MOLLEY v. CFG HEALTH SYSTEMS
Filing
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OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 4/3/12. (js)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SHARRIK MOLLEY,
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Plaintiff,
v.
CFG HEALTH SYSTEMS,
et al,
Defendants.
Civ. Action No.
10-5266 (NLH-JS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
SHARRIK MOLLEY
189299
ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY
5060 ATLANTIC AVE
MAYS LANDING, NJ 08330
Pro Se Plaintiff
STEPHEN D. HOLTZMAN
HOLTZMAN & MCCLAIN, PC
524 MAPLE AVENUE
SUITE 200
LINWOOD, NJ 08221
Attorney for Defendant CFG Health Systems
HILLMAN, District Judge
Before the Court are two motions filed by defendant CFG
Health Systems(“CFG”): 1) motion for judgment on the pleadings
pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); and 2) motion to dismiss for
plaintiff’s failure to advise of change of address pursuant to
L.Civ.R. 10.1(a), and failure to prosecute pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
For the reasons expressed below, defendant’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted, and its
motion to dismiss will be denied as moot.
I.
BACKGROUND
On October 13, 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint
stating that while an inmate at the Atlantic County Justice
Facility he was not permitted to attend his appointments with his
neurologist or be able to attend physical therapy sessions.
Plaintiff also states that he did not receive his medication for
high blood pressure or have access to a “cardiac diet.”
Plaintiff further states that he has been in extreme pain in his
back, neck and left leg due to a automobile accident that
occurred on June 15, 2010.
Plaintiff brought a claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation
of his Eighth Amendment rights.
On September 7, 2011, defendant sent a notice of
deposition to plaintiff at the Atlantic City Justice Center.
When counsel for defendant contacted the Atlantic City Justice
Center on October 20, 2011 to confirm the deposition, he was
advised by Lt. Iulicci that plaintiff had been released on
September 27, 2011.
Plaintiff has not updated his current address with the
Court as required by Local Rule 10.1(a).
Defendant states that
plaintiff has also failed to provide executed authorization forms
to request medical records, and has failed to answer
interrogatories and request for documents.
CFG filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
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pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), and a motion to dismiss for
plaintiff’s failure to advise of change of address pursuant to
L.Civ.R. 10.1(a), and failure to prosecute pursuant to
Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b).
motion.
Plaintiff filed no response to either
We first address defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings.
Because the Court will grant this motion, there is no
need to address defendant’s second motion.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Jurisdiction
Plaintiff alleged that defendant was deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs in violation of the
Eighth Amendment and, therefore, this Court exercises subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal
question jurisdiction).
B.
Standard for Judgment on the Pleadings
A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings may
be filed after the pleadings are closed.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c);
Turbe v. Gov’t of V.I., 938 F.2d 427, 428 (3d Cir. 1991).
In
analyzing a Rule 12(c) motion, a court applies the same legal
standards as applicable to a motion filed pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Turbe, 938 F.2d at 428.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (motion to
dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted), a court must accept all well-pleaded
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allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff.
F.3d 347, 350 (3d Cir. 2005).
See Evancho v. Fisher, 423
A complaint must contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“‘not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.’”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8, 127 S. Ct.
1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416
U.S. 232, 236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 (1974)); see also
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (“Our decision in Twombly expounded the
pleading standard for ‘all civil actions[.]’”) (citation
omitted).
The Third Circuit has instructed district courts to
conducted a two-part analysis in deciding a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
First, a district court “must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any
legal conclusions.”
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11 (citing Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949).
Second, a district court must “determine
whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show
that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’”
211 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950).
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Id. at
“[A] complaint must do
more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.”
Id.
“‘[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer
more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ - ‘that the pleader is
entitled to relief.’’”
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949);
see also Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d
Cir. 2008) (“The Supreme Court’s Twombly formulation of the
pleading standard can be summed up thus: ‘stating . . . a claim
requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true)
to suggest’ the required element.
This ‘does not impose a
probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead
‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the necessary
element.”)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
A court need not credit “bald assertions” or “legal
conclusions” in a complaint when deciding a motion to dismiss.
In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1429–30
(3d Cir. 1997).
The defendant has the burden of demonstrating
that no claim has been presented.
Hedges v. United States, 404
F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005)(citing Kehr Packages, Inc. v.
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
Based on plaintiff’s allegations in his complaint, it
appears that he is alleging a claim that defendant was
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs in
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violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
B.
Eighth Amendment Claim
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits state actors from inflicting “cruel and unusual
punishment” on those convicted of crimes.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452
U.S. 337, 344–46, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981).
This
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment requires that
prison officials provide inmates with adequate medical care.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d
251 (1976).
There is no dispute that CFG, a company under
contract to provide medical services to prisoners, is considered
a “state actor.”
See Christy v. Robinson, 216 F.Supp.2d 398, 412
n.26 (D.N.J. 2002).
In order to set forth a cognizable claim for a
violation of his right to adequate medical care, an inmate must
allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) behavior on the part
of prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to
that need.
Id. at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the
Estelle inquiry, the inmate must demonstrate that his medical
needs are serious.
Serious medical needs include those that have
been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or that are
so obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for
doctor’s attention, and those conditions which, if untreated,
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would result in lifelong handicap or permanent loss.
Monmouth
County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006, 108 S.Ct.
1731, 100 L.Ed.2d 195 (1988).
The second element of the Estelle test requires an
inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need.
“Deliberate
indifference” is more than mere malpractice or negligence; it is
a state of mind equivalent to reckless disregard of a known risk
of harm.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837–38, 114 S.Ct.
1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994).
Furthermore, a prisoner’s
subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does not in
itself indicate deliberate indifference.
Andrews v. Camden
County, 95 F.Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000); Peterson v. Davis,
551 F.Supp. 137, 145 (D.Md. 1982), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1453 (4th Cir.
1984).
Similarly, “mere disagreements over medical judgment do
not state Eighth Amendment claims.”
103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990).
White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d
“Courts will disavow any attempt to
second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment ... [which] remains a question of sound professional
judgment.
Implicit in this deference to prison medical
authorities is the assumption that such informed judgment has, in
fact, been made.”
Inmates of Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce,
612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation and citation
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omitted).
Even if a doctor’s judgment concerning the proper
course of a prisoner’s treatment ultimately is shown to be
mistaken, at most what would be proved is medical malpractice and
not an Eighth Amendment violation.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06;
White, 897 F.2d at 110.
“Where prison authorities deny reasonable requests for
medical treatment, however, and such denial exposes the inmate
‘to undue suffering or the threat of tangible residual injury,’
deliberate indifference is manifest.”
at 346 (citations omitted).
Monmouth County, 834 F.2d
“Similarly, where ‘knowledge of the
need for medical care [is accompanied by the] ... intentional
refusal to provide that care,’ the deliberate indifference
standard has been met.”
Id.
“Finally, deliberate indifference
is demonstrated ‘[w]hen ... prison authorities prevent an inmate
from receiving recommended treatment for serious medical needs or
deny access to a physician capable of evaluating the need for
such treatment.”
Id.; compare Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64,
69 (3d Cir. 1993) (summary judgment properly granted to prison
warden and state commissioner of corrections, the only allegation
against whom was that they failed to respond to letters from
prisoner complaining of prison doctor’s treatment decisions) with
Sprull v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (a
non-physician supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if he knew or
had reason to know of inadequate medical care).
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In support of his claim, plaintiff referenced the
inmate grievance forms that he filed with the Atlantic City
Justice Facility on September 29, 2010, September 25, 2010, and
September 26, 2010.
Plaintiff also attached copies of the forms
to his in forma pauperis application.
Plaintiff states on the
forms that he is having pain and would like to see his
neurologist and to attend physical therapy sessions, as well as
receive his blood pressure medication and a “cardiac diet.”
CFG does not dispute that plaintiff’s medical needs are
serious.
Rather CFG argues that plaintiff has not plead facts
that could support a claim that it was deliberately indifferent
to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
CFG argues that the
grievance forms attached to plaintiff’s complaint adequately
address each of plaintiff’s concerns.
Specifically, the inmate
grievance form dated September 25, 2010, includes the following
entry by health services administrator Cheryl DuBose:
9/29/10 Reports obtained by me. Dr. Hubbard reviewed
reports. On exam, you were evaluated and there is no
clinical need for outside f/u. Outside reports were
reviewed. No need for cane @ this point based on
review.
The inmate grievance form dated September 26, 2010,
includes the following entry by health services administrator
Cheryl DuBose:
9/28/10 I/M seen and evaluated by Dr. Hubbard for above
complaints. Your primary care MD does not have you on
B/P meds @ this time.
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Plaintiff filed no response to CFG’s motion.
Therefore, accepting all of the plaintiff’s
well-pleaded facts as true, the Court finds that the facts
alleged in the complaint, and grievance forms attached to the
complaint, do not show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim
for relief.”
at 1950).
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts that could raise a
reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that
CFG was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Although plaintiff has stated a
serious medical need, he has not alleged facts that could show
defendant was deliberately indifferent.
The facts show that
defendant responded to his complaints as stated on the inmate
grievance forms.
The comments by Ms. DuBose state that plaintiff
was seen and evaluated by Dr. Hubbard and that there was no need
for outside follow-up, and that plaintiff was not on blood
pressure medication and did not need a cane.
Therefore, the
facts show that plaintiff was evaluated by a medical professional
and that his concerns were timely addressed.
See Pierce, 612
F.2d at 762 (concluding that courts will not attempt to
second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment).
The only complaint not specifically addressed was
plaintiff’s request for a “cardiac diet.”
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Although it is
possible that a special diet could constitute a serious medical
need, plaintiff has not stated why he needed to be on that diet
or what medical condition he has that would necessitate such a
diet.
Accordingly, plaintiff has not plead sufficient facts in
support of a claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Therefore, defendant’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings will be granted.
Because the Court has granted
defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, there is no
need to address defendant’s motion to dismiss.1
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant CFG Health Systems’ motion for judgment on
the pleadings pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) will be granted.
Defendant’s motion to dismiss for plaintiff’s failure to advise
of change of address pursuant to L.Civ.R. 10.1(a), and failure to
prosecute pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) shall be denied as moot.
s/Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
At Camden, New Jersey
Dated:
April 3, 2012
1
Also, because the Court ruled on the motion as to
plaintiff’s failure to state a claim, we do not address CFG’s
second argument that it cannot be vicariously liable.
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