STOKES v. LANIGAN et al

Filing 3

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 6/20/2011. (nz, )n.m.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
JACQUAR STOKES,
:
: Civil Action No. 11-407 (JBS)
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
O P I N I O N
:
GARY M. LANIGAN, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
JACQUAR STOKES, PRO-SE PLAINTIFF
860509C/516883
SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON
215 BURLINGTON ROAD SOUTH
BRIDGETON, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, District Judge
Plaintiff, Jacquar Stokes, a convicted prisoner currently
confined at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey,
seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis.
affidavit

of

dismissals
Plaintiff's

indigence

within

28

and

U.S.C.

application

to

the
§

absence

1915(g),

proceed

in

of

Based on his

three

the Court
forma

qualifying
will

pauperis

grant

(“IFP”)

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to
file the complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, to determine whether it should
be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the
complaint should be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff will
be granted leave to file a proposed amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jacquar Stokes (“Plaintiff”), brings this civil
action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Gary M. Lanigan,
Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections; State
Corrections Officer (“SCO”) Sheppard, SCO John Doe and SCO Jane
Doe.

The

following

factual

allegations

are

taken

from

the

complaint, and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has made no findings as to the veracity of Plaintiff's
allegations.
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that on July 30, 2010, he
was returning to prison from a scheduled court appearance at the
Burlington County Courthouse in a bus operated by the New Jersey
Department of Corrections ("D.O.C.").

(Compl. at 10.)

negligent,

driving

reckless,

and

high-speed

by

the

Due to
Central

Transportation Unit, of which Defendants Shepard and Does are
members, he was thrown from his seat during transport and began to
experience

excruciating

pain

in

his

right

shoulder.

(Id.)

Plaintiff "attempted to notify the officers who operated the
vehicle that [he] had been injured but to no avail.”

2

(Id.)

At

approximately 11:00 p.m. that night, Plaintiff returned to South
Woods State Prison and notified the nurse about his shoulder pain.
(Id. at 11.)

At approximately 2:34 a.m., Plaintiff was sent to St.

Francis Medical Center in Trenton, New Jersey for x-rays.

(Id.)

X-rays revealed that his shoulder was dislocated and he was sedated
so his shoulder could be put back into place.

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants are responsible for his
injuries “due to the fact that they force prisoners to board unsafe
vehicles

while

handcuffed

and

shackled...They

are

personally

responsible in any case that may result in a violation of the state
or local traffic laws...Each vehicle occupant shall be restrained
in an automotive safety belt. Therefore, the New Jersey Department
of Corrections were deliberately indifferent to my safety.

These

vehicles (Blue Bird bus) have no safety belts and the drivers
operate them at high speeds for excessive periods of time in order
to secure overtime.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that the

D.O.C. is responsible “due to the fact that the occurrence was
reasonably foreseeable and a direct result of the department’s
failure to take appropriate steps that could have prevented the
situation from happening.”

(Id.)

With regard to Defendant Lanigan, Plaintiff alleges that as
the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Corrections, he is
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur for the following reasons:

3

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

As N.J.D.O.C. Commissioner defendant is the
overseer of all operations within and throughout
the Department of Corrections and has a duty to act
in order to prevent egregious constitutional
violations, which could and most likely would
result in ‘injury.’
Defendant should have been more careful in choosing
employees in order to avoid liability.
Defendant should have been more careful in
supervising the procedures and employees conduct in
order to avoid liability.
Defendant is a benefiting [sic] recipient of his
employee’s actions.
Defendant can or should have purchased liability
insurance.
The defendant has the delegated authority to
control the conduct (of is employees) and should be
the ‘person’ to bear punitive and compensatory
responsibility.

(Id. at 7.)
Plaintiff

alleges

that

his

rights

Fourteenth Amendments have been violated.

under

the

Eighth

and

He seeks injunctive

relief, compensatory damages, punitive damages, declaratory relief
and that all defendants named or soon to be named be suspended
immediately without pay or placed on alternative duty.

(Id. at

13.)
II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub.L. No. 104-134, §§
801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires a
district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress against
4

a governmental employee or entity.

The Court is required to

identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim that
is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under
both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) (B) and 1915A, because Plaintiff is a
prisoner and is proceeding as an indigent.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.

See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007)

(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see also United States v.
Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).

The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Citing

its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007),
for the proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do,’”

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting

5

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held that, to prevent
a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now allege “sufficient
factual matter” to show that the claim is facially plausible. This
then “allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” See id. at 1948.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff
must

demonstrate

plausible.

that

the

allegations

of

his

complaint

are

See id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555,

& n. 3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009).
2.

Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983
provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
or

laws

of

the

United

States

and,

second,

that

the

alleged

deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting under color
of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);

Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir. 1994).

6

B. Analysis
At the outset, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff has
alleged a violation of a right secured by the Constitution.
“The Eighth Amendment, in only three words, imposes the
constitutional limitation upon punishments: they cannot be ‘cruel
and unusual.’”

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981).

The

Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions which involve the unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain or are grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the crime warranting imprisonment.

Id. at 347.

The cruel and unusual punishment standard is not static, but is
measured by “the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”

Id. at 346 (quoting Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1956)).

To state a claim under the

Eighth Amendment, an inmate must satisfy an objective element and
a subjective element. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
Plaintiff’s claims focus on Defendants’ alleged failure to
provide seatbelts and failure to exercise due care in transporting
Plaintiff in a motor vehicle on the highway, which resulted in a
motor vehicle accident causing injury to Plaintiff. However, where
defendants have merely failed to exercise due care in operating a
motor vehicle, as alleged in this instance, such negligence is
insufficient to establish a violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendment. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 345-48 (1986) (citing
Daniels

v.

Williams,

474

U.S.

7

327,

333

(1986))(“...where

a

government official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no
procedure for compensation is constitutionally required”); Schwartz
v. County of Montgomery, 843 F. Supp 962 (E.D. Pa.), aff’d, 37 F.3d
1488 (3d Cir. 1994) (mere negligence insufficient to support a §
1983 action for violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments);
Morgan v. Department of Corrections, 2010 WL 4024777, at *4 (D.N.J.
October 13, 2010); Otero v. Catalogne, 2010 WL 3883444, at *8-11
(W.D.Pa.

September

28,

2010)(“the

alleged

failure

of

Defendants...to provide safety belts and properly welded steel
cages is more indicative of a lack of care or foresight, rather
than

a

‘conscious

disregard

of

a

substantial

risk

of

harm’...[t]hus, absent any allegation showing that the driver was
consciously made aware that he was creating a substantial risk of
serious harm, yet chose to ignore the risk, a claim of deliberate
indifference cannot stand”); Dexter v. Ford Motor Co., 92 Fed.Appx.
637, 641 (10th Cir. 2004).
Plaintiff has failed to allege a violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and as such, this
Court is constrained to dismiss Plaintiff's § 1983 action in its
entirety, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1

1

Since the Court finds that Plaintiff has not alleged a constitutional
violation, Plaintiff’s claims for respondeat superior liability and failure to
train and/or supervise must also be dismissed. Romero v. Hayman, 2011 WL
1344218, at *8 (D.N.J. April 08, 2011) (plaintiff failed to state a claim for
a constitutional injury; thus he fails to state a claim for failure to train);
Wenner v. Correctional Medical Services, Inc., 2009 WL 1089555, at *5 (D.N.J.

8

However, a district court should not dismiss a complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to
amend, unless

it

finds bad

faith,

undue delay,

prejudice

or

futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110-111
(3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 2000).
Plaintiff may be able to assert facts in an amended complaint
stating a cognizable claim under § 1983 against Defendants and
thus, this Court will grant Plaintiff thirty days to file a motion
to re-open, with a proposed amended complaint, stating a cognizable
§ 1983 claim.

If Plaintiff elects to file a motion to re-open and

a proposed amended complaint, he should comply with the pleading
requirements of Iqbal as set forth in this opinion.
2.

State Law Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting any state or common

law

claims

in

this

matter,

this

Court

declines

to

exercise

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Under § 1367(c)(3), where a district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, as this Court has done
here

at

this

time,

it

may

decline

to

exercise

jurisdiction over a related state law claim.

supplemental

The Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit has held that, where all federal claims are

April 21, 2009)(“[w]ith the Section 1983 claim against the treating defendants
now dismissed, there is no underlying constitutional violation capable of
supporting a claim for vicarious liability against the [supervising]
defendants”).

9

dismissed before trial, “the district court must decline to decide
the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative
justification for doing so.”

Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123

(3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

As no such extraordinary

circumstances appear to be present here, this Court will dismiss
without prejudice any state law claims purported to be asserted by
Plaintiff.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the

complaint will be

dismissed without prejudice in its entirety for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). Plaintiff will be granted leave
to file a motion to reopen and a proposed amended complaint,
stating a cognizable § 1983 claim, within 30 days.

An appropriate

order follows.

Dated:

June 20, 2011

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

10