JOHNSON v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/28/2011. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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N.J. DEPT. OF CORREC., et al.,
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Defendants.
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JEFFREY JOHNSON,
Civil No. 11-5764 (RMB)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
JEFFREY JOHNSON, 977662B
Northern State Prison
P.O. Box 2300
Newark, NJ 07114
BUMB, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Jeffrey Johnson, a state prisoner incarcerated at
Northern State Prison (“NSP”), seeks to bring this action in
forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
This Court will
grant Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and
direct the Clerk to file the Complaint without prepayment of the
filing fee.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
Having reviewed
Plaintiff’s allegations, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court will dismiss the federal
claims raised in the Complaint, without prejudice to the filing
of an amended complaint, and decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over claims arising under state law.
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff asserts violation of his constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (“NJDOC”), and P. Shepherd and Mr. Zaak, corrections
officers who transported him to South Woods State Prison.
Plaintiff asserts the following facts:
On: 11-10-2010, I was returning to South Wood
Prison from a court trip. I was assaulted by
two N.J. Department of Correction
transportation officers P. Shepherd and Zaak
in intake while handcuffed and shackled. I
was the only inmate they took into intake.
All other inmate[s] were still in the van.
Internal Affairs have video tapes and
photographs of the lacerations and swelling
that I received to my face, head and body.
(Dkt. 1 at 5.)
Plaintiff further alleges that the officer defendants “used
excessive physical force against me.”
(Dkt. 1 at 3.)
For
violation of his constitutional rights, Plaintiff seeks damages
of $100,000.
(Dkt. 1 at 6.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action
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in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a
prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or
entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court
determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), hammered the
“final nail-in-the-coffin” for the “no set of facts” standard set
forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),1 which was
previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a
claim.
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.
2009).
The pleading standard under Rule 8 was refined by the
United States Supreme Court in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009),
where the Supreme Court clarified as follows:
Two working principles underlie our decision
in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations
contained in a complaint is inapplicable to
legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice .
. . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous
departure from the hyper-technical, code-
1
The Conley court held that a district court was permitted
to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if “it
appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
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pleading regime of a prior era, but it does
not unlock the doors of discovery for a
plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that
states a plausible claim for relief survives
a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a
complaint states a plausible claim for relief
will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit
the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged - but it has not “show[n]” - “that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule
Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).
In keeping with these principles a court
considering a motion to dismiss can choose to
begin by identifying pleadings that, because
they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth. While
legal conclusions can provide the framework
of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations. When there are wellpleaded factual allegations, a court should
assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 -1950 (citations omitted).
Since Iqbal, the Third Circuit has required district courts
to conduct a three-part analysis when reviewing a complaint for
dismissal for failure to state a claim:
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint
under the [Iqbal] pleading regime . . . , a
court must take three steps: First, the
court must “tak[e] note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim.”
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court
should identify allegations that, “because
they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at
1950. Finally, “where there are well-pleaded
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factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement
for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F. 3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)
(footnote omitted).
The Court is mindful that the sufficiency of this pro se
pleading must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff,
even after Iqbal.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
III.
DISCUSSION
A court’s initial task is to “tak[e] note of the elements
[Plaintiff] must plead” in order to state a claim of liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Iqbal, 129 S Ct. at 1947-48.
Section 1983 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two
elements:
(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
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States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state
law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff seeks damages under § 1983
against the NJDOC, but a state agency is not subject to suit for
damages under § 1983.
See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Madden v. New Jersey State Parole
Board, 438 F.2d 1189, 1190 (3d Cir. 1971).
Accordingly, this
Court will dismiss the NJDOC as defendant with prejudice.
A.
Eighth Amendment
This Court construes Plaintiff’s allegations as attempting
to state an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment and
§ 1983 against corrections officers Shepherd and Zaak.
“[T]he
use of excessive physical force against a prisoner may constitute
cruel and unusual punishment [even] when the inmate does not
suffer serious injury.”
(1992).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4
Last year, the Supreme Court reversed dismissal of a pro
se prisoner’s excessive force claim where the prisoner alleged in
the complaint:
that, on June 13, 2007, he was “maliciously
and sadistically” assaulted “[w]ithout any
provocation” by a corrections officer,
respondent Gaddy. According to the complaint,
Gaddy, apparently angered by Wilkins' request
for a grievance form, “snatched [Wilkins] off
the ground and slammed him onto the concrete
floor.” Gaddy “then proceeded to punch, kick,
knee and choke [Wilkins] until another
officer had to physically remove him from
[Wilkins].” Wilkins further alleged that,
“[a]s a result of the excessive force used by
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[Gaddy], [he] sustained multiple physical
injuries including a bruised heel, lower back
pain, increased blood pressure, as well as
migraine headaches and dizziness” and
“psychological trauma and mental anguish
including depression, panic attacks and
nightmares of the assault.”
Wilkins v. Gaddy, 130 S.Ct. 1175, 1177 (2010) (footnote and
citations omitted).
Like Wilkins, the prisoner in Hudson v McMillion filed suit
under § 1983 alleging that corrections officers “had punched
Hudson in the mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach without
justification, resulting in ‘minor bruises and swelling of his
face, mouth, and lip’ as well as loosened teeth and a cracked
partial dental plate.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4).
Wilkins, 130 S.Ct at 1178 (quoting
The Supreme Court reversed the district
court’s dismissal of the complaints in both Hudson and Wilkins
where both dismissals were grounded on the prisoner’s failure to
allege significant injury.
The Supreme Court held that “whenever
prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical force
in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the
core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a
good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.”
6-7.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at
As the Court explained,
the extent of injury suffered by an inmate is
one factor that may suggest whether the use
of force could plausibly have been thought
necessary in a particular situation, or
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instead evinced such wantonness with respect
to the unjustified infliction of harm as is
tantamount to a knowing willingness that it
occur. In determining whether the use of
force was wanton and unnecessary, it may also
be proper to evaluate the need for
application of force, the relationship
between that need and the amount of force
used, the threat reasonably perceived by the
responsible officials, and any efforts made
to temper the severity of a forceful
response. The absence of serious injury is
therefore relevant to the Eighth Amendment
inquiry, but does not end it.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Applying Iqbal’s plausibility standard and the above
constitutional standard to Plaintiff’s Complaint, this Court
finds that, although Plaintiff’s allegations are consistent with
the malicious and sadistic use of force, the allegations are also
consistent with a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.
Because Plaintiff does not set forth facts
describing the circumstances surrounding the alleged assault, his
allegations fall short of showing that force was maliciously and
sadistically applied for the very purpose of causing harm.
Compare Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5 with Banks v. Mozingo, 423 Fed.
App’x 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2011) (where correction officer used mace
to subdue inmate after he had spat at a guard, and used taser to
subdue inmate after he had bitten one of the guards, the
force was not malicious and sadistic).
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use of
Accordingly, as written,
the Complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment excessive force
claim against corrections officers Shepherd and Zaak.
However, it is conceivable that Plaintiff simply neglected
to assert facts that would show that the force used by the
officers was applied maliciously and sadistically for the purpose
of causing harm, rather than to maintain order.
This Court will
therefore grant Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint
stating an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against
Shepherd and Zaak.2
B.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
"Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and
decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims when they
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy."
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Where a district court has original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal claims and supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
the district court has discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over
2
Plaintiff should note that once an amended complaint is
filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in
the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended
complaint. See 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure: Civil 2d § 1476 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
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which it has original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d
1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993).
In exercising its discretion,
?the district court should take into account generally accepted
principles of
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