RAINES v. LAPPIN et al
Filing
58
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/25/2013. (tf, n.m.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
(Document No. 46)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
JAMES O. RAINES,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
:
HAVELY G. LAPPIN, et al.
:
:
Defendants. :
___________________________________ :
Civil No. 11-5681 (RBK/AMD)
OPINION
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This is a Bivens action brought by Plaintiff James O. Raines (“Plaintiff”) against fifteen
present and former employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (collectively, “Defendants”) for
injuries he allegedly suffered during his incarceration at three federal corrections facilities. The
Court, in an opinion and order dated May 24, 2013, dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against six of
these Defendants for lack of personal jurisdiction (Doc. Nos. 55-56). Currently before the Court
is a motion filed on behalf of the remaining nine Defendants—Jeffrey Eobstel, Bradley
Jurgensen, Stephen Meyers, Ruben Miranda, Donald Terrell, John Chung, Tushal Patel, Chester
McKinney, and Edgardo Magallon— to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted (Doc. No. 46). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons
stated herein, the Court will grant the motion.
1
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 1
In August 2001, Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Federal Corrections Institution at Fort
Dix, New Jersey (“FCI Fort Dix”). He worked in the Federal Prison Industries (“FPI”) –
UNICOR Laser Cartridge Remanufacture facility at the prison, where his job was to refurbish
printer toner cartridges. Am. Compl. ¶ 6, pg. 1. In September of that year, he started to
encounter sinus problems. Id. at 1-2. Next, in mid-October, prison officials made the decision to
take away the respirator mask that Plaintiff used while refurbishing the toner cartridges, although
by the end of the month the masks had been returned. Id. at 4-5.
In March 2002, Plaintiff was assigned to another FPI detail: the DXRC Computers
Demanufacturing Factory. Id. at 7. This facility was cited by federal regulators for various
health and safety violations, but the substance of those violations was not made clear to inmates
like Plaintiff. Id. In 2005, his work station was moved to a different part of the facility where
Plaintiff encountered dust and allegedly toxic particles. Id. at 10-11. Then, in May 2006,
Plaintiff went to work at the “breakdown station,” where his job was to physically break down
with a hammer old discarded electronic equipment. For this task he was given gloves and a
mask. In performing these duties, Plaintiff observed that when he hit the equipment with his
hammer, dust would fly up in his face. Id. at 11. Again, Plaintiff was assured by prison officials
that the substances he was encountering were not harmful to him. Id. at 12. He also found that
machines around the facility in general were old and full of harmful substances. Id. at 16. He
continued to inform his superiors of his concerns about the substances to which he believed he
was being exposed. Id. at 19-21.
1
When considering the sufficiency of the factual allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint, the Court, for purposes of
deciding a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), assumes such allegations to be true. See Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).
2
On one occasion, on November 20, 2006, Plaintiff was working at the facility when some
of his co-workers tipped over a box filled with old computer monitors. When the monitors broke
apart on the concrete floor, Plaintiff exited the area for fear of the chemicals that had been
released. When his superiors discovered that he had left his workstation at an unauthorized time,
they reprimanded him, notwithstanding his attempts to explain his reasons for having done so.
Id. at 23.
In April 2007, while Plaintiff was working at the facility, he asked his supervisor if he
could turn on the exhaust fan system in order to circulate the air. His supervisor refused to turn
on the entire system, but he did activate a few wall-mounted fans. Id. at 26. Shortly thereafter, a
factory worker swept dust off some overhead pipes, and the dust fell all over Plaintiff. Plaintiff
immediately sought medical attention at the prison hospital. Id. He also started to present with
red bumps on his skin, and severe internal pain. Id. at 27.
His symptoms worsened, and he again reported to the prison hospital. His doctors told
him that his skin irritation was not serious. Id. at 29. They prescribed some topical cream for
him, which was somewhat successful in clearing up the irritation, although Plaintiff found that he
had red bumps on his chest that were not going away. Id. at 30. His doctors told him to continue
the treatment and assured him that his condition was not serious. Plaintiff requested that the
doctors perform blood work in order to better diagnose the cause of the bumps. Id. at 31. His
doctors refused to do so.
Plaintiff’s skin irritation continued, so again he sought medical treatment. Id. at 32. He
was prescribed calamine lotion for his skin. Id. at 33 In June 2007, because of a concern at the
prison about a chicken pox outbreak, Plaintiff did have blood testing done. The doctors tested
his blood for viruses, but not for heavy metal exposure, as Plaintiff requested. While he was
3
awaiting the results of the blood test, he met with an orthopedic surgeon who performed surgery
on his shoulder. Id. at 34. Finally, in October 2008, after Plaintiff had been transported to the
Federal Correctional Institution at Rye Brook, New York, he suffered severe chest pains, and it
was revealed that he had a collapsed lung requiring immediate emergency care. Id. at 35-36.
Plaintiff filed suit in this Court on September 30, 2011 (Doc. No. 1). Then, on November
7, 2012, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s because it was barred by the
statute of limitations (Doc. No. 46).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Where, as here, a complaining party comes to
this Court pro se, the Court must construe the complaint liberally in that plaintiff’s favor. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir.1992). In
such cases, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Seen in
this light, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second,
the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
4
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). 2 Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible
rather than plausible. Id.
III.
DISCUSSION & ANALYSIS
The primary thrust of Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted is that Plaintiff’s Bivens cause of action is barred
by the applicable statute of limitations. In response, Plaintiff offers numerous reasons why the
Court should not dismiss his claim as time-barred. The Court will therefore first determine
whether the statute of limitations has run on Plaintiff’s claims against the moving Defendants. It
will then consider each of Plaintiff’s arguments in turn.
A.
Statute of Limitations
i.
Has the statute of limitations period expired?
The statute of limitations for a Bivens claim is determined by reference to the personal
injury statute of the forum state. Hughes v. Knieblher, 341 Fed. App’x 749, 752 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 190 (3d Cir. 1993)). In New Jersey, claimants have a
two-year window in which to bring such claims. See N.J.S.A. §2A:14-2.
The two-year clock starts running at the point that the plaintiff has “a complete a present
cause of action,” meaning that he “can file suit and obtain relief.” Wallace v. Kato 549 U.S. 384,
2
Even under the liberal pleading standards afforded a pro se plaintiff, the Court need not credit such a party’s “bald
assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; Day, 969 F.2d at 42.
5
388 (2007) (citing Bay Area Laundry and Dry Cleaning Pension Trust Fund v. Ferbar Corp. of
Cal., 522 U.S. 192, 201 (1997)). Stated another way, a Bivens cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff “knew or should have known of the injury upon which its action is based.” Brown v.
Camden County Counsel, No. 06-6095, 2009 WL 5174640 at *1 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2009) (citing
Sameric Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998)).
In this case, the essence of Plaintiff’s claims is that Defendants failed to prevent his
exposure to toxic chemicals at the UNICOR facility, and then failed to order appropriate medical
testing in order to diagnose his condition, all of which led to his skin injuries, and finally his
collapsed lung. Accordingly, giving Plaintiff the benefit of every doubt, the Court finds that his
cause of action accrued at the point of his lung collapse on October 27, 2008. He filed his
Complaint in this matter on September 30, 2011. Thus, he missed the two-year statute of
limitations window by more than eleven months. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims will be barred
unless he can demonstrate that equitable principles of tolling or estoppel should apply based on
the facts of his case.
ii.
Should the limitations period be tolled?
A court’s statute of limitations analysis on a Bivens claim must also incorporate relevant
state tolling rules to the extent they are consistent with federal policies. See Lake v. Arnold, 232
F.3d 360, 368-70 (3d Cir. 2000). New Jersey law recognizes three principal tolling doctrines:
the discovery rule, equitable estoppel, and equitable tolling.
a.
The Discovery Rule
The discovery rule will delay the accrual of a cause of action “so long as a party
reasonably is unaware either that he has been injured, or that the injury is due to the fault or
neglect of an identifiable individual or entity.” Kendall v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 36 A.3d 541,
6
551 (N.J. 2012) (citations omitted). In this case, nothing in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
suggests that he was unaware of his injuries before October 27, 2008 (the day he suffered a
collapsed lung). On the contrary, his allegations make continuous reference to his skin irritation
(which, along with the collapsed lung, comprise the basis of his alleged injury), as well as his
belief that his medical condition was caused by his exposure to certain chemicals at the UNICOR
facility. Thus, the discovery rule cannot save Plaintiff’s claims from the otherwise expired two
year statute of limitations.
b.
Equitable Estoppel
New Jersey courts have defined the doctrine of equitable estoppel as:
[T]he effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting
rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed . . . as against
another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct,
and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse . . . .
Trinity Church v. Lawson-Bell, 925 A.2d 720, 727-28 (N.J. App. Div. 2007). Accordingly, in
the present context, a defendant may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense if
it engages in conduct that is “calculated to mislead the plaintiff into believing that it is
unnecessary to seek civil redress.” W.V. Pangborne & Co., Inc. v. N.J. Dept. of Transp., 562
A.2d 222, 227 (N.J. 1989). At all times, the burden is on the plaintiff “to show that the
defendant actively misled him, and that this deception caused the plaintiff’s non-compliance
with the limitations period.” Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D 233, 253 (D.N.J. 2000) (emphasis in
original). The plaintiff must also exercise due diligence to preserve his or her claim despite any
misleading or otherwise injurious action taken by the defendant. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d
1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990)).
7
In this case, although he doesn’t specifically ask the court to estop Defendants from
asserting a statute of limitations defense, Plaintiff claims that he waited to file his Bivens claim
until after the statutory period had expired because “Bureau [of Prisons] staff” informed him that
he had to exhaust his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) administrative remedies before filing
any type of suit in federal court. Pl.’s Opp. Br. 3. The Court finds that this single statement,
standing alone, does not amount to conduct which was “calculated to mislead” the Plaintiff into
letting the statutory period to lapse. See Pangborne, 562 A.2d at 227. There is no indication of
any intent by the Bureau of Prisons employee to lead Plaintiff astray. At best, the official may
have been explaining (correctly) that in order to file an FTCA suit in federal court, it is necessary
to exhaust the FTCA administrative process. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). At worst, it may have
been erroneous advice about a technical legal issue rendered by someone who may very well
have had no legal training. In any case, this conduct, even if it were to be imputed to the moving
Defendants in this action, does not warrant the exercise of equitable estoppel.
c.
Equitable Tolling
Finally, New Jersey law recognizes the doctrine of equitable tolling, which in effect
pauses the running of the statute of limitations.3 That state’s courts have found it to apply in
three situations. First, tolling may be appropriate where a plaintiff has been “induced or tricked
by his adversary’s misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass.” Villalobos v. Fava, 775
A.2d 700, 707 (N.J. App. Div. 2001). Second, the doctrine may apply where a plaintiff has been
prevented “in some extraordinary way” from asserting his rights, or, third, if the plaintiff has
3
The difference between equitable tolling and equitable estoppel has been described in the following way: “unlike
equitable tolling, equitable estoppel is not concerned with the running and suspension of the limitations period, but
rather comes into play only after the limitations period has run and addresses itself to the circumstances in which a
party will be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to an admittedly untimely action because
his conduct has induced another into forbearing suit within the applicable limitations period. Del Sontro v. Cendant
Corp., Inc., 223 F. Supp. 2d 563, 571 (D.N.J. 2002) (quoting Bomba v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070
(7th Cir.1978)) (internal quotations omitted).
8
“timely asserted his rights mistakenly by either defective pleading or in the wrong forum.”
Freeman v. State, 788 A.2d 867, 880 (N.J. App. Div. 2002). The standards for equitable tolling
as a matter of federal law in the Third Circuit are virtually identical. See Lake v. Arnold, 232
F.3d 360, 370 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate in three general scenarios: (1)
where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with respect to her cause of action; (2) where the
plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary
circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in
the wrong forum.”). As with equitable estoppel, in order for a plaintiff to receive the benefit of
equitable tolling, he must exercise diligence in pursuing and preserving his claims. Wolf v. PRD
Management, Inc., No. 11-2736, 2012 WL 1044504 at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2012).
For the same reasons stated in the above subsection regarding equitable estoppel, the
Court finds that the “advice” Plaintiff received from a Bureau of Prisons employee regarding the
time to file his Bivens claims does not, as a matter of New Jersey law, constitute conduct which
“actively misle[d]” Plaintiff into allowing his filing deadline to pass. See Freeman, 788 A.2d at
880. The Court further finds that this conduct does not amount to an “extraordinary
circumstance” warranting equitable tolling, especially given the obligation of Plaintiff to exercise
diligence in ensuring the preservation of his claim. See Wolf, 2012 WL 1044504. 4
Similarly, the Court’s research of applicable Third Circuit precedent leads it to conclude
that the conduct in question does not satisfy federal equitable tolling standards either. See, e.g.,
Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding that plaintiff’s phone
conversation with a government official in which he was erroneously advised that it was
unnecessary to file an administrative complaint and subsequently lost his claim did not
4
The third equitable tolling principle concerning a plaintiff who files in the wrong forum is inapplicable in the
instant case and will therefore receive no further attention here.
9
demonstrate either “inducement or trickery” by defendants into allowing a filing deadline to pass
or “extraordinary” circumstances warranting equitable tolling, and observing “should a plaintiff
in Robinson’s position be able to circumvent exhaustion requirements by simply asserting s/he
was given erroneous telephone advice from an agency employee, equitable tolling would be
converted from a remedy available only sparingly and in extraordinary situations into one that
can be readily invoked by those who have missed carefully drawn deadlines. We cannot extend
the doctrine that far.”); Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 751 (3d Cir. 2005)) (rejecting a
pro se litigant’s equitable tolling argument where litigant sought advice of government officials
on how to pursue his claim and received incorrect information resulting in the lapse of the
applicable statute of limitations and noting, among other things, that the government’s advice
was not “actively misleading”). For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim cannot
be salvaged by the doctrine of equitable tolling.
iii.
Plaintiff’s remaining arguments
Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss his claims contains
further explanations for his filing suit after the limitations period had expired. He explains that
he was in the process of continuing to exhaust his administrative remedies for his FTCA claim
during the relevant time period, and that such exhaustion efforts should act to toll the statute of
limitations on his Bivens claim. It is true that because Plaintiff is incarcerated, he was required
to exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing his Bivens claim in federal court.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2006) (Prison Litigation Reform Act); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 68
(3d Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is probably correct that the limitations period on a Bivens claim should
be tolled while a prisoner engages in the administrative remedy process. Shakuur v. Costello,
230 Fed. App’x 199, 201 (3d Cir. 2007). However, the exhaustion requirements under the Prison
10
Litigation Reform Act are not interchangeable with those for the FTCA. Fontana v. Lopez, No.
11-2573, 2011 WL 2745809 at *7 n.8 (D.N.J. July 12, 2011) (citing Robinson-Bey v. Feketee,
219 Fed. App’x 738 (10th Cir. 2007)). Thus, the statute of limitations on Plaintiff’s Bivens claim
cannot be tolled by virtue of his attempts to exhaust administrative remedies on his FTCA claim;
they are simply two different causes of action. 5 For this reason, Plaintiff’s argument is
unavailing.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff has failed to assert his Bivens claim against the
moving Defendants within the applicable two year statute of limitations. Therefore, the Court
must grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss it. An appropriate order shall issue today.
Dated:
6/25/2013
/s/ Robert B. Kugler
_
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
5
Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that his case is “unique” provides the Court with no cognizable basis to excuse his
failure to assert his claim within the applicable statute of limitations period.
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