]” Id. In so holding, the
appellate court noted plaintiff’s prior injuries, in addition to
plaintiff’s
disputed
incident.
plaintiff’s
noted
assertions
pain
purportedly
Id.
at
681-82.
allegations
of
continued
plaintiff’s
addition
of
to
protracted
plaintiff’s
However,
pain,
fifteen-hour
athletic
stemming
with
the
respect
court
automobile
endeavors
—
from
all
the
to
further
trip,
of
in
which
occurred subsequent to the incident. Id. at 682. Thus, “[g]iven
the long history of plaintiff's related prior injuries, the jury
was free to conclude either that plaintiff's current complaints
stemmed
from
that
legacy,
or
that
the
fall
at
[defendant’s
business] was inconsequential in affecting plaintiff's lifestyle
and
quotient
of
pain
and
suffering.”
Id.
As
in
Watts,
the
appellate division again rejected plaintiff's reliance on Love
11
and
affirmed
inconsistency
the
lower
court’s
whatsoever”
in
ruling,
light
of
finding
the
“no
"ample
jury
evidence”
presented by defendant. Id. at 684.
In support of his motion, Plaintiff relies on Love,
841 A.2d 931 (N.J. Super App. Div. 2004) and Brooks, 958 F.2d
525
(2nd
Cir.
1992).
Here,
however,
for
the
reasons
follow, the Court finds these cases distinguishable.
that
In Love,
the jury "determined that plaintiff was entitled to a damage
award for lost wages, i.e., that he had been disabled as a
result of the incident as to be unable to work, at least for a
period of time or to a limited extent." Love, 841 A.2d at 935.
However,
notwithstanding
connection
between
“the
finding
plaintiff’s
of
injuries
a
medically
and
the
causal
on-the-job
incident[,]” the jury did not award plaintiff any damages for
pain
and
suffering.
Id.
The
trial
court
denied
plaintiff’s
motion for a new trial. Id. at 932. On appeal, the New Jersey
appellate
division
found
that,
“[g]iven
the
finding
of
a
medically causal connection between plaintiff's injuries and the
on-the-job
incident,
and
considering
the
extended
medical
treatment that resulted, including a series of surgeries, it
follows that plaintiff was entitled to an award, as well, for
any pain and suffering that could be established.”
Id. In so
ruling, the appellate division concluded that, in light of the
12
evidence, “the jury might have been well warranted to take a
skeptical view of plaintiff's allegations of lasting injury or
long-term
question
pain
that
and
suffering[,]”
plaintiff
but
experienced
that,
some
“there
can
transitory
be
pain
no
and
suffering, at the very least, as a consequence of each of the
surgeries required, for the period of recovery, if not before
and beyond.” Id. The Love court held that, “the jury made no
award
whatsoever
those
logically
that
would
inescapable
fairly
periods
compensate
of
pain
plaintiff
and
for
suffering,
however brief they may have been perceived to be, or however low
a percentage of plaintiff's total pain and suffering the jury
may have attributed to the incident at issue in relation to the
pre-existing
injuries.”
Id.
Therefore,
the
appellate
division
reversed the trial court’s determination, and remanded the case
for a new trial. Id. at 937.
Unlike Love, Plaintiff's injuries
in this case required minimal medical treatment without the need
for surgery. 4
Therefore, though the appellate division in Love
concluded that the plaintiff’s surgery must have, at a minimum,
caused pain and suffering, no evidence presented in this case
necessitates a similar conclusion.
4.
In
Love,
the
plaintiff
testified
regarding
multiple
operations, in addition to "a decompression laminectomy at the
L4-5 and L5-S1 levels." Love, 841 A.2d at 934-35.
13
In Brooks, the original plaintiff's 5 wife died as a
result of a misdiagnosed illness, whereupon plaintiff filed suit
against
the
treating
physician
and
hospital.
Id.
at
526.
In
Brooks, the jury determined that the defendants "were negligent
and that their negligence proximately caused [decedent] to incur
medical expenses and pain and suffering, and caused pecuniary
loss to [decedent’s] next-of-kin." Id. The Brooks jury "awarded
damages for all of [decedent’s] medical expenses, but awarded
nothing for [decedent’s] uncontested pain and suffering" or "for
pecuniary loss or loss of consortium." Id. The District Court
for the District of Vermont denied plaintiff's motion for a new
trial,
but
the
Second
Circuit
reversed,
finding
it
"irreconcilably inconsistent for the jury to have awarded zero
damages for her contemporaneous, undisputed pain and suffering."
Id. at 530.
In so holding, the Second Circuit noted that,
"defendants did not dispute the evidence that [the decedent]
experienced
[decedent’s]
much
pain
and
deteriorating
suffering"
condition
and
"as
of
medical tests and procedures[.]" Id. at 527.
a
the
result
of
necessary
Unlike Brooks,
where the decedent’s suffering went undisputed, here, the extent
5.
The original plaintiff died before oral argument on the
appeal and was replaced by the executor of the original
plaintiff's estate. Brooks, 958 F.2d at 525 n.1.
14
of Plaintiff's pain and suffering constituted a contested issue
at trial. Defendant presented two surveillance videos to the
jury, which depicted Plaintiff walking and standing, and the
jury may have considered the videos in determining an absence of
pain
and
suffering.
In
addition,
in
light
of
the
evidence
presented by Defendant, the jury could have attributed any pain
and
suffering
experienced
by
Plaintiff
to
Plaintiff’s
pre-
existing back condition. Therefore, the contested nature of the
pain and suffering in this case presents a factually distinct
scenario from the uncontested pain and suffering considered in
Brooks.
Accordingly,
the
Court
also
finds
Brooks
distinguishable.
In addition to Watts and Kozma, the Court finds that
the
cases
cited
by
Defendant
to
be
more
analogous
to
the
circumstances presented in this case. (See Def.’s Br. [Doc. No.
67], 4, 5.) Specifically, in Davis v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 967
F.2d 1563, 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed
a jury award for past and future medical expenses, absent a
corresponding award for pain and suffering because the evidence
supported
"a
jury
conclusion
that
[plaintiff’s]
problems
may
have been brought about by [other] causes[,]” particularly in
light of the fact that “the jurors simply may not have believed
the plaintiffs in all respects." Id. Similarly, in Penney v.
15
Praxair, Inc., 116 F.3d 330, 333 (8th Cir. 1997), the Eighth
Circuit
affirmed
a
jury
award
for
past
and
future
medical
expenses, but not for pain and suffering, “given the conflicting
evidence” regarding plaintiff’s injuries and the proximate cause
of such injuries. Id. Finally, in Kerzner v. Global Upholstery
Co., Ltd., No. 95-1209, 1997 WL 727692, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19,
1997),
the
court
noted
an
award
of
without
that
an
for
damages
“award
pain
of
and
medical
expenses
suffering
is
not
necessarily inconsistent.” Id.
In
considering
“attempt
to
reconcile
“whether
the
jury
Plaintiff’s
the
could
jury’s
have,
motion,
the
findings”
in
consistent
with
Court
must
determining
[the
Court’s]
instructions, rendered the challenged verdicts.” Monaco, 366 F.
App’x at 331-32 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The
Court charged the jury concerning “pain, suffering, disability,
impairment and loss of enjoyment of life.” (Jury Instructions
[Doc.
No.
58],
14.)
Specifically,
the
Court
instructed
the
jurors “to exercise sound judgment as to what is fair, just and
reasonable under all the circumstances” and to “consider the
testimony” of Plaintiff, in addition to “all the other evidence
presented by both parties on this subject, including, of course,
the testimony of the doctors who appeared.” (Id. at 17-18.) At
trial,
Defendant
specifically
disputed
16
the
extent
to
which
Plaintiff
experienced
pain
and
suffering,
in
addition
to
contesting the causation for such pain and suffering. In light
of
the
existing
medical
back
testimony
with
the
condition,
respect
to
Plaintiff’s
pre-
jury
could
reasonably
have
concluded that any pain and suffering resulted from those prior
injuries. Cf. Kozma, 990 A.2d at 683 (noting that "[gi]ven the
long history of plaintiff's related prior injuries, the jury was
free
to
stemmed
conclude
from
either
that
that
legacy,
or
plaintiff's
that
the
current
fall
at
complaints
[defendant’s
business] was inconsequential in affecting plaintiff's lifestyle
and quotient of pain and suffering"). Moreover, the two videos
submitted by Defendant could reasonably have indicated to the
jury that Plaintiff suffered no limitation on mobility. Cf. id.
at
682
Florida”
(noting
and
plaintiff’s
athletic
“fifteen-hour
endeavors
automobile
subsequent
to
the
trip
to
alleged
injuries). The record developed at trial further demonstrated
that
Plaintiff’s
injuries
required
minimal
medical
treatment
without the need for surgery or an otherwise invasive procedure.
Indeed,
subsequent
to
Plaintiff's
initial
treatment
at
the
hospital, Plaintiff’s injuries required little by way of followup treatment. (See Stuart L. Trager, M.D., Transcript, 24:625:3.) According to Defendant's expert, Plaintiff "denied seeing
any orthopedic doctors or musculoskeletal specialists."
17
(Id. at
25:4-6.) Cf. Watts, 2012 WL 4069477, at *4 (noting that "[t]he
[limited] infrequency of plaintiff's consultations with treating
physicians and absence of treatment could have influenced the
jury's
verdict").
Therefore,
though
the
jury
found
that
Defendant caused Plaintiff’s injuries, and held Defendant liable
for the “stipulated” medical expenses, 6 the jury verdict with
respect to pain and suffering can be reconciled by concluding
that
the
jury
discredited
the
testimony
of
Plaintiff
and
Plaintiff’s witnesses. See Monaco, 366 F. App'x at 332 (stating
that "[i]n undertaking to read the verdicts consistently, the
court must 'view the facts in the light most favorable to the
verdict.'") (citations omitted)); see also Kozma, 990 A.2d at
683 (noting that "[a] jury need not give controlling effect to
any or all of the testimony provided by experts, even in the
absence of evidence to the contrary").
As set forth supra, “[A] court may order a new trial
based on inconsistent verdicts only if ‘no rational jury could
have brought back the verdicts that were returned.’”
366
F.
App'x
undertaking
to
at
331
read
the
(citations
verdicts
6
omitted).
Monaco,
Moreover,
consistently,”
courts
“[i]n
must
Plaintiff’s medical expenses amounted to $13,817.47. However,
the parties stipulated that Plaintiff was entitled to recover
only $2,310.44. (See, e.g., Letter [Doc. No. 63], 1-2.)
18
“‘view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict.’”
Id. at 332 (citation omitted). Therefore, the Court finds the
jury
verdict
is
not
inconsistent,
and
accordingly,
denies
Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.
CONSEQUENTLY, for the reasons set forth above and for
good cause shown:
IT IS on this 17th day of October 2013,
ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion [Doc. No. 66] for a
new trial shall be, and is hereby, DENIED.
s/ Ann Marie Donio
ANN MARIE DONIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
19
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