GONZALEZ v. CAMARERO et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/19/2011. (bdk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VICTOR GONZALEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
GABRIEL CAMARERO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 11-0995 (RMB)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
VICTOR GONZALEZ, 246450, Plaintiff Pro Se
Camden County Correctional Facility
P.O. BOX 90431
Camden, NJ 08101
BUMB, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Victor Gonzalez, a prisoner incarcerated at
Camden County Correctional Facility in New Jersey, seeks to bring
this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
This
Court will grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma
pauperis and direct the Clerk to file the Complaint without
prepayment of the filing fee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Having
reviewed Plaintiff’s allegations, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court will dismiss the federal
claims raised in the Complaint and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over claims arising under state law.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts violation of his constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Gabriel Camarero and Jose Aparicio, who
are Probation Officers in Hartford, Connecticut, Northampton
County Prison, and Northampton County Courts.
Plaintiff asserts:
On 7/11/2008 I was sentenced to 1 yr
probation. On 2/5/10 I was violated against
that 1 yr probation and served 1 yr in
Northampton County Prison. This was a
violation of my Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process of law which
resulted in cruel and unusual punishment for
my unlawful detainment.
My assigned Probation Officer is Gabriel
Camarero. Northampton County courts had sent
me an appointment for 8/11/2009. I wanted to
report to her that I had to leave the state
to report to my appointment. Instead of
speaking to her I was given a substitute
officer, Jose Aparicio. I was told that I
could not go to the assigned appointment in
Northampton County. Northampton County
courts then put a failure to appear warrant
against me. I was sentenced to one year
probation for a DUI charge on 7/11/2008. I
was arrested on 1/26/2010 for a separate
charge which was later dropped. On 2/5/2010
my one year probation was revoked and I was
forced to serve one year in Northampton
County Prison, even though I had completed my
year of probation. So in actuality I served
two years instead of one.
(Dkt. 1 at 4, 7.)
For relief, Plaintiff seeks “restitution for my lost time
due to my unlawful detainment.
Also I am seeking lost wages
during my unlawful detainment and punitive damages and pain and
suffering.”
(Dkt. 1 at 8.)
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II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action
in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a
prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or
entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court
determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the United
States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), where the
Supreme Court clarified as follows:
Two working principles underlie our decision
in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice .
. . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, codepleading regime of a prior era, but it does
not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its
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judicial experience and common sense. But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged-but it has not “show[n]”-“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted).
The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se
pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff,
even after Iqbal.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
III.
A.
DISCUSSION
Federal Claims
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code
authorizes a person such as Plaintiff to seek redress for a
violation of his federal civil rights by a person who was acting
under color of state law.
Section 1983 provides in relevant
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
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jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two
elements:
(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state
law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d
1099, 1107 (3d Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff’s claim for damages because he served two years
for revocation of probation when the sentence was only one year
is barred because a favorable judgment on the claim would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his incarceration.
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
As the Supreme Court
explained,
We hold that, in order to recover damages for
allegedly unconstitutional . . .
imprisonment, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has
been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such
determination, or called into question by a
federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for
damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in
a § 1983 suit, the district court must
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See Heck
consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if
it would, the complaint must be dismissed
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-487.
In this Complaint, Plaintiff contends that, although his
term for violation of probation was one year, he was incarcerated
for two years in violation of his constitutional rights.
Were
this Court to agree with Plaintiff that he has been imprisoned
beyond his one-year term, this decision would necessarily imply
that probation authorities or the prison incorrectly determined
his release date or failed to timely release him.
Because
Plaintiff’s incarceration beyond one year has not been
invalidated by a state court or called into question by issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus, Plaintiff’s instant Complaint for
damages based on the illegality of that incarceration is barred
by Heck.
See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005) (“Heck
specifies that a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages
where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not
previously invalidated) conviction or sentence”) (emphasis in
original); Glenn v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole, 410
Fed. App’x 424 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that damages claim for
incarceration beyond original sentence is barred by Heck).
Because amending the Complaint would be futile, this Court will
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dismiss the federal claims in the Complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B.
Claims Arising Under State Law
"Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and
decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims when they
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy."
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Where a district court has original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal claims and supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
the district court has discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over
which it has original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d
1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993).
In exercising its discretion,
?the district court should take into account generally accepted
principles of
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