STOKES v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 10

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 10/27/2011. (dmr)(n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
JACQUAR STOKES,
:
: Civil Action No. 11-407 (JBS)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
O P I N I O N
:
GARY M. LANIGAN, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
JACQUAR STOKES, PRO-SE PLAINTIFF
860509C/516883
SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON
215 BURLINGTON ROAD SOUTH
BRIDGETON, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, District Judge
Plaintiff, Jacquar Stokes (“Plaintiff”), a convicted prisoner
currently confined at Bayside State Prison in Leesburg, New Jersey
who was confined at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New
Jersey during the events alleged in the amended complaint, sought
to

bring

this

Plaintiff's

action

in

application

forma

to

pauperis.

proceed

in

The

forma

Court

granted

pauperis

(“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and ordered the Clerk of the Court
to file the complaint.

After reviewing the complaint, pursuant to

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A,, the Court concluded that the
complaint should be dismissed without prejudice.

Plaintiff was

granted leave to file a proposed amended complaint.

Thereafter,

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint.

(Docket Entry No. 5.)

He

then filed another amended complaint, stating that the first
amended complaint was not complete.

(Docket Entry No. 6.)

At this time, the Court must review the complete amended
complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious,
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court

concludes that the complaint should be permitted to proceed in
part.
I.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a
district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against
a governmental employee or entity.

The Court is required to

identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under
2

both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B) and 1915A, because Plaintiff is a
prisoner and is proceeding as an indigent.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also United States v.
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Citing

its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
for the proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’”

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent
a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege “sufficient
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This
then “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See id. at 1948.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff

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must

demonstrate

plausible.

that

the

allegations

of

his

complaint

are

See id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555,

& n. 3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
2.

Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or

laws

of

the

United

States

and,

second,

that

the

alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color
of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).
B. Analysis
1. Original Complaint
In his original complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on July 30,
2010, he was returning to prison from a scheduled court appearance
at the Burlington County Courthouse in a bus operated by the New
Jersey Department of Corrections ("D.O.C.").

(Compl. at 10.)

Due

to negligent, reckless, and high-speed driving by the Central
4

Transportation Unit he was thrown from his seat during transport
and began to experience excruciating pain in his right shoulder.
(Id.) Plaintiff "attempted to notify the officers who operated the
vehicle that [he] had been injured but to no avail.”

(Id.)

At

approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, Plaintiff returned to South
Woods State Prison and notified the nurse about his shoulder pain.
(Id. at 11.)

At approximately 2:34 a.m., Plaintiff was sent to St.

Francis Medical Center in Trenton, New Jersey for x-rays.

(Id.)

X-rays revealed that his shoulder was dislocated and he was sedated
so his shoulder could be put back into place.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleged that the Defendants are responsible for his
injuries “due to the fact that they force prisoners to board unsafe
vehicles

while

handcuffed

and

shackled...They

are

personally

responsible in any case that may result in a violation of the state
or local traffic laws...Each vehicle occupant shall be restrained
in an automotive safety belt. Therefore, the New Jersey Department
of Corrections were deliberately indifferent to my safety.

These

vehicles (Blue Bird bus) have no safety belts and the drivers
operate them at high speeds for excessive periods of time in order
to secure overtime.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff further alleged that the

D.O.C. is responsible “due to the fact that the occurrence was
reasonably foreseeable and a direct result of the department’s
failure to take appropriate steps that could have prevented the
situation from happening.”

(Id.)

5

With regard to Defendant Lanigan, Plaintiff alleged that as
the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, he is
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur.

(Id. at 7.)

In its June 20, 2011 Opinion and Order, this Court found that
Plaintiff’s allegations, at best, stated a claim for negligence,
which is insufficient to establish a violation of the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48
(1986)

(citing

Daniels

v.

Williams,

474

U.S.

327,

333

(1986))(“...where a government official is merely negligent in
causing

the

injury,

no

procedure

for

compensation

is

constitutionally required”); Schwartz v. County of Montgomery, 843
F. Supp 962 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 37 F.3d 1488 (3d Cir. 1994) (mere
negligence insufficient to support a § 1983 action for violation of
the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments); Morgan v. Department of
Corrections, 2010 WL 4024777, at *4 (D.N.J. October 13, 2010);
Otero v. Catalogne, 2010 WL 3883444, at *8-11 (W.D.Pa. September
28, 2010)(“the alleged failure of Defendants...to provide safety
belts and properly welded steel cages is more indicative of a lack
of care or foresight, rather than a ‘conscious disregard of a
substantial risk of harm’...[t]hus, absent any allegation showing
that the driver was consciously made aware that he was creating a
substantial risk of serious harm, yet chose to ignore the risk, a
claim of deliberate indifference cannot stand”); Dexter v. Ford

6

Motor Co., 92 Fed.Appx. 637, 641 (10th Cir. 2004).
Since Plaintiff failed to allege a violation of a right
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, this
Court was constrained to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 action in its
entirety, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

The complaint

was dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff was given leave to
file an amended complaint.
2. Amended Complaint
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff raises the same claims as
in his original complaint, as well as a new claim for retaliation,
denial/denial of medical treatment and two new defendants.
a.

Negligent Transportation Claim
With regard to his negligent transportation claim against Gary

M.

Lanigan,

Commissioner

of

the

New

Jersey

Department

of

Corrections; State Corrections Officer (“SCO”) Sheppard, SCO John
Doe and SCO Jane Doe, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not allege
any new facts which would lead this Court to conclude anything
other than Plaintiff, at best, has stated a claim for negligence,

1

Since the Court found that Plaintiff had not alleged a constitutional
violation, Plaintiff’s claims for respondeat superior liability and failure to
train and/or supervise were also dismissed. Romero v. Hayman, 2011 WL 1344218,
at *8 (D.N.J. April 08, 2011) (plaintiff failed to state a claim for a
constitutional injury; thus he fails to state a claim for failure to train);
Wenner v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 2009 WL 1089555, at *5 (D.N.J.
April 21, 2009)(“[w]ith the Section 1983 claim against the treating defendants
now dismissed, there is no underlying constitutional violation capable of
supporting a claim for vicarious liability against the [supervising]
defendants”).

7

which is insufficient to establish a violation of the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, for the same reasons more fully
discussed

in

Plaintiff’s
regarding

the

Court’s

Eighth

his

June

Amendment

July

30th

20,

claims

transport

2011

Opinion

against

from

the

all

and

Order,

Defendants

Burlington

County

Courthouse are hereby dismissed.
b.

Denial/Delay of Medical Care Claim
It

appears

that

Plaintiff

is

stating

a

claim

for

denial/delay of medical care under the Eighth Amendment.

a
The

Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
requires

that

prison

officials

provide

inmates

with

adequate

medical care. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); Rouse
v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 1999). In order to set forth a
cognizable claim for a violation of his right to adequate medical
care, an inmate must allege: (1) a serious medical need; and (2)
behavior

on

the

part

of

prison

officials

deliberate indifference to that need.

that

constitutes

Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106;

Natale v. Camden County Correctional Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582
(3d Cir. 2003).

“Deliberate indifference” is more than mere

malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind equivalent to
reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.

Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 837–38 (1994).
The Third Circuit has found deliberate indifference where a
prison official:

(1)

knows

of

a

8

prisoner's

need

for

medical

treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays
necessary

medical

treatment

for

non-medical

reasons;

or

(3)

prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment.
See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
In this case, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant SCO Sheppard
failed to provide medical attention to Plaintiff after being
notified.

(Am. Compl. at 4.)

Plaintiff alleges that he injured

his shoulder at some point between the hours of 8:00 and 10:00 p.m.
and was in “excruciating pain”.

Upon arrival at Bayside and

Southern State Prison, while switching from the bus to a van,
Plaintiff again notified Defendant Sheppard about his injury.
Defendant Sheppard told him to address the issue at South Woods
State Prison.

When he arrived back at South Woods State Prison,

around 11:00 p.m., he informed the nurse that he was injured and
was examined.

By 2:04 a.m., he was sent to St. Francis Medical

Center for treatment.
Since it appears from the allegations in the Amended Complaint
that medical treatment for Plaintiff was delayed for non-medical
reasons, the Court finds that at this early juncture, Plaintiff has
stated sufficient facts to allow this claim to proceed against
Defendant Sheppard.
c. Retaliation Claim
“Retaliation for the exercise of constitutionally protected
rights

is

itself

a

violation

9

of

rights

secured

by

the

Constitution.”
1990).
must

White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111-12

(3d Cir.

To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff
allege:

retaliatory

(a)

action

constitutionally
sufficient

to

protected

deter

a

conduct,

person

of

(b)

ordinary

firmness from exercising his constitutional rights, and (c) a
causal link between the constitutionally protected conduct and the
retaliatory action. See Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285,
296 (3d Cir. 2006); Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.
2001); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000).

A

plaintiff may establish causation by alleging either: (a) an
unusually

suggestive temporal

proximity

between

the protected

activity and the allegedly retaliatory action, or (b) a pattern of
antagonism coupled with timing to establish a causal link.

See

Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 2007).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that “upon discovering that [he] had
filed suit against NJDOC Senior Corrections Officer Gregory began
to make threats that he would have [Plaintiff] ‘mashed out’ by
several officers, since ‘[Plaintiff] likes to sue.’” (Am. Compl.
2.) On several occasions, Plaintiff states that false disciplinary
charges were filed against him by SCO Waters, Sergeant Dilks,
Lieutenant Clarke.

Further, he alleges that his job was changed

from paralegal to sanitation with no explanation given.
Based on the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint,
if true, Plaintiff may be able to support a claim of retaliation.

10

He alleges that shortly after he filed his lawsuit, Officer Gregory
made threats and SCO Waters, Sergeant Dilks, Lieutenant Clarke
filed false disciplinary charges against him.
A prisoner's ability to file grievances and lawsuits against
prison officials is a constitutionally protected activity for
purposes of a retaliation claim. See Milhouse v. Carlson, 652 F.2d
371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1981) (retaliation for exercising right to
petition for redress of grievances states a cause of action for
damages under the constitution); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1165
(5th Cir. 1995) (prison officials may not retaliate against an
inmate for complaining about a guard's misconduct).

Therefore,

because Plaintiff alleges that the retaliation was the result of
his filing a lawsuit against NJDOC officials, he appears to meet
the requisite elements of a retaliation claim.

Namely, Plaintiff

has alleged: (1) a constitutionally protected activity; (2) that he
was subjected to adverse action by Defendants Gregory, SCO Waters,
Sergeant Dilks and Lieutenant Clarke; and (3) that the filing of
grievances was the motivating factor in Defendants’ decisions to
take adverse action against Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court will
allow this claim to proceed as against Defendants Gregory, SCO
Waters, Sergeant Dilks and Lieutenant Clarke.
d.

Additional Defendants
Plaintiff seeks to add two additional defendants: (1) John

Doe, bus manufacturer; and (2) John Doe, vehicle inspector for

11

motor vehicles.

At the outset, it is not clear that these two

individuals were acting under “the color of state law,” which is a
requirement to bring a § 1983 claim.

“The color of state law ...

is a threshold issue; there is no liability under [Section] 1983
for those not acting under color of law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 638 (3d Cir. 1995).
element in

a

section

1983

action

The color of state law

requires

that

“the

conduct

allegedly causing the deprivation of [the plaintiff's rights] be
fairly attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982).
conduct

to

be

“fairly

attributable”

to

the

State:

For the
(1)

the

deprivation must be caused by (a) the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State, or (b) by a rule of conduct imposed
by it or by a person for whom the State is responsible; and (2) the
defendant must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state
actor, either because the person (a) is a state official, (b) acted
together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials,
or (c) performed conduct otherwise chargeable to the State.

See

id. at 936-39.
Given the little amount of information provided by Plaintiff
regarding these two John Doe defendants, it appears that they are
not state actors for purposes of section 1983 actions. Further, it
is also not clear what constitutional claims Plaintiff attempts to
assert against these defendants.

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As such, the claims will be

dismissed without prejudice.
II. CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the claim against all Defendants
regarding

the operation

Plaintiff’s
Defendant

denial/delay

Sheppard

and

of
of

the

transport

medical

retaliation

van

treatment
claims

is

dismissed.

claim

against

against

Defendants

Gregory, Waters, Dilks and Clarke will be permitted to proceed at
this time.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants John Doe, bus

manufacturer and John Doe, motor vehicle inspector, are dismissed.
An appropriate order accompanies this opinion.

Dated: October 27, 2011
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
United States District Judge

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