MEDINA v. CUMBERLAND COUNTY et al

Filing 24

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Joseph E. Irenas on 5/3/11. (js)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARIE MEDINA,
HONORABLE JOSEPH E. IRENAS

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-905 (JEI/JS)

v.

OPINION

CUMBERLAND COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
FOLKMAN LAW OFFICES, P.C.
By: Lisa R. Marone, Esq.
1415 Route 70 East, Suite 407
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08034
Counsel for Plaintiff

LONG MARMERO & ASSOCIATES, LLP
By: Douglas M. Long, Esq.
44 Euclid Street
Woodbury, New Jersey 08096
Counsel for Cumberland County Department of Corrections
KAVANAGH, KAVANAGH & DILAZZERO, LLC
By: Brendan J. Kavanagh, Esq.
219 N. High Street, Suite A
P.O. Box 728
Millville, New Jersey 08332
Counsel for Cumberland County
JASINSKI, P.C.
By: John C. Hegarty, Esq.
Bayport One
8025 Black Horse Pike
Suite 470
West Atlantic City, New Jersey 08232
Counsel for Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department
IRENAS, Senior District Judge:
Plaintiff Marie Medina initiated this action against
1

Cumberland County (the “County”), Cumberland County Department of
Corrections (“DOC”), Cumberland County Sheriff’s Department
(“Sheriff’s Department”) and Sergey Udalovas.

The Complaint

alleges civil rights violations under federal and state law and
various common law claims arising out of alleged sexual assaults
that took place at the Cumberland County Jail (the “Jail”) between
May and July 2009.1

Pending before the Court are Motions to

Dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by DOC and the
Sheriff’s Department.2
I.
Plaintiff visited the Jail between May 2009 and July 2009 for
the purpose of visiting her boyfriend.

(Compl. ¶ 9.)

During that

time, Plaintiff alleges that she was sexually assaulted by Sergey
Udalovas.

(Id. ¶ 10.)

According to Plaintiff, Udalovas, while

1

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367.
2

In addition, the County, which answered the Complaint on
March 2, 2011, filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) on March 17, 2011. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the
pleadings are closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c).
Here, the pleadings are not closed, as the County is the
only one of the four Defendants to have filed an answer. In
fact, at the time the County filed its Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings, Defendant Udalovas had not yet been served with the
Complaint. (See 11-cv-905, Dkt. Nos. 20, 23.) Because the
County’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is premature, the
Motion will be denied without prejudice, allowing the County to
refile once the pleading stage of this litigation has concluded.
2

wearing a correction officer’s uniform and with all of his weapons
on his person, forcibly took her into a small room, locked the door
and forced her to engage in sexual acts with him.

(Id. ¶¶ 12-13,

18.)
Udalovas allegedly made threats against Plaintiff, her
children and her inmate-boyfriend to intimidate, harass and coerce
Plaintiff into the sexual acts.

(Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 20.)

Plaintiff

alleges that the sexual assault took place at the Jail while others
looked on and did nothing.3

(Id. ¶ 25.)

According to Plaintiff,

Udalovas had a reputation as a “sex fiend” in the workplace.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants knew or should have known
that Udalovas posed a danger to female visitors and they failed to
protect Plaintiff from this danger.

(Id. ¶¶ 26-28.)

As a result of Plaintiff’s cooperation with the prosecutor’s
office, Udalovas was arrested and charged with official misconduct
and aggravated sexual assault.

(Id. ¶ 22.)

On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in this
Court alleging civil rights violations under state and federal law
and various common law claims.4

On March 7, 2011, DOC moved to

3

While the Complaint alleges generally that Plaintiff was
sexually assaulted by Udalovas “[d]uring the months of May 2009
through July 2009" (Compl. ¶ 10), the specific facts alleged
appear to detail one particular instance of sexual assault. (See
id. ¶¶ 11-25.)
4

The Complaint also assert a punitive damages claim
against all Defendants. However, Plaintiff concedes that
punitive damages are available only as to Defendant Udalovas and
3

dismiss the federal claims.

On March 25, 2011, the Sheriff’s

Department filed a motion to dismiss the federal claims.
II.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a court
may dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.”

In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must allege facts that raise a right to relief above the
speculative level.

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While a court must accept as true all allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff, Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231
(3d Cir. 2008), a court is not required to accept sweeping legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, unwarranted
inferences, or unsupported conclusions.

Morse v. Lower Merion Sch.

Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

The complaint must state

sufficient facts to show that the legal allegations are not simply
possible, but plausible.

Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234.

“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
voluntarily dismisses her punitive damages claims against the
County, the DOC and the Sheriff’s Department. (See Pl’s Opp. to
Sheriff’s Motion to Dismiss at 15.)
4

When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
considers “only the allegations in the complaint, exhibits attached
to the complaint, matters of public record, and documents that form
the basis of a claim.”
n.3 (3d Cir. 2004).

Lum v. Bank of America, 361 F.3d 217, 221

A document that forms the basis of a claim is

one that is “integral to or explicitly relied upon in the
complaint.”

Id. (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec.

Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997)).
III.
Count One of Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts federal civil
rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985 and § 1983 against
all Defendants.5

DOC and the Sheriff’s Department move to dismiss

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985, while the
Sheriff’s Department also moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
pursuant to § 1983.
The law is well settled that § 1983 claims may only be brought
against “persons.”6

See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State

5

Although the Complaint does not specify the provision of
§ 1985 under which Plaintiff seeks redress, Plaintiff makes clear
in her Oppositions to the Motions to Dismiss that her claim is
under § 1985(3), which prohibits “two or more persons” from
conspiring “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or
indirectly, any person or class or persons of the equal
protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).
6

Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of
5

Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Although local government units and

municipalities are “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and §
1985,7 sheriff’s departments and corrections departments are not
separate legal entities from the County, and therefore cannot be
independently sued for violations of § 1983 and § 1985.8

See

McLaughlin v. Cnty. of Gloucester, 2008 WL 700125, *2 (D.N.J. March
12, 2008)(dismissing § 1983 claim against sheriff’s department
because it is a branch of the county); Ramalho v. Montgomery Cnty.

Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
7

The term “persons” in § 1983 has the same meaning under §
1985. See Davis v. Norris, 198 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1999)
(affirming lower court’s dismissal of claims because State of
Missouri and its agencies are not “persons” under either § 1983
or § 1985); New Jersey Sand Hill Band of Lenape & Cherokee
Indians v. Corzine, 2010 WL 2674565, at *6 (D.N.J. June 30,
2010)(concluding that persons under § 1983 and § 1985 have the
same meaning); DiBartolo v. City of Philadelphia, 2000 WL 217746,
at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2000)(finding that “persons” has same meaning
under both § 1983 and § 1985).
8

The Court notes that while neither DOC nor the Sheriff’s
Department have made this argument, Plaintiff “submits that
either the DOC is a person because it is separate and distinct
from the County, and Plaintiff’s claims are viable; or the DOC is
merely a sub-agent of the County with the County being liable for
its conduct, in which case Plaintiff would voluntarily dismiss
her § 1983 claims against the DOC.” (Pl’s Br. in Opp. to DOC’s
Motion to Dismiss at 17.)
6

Corr. Facility, 2007 WL 1810700, at *1 (D.N.J. June 21,
2007)(dismissing claims against Montgomery County Correctional
Facility because not a person amenable to suit under § 1983);
Crooks v. Passaic Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t/Jail, 2007 WL 923330, at *2
(D.N.J. March 26, 2007)(dismissing § 1983 claim against sheriff’s
department/jail because not a proper defendant under the statute);
Open Inns, Ltd. v. Chester Cnty. Sheriff Dep’t, 24 F.Supp. 2d 410,
417 n.13 (E.D. Pa. 1998)(dismissing § 1983 claims against sheriff’s
department because it is a sub-unit of county); Grabow v. Southern
State Corr. Facility, 726 F.Supp 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989)(finding
that New Jersey Department of Corrections is an arm of the state,
which is not a person under § 1983); see also Bonenberger v.
Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (municipalities
and police departments are treated as a single entity under §
1983).9
As noted supra, Plaintiff has named the County, DOC, and the
Sheriff’s Department as defendants in the instant action and has
9

Other circuits have also held that county corrections
departments and sheriff’s departments are not separate legal
entities amenable to suit under § 1983. See, e.g., Aston v.
Cunningham, 2000 WL 796086, *4 n.3 (10th Cir. June 21,
2000)(finding that dismissal of § 1983 claims against county jail
was proper because “a detention facility is not a person or
legally created entity capable of being sued”); Preval v. Reno,
2000 WL 20591, at *1 (4th Cir. January 13, 2000)(affirming
dismissal of claims against regional jail because not a person
amenable to suit under § 1983); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210,
1214 (11th Cir. 1992)(upholding dismissal of § 1983 against
sheriff’s department because not a legal entity subject to suit
or liability under § 1983).
7

asserted all federal and state law claims against each of them.
However, because the Sheriff’s Department and DOC are sub-units of
the County, they cannot be sued as separate individual entities
under § 1983 or § 1985.

For the same reason, Plaintiff cannot

maintain state common law or state civil rights claims against the
DOC or the Sheriff’s Department separately from the County.

See

Jordan v. Cicchi, 2009 WL 1704330, at *5 (D.N.J. June 18,
2009)(dismissing all claims against county correction center
because not a suable entity separate from the county); Harris ex
rel. Litz v. Lehigh Cnty. Office of Children & Youth Servs., 418
F.Supp. 2d 643, 645 n.1 (dismissing county office of children and
youth services as a defendant because not a legal entity separate
from the county).
Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims against the Sheriff’s
Department and DOC are dismissed with prejudice.
IV.
For the reasons stated above, DOC’s and the Sheriff’s
Department’s Motions to Dismiss will be granted.

Defendant

Cumberland County’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings will be
denied without prejudice.

An appropriate Order accompanies this

Opinion.
Dated: May 3, 2011

s/Joseph E. Irenas
JOSEPH E. IRENAS, S.U.S.D.J.
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