MSKP OAK GROVE, LLC v. VENUTO et al

Filing 255

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/5/2017. (TH, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MSKP OAK GROVE, LLC,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 10-6465 (JBS/JS)

v.
CAROL VENUTO, individually and
as executrix of the Estate of
RALPH A. VENUTO, Sr., et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Robert A. Vort, Esq.
2 University Plaza, Suite 101
Hackensack, NJ 07601
-andJoseph A. Molinaro, Esq.
666 Godwin Avenue, Suire 220
Midland Park, NJ 07342
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Dimitri Luke Karapelou, Esq.
LAW OFFICES OF DIMITRI L. KARAPELOU, LLC
Two Penn Center
1500 JFK Boulevard, Suite 920
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorney for Defendants
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the Court on motions in limine filed
by both parties [Docket Items 232 & 233] in advance of a nonjury trial scheduled for May 15, 2017. The Court finds as
follows.

BACKGROUND
For the purposes of the instant motion, it suffices to
recount the following. In this action, Plaintiff MSKP Oak Grove,
LLC (“MSKP”) asserts claims under the New Jersey Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, N.J.S.A. § 25:2-20 et seq. (“NJUFTA”),
arising from an allegedly fraudulent transfer of assets through
which Defendants intended to avoid payment to certain creditors,
including Plaintiff.

Plaintiff is a commercial landlord to

which Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc. (“HTS”) is indebted by a
2009 judgment in the amount of $411,573.45.

Plaintiff alleges

that following an asset purchase agreement with another
corporation, Tan Holdings, LLC, in 2007, HTS fraudulently
distributed $23.9 million to its shareholders, Defendants Carol
and Ralph A. Venuto, Sr.,1 Ralph A. Venuto, Jr., Carol Rebbecchi,
and Richard P. Venuto (“the Shareholders”) on June 22, 2007, and
rendered HTS without sufficient assets to satisfy future
obligations to creditors, including HTS’s obligation to
Plaintiff relating to a defaulted lease agreement.
The parties now move for orders excluding, or striking
their opponents’ objections to, certain of the trial exhibits
and witnesses identified in the Joint Final Pretrial Order,

1

Because Ralph A. Venuto, Sr. died prior to the initiation of
this action, Plaintiff names his estate as a defendant,
represented by Defendant Carol Venuto as executrix.
2

signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on January 12, 2017.
[Docket Item 226.] These motions are now fully briefed, and
supplemented by a joint stipulation of certain facts filed on
April 19, 2017. [Docket Item 248.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court may hear the present motions in limine because
it has the inherent authority to manage cases brought before it.
Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 40 n. 2 (1984). An “in
limine ruling on evidence issues is a procedure which should, in
the trial court's discretion, be used in appropriate cases.” In
re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 260 (3d
Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). One such
appropriate case is where the court can shield the jury from
unfairly prejudicial or irrelevant evidence. See United States
v. Romano, 849 F.2d 812, 815 (3d Cir. 1988). The in limine
motion then fosters efficiency for the court and for counsel by
preventing needless argument at trial. New Jersey Civil
Procedure § 16–2:2 (citing Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of
Educ., 913 F.2d 1064, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990)). Although pretrial
motions in limine are also permissible in a non-jury case, their
utility is diminished because the judge determining the
admissibility of evidence is also the fact finder, and thus many
such objections can be deferred until trial.
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DISCUSSION
At trial, Plaintiff will be required to prove by clear and
convincing evidence the various essential elements of its NJUFTA
claims,2 including that the Shareholders intended to hinder,
delay, or defraud MSKP through the Shareholders’ distribution of
most proceeds from the June, 2007 Tan Holdings transaction to
themselves. Plaintiff seeks to do this, in part, by introducing
testimony and documentary evidence of Defendants’ behavior
towards other creditors and in other lawsuits, specifically in
connection with suits against HTS by Hadis Nafar, GS Partners,
HT of Highlands, and Rowan Petroleum Properties, LLC; and
against Hollywood Hands by Warminster Group, L.P.; and against
Ralph Venuto, Sr., and other companies he owned. Plaintiff also
seeks to use much of this evidence to prove that HTS was
insolvent and/or maintained inadequate cash reserves in relation

2

Specifically, as discussed in the Opinion filed June 29, 2016
[Docket Item 215], Plaintiff asserts claims under the NJUFTA in
three counts. Count One alleges that the $23.8 million
shareholder distribution to Defendants violates the
intentionally fraudulent transfer provision of the NJUFTA,
N.J.S.A. 25:2-225(a). Id. at 28-34. Count Two alleges that the
shareholder distribution constitutes a constructive fraudulent
transfer because HTS’s remaining assets were unreasonably small
in relation to its business, in violation of N.J.S.A. 25:225(b)(1). Id. at 34-40. Count Three alleges that the shareholder
distribution caused HTS to become insolvent, in violation of
N.J.S.A. 25:2-27(a). Id. at 40-42. Plaintiff’s claim in Count
Four under N.J.S.A. 25:2-27(b) was recently dismissed as barred
by the statute of limitations in the Memorandum Opinion and
Order of April 17, 2017 [Docket Items 246 & 247].
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to its business between 2006 and 2010. Also contested in the
instant motions are documents relating to the Estate of Ralph
Venuto, Sr.; the assets of HTS; Defendants’ rebuttal expert
report by William Pederson and other documentary evidence from
the Orchard Mall case; the admissibility of case law and filings
from this case; and a few miscellaneous documents.3 The parties
have supplemented their briefing record with a stipulation of
facts [Docket Item 248] by which the parties agree, inter alia,
that all of the documents which Plaintiff intends to introduce
are authentic and that Defendants reserve their right to
challenge their relevance at trial.
1. Other lawsuits against HTS
Plaintiff seeks to introduce testimony and documentary
evidence regarding a number of other lawsuits by creditors
against HTS, including those involving Hadis Nafar, GS Partners,
HT of Highlands Ranch, and Rowen Petroleum in the state and
federal courts of New Jersey. Plaintiff argues that this
evidence will be relevant to prove (i) that HTS was insolvent
and maintained inadequate cash reserves, and (ii) that HTS

3

Plaintiff also requests leave to amend the Joint Final Pretrial
Order to add Glenn Geiger to its witness list, who will testify
as to jurisdictional facts regarding Plaintiff’s ownership and
citizenship. Because Defendants do not oppose this relief, the
Court will grant Plaintiff’s motion to the extent it seeks this
relief. If the facts of Plaintiff’s citizenship are not in
dispute, the Court would appreciate a suitable stipulation of
facts in lieu of testimony.
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intended to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors by “employing a
scorched earth litigation strategy” against all its creditors.
Defendants object to this evidence on the grounds that it is
irrelevant and that much of it is hearsay. Defendants seek to
exclude Plaintiff’s Exhibits 16-19, 37-58 & 71.
At the outset, the Court notes that it appears that the
parties have resolved their dispute over whether Plaintiff can
call Mr. Federman or a representative from Travelers Insurance.
The new stipulations of fact include agreements that the
documents which each would be called to authenticate – a lease
signed by Ralph Venuto, Sr. and an insurance policy issued to
HTS, respectively – are authentic, obviating the need for their
testimony at trial. Accordingly, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s
motion as moot to the extent that it seeks an order overruling
Defendants’ objections to Mr. Federman and the Travelers
Insurance representative.
Because the parties have framed their arguments about other
case evidence in broad terms, the Court too will address the
issues ranging from the general to the specific. Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence is only admissible to the
extent that it is relevant. Fed. R. Evid. 402. The Rules define
relevant evidence as “evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
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it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. This sets
a low bar for admissibility, subject to the other Rules of
Evidence. United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 214 (3d Cir.
2009). However, even where evidence is relevant, it may be
excluded where “its probative value is substantially outweighed
by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, . .
. undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
This Court has already determined that evidence of
Defendants’ conduct in this and other litigations is not
probative of their “intent to hinder or delay” creditors within
the meaning of the NJUFTA; all parties are bound by the law of
the case holding that “what is relevant to Plaintiff’s success .
. . is only proof of Defendants’ intent to defraud or delay
creditors by means of a fraudulent conveyance, in this case the
shareholder distribution, and not any other conduct.” Opinion
dated June 29, 2016 [Docket Item 215] at 31 n. 7. Nevertheless,
some items of evidence of these other suits may be probative of
HTS’s financial condition and whether HTS retained assets after
the shareholder distribution that were “unreasonably small in
relation to the business or transaction,” or whether HTS was
insolvent at the time of the shareholder distribution or became
insolvent because of the distribution. See N.J.S.A. 25:225(b)(1) and 25:2-27(a).
7

Several clear guideposts emerge regarding the use of
evidence from other HTS cases. First, Plaintiff will not be
permitted to relitigate claims by other creditors against these
defendants that were made but not adjudicated in other lawsuits.
To permit Plaintiff to submit reams of evidence from other cases
in hopes of proving that these defendants committed fraudulent
acts in these cases toward other creditors, where there was no
adjudication that such fraud had been proved, would
impermissibly involve this Court in determining the merits of
other creditors’ unadjudicated claims from other cases. This is
true of each of the other cases referenced by Plaintiff in which
the matter of fraud was not adjudicated, namely, the Hadis
Nafar, GS Partners, and HT of Highlands Ranch lawsuits. Such a
trial-within-a-trial is not to be permitted where it would, as
in the present circumstances, consume undue time to even know
whether such fraud occurred, contrary to Rule 403, Fed. R. Evid.
This presents a situation in which this Court finds the
probative value of the evidence from unadjudicated accusations
in other cases is substantially outweighed by the undue
consumption of time that such minitrials would consume, tipping
the Rule 403 balance squarely against admissibility of much that
happened in other cases. The Court thus rules out Plaintiff’s
proposal to make a wholesale introduction of pleadings, briefs

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and documents from other cases. Defendants’ motion is granted to
this extent.
Second, pleadings and briefs filed in other cases are not
evidence. They are allegations, not proof. Pleadings and briefs
are thus inadmissible standing alone. Orson, Inc. v. Miramax
Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that
“legal memoranda and oral argument are not evidence.”).
Third, a judicial order from another case may be admissible
if otherwise relevant and probative to the factual issues in
this case, as a court may take judicial notice of another
court’s order upon the public docket when Rule 201, Fed. R.
Evid., is satisfied. McTernan v. City of York, 577 F.3d 521, 525
(3d Cir. 2009) (noting that “a court may take judicial notice of
a prior judicial opinion.”).
Fourth, a relevant statement by a party opponent, though
made in another case, is not hearsay and it may be admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2), Fed. R. Evid. Further, a prior
inconsistent statement of a witness, made in another case, is
likewise not hearsay and it may be admissible if Rule
801(d)(1)(A), Fed. R. Evid., is satisfied.
Fifth, evidence that Defendants or their attorneys have
caused delay or been uncooperative in other cases regarding
claims of Defendants’ fraud, as Plaintiff asserts, will
generally not be admissible here. Defendants are not on trial
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here for the manner in which they defend other creditors’
claims. However, if another court has addressed such alleged
misconduct and found that it occurred and that it gives rise in
that case to an evidential inference or sanction, then Plaintiff
here will be permitted to argue for its admissibility here. For
example, if there is evidence that Defendants hid the true
financial condition of HTS from creditors at or about the time
of the alleged fraudulent transfer in 2007, such evidence may be
intrinsic to the present case. The Court will then examine the
probative value of such a finding to the issues in dispute and
whether the Rule 403 concerns substantially outweigh the
probative value. Such a determination cannot be made on the
present record.
Resolution of some of these disputes is premature because
“the context of trial” may provide clarity on the relevance and
potential prejudice of each proffered piece of evidence.
Ebenhoech v. Koppers Indus., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 2d 455, 461
(D.N.J. 2002) (noting that rulings on motions in limine “should
not be made prematurely if the context of trial would provide
clarity”); Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 924 F. Supp.
1396, 1413 (D.N.J. 1996) (“[I]t is difficult to rule on the
admissibility of pieces of evidence prior to trial. It is often
useful to wait and see how the trial unfolds.”). The Court will
discuss other specific issues raised in these motions.
10

Plaintiff has listed two witnesses who were participants in
prior HTS litigation to whom Defendants object, namely, Stephen
M. Orlofsky and Carmine Gallicchio.
Mr. Orlofsky’s firm, Blank Rome LLP, was counsel to
Hollywood Tanning Systems, Inc., in a suit filed in 2006 by
Hadis Nafar that was removed to this Court, Nafar v. Hollywood
Tanning Systems, Civil No. 06-3826; Plaintiff proposes to obtain
Mr. Orlofsky’s testimony about HTS’s insurance policy which
covered only counsel fees and costs of defense but not
indemnification of any settlement or judgment against HTS, as
well as addressing the contents of HTS’s notice of removal which
pleaded that damages sought from HTS exceeded $5 million. [See
JFPTO, Part V, p. 26.]
Mr. Gallicchio, on the other hand, was the sole member of
GS Partners which purchased an HTS franchise, for which GS
Partners asserted fraud claims against HTS, Ralph Venuto, Jr.
and Ralph Venuto, Sr. in 2009 in arbitration, which was
terminated when HTS failed to pay its arbitration fee; Mr.
Gallicchio would testify that GS Partners then filed suit in
2010 for damages against HTS, the Estate of Ralph Venuto, Sr.,
and Ralph Venuto, Jr., which resulted in an empty judgment
against HTS only in 2011 in the amount of $959,359. [See JFPTO,
Part V, p. 27.]

11

The need for Mr. Orlofsky’s testimony has been mooted by
the parties’ stipulations. They have stipulated that in removing
the Nafar case to federal court, HTS pleaded that the amount in
controversy exceeded $5,000,000. Stipulations of Facts [Docket
Item 248] at ¶¶ 1 & 2. Likewise, they have stipulated to the
existence of HTS’s sole insurance policy and attached a copy to
the stipulations. Id. ¶ 3. Accordingly, Mr. Orlofsky’s proffered
testimony has been rendered unnecessary.
As for Mr. Gallicchio, while the parties have stipulated
that the documents on which Gallicchio will rely (P-41 to P-61
and P-63) are authentic (Stipulations of Fact at ¶ 6),
Defendants reserve their right to object to the relevance of
these documents. Id. As discussed above, if Plaintiff intends to
present these 21 documents to demonstrate that several of the
Defendants employed an evasive litigation style in the GS
Partners case, the Defendants’ objection will be sustained. If
there are particular documents from the GS Partners case that
document HTS’s financial condition at or about the time of the
alleged fraudulent transfer in 2007, such documents may be
admissible, but no determination can be made now. Likewise, for
example, the court’s final judgment may well be admissible if
Plaintiff can show why defendants’ acts in defrauding an HTS
franchisee are probative of the alleged fraudulent conveyance,
to the Defendants, of HTS’s proceeds from the Tan Holdings
12

purchase in 2007; such a determination is likewise premature,
and will be deferred for trial.
2. Hollywood Hands lawsuit
Next, Defendants seek to exclude, and Plaintiff seeks to
overrule Defendants’ objections to, documents related to
Warminster Group, L.P. v. Hollywood Hands, Court of Common Pleas
of Pennsylvania, Bucks County, Docket No. 2000-4882-18-1. (See
P-114-135.) Plaintiff argues that this evidence is relevant to
prove Defendants’ “intent to hinder, delay and defraud;”
Defendants take the position that this evidence is irrelevant as
to HTS’s assets because HTS was not a party to that lawsuit, and
inadmissible hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence.
As above, Plaintiff is precluded from arguing that
Defendants’ conduct in other lawsuits is probative of their
intent to hinder and delay creditors, because such conduct is
not related to the shareholder distribution that is the focus of
this suit. To the extent that Plaintiff plans to use this
evidence to show that HTS held insufficient assets, Plaintiff
has failed to show how such evidence is not inadmissible
hearsay. While such evidence might be conditionally admissible
on the grounds that Plaintiff proves at trial that HTS and
Hollywood Hands were in fact the same entity, Plaintiff has
failed to articulate either a non-hearsay use for this evidence

13

or a reason this evidence is excepted or exempted from the
definition of hearsay.
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as an out-ofcourt statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter
asserted in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801. It is the burden
of the proponent of a particular piece of evidence to prove that
the statement is admissible and is not hearsay. Idaho v. Wright,
497 U.S. 805, 816 (1990). It appears that Plaintiff seeks to
introduce evidence of the judgment against Hollywood Hands to
show another claim on HTS’s assets, or the fact of another of
HTS’s liabilities. Plaintiff has not adequately articulated an
admissible purpose for this evidence, but may be able to do so
in the context of trial. For this reason, the Court will deny
both motions in limine as they concern the Hollywood Hands
lawsuit, without prejudice to both parties’ right to raise these
arguments again at trial.
3. Lawsuits involving Ralph Venuto, Sr. and his Estate
Defendants also seek to exclude, and Plaintiff seeks to
overrule Defendants’ objections to, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 136,
which is a “list of cases in which Venutos or their companies
were parties” and Plaintiff’s Exhibits 177 & 178, which are
court filings related to the insolvency of the Estate of Ralph
Venuto, Sr. [JFPTO at pp. 49, 51.]

14

As above, Plaintiff is precluded by the law of the case
from introducing this evidence to show HTS’s intent to hinder or
delay creditors. To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to use this
evidence to prove that HTS had inadequate assets after the
shareholder distribution, Plaintiff has failed to show how these
facts are related – Plaintiff has adduced nothing to prove that
HTS’s assets are the same as to Mr. Venuto’s personal assets, or
the assets of his other companies. Moreover, insofar as
Plaintiff plans to use this evidence to prove Mr. Venuto’s
“predisposition to hinder, delay and defraud,” Plaintiff has not
shown that this evidence is not inadmissible character evidence
pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(a). Accordingly, the Court will
grant Defendants’ motion and deny Plaintiff’s motion in limine
on this point, and will bar Plaintiff from introducing evidence
of lawsuits involving Ralph Venuto, Sr., his other companies,
and his Estate insofar as HTS was not a party to any of them,
nor has Plaintiff articulated a basis under Rule 406, Fed. R.
Evid., by which these acts by Mr. Venuto, Sr. are probative of
issues in this case.
4. Exhibits relied upon by Ms. Brown
Defendants also seek to exclude, and Plaintiff seeks to
overrule Defendants’ objections to, Plaintiff’s Exhibit 162,
which is an “E-mail from Rebecca McDowell to Robert Vort,
Quickbooks Password.” [JFPTO at p. 50.] Defendants contend that
15

this evidence is irrelevant to any issue reserved for trial, and
that it only concerns “an issue already litigated and decided”
with regards to Defendants’ alleged misconduct in discovery.
Plaintiff contends that this evidence is admissible as a basis
of its expert Shelley Brown’s report, pursuant to Fed. R. Evid.
703. The Court will reserve decision on this dispute until it
has the benefit of the context of trial to evaluate whether this
evidence is relevant to Ms. Brown’s testimony and not unduly
prejudicial or otherwise excludable under Rule 403, Fed. R.
Evid., which the parties have not addressed in their motions.
Likewise, the Court will reserve decision on the
admissibility of Plaintiff’s Exhibit 140, “Documents requested
from Hollywood Tanning which were not received.” [JFPTO at p.
49.] Such evidence may or may not be relevant depending on Ms.
Brown’s testimony at trial.
5. The Orchard Mall case
Defendants seek to introduce testimony regarding and
documentary evidence from Orchard Mall, LLC v. Venuto et al.,
Docket No. L-2044-10 (N.J. Super. Ct.), another case involving
the Defendants, in which both Plaintiff’s expert Ms. Brown and
Defendants’ expert, Mr. Pederson, appeared. Plaintiff objects to
the testimony of Mr. Pederson at trial to the extent he will
testify about his conclusions in the Orchard Mall case, and
object to the introduction of Mr. Pederson’s report and other
16

discovery and court filings from that case. (See Defendants’
Exhibits 1, 5-7, 29-32, 49-50 & 62.)
Plaintiff takes the position that this evidence should be
excluded because it is not relevant. In opposition, Defendants
principally argue that this evidence is relevant because
Plaintiff relied on Ms. Brown’s Orchard Mall expert report in
its pleadings, and because Ms. Brown relies on that report in
her expert report in the instant case. In addition, Defendants
argue that some of these documents are necessary to authenticate
other documents in this case. Finally, Defendants argue that
this evidence is admissible because “Plaintiff avers that these
Exhibits are not relevant but provides no explanation.”
As explained above, court filings from Orchard Mall are
inadmissible as evidence of (or against) Defendants’ fraud
towards creditors where the case was settled and not finally
adjudicated. (Defendants’ Exhibits 49 & 62). Of course, Ms.
Brown and Mr. Pederson may be cross-examined on their prior
statements in the Orchard Mall case if they are inconsistent
with their opinions at this trial. (Defendants’ Exhibit 1.) Both
expert witnesses will be permitted to rely on other material
from the Orchard Mall case so long as it is the type of material
customarily relied on by an expert in the field under Rule 703,
Fed. R. Evid., but such facts or data need not be admissible.
The Court will reserve decision on the admissibility of
17

Defendants’ other proposed exhibits related to the Orchard Mall
case (Defendants’ Exhibits 5-7, 29-32 & 50) until it has the
benefit of the context of trial to determine whether these
materials are relevant and not unduly prejudicial to the
experts’ testimony in this case.
6. Court filings in this case
Next, Plaintiff seeks to exclude Defendants’ Exhibits 2-4,
which are three of Defendants’ briefs in this case. Defendants
take the position that such court filings are relevant because
“they contain thorough expositions of the law of fraudulent
transfer as it would apply to this case,” and may introduce
their filings “to assert arguments at trial which rely on these
decisions including: law of the case for issues already ruled on
by this Court; prior discussions of the issues and claims
relevant to trial including factual observations, burdens of
proof, elements of causes of action and legal theories; and the
findings in these decisions.” Plaintiff takes the position that
briefs are not admissible because “argument is not evidence.”
The Court grants Plaintiff’s motion. Defendants’ briefs are
not admissible evidence – they are not relevant to, or probative
of, any fact in dispute. Defendants’ briefs are, of course, “of
record” in the sense they are on the docket. Other than perhaps
in a case in which an attorney’s legal malpractice is at issue
(and the briefs would be evidence of issues raised or not
18

raised), there is no basis for admitting such briefs into
evidence, and Defendants’ Exhibits 2-4 will be excluded.
7. Case law
Plaintiff also seeks to exclude Defendants’ Exhibits 19-28,
which are cases which Defendants plan to use to cross-examine
Ms. Brown at trial. Plaintiff takes the position that case law
is argument, not evidence, and that Ms. Brown cannot be crossexamined on case law because “she is an accountant – not an
attorney.” Defendants argue that it is proper to use case law on
cross examination to impeach Ms. Brown’s credibility because Ms.
Brown relies on the treatise Pratt, Valuing a Business, in her
expert report, and Pratt states that “Valuation decisions are
affected by a wide variety of legal decisions and principles.”
The Court is not inclined to permit Defendants to crossexamine Ms. Brown on legal issues reflected in judicial
opinions. She is not testifying as an expert on the legal
standards, and indeed such issues are for the Court in this
case. Pointing out language in prior opinions in unrelated cases
to an accounting expert witness who expresses no opinion as to
what the law is, will be impermissible as beyond the scope of
the expert’s opinion and expertise. Plaintiff’s motion to
exclude Defendants’ Exhibits 19-28 from being used to crossexamine Ms. Brown will be granted. Defendants may renew their
request to use such prior court opinions for this purpose if Ms.
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Brown’s testimony purports to identify legal, rather than
accounting, principles.
8. Miscellaneous documents
Finally, the parties dispute the admissibility of
Defendants’ Exhibits 53-55, 94, 126, and 129, which appear to be
a variety of miscellaneous correspondence, court documents, and
documents for Tan Holdings. [JFPTO at pp. 59-65.] The parties
simply state that these documents are either “relevant” or “not
relevant,” without further explanation of what these documents
are, how they are related to the case, and how and why they are
admissible. For this reason, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s
motion as premature with respect to these exhibits and will
defer decision unless and until these documents are sought to be
introduced at trial.
CONCLUSION
An accompanying Order will be entered.

May 5, 2017
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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