Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. v. Mascola et al
Filing
500
OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/22/15. (js)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[Docket Nos. 484, 496, 497 & 499]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY,
INC.,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 11-4316 (RMB/JS)
v.
JOHN BONINO and 007 BAIL BONDS,
INC.,
OPINION
Defendants.
Appearances:
Samuel M. Silver
2050 Route 27, Suite 105
North Brunswick, NJ 08902
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Joseph Liguori
Mazraani & Liguori, LLP
1901 Route 130
Second Floor
North Brunswick, NJ 08902
Ksenia Proskurchenko
Proskurchenko Law Group, LLC
570 North Broad Street, Suite 13
Elizabeth, NJ 07208
Attorneys for Defendants John Bonino and 007 Bail Bonds
BUMB, United States District Judge:
I.
Introduction
This matter comes before the Court upon the post-trial
1
motion by Defendants John Bonino and 007 Bail Bonds (the
“Defendants”) [Docket No. 484] and the supplemental briefing of
the parties, including Plaintiff Financial Casualty & Surety,
Inc. (“FCS” or the “Plaintiff”), addressing whether the jury’s
verdict and damage awards may be reconciled or whether a new
trial is warranted [Docket Nos. 496 & 499], as well as
Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss its action against 007 Bail Bonds.
[Docket No. 497].
In its September 3, 2015 Opinion [Docket No. 493], this
Court requested further briefing, in addition to the submission
of appropriate record citations where applicable, addressing
whether the jury’s answers in the verdict are irreconcilable
such that a new trial is warranted.
The parties each submitted
supplemental briefs in support of their respective positions.
[Docket Nos. 496 & 499].
FCS also moved to dismiss its action
against 007 Bail Bonds only.
[Docket No. 497].
Based on the
record now before it, this Court will discuss the resolution of
these issues below.
II.
Motion to Dismiss Defendant 007 Bail Bonds Only
In the face of potentially inconsistent jury verdicts, the
Plaintiff seeks a Court Order dismissing its action against
Defendant 007 Bail Bonds only under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(a)(2).
2
Under Rule 41(a)(2), a court may dismiss an action at the
plaintiff’s request “on terms that the court considers proper.”
The “decision to allow voluntary dismissal is left to the sound
discretion of the district court.
That said, Rule 41 motions
should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some
prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.”
Hayden v. Westfield Ins. Co., 586 F. App’x 835, 842 (3d Cir.
2014) (internal citations, quotations, and modifications
omitted); see also Baldinger v. Cronin, 535 F. App’x 78, 80 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal under Rule
41(a)(2) requires court approval, though the general rule
provides that such a motion should be granted liberally.”).
Courts in the Third Circuit consider various factors in
ruling on a Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss, including:
(1)
the plaintiff’s diligence in moving to dismiss;
(2)
any undue vexatiousness on the plaintiff’s part;
(3)
the extent to which the pending litigation has
progressed;
(4)
the effort and expense incurred by the defendant in
preparing for trial;
(5)
any excessive and duplicative expense of relitigation; and
(6)
the adequacy of the plaintiff’s explanation for the
need to dismiss.
3
See, e.g., Hayden v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2013 WL 5781121, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2013) aff’d, 586 F. App’x 835 (3d Cir. 2014);
Lombarski v. Cape May Cnty., 2011 WL 1322910, at *3 (D.N.J. Apr.
5, 2011); Pappas v. Twp. of Galloway, 565 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594
(D.N.J. 2008).
“Chief among the factors to consider in determining whether
a defendant will suffer prejudice are the extent to which
litigation has progressed and the extent to which the defendant
will be exposed to new litigation in another forum.”
Hayden,
586 F. App’x at 842 (affirming district court’s denial of Rule
41(a)(2) motion to dismiss brought “seventeen months after the
start of litigation and six months after the close of discovery”
and for the purpose of “litigat[ing] against [defendant] in
state court”); see also Ferguson v. Eakle, 492 F.2d 26, 29 (3d
Cir. 1974) (holding that district court abused its discretion in
granting plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss defendants since the
motion was filed “[f]ourteen months after they became defendants
in one case . . . and at least two months after they had
expected that all discovery had been completed.”).
007 Bail Bonds has been a defendant in this litigation
since it was first initiated, on January 12, 2011, nearly four
years ago.
Defendants 007 Bail Bonds and John Bonino have
engaged in extensive motion practice over the course of these
four years, presumably incurring significant effort and expense.
4
The litigation is in its final stages.
The jury trial in this
litigation has long since been completed.
In fact, the jury
verdict that is the subject of the dispute presently before the
Court was rendered nearly one and a half years ago.
Given all
of this, it cannot be said that the Plaintiff has been diligent
in moving to dismiss 007 Bail Bonds.
Rather, FCS seeks to dismiss its action against 007 Bail
Bonds specifically to encourage the Court to deny Defendants’
motion for a new trial.
See Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief
[Docket No. 499] at ¶ 1 (“FCS has filed a Motion to Dismiss 007
from this lawsuit (Doc. No. 497) and has elected to proceed to
judgment against Bonino only.
The jury’s verdict with respect
to Bonino only contains no inconsistencies, thus obviating the
need for a new trial.”); id. at ¶ 3 (“To the extent the Court
finds difficulty in rendering judgment based on the verdict as
to Bonino and 007, that conflict has been mooted given FCS has
abandoned its claims against 007.”).
The Plaintiff only seeks
dismissal to “kill two birds with one stone.”
F. App’x at 843; Ferguson, 492 F.2d at 29.
See Hayden, 586
The Court finds this
explanation for dismissal inadequate.
In light of the above, this Court will deny Plaintiff’s
motion to dismiss its action against 007 Bail Bonds.
5
III. Inconsistent Verdict and Motion for New Trial
“[A] court may order a new trial based on inconsistent
verdicts only if ‘no rational jury could have brought back the
verdicts that were returned.’”
Monaco v. Camden, 366 F. App’x
330, 332 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Pearson v. Welborn, 471 F.3d
732, 739 (7th Cir. 2006)).
Establishing this is no easy feat.
The Third Circuit has made clear that district courts are “under
a constitutional mandate to search for a view of the case that
makes the jury’s answers consistent.”
Citizens Fin. Grp., Inc.
v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 383 F.3d 110, 124 (3d Cir.
2004).
Accordingly, if there is “any view of the case which
reconciles the various answers,” this Court must construe the
jury’s verdict in accordance with that view and deny a new
trial.
Id. at 124 (emphasis in original) (quoting McAdam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 F.2d 750, 763 (3d Cir. 1990)).
See also Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119
(1963) (“Where there is a view of the case that makes the jury’s
answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be
resolved that way.”); Kinnel v. Mid-Atl. Mausoleums, Inc., 850
F.2d 958, 965 (3d Cir. 1988) (“We, therefore, must attempt to
reconcile the jury’s findings, by exegesis if necessary, . . .
before we are free to disregard the jury’s special verdict and
remand the case for a new trial.”).
6
Courts across the country routinely reconcile jury verdicts
and damage awards that appear inconsistent at first glance by
applying the well-established principle against double
recoveries.
For example, in Associated Business Telephone
Systems Corp. v. Dalia, 729 F. Supp. 1488, 1507-08 (D.N.J.
1990), aff’d 919 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1990), the district court
reconciled a verdict where the jury awarded compensatory damages
against a corporation, but awarded only punitive damages against
that corporation’s officers, reasoning that the jury “had an
obvious desire to prevent a double recovery.”
Id. at 1508.
This Court directed the parties to address whether the logic in
Dalia should apply in the present case.
The Defendants have failed to meaningfully distinguish
Dalia from the case at bar.
The Court is convinced that, as in
Dalia, the jury only awarded damages against Bonino, despite
finding both Bonino and 007 Bail Bonds liable, in an effort to
prevent a double recovery by FCS.
In fact, the jury was
instructed as to the proper measure of compensatory damages for
breach of contract, which does not allow for double recovery,
but rather is “designed under the law to place the injured party
in as good a monetary position as it would have enjoyed if the
contract had been performed as promised.”
Instruction No. 17.
Furthermore, the jury verdict form requested that the jury
determine Bonino’s liability and the amount of damages to be
7
assessed against him first, before addressing the liability of
and damages against 007 Bail Bonds.
[Docket No. 450].
“By the
time they filled out the first line, [the jury] had accounted
for all the compensatory damages.
The jury was not specifically
instructed on joint and several liability, but that was their
intent.”
Dalia, 729 F. Supp. at 1508.
Several other courts have reconciled jury verdicts using
the same reasoning.
The Fifth Circuit in Holt Oil & Gas Corp.
v. Harvey, 801 F.2d 773, 781 (5th Cir. 1986) held that it had
“no difficulty reconciling the jury’s verdict” finding the
defendant liable under two theories of recovery, but awarding
damages only under one theory.
The Holt court explained, “[t]he
jury might well have concluded that [the plaintiff] would
unjustifiably receive a double recovery if damages were awarded
under both theories of recovery.”
Id.
See also Cutaia v.
Radius Eng’g Int’l, Inc., 2014 WL 3359368, at *3 (W.D. Va. July
9, 2014) (holding that Holt’s “reasoning applies equally to the
jury’s decision in this case.
As such, the court will harmonize
the jury’s verdict by entering judgment for $1,762,087.40 on the
breach of contract claim only[, which] will fully compensate
Cutaia for the damages he sustained.”); Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Michael Kent Plambeck, D.C., 2014 WL 1303000, at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Mar. 31, 2014) aff’d sub nom. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck,
2015 WL 5472433 (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 2015) (relying on Holt and
8
rule against double recovery to reconcile jury damage award on
RICO claims, but not on fraud and unjust enrichment claims,
despite finding liability based on all three theories).
In Zwerin v. Maccabees Mutual Life Insurance Co., 111 F.3d
140 (Table), 1997 WL 191490, at *5 (10th Cir. 1997), the Tenth
Circuit affirmed a district court’s order reconciling a jury’s
verdict, which awarded the full amount requested by the
plaintiffs under one theory of recovery only, despite finding
the defendant liable under two theories.
The district court
found that “the jury had simply followed its admonition not to
duplicate damages.”
Id.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed, noting
that the district court’s reasoning was “coherent, logical, and
consistent with the instructions.”
Id.
Here, too, the jury’s
verdict suggests that it intended to award compensatory damages
in accordance with the instructions it received and prevent
double recovery by FCS, as contemplated by Instruction No. 17.
Additionally, the jury was instructed that “[a]
corporation, like 007 Bail Bonds, is a creature of legal fiction
which can act only through its officers, directors and other
agents, and acts of a corporate agent which are performed within
the scope of his authority are binding upon the corporate
principal.”
Instruction No. 12.
Bonino testified at trial that
he was the “owner of 007 Bail Bonds.”
No. 496-1] at 689:15-17.
Trial Transcript [Docket
He also testified that the
9
recognizance documents generally listed Bonino as the agent
“because I was at that time the only one working for my
company.”
Id. at 729:20-23.
Consistent with the instruction
and Defendant Bonino’s testimony as to his relationship to 007
Bail Bonds, “the jury acted as if the acts of [Bonino] and the
acts of the corporation [007 Bail Bonds] were one and the same.”
Dalia, 729 F. Supp. at 1508.
This Court finds that the jury
“acted under the belief that an award against [Bonino]
functioned as an award against [007 Bail Bonds]” and, therefore,
any inconsistency in the jury’s damage awards is “one of form,
not of substance.”
IV.
Id.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court holds that the
jury’s answers are not inconsistent and that a new trial is not
warranted.
Judgment will be entered against both Defendant
Bonino and Defendant 007 Bail Bonds, but damages will be awarded
only against Defendant Bonino, consistent with the jury’s
verdict.
An appropriate Order will issue.
The Court has scoured the burdensome and protracted record
and docket and has determined that this Opinion and accompanying
Order finally resolve all claims with respect to all parties
presently before the Court.
See, e.g., Order dated November 18,
2014 [Docket No. 478] (granting BGM Defendants’ motion to
10
dismiss all remaining cross-claims and Plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss counterclaim); Joint Final Pretrial Order [Docket No.
367] at 36-37 (defining legal issues of the case for trial,
which do not include any counterclaims or cross-claims); see
also Barista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 85 (3d Cir. 1965) (“It is, of
course, established law that a pretrial order when entered
limits the issues for trial and in substance takes the place of
the pleadings covered by the pretrial order.”); AstraZeneca LP
v. Breath Ltd., 2013 WL 2404167, at *6 (D.N.J. May 31, 2013)
(“The final pretrial order controls the course of the action
unless the court modifies it . . . ; it effectively supersedes
the pleadings and defines the issues for trial.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties shall have the
opportunity to advise the Court within ten days as to whether
there are any outstanding claims not yet adjudicated by the
Court.
Should no unresolved claims be brought to the Court’s
attention within ten days, the Court shall issue its final
judgment and direct the Clerk of the Court to close this matter.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: October 22, 2015
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?