WHITE v. TAYLOR et al

Filing 54

OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 8/28/13. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KASHIEF WHITE,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 10-5485 (JBS/AMD)

v.
ERIC TAYLOR, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Mr. Kashief White
654775/ SBI 739645-C
Bayside State Prison
4923 Route 47
P.O. Box F-1
Leesburg, NJ 08327
Plaintiff Pro Se
Matthew J. Behr, Esq.
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN
200 Lake Drive East, Suite 300
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
Attorney for Defendants Aramark, Inc., Aramark
Correctional Services, LLC, and Dietician Carey
Anne E. Walters, Esq.
Office of County Counsel
Courthouse, 14th Floor
520 Market Street
Camden, NJ 08102
Attorney for Defendants Warden Eric Taylor, Deputy
Warden Christopher Fossler, Deputy Warden Anthony
Pizzaro, Rodney Greco, Camden County and Camden County
Freeholders
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion
to file an amended complaint against Defendants Aramark,
Inc. (“Aramark”), Aramark Correctional Services LLC
(“ACS”), and ACS's Dietician Carey (collectively, “Aramark
Defendants”). [Docket Item 44.] This action concerns meals
that the Aramark Defendants served to Plaintiff while he
was a pretrial detainee at the Camden County Correctional
Facility (“CCCF”) in Camden, N.J., from 2008 to 2010.
Plaintiff alleges that the Aramark Defendants served meals
in an unsanitary fashion and failed to provide him with an
adequate diet, thereby violating his Due Process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff also contends
that the Aramark Defendants conspired to deprive him of his
nutritional requirements, leaving him and other inmates no
other option but to shop at the jail’s commissary to
fulfill their dietary needs. Plaintiff files suit under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.
Also included in Plaintiff’s Proposed Amended
Complaint are new claims against Camden County and County
officials (“County Defendants”) for civil conspiracy and
failing to provide Plaintiff with safe and healthy prison
conditions pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Although
the Court only granted Plaintiff permission to amend claims
against the Aramark Defendants, the County has filed

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opposition responding to the substance of Plaintiff’s
argument. [Docket Item 45.] Because the Court must treat
pleadings from pro se litigants liberally, Liggon-Redding
v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011),
the Court will construe this pleading as a motion to amend
against Camden County and will address the merits of this
claim.
For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s motion to amend his constitutional claims
against the Aramark Defendants and will deny the motion as
to Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claims against the Aramark
and County Defendants.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
The background of this case has been discussed at
length in previous opinions, which is incorporated herein.
See White v. Taylor, No. 10-5485, 2013 WL 1412300, at *1-*2
(D.N.J. Apr. 5, 2013), ECF No. 40; Cook v. Taylor, No. 10–
2643, 2012 WL 4959519, at *1-*2 (D.N.J. Oct. 16, 2012).
Plaintiff was confined at CCCF from December 2008 through
April 2010. (Am. Compl. [Docket Item 44-1] at 2.) His
Proposed Amended Complaint states that he was a pretrial
detainee. (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff alleges that the Aramark
Defendants intentionally served inmates at CCCF meals that

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differed from those listed on the menu and which failed to
meet the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s nutritional
daily standards because the portions were so small. (Id. at
10-11.) Further, Plaintiff contends that meals were served
on food trays in an unsanitary manner. (Id. at 14.)
Plaintiff provides examples of how meals served to the
inmates differed from meals listed on the menus.1 For
example, the lunch that was served to inmates on November
25, 2009, consisted of two hotdogs and buns, one-quarter
cup of plain cabbage without dressing, and three teaspoons
of beans. (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff contends that according to
the listed menu, inmates should have been served two
hotdogs and buns, one-half cup of coleslaw, one-half cup of
salad with low-fat dressing, three-quarters of a cup of
ranch beans, and one-half cup of vanilla pudding. (Id.)
Additionally, Plaintiff contends that lunch on
December 1, 2009, consisted of two slices of bread, two
teaspoons of turkey in barbecue sauce (“mostly sauce [with]
very little meat”), two teaspoons of mashed potatoes, one
teaspoon of shredded cabbage with mayonnaise, and a Nutri–
Grain cereal bar. (Id.) Plaintiff contends the menu was
listed as three ounces of barbecue turkey meat, two slices
1

Plaintiff provides a comparison of actual and listed menus
for six meals: breakfast, lunch, and dinner on November 5,
2009, and December 1, 2009. (Id. at 11-12.)
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of bread, one cup of potatoes, one-half cup of salad with
low-fat dressing, and a slice of cake. (Id. at 12.)
Plaintiff adds that these substituted meals are not
“isolated incidents” but instead are examples of what was
served on a daily basis. (Id.) Specifically, Plaintiff
alleges that whenever the menu listed either a cup or half
cup of a food item, the Aramark Defendants would
“significantly reduce the portion actually served to two or
three teaspoons, and deny straving [sic] inmates.” (Id.)
For instance, Plaintiff alleges that when the menu called
for a half-cup of oatmeal, he received only three
teaspoons; a half-cup of scrambled eggs became two
teaspoons; one cup of rice and beans was reduced to three
teaspoons. (Id. at 11-12.)
Plaintiff asserts that when inmates complained about
the smaller portion sizes, they were told “that’s why there
is commissary” and “buy some[thing from the] commissary."
(Id. at 13.) Warden Taylor and deputy wardens also
“instructed the inmates to purchase food from the jail’s
commissary.” (Id. at 14.) Plaintiff contends that the
commissary charges “exorbant [sic] prices which not all
inmates can afford.” (Id.) For example, Plaintiff states
that the manufacturer’s suggested retail price for “Ramen
Soup” is 20 cents each, but CCCF charges $1.00 each. (Id.)

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Additionally, a box of “Saltine Crackers,” which contains
four sleeves, would normally cost $1.23; however, CCCF
sells one individual sleeve of crackers for 75 cents each.
(Id.)
Plaintiff also contends that meals were served on food
trays that contained “cracks, in which stagnat [sic] water
collects and harbors bacteria, and emits a very foul odor,”
thereby contaminating the food served on the tray. (Id.)
Plaintiff adds that the meal trays are distributed to
inmates in such a way that “dirt, hair, dust, and other
foreign objects” end up on the trays. (Id.) As evidence of
the lack of sanitation, Plaintiff alleges that trays and
cups often contain remnants of dried food from previous
meals. (Id. at 15.)
Plaintiff asserts that he suffered from “starvation,
significant weight loss; depression; fatigue; unrelenting
and painful stomach cramps; excessive gas; [and] strained
bowel movements and constipation” as a result of the
inadequate food portions. (Id. at 13.) In addition,
Plaintiff also alleges that the contamination from the food
trays has led him to suffer “several bouts of uncontrolable
[sic] viomiting [sic] at least 2 to 3 times per month,
throughout his period of confinement at the CCCF.” (Id. at
15.)

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B. Procedural History
Plaintiff and many other detainees and inmates brought
virtually identical suits complaining of the general
conditions at CCCF, as well as the unsanitary meal
presentation and inadequate nutrition. Although the Court
dismissed claims against the Aramark Defendants in all of
the other cases, the Court never dismissed Plaintiff
White’s case because, before the Court decided the motion,
the Court terminated his case without prejudice for failure
to comply with L. Civ. R. 10.1(a).2 [Docket Item 24.] See
Simmons v. Taylor, No. 10–1192, 2012 WL 3863792, at *4
(D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2012) (dismissing claims); Cook, 2012 WL
4959519, at *2 (same); Kunst v. Taylor, No. 10–1608, 2012
WL 5451275, at *3 (D.N.J. Nov. 5, 2012) (same).
In January 2013, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion
to reopen his case and reinstated the Aramark Defendants’
motion to dismiss. [Docket Items 14 & 30.] Plaintiff filed
opposition to the motion to dismiss [Docket Item 34] and
moved to amend the Complaint. [Docket Item 35.] The Court
denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend without prejudice, as he
failed to attach a proposed amended complaint. White, 2013
2

L. Civ. R. 10.1(a) requires parties to advise the Court of
any change of address within seven days of such a change.
In this case, court mail sent to Plaintiff was returned as
undeliverable from July 2011 to May 2012. (See Docket Items
13, 21, & 25 (documenting undeliverable mail).)
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WL 1412300, at *8. Plaintiff refiled the present motion to
amend, attaching a Proposed Amended Complaint.
C. Parties’ Arguments
The Aramark Defendants contend that even with the
proposed amendments, Plaintiff still has failed to
establish a valid cause of action under the Fourteenth
Amendment, as his allegation “that certain foods were
switched with other foods does not warrant a finding that
the deprivation was ‘sufficiently serious.’” (Aramark Defs.
Br. [Docket Item 48] at 9.) They contend that “plaintiff is
alleging minor deviations from the menu that do not rise to
a constitutional violation,” and “Plaintiff still received
as alleged a balanced meal . . . .” (Id.) They analogize
the present case to the unpublished decision in Mora v.
Camden Cnty., No. 09-4183, 2010 WL 2560680, at *3 (D.N.J.
June 21, 2010), in which the plaintiff alleged that he
received inadequate calories and suffered “diminished
mental and physical faculties.”3 (Aramark Defs. Br. at 7-9.)

3

In Mora, however, the Court dismissed the Complaint
without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint,
because the plaintiff did not describe the diet, the dates
of confinement, or plead facts showing how long he
allegedly suffered malnutrition. Id. at *9. This case is
distinguishable because Plaintiff makes factual allegations
about his diet, the dates of his confinement and how long
he allegedly suffered malnutrition.
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The Aramark Defendants request that the motion to amend be
denied as to the conspiracy claim.4 (Id. at 9.)
The County Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion to
amend, referencing the Court’s April 5, 2013 Order which
only permitted amendments pertaining to the Aramark
Defendants. (County Defs. Br. at 1.) Addressing the merits
of the conspiracy claim, the County Defendants contend that
permitting amendment would prejudice them due to delay.
(Id. at 4.) They add that Plaintiff’s amendment would be
futile, as his vague allegations of conspiracy fail to meet
the prevailing pleading standard. (Id. at 5.)
III. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a party may amend its
pleading with the court’s leave, and “[t]he court should
freely give leave when justice so requires.” However, the
Third Circuit has recognized that a district court
justifiably may deny leave to amend on grounds “such as
undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, prejudice and
futility.” Calif. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp.,
394 F.3d 126, 165 (3d Cir. 2004). An amendment is futile
where the complaint, as amended, would fail to state a
4

The Aramark Defendants “adopt co-defendant County’s
arguments” in favor of denying the motion to amend the
conspiracy claim. (Id. at 9.)
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claim upon which relief could be granted under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997). Furthermore, although a
court must accept as true all factual allegations in a
complaint, that tenet is “inapplicable to legal
conclusions,” and “[a] pleading that offers labels and
conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009).
B. Plaintiff’s Constitutional Claims Against the
Aramark Defendants
Plaintiff has alleged plausible factual allegations in
support of his constitutional claim against the Aramark
Defendants. Accordingly, his motion to amend as to this
claim will be granted. The Court has previously stated that
when a pretrial detainee such as Plaintiff raises a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court looks to the
standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
i.e., whether the conditions of confinement complained of
amounted to punishment prior to the adjudication of guilt.
See Simmons, 2012 WL 3863792, at *3; Acevedo v. CFG Health
Sys. Staff, Civ. No. 10–5103, 2010 WL 4703774, at *4

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(D.N.J. Nov. 12, 2010); Mora, 2010 WL 2560680, at *7.5
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits punishment of a pretrial detainee prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of
law. See Bell, 441 U.S. at 535. The Third Circuit
summarized the conditions of confinement standard under
Bell as follows:
[A] particular measure amounts to punishment
when there is a showing of express intent to
punish on the part of detention facility
officials, when the restriction or condition
is not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive government purpose, or when the
restriction is excessive in light of that
purpose.
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Thus, the Third Circuit has “distilled the Supreme
Court’s teachings in Bell into a two-part test. We must
5

As the Court discussed recently in Hargis v. Aramark Corr.
Serv., LLC, No. 10-1006, 2013 WL 3465189, at *7-*8 (D.N.J.
July 10, 2013), the “standard to apply when evaluating
conditions of confinement imposed on pretrial detainees is
not clear and has been the subject of recent scholarly
debate.” As the Court did in Hargis, here the Court will
apply the standard articulated in Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008), discussed infra, which
represents the minimum constitutional protections afforded
to pretrial detainees. See id. at *8. Plaintiff makes no
allegation here that he was not afforded a probable cause
hearing, and thus this case does not implicate some of the
more controversial aspects of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment doctrine. See generally Catherine T. Struve, The
Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1009
(2013).
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ask, first, whether any legitimate purposes are served by
these conditions, and second, whether these conditions are
rationally related to these purposes.” Hubbard v. Taylor,
538 F.3d 229, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the Fourteenth
Amendment standard of unconstitutional punishment contains
both an objective component and a subjective component:
Unconstitutional punishment typically includes
both objective and subjective components. As the
Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271
(1991), the objective component requires an
inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently
serious”
and
the
subjective
component asks whether “the officials act[ed]
with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]”
Id. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321. The Supreme Court
did not abandon this bipartite analysis in Bell,
but rather allowed for an inference of mens rea
where
the
restriction
is
arbitrary
or
purposeless,
or
where
the
restriction
is
excessive, even if it would accomplish a
legitimate
governmental
objective.
Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68.
Under the Due Process Clause, prison officials must
satisfy inmates’ “basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.” Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). The Constitution requires
“that prisoners be served ‘nutritionally adequate food that
is prepared and served under conditions which do not
present an immediate danger to the health and well being of

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the inmates who consume it’ [and] under certain
circumstances a substantial deprivation of food may well be
recognized as being of constitutional dimension.” Robles v.
Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983). “[A] prisoner’s
diet must provide adequate nutrition, but prison officials
cannot be held liable under the [constitutional standard]
unless the prisoner shows both an objectively serious risk
of harm and that the officials knew about it and could have
prevented it but did not.” Mays v. Springborn, 575 F.3d
643, 648 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Duran
v. Merline, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 07-3589, 2013 WL
504582, at *9 (D.N.J. Feb. 8, 2013) (citing Robles and
Springborn).
While the allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s
Proposed Amended Complaint do not explicitly state what the
nutritional daily standards are, or the caloric intake of
the meals actually served, accepting all factual
allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences
in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has stated a claim for a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Plaintiff alleges that the food he was provided
on two representative days contained significantly smaller
portion sizes than promised. Some meals allegedly consisted
of no more than two slices of bread and a few teaspoons of

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meat, potatoes, or other food. (Am. Compl. at 11-12.)
Although the parties are silent as to the caloric or
nutritional value as to the meals actually served,6 the
Court will infer at this stage that the meals as described
fell below the acceptable standard.
In addition, Plaintiff pleads that he suffered
significant weight loss, depression, fatigue, stomach
cramps, gas, constipation, and uncontrollable vomiting as a
result of the Aramark Defendants’ food service. These
allegations permit the inference that the food service
presented an immediate danger to the health and well being
of the inmates and detainees. Although Plaintiff does not
plead facts that directly demonstrate a culpable state of
mind on the part of the Aramark Defendants, the Third
Circuit permits an inference of mens rea when the
restriction is arbitrary, purposeless or excessive.
Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68. As pleaded, Plaintiff’s
allegations appear arbitrary, purposeless and excessive,
and therefore culpability may be inferred.
Because the Court cannot and must not assess the
credibility of the claims alleged, but merely assess
whether the pleadings state a claim that is plausible on

6

The Aramark Defendants maintain that Plaintiff received
“as alleged a balanced meal.” (Aramark Defs. Br. at 9.)
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its face, the Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to amend
as to the constitutional violation against the Aramark
Defendants. Whether the diet served to Plaintiff as a
pretrial detainee failed to meet the minimum requirements
of a non-harmful diet is a question of fact on which
Plaintiff will have the burden of proof. The Court cannot
say that Plaintiff’s claim of a harmfully inadequate diet
fails as a matter of law at this stage, given the
allegations in the amended complaint of weight loss and
sickness on a recurring basis. As the Court has stressed
repeatedly in these related cases, the concern is not the
mere substitution of one food item for another but rather
the allegation of a nutritionally deficient diet that, over
time, caused actual harm to Plaintiff. See, e.g., Simmons,
2012 WL 3863792, at *4 (“the alleged deviations from the
menu . . . do not raise a plausible inference that
Defendants caused Plaintiff to suffer from malnutrition”).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint makes such allegations and
will not be dismissed at this stage.
C. Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim Against the Aramark
Defendants
Plaintiff’s motion to amend regarding his conspiracy
claim against the Aramark Defendants will be denied, as he
fails to plead sufficient facts to support such an

15

allegation. In order to state a claim for civil conspiracy
in New Jersey, a Plaintiff must provide facts which allege
a combination of two or more persons acting in
concert to commit an unlawful act, or to commit
a lawful act by unlawful means, the principal
element of which is an agreement between the
parties to inflict a wrong against or injury
upon another, and an overt act that results in
damage.
Warren v. Fisher, No. 10-5343, 2011 WL 4073753, at *3
(D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2011) (quoting Banco Popular N. Am. v.
Gandi, 876 A.2d 253, 263 (N.J. 2005)). Thus, to state a
claim for civil conspiracy, the plaintiff must allege that
the defendant (1) entered into an agreement with at least
one other person, (2) for the purpose of committing an
unlawful act, and (3) one of the conspirators then took at
least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement, and
(4) plaintiff suffered some damage as a result. Gandi, 876
A.2d at 263.
In this case, Plaintiff does not allege facts
supporting the first element of a civil conspiracy claim.
Plaintiff provides no factual allegations that the Aramark
Defendants entered into an agreement with one another to
treat the inmates in such a fashion. Plaintiff instead
recites the elements of claim in conclusory language:
“defendants agreed to act in concert to deprive CCCF
inmates of their essential daily carolic [sic] and

16

nutritional requirements, and forcing inmates to utilize
the jail’s commissary in an attempt to satisfy their
nutritional needs.” (Am. Compl. at 19.)
Since “[t]he assumption of truth does not apply. . . .
to legal conclusions couched as factual allegations or to
‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements,’” Warren,
2011 WL 4073753, at *3 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677),
Plaintiff’s claims would not survive a motion to dismiss.
As such, Plaintiff’s motion to amend as to the civil
conspiracy claim against the Aramark Defendants will be
denied.
D. Plaintiff’s Conspiracy Claim Against the County
Defendants
Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim against the County
Defendants is deficient for the same reasons. Specifically,
Plaintiff failed to allege facts demonstrating whether or
how the County Defendants entered into an agreement to
serve insufficient meal portions to Plaintiff and other
detainees, leaving him and others no option but to shop at
the jail’s commissary. Accordingly, the Court will deny
Plaintiff’s motion to amend as to the civil conspiracy
claim against the County Defendants, as amendment would be
futile.

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IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motion to amend is granted as to his
Fourteenth Amendment claim against the Aramark Defendants.
Plaintiff’s motion to amend is denied as to the conspiracy
claims against the Aramark and County Defendants. An
accompanying Order will be entered.

August 28, 2013
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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