SHAW, et al v. OBERMIER, et al

Filing 138

MEMORANDUM OPINION FILED. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/2/16. (js)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MELISSA L. SHAW, et al.,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiffs,
Civil Action
No. 11-276 (JBS/JS)

v.
SCOTT OBERMEIER, et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on two motions for
summary judgment by Defendants Scott Obermeier, Richard Worst,
Mark Pickard, Mario Straccialini, Harry Earle, and the Township
of Gloucester [Docket Item 132] and by Defendant James W.
Shriver [Docket Item 137.] This action arises from two traffic
stops in Gloucester Township in the early morning of November
10, 2010 which followed observations by the local police of
suspected drug activity involving pro se Plaintiffs Melissa Shaw
and Salahuddin Smart. Prior to the traffic stops, detectives
conducting surveillance in the area observed Plaintiff Smart in
the parking lot of a Howard Johnson Motel entering a vehicle
operated by Plaintiff Shaw and returning to his vehicle, which
was later revealed to be a vehicle rented by Plaintiff Shaw.
Ultimately, both Plaintiff Smart and his passenger, Melissa
Librojo, were charged with possession of a controlled substance.

Plaintiff Smart now asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
alleged violations of his Fourth Amendment rights stemming from
the traffic stop and subsequent criminal prosecution.
For the following reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’
motions and dismiss Plaintiff Smart’s case in its entirety with
prejudice.
1.

The factual record for purposes of the pending motions

are straightforward and undisputed.1 On November 13, 2010,
detectives from the Gloucester Township Police Department
(“GTPD”) Defendants Scott Obermeier, Mario Straccialini, and
Detective Sargent James Shriver were conducting surveillance of
the Howard Johnson Motel in Gloucester Township, an area known
for criminal activity. (Obermeier et al. Statement of Material
Facts (“SMF”) [Docket Item 133] ¶¶ 10-11.) The detectives
observed a car driven by Plaintiff Smart circle the Howard
Johnson’s parking lot repeatedly before ultimately parking next
to a second vehicle, a white SUV driven by Plaintiff Shaw, which
pulled to the rear of the lot. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 19-21.) The
detectives watched as Plaintiff Smart entered the rear passenger
compartment of the white SUV, returned to his vehicle, then
entered the white SUV a second time before returning to his

1

Because Plaintiff has filed no opposition, the Court deems the
facts set forth by Defendants undisputed for purposes of the
pending summary judgment motion. See L. CIV. R. 56.1(a).
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vehicle and exiting the parking lot. (Id. ¶¶ 22-23.) The
detectives positively identified Smart, who was known to them
due to previous encounters and arrests for criminal activity.
(Id. ¶¶ 27-28.) Detectives believed Plaintiff Smart’s license
was suspended and called for his vehicle to be stopped. (Id. ¶¶
29, 31.)
2.

Defendant Pickard, another Officer with the GTPD, was

the first patrol unit available to stop Plaintiff Smart’s
vehicle. (Id. ¶ 31.) During the stop, Smart and his passenger
were ordered to exit the vehicle so that a canine perimeter
sniff search could be conducted. (Id. ¶ 35.) Upon being advised
that a female officer was going to conduct a pat down of her
person, the passenger, Melissa Librojo, told officers that she
placed a bag down the front of her pants. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37.) She
was then found to be in possession of two plastic bags
containing small pills. (Id. ¶ 37.) Ms. Librojo told Defendant
Obermeier that the bag of pills had been in the center console
of the vehicle before they were stopped, and that she had hidden
them in her pants to avoid having them seen by police. (Id. ¶
38.) She told Defendant Obermeier that the drugs did not belong
to her. (Id. ¶ 40-41.) Both Smart and Librojo were charged with
possession of a controlled substance. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 55.)
3.

Plaintiff Smart was taken to the Gloucester Township

Police Department, where he was placed in cell while evidence
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was being processed. (Id. ¶¶ 43, 45.) Surveillance video shows
Plaintiff Smart attempting to flush an unknown object down the
cell toilet and placing items – including his mattress and
various articles of clothing – over the camera in the cell. (Id.
¶¶ 46, 48-49.) Each time Plaintiff Smart used an item to cover
the camera, GTPD officers removed it from the cell. (Id. ¶ 50.)
Defendants Obermeier and Shriver considered this conduct
“violent” and placed Plaintiff Smart in a physical restraint
chair so that he would not harm himself. (Id. ¶¶ 51-53.)
4.

Plaintiffs Shaw and Smart commenced separate actions

on January 18, 2011 and February 9, 2011 respectively. On March
15, 2011, Shaw and Smart filed an Amended Complaint in Shaw v.
Obermier, Civil No. 11-276 (JBS/JS). [Docket Item 6.] On that
same date, Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to consolidate
the later-filed action Smart v. Pickard, Civil No. 11-743
(RBK/AMD) with Shaw v. Obermier, Civil No. 11-276 (JBS/JS),
which the Court granted on April 6, 2011. [Docket Item 9.]
Plaintiff Shaw’s suit was ultimately dismissed in its entirety
for lack of prosecution. [Docket Items 112 & 113.] Discovery as
to Plaintiff Smart’s remaining claims has now closed. Pending
before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by
Defendants Scott Obermeier, Richard Worst, Mark Pickard, Mario
Straccialini, Harry Earle, and the Township of Gloucester

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[Docket Item 132] and by Defendant James W. Shriver [Docket Item
137.]
5.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) generally

provides that the “court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact” such that the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words, where “the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact
to find for the non-moving party,” the Court may grant summary
judgment.

Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The Court finds that based on
the undisputed facts in the record, summary judgment is
warranted for all Defendants.
6.

To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff

must allege: 1) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and 2) that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d
Cir. 1994). See also Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d
Cir. 2011). Plaintiff Smart alleges that the individual
Defendants, all GTPD officers, violated his Fourth Amendment
rights by way of a traffic stop, canine sniff search of his
vehicle, arrest, strip search, and malicious prosecution, and
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alleges that Gloucester Township and the Chief of Police are
liable for inadequate training of police officers, failing to
have clear policies and procedures, and having a custom of
allowing officers “unfettered discretion” to conduct canine drug
detection searches.
7.

Plaintiff Smart has not established a Fourth Amendment

violation on account of the traffic stop. The Fourth Amendment
protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and
seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. A traffic stop is a “seizure”
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, “even though the
purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite
brief.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); see also
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); United States
v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2006). Consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, an officer may conduct a brief
investigatory stop when he has reasonable, articulable, and
individualized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. United
States v. Lowe, 791 F.3d 424, 434 (3d Cir. 2015). Reasonable
suspicion is a “less demanding standard than probable cause and
requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the
evidence.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000).
8.

In this case, the officers on the scene – according to

Plaintiff Smart, it appears Defendants Obermeier, Straccialini,
Shriver, Worst, and Pickard – had reasonable suspicion to stop
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Plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff was observed in an area “known for
criminal activity” engaged in activity in the Howard Johnson
parking lot which three different officers described as
“suspicious.”(SMF Ex. B at 4, 11; Ex. C at 52:2-5; Ex. D. at
33:9-34:8; Ex. F at 4:22-5:17.) Because Defendant Straccialini
was able to identify Mr. Smart in the parking lot, the officers
on the scene were able to learn that he did not have a valid
driver’s license. (SMF Ex. D at 24:22-25:20, 30:6-21.) The
officers therefore observed him in violation of one of the
traffic laws of New Jersey, driving without a license, when he
exited the Howard Johnson parking lot. (SMF Ex. B at 4, 11.) “A
police officer who observes a violation of state traffic laws
may lawfully stop the car committing the violation.” United
States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 216 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 424 U.S. 106, 109 (1977)). Although
Plaintiff asserts that he was not “operating the vehicle in
excess of the speeding limit” (Am. Compl. Count 1), this traffic
violation of driving without a license sufficed to give Officer
Pickard reason to stop Plaintiff Smart’s vehicle. Accordingly,
the Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as
to Plaintiff Smart’s claims arising from the traffic stop.
9.

Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth

Amendment violation on account of the canine sniff search of his
vehicle. Plaintiff asserts that “the k-9 sniff was intrusive
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enough to amount to a search” (Am. Compl. Count 25), but the
Supreme Court has held that “the use of a well-trained narcotics
detection dog – one that does not expose noncontraband items
that otherwise would remain hidden from public view – during a
lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate
privacy interests.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409
(2005) (internal citations omitted). Because the Court has
already found that Plaintiff Smart’s traffic stop was lawful,
and because there is no evidence showing that any noncontraband
items were revealed by Officer Pickard’s dog (SMF Ex. B at 4,
11), nothing unconstitutional occurred on account of the canine
search. The Court will grant Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s claims arising from the canine
sniff search.
10.

Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth

Amendment violation for false arrest. To state a claim for false
arrest, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that there was an arrest;
and (2) that the arrest was made without probable cause.” James
v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). An
officer has probable cause to arrest when there are “facts and
circumstances sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing
that the suspect had committed or was committing an offense.”
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111 (1975) (internal citations
omitted). In this case, Defendant Obermeier filed criminal
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charges against Plaintiff Smart for violation of N.J.S.A. §
2C:35:10(a)(1), which criminalizes the possession or
constructive possession of controlled dangerous substances. The
New Jersey Supreme Court defines constructive possession as a
situation where, although a defendant lacks physical control
over an item, “the circumstances permit a reasonable inference
that the defendant has knowledge of its presence, and intends
and has the capacity to exercise physical control or dominion
over it during a span of time.” State v. Spivey, 844 A.2d 512,
516 (N.J. 2004). Defendant Obermeier had probable cause to
believe that Plaintiff Smart had constructive possession of the
pills handed over by Ms. Librojo, the passenger in his car: Ms.
Librojo told Defendant Obermeier that she had a bag of pills
concealed in her pants, that the drugs had been in the center
console of Plaintiff Smart’s car, that she did not want the
police to see the drugs in the console, and that the drugs did
not belong to her. (SMF Ex. B at 4, 11.) Defendant Obermeier was
entitled to rely on Ms. Librojo’s statement in his determination
that probable cause existed to find that Plaintiff Smart had
constructive possession of the drugs without investigating them
further. See Merkle v. Upper Dublin Sch. Dist., 211 F.3d 782,
790 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2000) (officer “was not required to undertake
an exhaustive investigation in order to validate the probable
cause that, in his mind, already existed.”). Smart was the
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driver, seated next to the console containing the drugs, and his
passenger said the drugs were not hers; these circumstances were
known to the arresting officer and they constituted probable
cause for his arrest. No reasonable juror could find that
probable cause was lacking. Accordingly, because there was
probable cause to arrest Plaintiff Smart for possession of a
controlled dangerous substance, the Court will grant Defendants’
motions for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s false
arrest claim.
11.

Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth

Amendment violation for false imprisonment based on his
incarceration in the Camden County Correctional Facility. To
state a claim for false imprisonment, a plaintiff must show:
“(1) that [he] was detained; and (2) that the detention was
unlawful.” James, 700 F.3d at 682-83. Plaintiff Smart may have
had a viable false imprisonment claim if he had been arrested
without probable cause, Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995), but his detention was lawful because he
was held, first at the Gloucester Township Police Department and
then at the Camden County Correctional Facility, pursuant to his
legitimate criminal charges for possession of a controlled
dangerous substance. Accordingly, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s
false imprisonment claim.
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12.

Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth

Amendment violation on account of the alleged “strip search” in
his jail cell at the Gloucester Township Police Department.
Plaintiff Smart asserts that Defendant Obermeier “force[d]
plaintiff Smart to acts that constituted a strip search outside
the holding cell when he required removal of clothing” (Am.
Compl. Count 28), but the evidence shows that Plaintiff Smart
removed his clothing of his own accord to obscure the
surveillance camera in his cell. (See SMF Ex. H.) Officers
confiscated each item of clothing as it was used to block the
camera, on the grounds that Plaintiff Smart’s behavior was
“violent” and could “cause damage or cause harm” to himself.
(SMF Ex. B at 5, 12-13; Ex. C. at 93:9-22.) This does not
implicate any reasonable expectation of privacy protected by the
Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, the Court will grant Defendants’
motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Smart’s Fourth
Amendment claim arising out of his alleged strip search.
13.

Plaintiff Smart has also not established a Fourth

Amendment violation for malicious prosecution. To state a claim
for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must show “(1) the
defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal
proceeding ended in the plaintiff’s favor; (3) the proceeding
was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants acted
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff
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to justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of
liberty consistent with the concept of seizure as a consequence
of a legal proceeding.” DiBella v. Borough of Beachwood, 407
F.3d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 2005). Because, as discussed above, the
charges against Plaintiff Smart for possession of a controlled
dangerous substance were based upon probable cause, Plaintiff
cannot prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution on account
of those charges. Therefore the Court will grant Defendants’
motion summary judgment on Plaintiff Smart’s malicious
prosecution claim.
14.

Nor can Plaintiff maintain claims against Defendants

Obermeier, Straccialini, Worst, and Shriver for “bystander
liability” for not intervening to prevent the allegedly
unconstitutional traffic stop, canine search, arrest, and strip
search. It is black-letter law that state actors may be liable
in a § 1983 claim only for their own unconstitutional conduct.
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012); Rode v.
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Indeed, as
held above, no unconstitutional conduct occurred in the traffic
stop, canine search, arrest and strip search, so there can be no
bystander liability for failing to prevent nonexistent
misconduct. Police officers only have a duty to intervene “when
other officers use excessive force.” Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641, 655 (3d Cir. 2002). Because Plaintiff has not
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presented facts showing that these officers were personally
involved in the conduct of which he complains, and because he
has not brought an excessive force claim, the Court will grant
Defendants’ motions for summary judgment as to all claims of
bystander liability.2
15.

Plaintiff also cannot maintain municipal liability

claims against Gloucester Township or Police Chief Earle.3
Plaintiff Smart brings claims against the Township and Defendant
Earle for inadequate training of GTPD officers (Am. Compl.
Counts 21 & 22), for having a custom of allowing officers
“unfettered discretion” to conduct canine drug detection
searches (Counts 26 & 27), and for failure to have a clear
policies and procedures regarding “removal of arrestees clothing
which amounts to a strip search” (Counts 29 & 30).
16.

It is well-established that “municipal liability under

§ 1983 attaches where-- and only where-- a deliberate choice to
follow a course of action is made from among various
alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in

2

Having found no constitutional violations in this case, the
Court will not reach the Individual Defendants’ arguments about
qualified immunity.
3 A claim against a public officer in his official capacity is
treated as a claim against the governmental entity of which he
is an officer. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-72 (1985).
Thus, the same Monell analysis applies to the claims against
both the Township and Defendant Earle.
13 

question.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). Whether a policy or a custom, “The
plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate
conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the
injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v.
Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Thus, for a plaintiff to
sufficiently demonstrate municipal liability for an
unconstitutional custom under § 1983, he must present facts to
support a finding that execution of a specific policy or custom,
or the directive of the municipality’s final decision maker,
caused the alleged harm. To maintain a claim for a failure to
supervise or discipline its police officers, a plaintiff must
show that the municipality was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of its inhabitants. Groman v. Township of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995).
17.

There is no evidence in the record describing a

specific policy or custom which deprived Plaintiff of his
constitutional rights, or that the municipality – and not just
individual officers – was the “moving force” behind any such
policy or custom. Nor is there any evidence to find that the
Gloucester Township was deliberately indifferent to the
constitutional rights of its inhabitants. Indeed, Plaintiff has
not shown that any of his constitutional rights were in fact
violated. Therefore, the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
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summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims against Gloucester
Township and Defendant Earle in his official capacity.
18.

Finally, the Amended Complaint is sometimes unclear as

to whether the allegations against the Individual Defendants
refer to claims brought by Plaintiff Shaw or claims brought by
Plaintiff Smart. To the extent that any of Plaintiff Smart’s
claims implicate conduct directed at Plaintiff Shaw, the Court
will grant Defendants’ motions for summary judgment: Plaintiff
Shaw does not have standing to seek § 1983 relief for the
violation of someone else’s constitutional rights, and those
claims have already been dismissed with prejudice. [See Docket
Items 112 & 113.]
19.

An accompanying order will be entered granting

Defendants’ motions in their entirety.

June 2, 2016
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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