BROWN v. TAYLOR
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 9/6/2011. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
NICHOLAS T. BROWN,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC TAYLOR,
Respondents.
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Hon. Noel L. Hillman
Civil No. 11-4709 (NLH)
O P I N I O N
APPEARANCES:
NICHOLAS T. BROWN, #242351
Camden County Correctional Facility
330 Federal Street
Camden, NJ 08101
Petitioner Pro Se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Nicholas T. Brown (“Petitioner”), an inmate incarcerated at
Camden County Correctional Facility in New Jersey, filed a
Petition with this Court.
This Court will summarily dismiss the
Petition for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND
On August 11, 2011, Petitioner executed a two-page document
labeled “Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Deliberandum et Recipiendum”;
he addressed it to “United States District Court of Camden
County, State of New Jersey, Honorable Robert B. Kugler,
presiding.”
(Dkt. 1.)
In that document, Petitioner stated:
I, Nicholas T. Brown, confined at the Camden County
Correctional Facility, Camden, New Jersey, pursuant to
2A:67-13(h), hereby seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad
Deliberandum et Recipiendum and alleges:
1) I, Nicholas T. Brown, am imprisoned and
restraine[]d in the Camden County
Correctional Facility, and the person of
officer whom by I am imprisoned and
restrained is the respondent, Eric Taylor,
Warden of the aforementioned county jail;
2) I, Nicholas T. Brown, have been committed,
kidnapped and am detained by virtue of
process;
3) The cause, and presentation is in
question, as it pertains to my nationality, a
non-federal citizen, a Moorish American to
whom the Court has no jurisdiction over my
body, nor have I’ve given jurisdiction over
me;
4) No previous application has been made for
this writ, by myself or anyone on my behalf;
5) WHEREFORE, I, the petitioner pray that
this writ of habeas corpus ad deliberandum et
recipiendum, directed to Eric Taylor, as
warden of the County Jail of Camden County,
or whosoever has custodial charge of the lack
of process, or me, Nicholas T. Brown,
petitioner in this matter, commanding to
produce me, Nicholas T. Brown, before this
Court at a stated term thereof. Whereby I
may be held in and for the lack of process or
answer to process, at the United States
District Courthouse on the earliest date
possible, that I, the petitioner may address
the alleged accusation action levied against
me by said Court, as is my right pursuant to
R. 3:4-2 and R. 3:4-2, New Jersey Court
Rules, and Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) 1207 & 1-308.
(Dkt. 1.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading
requirements.”
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
Habeas Rule 2(c) requires a § 2254 petition to “specify all the
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grounds for relief available to the petitioner,” “state the facts
supporting each ground,” “state the relief requested,” be
printed, typewritten, or legibly handwritten, and be signed under
penalty of perjury.
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c), applicable
through Rule 1(b).
Habeas Rule 4 requires a judge to sua sponte dismiss a §
2254 petition without ordering a responsive pleading “[i]f it
plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that
the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 4, applicable through Rule 1(b).
Thus,
“Federal courts are authorized to dismiss summarily any habeas
petition that appears legally insufficient on its face.”
McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856.
Dismissal without the filing of an
answer has been found warranted when “it appears on the face of
the petition that petitioner is not entitled to [habeas] relief.”
Siers v. Ryan, 773 F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1025 (1989); see also McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856; United
States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430, 437 (3d Cir. 2000) (habeas
petition may be dismissed where “none of the grounds alleged in
the petition would entitle [petitioner] to [habeas] relief”); see
also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655 (2005).
III.
DISCUSSION
“Congress . . . possesses the authority pursuant to Article
III of the U.S. Constitution, to define the lower federal courts’
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes [and], absent congressional
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action, the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to adjudicate
any claims.”
Corp.,
Animal Science Products, Inc. v. China Minmetals
F. 3d
, 2011 WL 36066995 (3d Cir. Aug. 17, 2011).
Here, asserting the jurisdictional basis for his application
in no ambiguous terms, Petitioner labeled his pleading “Writ of
Habeas Corpus ad Deliberandum et Recipiendum.”
(Dkt. 1 at 1.)
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “habeas corpus ad deliberandum et
recipiendum” as follows:
[Law Latin “that you have the body to consider and
receive”]. Hist. A writ used to remove a person for
trial from one county to the county where the person
allegedly committed the offense. Cf. EXTRADITION.
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009).
At common law, habeas corpus “had other functions besides
inquiry into illegal detention with a view to an order releasing
the petitioner.
Blackstone name[d] four:
habeas corpus ad
respondendum; [habeas corpus] ad satisfaciendum; [habeas corpus]
ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum; [and habeas corpus]
ad faciendum et recipiendum. 3 Commentaries 129-132.”
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 400 n.5 (1963).
Fay v.
In Ex parte Bollman, 4
Cranch 75, 8 U.S. 75 (1807), Chief Justice Marshall held that the
Supreme Court had the statutory power to issue a writ of habeas
corpus for the release of two prisoners held for trial under
warrant of the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, but the
Court rejected the argument that the Court had inherent power to
issue the common law writs, other than habeas corpus ad
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prosequendum and habeas corpus ad testificundum.
Chief Justice
Marshall clarified the jurisdictional aspect as follows:
Courts which originate in the common law possess a
jurisdiction which must be regulated by their common
law . . . ; but courts which are created by written
law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law,
cannot transcend that jurisdiction . . . . [F]or the
meaning of the term habeas corpus, resort may
unquestionably be had to the common law; but the power
to award the writ by any of the courts of the United
States, must be given by written law . . . . The
inquiry therefore on this motion will be, whether by
any statute, compatible with the constitution of the
United States, the power to award a writ of habeas
corpus, in such a case as that of Erick Bollman and
Samuel Swartwout, has been given to this court. The
14th section of the judicial act [provides] “that
either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as
judges of the district courts, shall have power to
grant writs of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an
inquiry into the cause of commitment . . .”
. . .
The doubt which has been raised on this subject may be
further explained by examining the character of the
various writs of habeas corpus, and selecting those to
which this general grant of power must be restricted,
if taken in the limited sense of being merely used to
enable the court to exercise its jurisdiction in causes
which it is enabled to decide finally.
The various writs of habeas corpus, as stated and
accurately defined by judge Blackstone, (3 Bl. Com.
129.) are, 1st. The writ of habeas corpus ad
respondendum, ‘when a man hath a cause of action
against one who is confined by the process of some
inferior court; in order to remove the prisoner and
charge him with this new action in the court above.’
. . .
2d. The writ of habeas corpus ad satisfaciendum, ‘when
a prisoner hath had judgment against him in an action,
and the plaintiff is desirous to bring him up to some
superior court to charge him with process of
execution.’
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. . .
3d. Ad prosequendum, testificandum, deliberandum, & c.
‘which issue when it is necessary to remove a prisoner,
in order to prosecute, or bear testimony, in any court,
or to be tried in the proper jurisdiction wherein the
fact was committed.’ . . .
4th, and last. The common writ ad faciendum et
recipiendum, ‘which issues out of any of the courts of
Westminster-hall, when a person is sued in some
inferior jurisdiction, and is desirous to remove the
action into the superior court, commanding the inferior
judges to produce the body of the defendant, together
with the day and cause of his caption and detainer,
(whence the writ is frequently denominated an habeas
corpus cum cause,) to do and receive whatever the
king’s court shall consider in that behalf. This writ
is grantable of common right, without any motion in
court, and it instantly supersedes all proceedings in
the court below.’
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 8 U.S. at 93-98 (emphasis in
original).
Petitioner does not enlighten this Court as to any statute
granting this Court the power to grant him writ of habeas corpus
ad deliberandum et recipiendum, and this Court, on its own, is
not aware of any statutory source supplying such jurisdiction.
Accordingly, this Court will dismiss the petition for lack of
jurisdiction.
Cf. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children’s Services
Agency, 648 F. 2d 135, 142 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that habeas
corpus jurisdiction does not lie to challenge a termination of
parental rights, since [t]he custody of a foster or adoptive
parent over a child is simply not the type of custody that may be
challenged through federal habeas”); U.S. ex rel. State of Wis.
v. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 248 F. 2d 804, (7th Cir.
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1957) (holding that, since the jurisdiction of federal district
courts is defined strictly by statute, there is no specific
statutory provision vesting original jurisdiction in district
courts in quo warranto actions, and the All Writs Act does not
contain a new grant of judicial power, district court lacked
jurisdiction to entertain an information in the nature of quo
warranto).1
IV.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Petition
for lack of jurisdiction.
/s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United Stated District Judge
Dated:
September 6 , 2011
At Camden, New Jersey
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The Court notes, in passing, that – to the degree that
the Petition could be construed as challenging Petitioner’s
detention on the grounds of his “Moorish citizenship” and related
to this “Moorish citizenship” Petitioner’s self-proclaimed
“immunity,” Petitioner’s claims are facially frivolous and
subject to dismissal. See Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v.
New Jersey,
F. Supp. 2d
, 2011 WL 1871431 (D.N.J. May
13, 2011) (detailing facial frivolity of claims raised on the
basis of “Moorish citizenship” and “Moorish citizenship” derived
from unwarranted reading of all ancient Barbary Treaties, in
general, or of the Treaty with Morocco, in particular).
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