LYLES v. ZICKEFOOSE et al

Filing 5

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 7/2/2012. (dmr)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
D. ZICKEFOOSE, etc., et al., :
:
Respondents. :
:
JERRA MCCREA LYLES,

Civil No. 11-6477 (NLH)

O P I N I O N

APPEARANCES:
DOUGLAS GRANNAN, ESQ.
325 Chestnut Street, Suite 403
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Attorneys for Petitioner
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner Jerra McCrea Lyles seeks a Writ of Mandamus
directing officials of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), the United
States Parole Commission, and the United States Probation Office
to recalculate the computation of his federal sentence, his good
time credits, and the remaining period under which he will be
subject to the jurisdiction of the Parole Commission.

Because

Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of mandamus and because this
Court rejected essentially the same claims in Lyles v. Zickfoose,
Civ. No. 09-3764 (NLH) opinion (D.N.J. Dec. 20, 2010), appeal
dismissed as moot, C.A. No. 11-1470 (3d Cir. July 25, 2011), this
Court will dismiss the Petition.

I.

BACKGROUND

This Court will take judicial notice of the docket and prior
federal judicial opinions regarding Petitioner, see McTernan v.
City of York, 577 F. 3d 521, 525 (3d Cir. 2009), and will not
reiterate the lengthy factual background which begins with
Petitioner’s 1976 federal conviction.

Most recently, on July 28,

2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging a final decision of the
BOP dated February 3, 2009, which he similarly challenges in the
Mandamus Petition presently before this Court.
No. 09-3764.

See Lyles, Civ.

In the amended petition in the prior habeas action,

[Lyles] claim[ed] that his custody violate[d]
the Constitution, laws or treaties of the
United States in the following ways: the BOP
“failed to provide Petitioner with adequate
and accurate information regarding its manner
of computing the authorized length of his
ongoing detention, in adjudicating his
administrative appeal dated, February 3,
2009, in violation of Petitioner’s right to
due process of law;” “failed to provide
Petitioner with information regarding the
legal, regulatory and/or policy authorities
upon which it relied, in adjudicating his
administrative appeal dated, February 3,
2009, in computing the remaining period of
Petitioner’s incarceration, in violation of
Petitioner’s right to due process of law;”
“relied upon improper legal authority in its
computation of the remaining length of
Petitioner’s authorized detention in
adjudicating his administrative appeal dated,
February 3, 2009, in violation of
Petitioner’s right to due process of law;”
“failed to comply with 28 CFR section 542.18
regarding its adjudication of Petitioner’s
appeals;” “failed to comply with the
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provisions of 28 CFR section 523.2(b)
regarding the Petitioner’s eligibility for
good time;” “failed to comply with applicable
case law;” “erred in the calculation of
credits/good time to which the Petitioner is
eligible or modify its sentence computation
sheets and other relevant documents in a
timely manner and upon notice from the
Petitioner of the errors contained in the
computation sheets while adjudicating
Petitioner’s administrative appeal dated,
February 3, 2009, in violation of
Petitioner’s right to due process of law;”
“erred in the adjudication of the
Petitioner’s administrative appeal dated,
February 3, 2009, in that Respondents were
not responsive to the legal/factual
challenges presented in the Petitioner’s
appeals, in violation of Petitioner’s right
to due process of law in the appeal process;”
“erred in the adjudication of the
Petitioner’s administrative appeal dated,
February 3, 2009, in that Respondents relied
upon incorrect data as contained in the
sentence computation sheets prepared in
connection with the Petitioner’s detention
and the Respondents failed to correct the
incorrect information even after being
informed by the Petitioner that the
information was incorrect, in violation of
his right to due process of law.”
Lyles v. Zickefoose, Civ. No. 09-3764 opinion (D.N.J. Dec. 20,
2010).
On December 20, 2010, this Court dismissed the habeas
petition, holding that the BOP’s February 3, 2009, decision did
not violate due process, Lyles’ detention was authorized by 21
U.S.C. § 841(c) (repealed) in that he was serving a 40-year term
of imprisonment as a result of the revocation of his 40-year
special parole term by the Parole Commission on August 19, 2002,

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and the BOP did not abuse its discretion in calculating his
presumptive parole date as January 8, 2011, determining that he
was eligible to receive 4,800 days of statutory good conduct time
credit, and calculating his statutory release date on the 40-year
sentence to be March 29, 2029.
09-3764 opinion at 16-20.

See Lyles v. Zickefoose, Civ. No.

Lyles appealed, and on July 25, 2011,

the Third Circuit granted the government’s motion to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the petition became moot when Lyles was
released on parole on January 7, 2011.

Id., mandate (D.N.J. July

25, 2011) (Pet. at pp. 9-10) (Dkt. 1 at 9-10).
In the instant Petition, Lyles seeks a writ of mandamus:
(a) mandating the Respondents provide the
Petitioner with adequate and accurate
information regarding its manner of computing
the authorized length of his ongoing period
of parole and the legal, regulatory and/or
policy authorities relied upon in computing
the remaining period of Petitioner’s
statutory and full term on his sentence; and
(b) mandat[ing] the [Respondents] to
calculate, accurately, any credits/good time
to which the Petitioner may be eligible and
modify its sentence computation sheets,
parole documents and other relevant documents
without further delay; and,
(c) direct[ing] Respondents to modify
existing calculations regarding the remaining
period under which Petitioner will be subject
to the jurisdiction of US parole authorities;
and,
(d) granting such other relief at law and in
equity as justice may mandate.
(Pet., pp. 14-15) (Dkt. 1 at pp. 14-15).
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II.

DISCUSSION

Section 1361 provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.”
1361.1

28 U.S.C. §

“The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28

U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff
only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief and only if
the defendant owes him a clear nondiscretionary duty.”
v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984).

Heckler

See also Pittston Coal

Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 121 (1988) (“The extraordinary
remedy of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 will issue only to
compel the performance of a clear nondiscretionary duty”)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

“Before a writ

of mandamus may issue, a party must establish that (1) ‘no other
adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires,’ (2) the
party’s ‘right to issuance of the writ is clear and
indisputable,’ and (3) ‘the writ is appropriate under the
circumstances.’”

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705 (2010)

(quoting Cheny v. United States Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S.
367, 380-81 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

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“‘The

The All Writs Act also authorizes federal courts to issue
a writ of mandamus where “necessary or appropriate in aid of
their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).
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general principle which governs proceedings by mandamus is, that
whatever can be done without the employment of that extraordinary
writ, may not be done with it.

It lies only when there is

practically no other remedy.’”

Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S.

500, 505 (1979) (quoting Ex parte Rowland, 104 U.S. 604, 617
(1882) (emphasis in Helstoski).
Here, Lyles seeks a writ of mandamus directing BOP and
parole officials to recalculate his federal sentence, his good
time credits, and the period of time he will be on parole.
1 at 14-15.)

(Dkt.

He has not shown, however, that any respondent has

a clear nondiscretionary duty to perform these recalculations.
Nor has he shown that he has no other remedy, particularly where
he sought essentially the same relief in his appeal to the Third
Circuit from this Court’s Order denying habeas corpus relief.
See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 506 (1979) (mandamus may
not be used as a substitute for appeal); Oracare DPO, Inc. v.
Merin, 972 F.2d 519, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[A] petition for a writ
of mandamus must never be regarded as an alternative to an
appeal”).

Because Petitioner has shown neither a clear

nondiscretionary duty nor the absence of any other remedy, he is
not entitled to mandamus relief.

This Court will accordingly

dismiss the Petition.

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III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court dismisses the Petition for
a Writ of Mandamus.

s/ Noel L. Hillman
HON. NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
Dated:

July 2

, 2012

At Camden, New Jersey

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