FORD v. ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE FACILITY et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 10/5/2011. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JIMMIE RYAN FORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
ATLANTIC COUNTY JUSTICE
FACILITY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 11-1423 (RBK)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
JIMMIE RYAN FORD, Plaintiff pro se
# 188892GR
Atlantic County Justice Facility
5060 Atlantic Avenue
Mays Landing, New Jersey 08330
KUGLER, District Judge
Plaintiff, Jimmie Ryan Ford, a state inmate confined at the
Atlantic County Justice Facility in Mays Landing, New Jersey, at
the time he submitted the above-captioned Complaint for filing,
seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis.
Based on his
affidavit of indigence, the Court will grant plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1998) and order the Clerk of the Court to file
the Complaint.
At this time, this Court must review the Complaint, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, to determine whether the
Complaint should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court
concludes that the Complaint should be dismissed without
prejudice.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, Jimmie Ryan Ford (“Ford”), brings this civil
action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the following
defendants: the Atlantic County Justice Facility, Sgt. Montoya,
Sgt. Nilson and Sgt. Iris.
(Complaint, Caption and ¶ 3).
The
following factual allegations are taken from the Complaint, and
are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court has
made no findings as to the veracity of plaintiff’s allegations.
Ford alleges that, on or about January 4, 2011, he was
placed in I-lock down at the Atlantic County Justice Facility
after plaintiff was assaulted by another inmate.
Ford alleges
that he was twice punched in the face by another inmate so
plaintiff picked up a broom.
Sgt. Montoya took plaintiff to
inmate lock down for the month of January 2011.
Ford says that
the other inmate was not taken to lock-up, even though he punched
plaintiff.
Ford also alleges that Sgt. Iris took plaintiff to the nurse
and then to the Somers Point Hospital for treatment.
Ford
allegedly received seven stitches from the incident.
He was
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returned to jail after receiving stitches.
(Compl., ¶¶ 3B and
4).
Ford seeks $ 1.7 million in damages for his injuries and for
being placed in lock down for a month.
II.
(Compl., ¶ 5).
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a district court to review a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks
redress against a governmental employee or entity.
The Court is
required to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss
any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.
28 U.S.C. §§
This action is subject to sua sponte
screening for dismissal under both 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) an
§ 1915A.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94
(2007)(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) and
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)).
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
See also United
The Court must
“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
The Court
need not, however, credit a pro se plaintiff’s “bald assertions”
or “legal conclusions.”
Id.
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.”
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
325 (1989) (interpreting the predecessor of § 1915(e)(2), the
former § 1915(d)).
The standard for evaluating whether a
complaint is “frivolous” is an objective one.
Deutsch v. United
States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995).
A pro se complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a
claim only if it appears “‘beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief.’”
Haines, 404 U.S. at 521 (quoting Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
See also Erickson, 551 U.S.
at 93-94 (In a pro se prisoner civil rights complaint, the Court
reviewed whether the complaint complied with the pleading
requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)).
However, recently, the Supreme Court revised this standard
for summary dismissal of a Complaint that fails to state a claim
in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
The issue before
the Supreme Court was whether Iqbal’s civil rights complaint
adequately alleged defendants’ personal involvement in
discriminatory decisions regarding Iqbal’s treatment during
detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center which, if true,
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violated his constitutional rights.
Id.
The Court examined Rule
8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).1
Citing its recent opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), for the
proposition that “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,’ “Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court identified two
working principles underlying the failure to state a claim
standard:
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a
cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice ... . Rule 8 ... does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a
plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will ... be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not
permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not
“show[n]”-“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-1950 (citations omitted).
The Court further explained that
1
Rule 8(d)(1) provides that “[e]ach allegation must be
simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required.”
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(d).
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a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin
by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.
While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.
When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950.
Thus, to prevent a summary dismissal, civil complaints must
now allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that a claim is
facially plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Id. at 1948.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in
Iqbal emphasizes that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
allegations of his complaint are plausible.
Id. at 1949-50; see
also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210(3d Cir. 2009).
Consequently, the Third Circuit observed that Iqbal provides
the “final nail-in-the-coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard”
set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),2 that
applied to federal complaints before Twombly.
at 210.
Fowler, 578 F.3d
The Third Circuit now requires that a district court
2
In Conley, as stated above, a district court was
permitted to summarily dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim only if “it appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle
him to relief. Id., 355 U.S. at 45-46. Under this “no set of
facts” standard, a complaint could effectively survive a motion
to dismiss so long as it contained a bare recitation of the
claim’s legal elements.
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must conduct the two-part analysis set forth in Iqbal when
presented with a motion to dismiss:
First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be
separated. The District Court must accept all of the
complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard
any legal conclusions. [Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50].
Second, a District Court must then determine whether the
facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that
the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” [Id.] In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the
plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint has to
“show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips,
515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in
Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,
the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show [n]’-‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Iqbal, [129 S.Ct. at
1949-50]. This “plausibility” determination will be “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-211.
This Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this
pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of
Plaintiff, even after Iqbal.
(2007).
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89
Moreover, a court should not dismiss a complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim without granting leave to
amend, unless it finds bad faith, undue delay, prejudice or
futility. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110111 (3d Cir. 2002); Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir.
2000).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
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Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
Here, Ford names Atlantic County Justice Facility (“ACJF”)
as one of the defendants in this action.
However, the ACJF is
not an entity cognizable as “person” for the purposes of a § 1983
suit.
See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58
(1989); Grabow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Marsden v. Federal BOP,
856 F. Supp. 832, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
Therefore, Ford’s
allegations against the ACJF will be dismissed, and such
dismissal will be with prejudice.
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS
Failure to Protect Claim
Ford appears to be claiming that defendants failed to
protect him from harm by the other inmate when they placed Ford
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with “murderers instead of a pod with psychs!”
(Compl., ¶ 4).
An allegation of failure to protect is evaluated under the
Fourteenth Amendment for pre-trial detainees and under the Eighth
amendment for convicted prisoners.
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 535 (1979); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 342 (3d Cir.
2000).
Under either analysis, the standard is the same - a
defendant violates a plaintiff’s constitutional rights if he or
she is deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s rights.
See
Burton v. Kindle, 401 Fed. Appx. 635, 637 (3d Cir. 2010)(“[W]e
conclude that a pretrial detainee presenting a failure-to-protect
claim must plead that the prison official acted with deliberate
indifference to the detainee’s health or safety.”); Aruanno v.
Booker, 2008 WL 5070540, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 24, 2008)(citing A.M.
ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, 372
F.3d 572, 583 (3d Cir. 2004).
“Deliberate indifference” is a subjective standard in which the
official knew of a “substantial risk of serious harm” and
disregarded the risk by “failing to take reasonable measures to
abate it.”
(1994).
Id. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
“To be liable on a deliberate indifference claim, a
defendant prison official must both know of and disregard an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety.
The knowledge element
of deliberate indifference is subjective, not objective
knowledge, meaning that the official must actually be aware of
the existence of the excessive risk; it is not sufficient that
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the official should have been aware.”
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel,
256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, the Complaint is deficient with respect to both the
objective and subjective elements of a failure to protect claim.
Ford does not allege any facts showing that he faced a
substantial risk of assault from other inmates or that defendants
knew, or were aware of any risk of assault on Ford.3
Therefore,
any failure to protect claim based on the January 2011 incident
fails as a matter of law, and the claim will be dismissed without
prejudice at this time.
B.
Detention Claim
Next, Ford also appears to be asserting that his confinement
in detention or “I-lock-down” for the month of January 2011,
after the January 4, 2011 incident, violated his constitutional
rights.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
punishment of a pretrial detainee prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law.
3
See Bell v.
At best, Ford’s allegations suggest possible negligence
by the defendants, and negligence does not satisfy the
constitutional standard. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
835 (1994)(“an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk
that he should have perceived but did not, while no cause for
commendation, cannot under our cases be condemned as the
infliction of [unconstitutional] punishment”); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986)(prison official who “mistakenly
believed that the situation was not particularly serious” did not
deprive inmate of a liberty interest); Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986) (due process is not implicated by a state
official’s negligent act causing injury to an inmate).
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Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 535; Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 166
(3d Cir. 2005).4
As the Supreme Court explained,
[I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to
“punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or condition is
not reasonably related to a legitimate goal-if it is
arbitrary or purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that
the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that
may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 (footnote and citation omitted).
The Supreme Court noted that the maintenance of security,
internal order, and discipline are essential goals which at times
require “limitation or retraction of ... retained constitutional
rights.”
Bell, 411 U.S. at 546.
“Restraints that are reasonably
related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail
security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional
punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions
that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released
while awaiting trial.”
Id. at 540.
“In assessing whether the
conditions are reasonably related to the assigned purposes, [a
court] must further inquire as to whether these conditions cause
4
“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with
which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has
secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due
process of law. Where the State seeks to impose punishment
without such an adjudication, the pertinent constitutional
guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537, n. 16 (quoting Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72, n. 40 (1977)); see also City of
Revere v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 463 U.S. 239, 244
(1983).
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[inmates] to endure [such] genuine privations and hardship over
an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions become
excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.”
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159 (quoting Union County Jail Inmates v.
DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir. 1983)).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the
holding of Bell as follows:
[A] particular measure amounts to punishment when there is a
showing of express intent to punish on the part of detention
facility officials, when the restriction or condition is not
rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive government
purpose, or when the restriction is excessive in light of
that purpose.
Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007)(citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, the Third Circuit
“distilled the Supreme Court’s teachings in Bell into a two-part
test.
“We must ask, first, whether any legitimate purposes are
served by these conditions, and second, whether these conditions
are rationally related to these purposes.”
Hubbard, 538 F.3d at
232 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court
of Appeals further explained that the Fourteenth Amendment
standard of unconstitutional punishment, like the Eighth
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments standard, contains an
objective component, as well as a subjective component:
Unconstitutional punishment typically includes both
objective and subjective components. As the Supreme Court
explained in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 [](1991), the
objective component requires an inquiry into whether “the
deprivation [was] sufficiently serious” and the subjective
component asks whether “the officials act[ed] with a
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sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Id. at 298 ....
The Supreme Court did not abandon this bipartite analysis in
Bell, but rather allowed for an inference of mens rea where
the restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, or where the
restriction is excessive, even if it would accomplish a
legitimate governmental objective.
Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68.
Here, the allegations in the Complaint admittedly show that
Ford’s detention in lock-up was in response to a security, safety
and disciplinary concern.
Ford was involved in an inmate
altercation that resulted in injury to himself.
Further, he
admits that he had wielded a broom in defense against the other
inmate in the January 4, 2011 incident.
Thus, Ford’s restricted
confinement in detention or lock-up was rationally related to a
legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose.
Moreover, the short duration of plaintiff’s confinement in
detention, and the lack of any allegations of adverse conditions
or “genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of
time,” require summary dismissal of Ford’s Fourteenth Amendment
detention claim at this time.
V.
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 159.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice, in its entirety, as against defendant
ACJF, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1),
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Further, the Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, in
its entirety, as against the remaining named defendants, pursuant
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to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted at this time.
appropriate order follows.
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
Dated: October 5, 2011
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