WATFORD v. SCIORE
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/29/2012. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
KENNY WATFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
LIEUTENANT ROBERT SCIORE,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 11-5111 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiff pro se
Kenny Watford
East Jersey State Prison
Rahway, NJ 07065
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Kenny Watford, a prisoner confined at East Jersey
State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in
forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of his constitutional rights.
Based on his affidavit of
indigence and the absence of three qualifying dismissals within
28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the Court will grant Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and
order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s
Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 8, 2011, while he was a
pre-trial detainee at the Cumberland County Department of
Corrections, he was charged with disciplinary infractions (.005 threat of bodily harm against any person or his property - and
.256 - refusal to obey an order) and placed into “pre-hearing
detention” pending an investigation.
The attachments to the
Complaint, including the Adjudication, reflect that Plaintiff was
given notice of the charges against him on August 9, 2011.
Plaintiff alleges that he remained in pre-hearing detention for
eight days, until August 15, 2011.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 15, 2011, hearing officer
Lieutenant Robert Sciore, the Defendant here, conducted a
disciplinary hearing without permitting Plaintiff to appear.
The
Adjudication sheet reflects that Plaintiff denied the charges and
requested to speak at the hearing and that two witness statements
were submitted on Plaintiff’s behalf.
In addition, the hearing
officer considered the statement of the correctional officer who
originally charged Plaintiff with the disciplinary infraction.
The hearing officer found Plaintiff guilty of the charges and
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imposed an eight-day term of confinement in segregation, that is,
the time served during the investigation period, to end the day
of the hearing.
The Adjudication also reflects that the reason
for the eight-day term in segregation is to “stop violence in the
jail.”
Plaintiff also objects to the fact that the Adjudication
is witnessed by two civilian employees that he never met.
Plaintiff asserts that Lieutenant Sciore failed to provide
Plaintiff with a proper disciplinary hearing.
He seeks a
monetary judgment in the amount of $35,000.00.
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time,
certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are
frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a
governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions
brought with respect to prison conditions).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United
States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Court must
“accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them
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in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.”
Morse v. Lower
Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
In addition, any complaint must comply with the pleading
requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.”
A complaint must plead facts sufficient at least to
“suggest” a basis for liability.
218, 236 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004).
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
“Specific facts are not necessary;
the statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what
the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106
S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to
dismiss, courts “are not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level ... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the
Twombly pleading standard applies to civil rights complaints.
See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir.
2008).
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Context matters in notice pleading. Fair notice under
Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case -- some
complaints will require at least some factual
allegations to make out a “showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair
notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” ... Put another way, in light of
Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a “showing” rather than
a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. We
caution that without some factual allegation in the
complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement
that he or she provide not only “fair notice,” but also
the “grounds” on which the claim rests.
Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citations omitted).
More recently, the Supreme Court has emphasized that, when
assessing the sufficiency of any civil complaint, a court must
distinguish factual contentions -- which allege behavior on the
part of the defendant that, if true, would satisfy one or more
elements of the claim asserted -- and “[t]hreadbare recitals of
the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard
is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has
acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that
are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it
stops short of the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.
Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted)
(quoted in Bistrian v. Levi, 2012 WL 4335958 (3d Cir. Sept. 24,
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2012).
Although the Court must assume the veracity of the facts
asserted in the complaint, it is “‘not bound to accept as true a
legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”
(citation omitted).
Id.
Thus, “a court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to
the assumption of truth.”
Id. at 679.
See also Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Where a complaint can be remedied by an amendment, a
district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but
must permit the amendment.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Shane
v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg
County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
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injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
IV.
ANALYSIS
The Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as attempting to
state a claim for deprivation of liberty without due process, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
Pre-trial detainees and convicted but unsentenced prisoners
retain liberty interests firmly grounded in the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
F.3d 150
See Hubbard v. Taylor, 399
(3d Cir. 2005); Fuentes v. Wagner, 206 F.3d 335, 341
(3d Cir. 2000).
Analysis of whether such a detainee or
unsentenced prisoner has been deprived of liberty without due
process is governed by the standards set out by the Supreme Court
in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Hubbard, 399 F.3d at
157-60, 164-67; Fuentes, 206 F.3d at 341-42.
In evaluating the constitutionality of conditions
or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate
only the protection against deprivation of liberty
without due process of law, we think that the proper
inquiry is whether those conditions amount to
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punishment of the detainee. For under the Due Process
Clause, a detainee may not be punished prior to an
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of
law. ...
Not every disability imposed during pretrial
detention amounts to “punishment” in the constitutional
sense, however. Once the government has exercised its
conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it
obviously is entitled to employ devices that are
calculated to effectuate this detention. ...
A court must decide whether the disability is
imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is
but an incident of some other legitimate governmental
purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to
punish on the part of detention facility officials,
that determination generally will turn on “whether an
alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the
alternative purpose assigned [to it].” Thus, if a
particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, without more,
amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction
or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate
goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court
permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment that may not
constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua
detainees. ...
441 U.S. at 535-39 (citations omitted).
The Court further
explained that the government has legitimate interests that stem
from its need to maintain security and order at the detention
facility.
“Restraints that are reasonably related to the
institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not,
without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if
they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee
would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting
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trial.”
441 U.S. at 540.
Retribution and deterrence, however,
are not legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectives.
at 539 n.20.
441 U.S.
Nor are grossly exaggerated responses to genuine
security considerations.
Id. at 539 n.20, 561-62.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied the
Bell standard to allegations similar to those asserted here,
challenging placement in segregated housing without a hearing.
See Stevenson v. Carroll, 495 F.3d 62 (3d Cir. 2007).
Unconstitutional punishment typically includes
both objective and subjective components. As the
Supreme Court explained in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S.
294, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), the
objective component requires an inquiry into whether
“the deprivation [was] sufficiently serious” and the
subjective component asks whether “the officials
act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]”
Id. at 298, 111 S.Ct. 2321. The Supreme Court did not
abandon this bipartite analysis in Bell, but rather
allowed for an inference of mens rea whether the
restriction is arbitrary or purposeless, or whether the
restriction is excessive, even if it would accomplish a
legitimate governmental objective. See Bell, 441 U.S.
at 538-39 & n.20, 99 S.Ct. 1861.
...
In evaluating a pretrial detainee’s claim of
unconstitutional punishment, courts must examine the
totality of the circumstances within the institution.
... Appellants assert that, as compared to the
conditions for the general prison population, housing
in the SHU is significantly more restrictive. the
complaint draws specific, item-by-item comparisons
between the restrictions in the SHU and those in the
general prison population. The allegations in the
complaint raise an inference of impermissible
punishment that precludes granting a motion to dismiss
and may warrant further discovery.
Stevenson, 495 F.3d at 68-69 (footnote omitted).
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The prisoners in Stevenson had been placed in a segregated
housing unit for several years without a hearing.
The Court of
Appeals found that, although pretrial detainees do not have a
liberty interest in being confined in the general prison
population, “they do have a liberty interest in not being
detained indefinitely in the SHU without explanation or review of
their confinement.”
Id. at 69.
Taking into account the
competing interests of the detainees and the governmental
function involved in maintaining order and security, the Court of
Appeals found that the process required for administrative
transfers need not be “extensive.”
Id. at 70.
Thus, prison
officials must provide detainees who are transferred into more
restrictive housing, for administrative purposes, only an
explanation of the reason for their transfer as well as an
opportunity to respond.
Id.
Due process requires only an
informal nonadversary review of evidence, which is satisfied when
an inmate receives “‘some notice of the charges against him and
an opportunity to present his views to the prison official
charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative
segregation.’” Id. (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 476
(1983)).
The proceeding must occur within a reasonable time
following an inmate’s transfer.
Id.
The Court of Appeals further instructed that greater process
is due prisoners who are confined for disciplinary infractions
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than those moved for purely administrative reasons.
Prisoners
transferred for disciplinary reasons must receive written notice
of the charges against them and a written statement by the
factfinders as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for the
disciplinary actions.
Id. at 70-71
Here, the Court is presented with something of an aggregate:
it appears that Plaintiff was initially placed into “pre-hearing
detention” for administrative reasons - security during an
investigation into the disciplinary charge - which was then
converted, after the disciplinary hearing, into disciplinary
confinement, that is, “time served.”
Nevertheless, this Court
finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for violation of
his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
More specifically, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts
suggesting that his confinement in pre-hearing detention for
eight days amounted to “punishment” as defined in Bell.
Nor does
he allege any facts suggesting that Lieutenant Sciore had any
involvement in the decision to place Plaintiff into pre-hearing
detention, or to continue that placement prior to the
disciplinary hearing.
Nor is the pre-hearing detention placement
for eight days excessive, in light of the need to maintain
security during investigation of the alleged disciplinary
violation.
Moreover, even if there were some deprivation of
liberty, which this Court does not find, Plaintiff received all
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the process he was due.
He received a written statement of the
charges against him the day after he was placed into pre-hearing
detention.
The hearing took place within a reasonable time and
the hearing officer was advised that Plaintiff denied the charges
and was provided the supporting statements of Plaintiff’s two
witnesses.
The hearing officer then provided Plaintiff with a
written statement of his decision, the evidence relied on, and
the reasons for the decision.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), for failure to state a
claim.
It does not appear that Plaintiff could amend the
Complaint to overcome the deficiencies described herein.
An
appropriate order follows.
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
Noel L. Hillman
United States District Judge
Dated: October 29, 2012
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