BROWN v. ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER granting and denying Defendants' 16 Motion to Dismiss ; denying Plaintiff's 20 Motion for Summary Judgment. ORDERED that DHS and ANCORA are DISMISSED from this action. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/11/2012. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
[Dkt. Ents. 16, 20]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DELORES BROWN on behalf of
ALVIN PAYTON, JR.,
Civil No. 11-7159 (RMB/KMW)
Plaintiff,
v.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
ANCORA PSYCHIATRIC HOSPITAL,
ALLAN BOYER, NEW JERSEY
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
and JENNIFER VELEZ,
Defendants.
BUMB, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Delores Brown (the “Plaintiff”) brought this
lawsuit on behalf of her son, Alvin Payton, Jr., an involuntarily
committed patient at Ancora Psychiatric Hospital (“Ancora”),
alleging medical malpractice and cruel and unusual treatment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment.
are two motions:
Currently before the Court
(1) a motion to dismiss by all of the
defendants, Jennifer Velez, Esq., Allan Boyer, the New Jersey
Department of Human Services (“DHS”), and Ancora (collectively,
the “Defendants”) [Dkt. Ent. 16]; and (2) a motion for summary
judgment by the Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se.
1
For the
reasons set forth below, the Court grants Defendants’ motion to
dismiss in part and denies it in part.
Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment is premature and denied without prejudice.
I. ANALYSIS
Because the particular allegations detailed in the Complaint
do not bear upon these motions, the Court need not recite them
here except to note that Plaintiff seeks both damages (“one
million dollars”) and prospective injunctive relief (the
establishment of a unit at Ancora dedicated to the treatment of
pica disorders).
A.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
1. Federal Claims
Defendants have asserted two grounds for dismissal of
Plaintiff’s federal claims:
that Defendants are immune from suit
under the Eleventh Amendment; and that Defendants are not
“persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1
1
Since the
The Complaint only cites the Eighth Amendment as a source of
Plaintiff’s federal claims. Defendants correctly argue that this
Amendment has no application here, since Plaintiff’s son is not a
convicted criminal but an involuntarily committed patient.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1983) (Fourteenth Amendment, as
opposed to Eighth Amendment, was appropriate source for
determining rights of involuntarily committed individual). It is
well settled that pro se complaints must be liberally construed
and held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Here,
Plaintiff’s allegations concern her son’s treatment at Ancora.
The Court therefore construes her to be invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983
to vindicate her son’s substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
2
jurisprudence in this area treats state departments and agencies
differently than state officials, the Court bifurcates its
analysis accordingly.
i.
State Departments and Agencies (DHS and
Ancora)
As to the first asserted basis for dismissal:
absent a
waiver of sovereign immunity, the Eleventh Amendment2 protects
states, their agencies and departments, from suit in federal
court regardless of the type of relief sought.
Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984); Shahin v.
Delaware, 345 F. App’x 815, 817 (3d Cir. 2009); C.H. v. Oliva,
226 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000), cert. den’d, 533 U.S. 915
(2001) (en banc).
Nothing in § 1983 abrogates this immunity.
Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341-43 (1979).
Since DHS is a
principal department in the executive branch of the New Jersey
state government, N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:1-2, it is therefore immune
from suit.
Weisman v. N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 817 F. Supp.
2d 456, 464 n.10 (D.N.J. 2011) (Eleventh Amendment barred suit
against DHS in federal court); cf. C.H., 226 F.3d at 201
(Eleventh Amendment barred suit against New Jersey Department of
2
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amd. XI.
3
Education in federal court).
As for Ancora, courts in this district have routinely
accorded it Eleventh Amendment immunity, since (1) it is a state
hospital, created by statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:1-73; (2) it is
operated by DHS and under the control of the Commissioner of
Human Services, N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:1-12; (3) it receives nearly
all of its funding from the state treasury; (4) any judgment
against Ancora would be paid from the state treasury; and (5) it
lacks authorization to sue or be sued in its own right.
Dep’t of
Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., 923 F. Supp.
651, 660 (D.N.J. 1995) (considering factors set forth in Fitchik
v. N.J. Transit Rail Ops., Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989), and
concluding that Ancora is alter ego of New Jersey for Eleventh
Amendment purposes); Marcucci v. Ancora Psych. Hosp., Civ. No.
09-1449, 2012 WL 2374653, *3 (D.N.J. June 22, 2012); Weisman, 817
F. Supp. 2d at 464 n.10; Brown v. Ancora Psych. Hosp., Civ. No.
06-3458, 2006 WL 3827328 *2-3 (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2006).
The Court
agrees with this analysis and recognizes Ancora as an “arm of the
state” and therefore immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment.
Cf. Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Cntr., 621 F.3d
249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. den’d, 131 S.Ct. 1614 (2011)
(summary disposition of Eleventh Amendment immunity issue was
3
N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:1-7 lists Ancora as one of the “long-term
care facilities, institutions, and psychiatric facilities of this
State.”
4
proper where Youth Development Center, a Pennsylvania state
agency that was regulated, monitored, and maintained by the
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, was clearly an “arm”
of the state).
Accordingly, the Court dismisses the claims
against DHS and Ancora for lack of jurisdiction.
C.H., 226 F.3d
at 201 (given Eleventh Amendment immunity, trial court should
have dismissed claim for want of jurisdiction rather than
entering judgment in state’s favor).
In any event, these claims would also fail under the second
asserted basis for dismissal:
as a state department and agency,
DHS and Ancora are not “persons” and therefore not amenable to
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70 (1989); Weisman, 817 F. Supp. 2d at
464.
ii.
State Officials (Velez and Boyer)
Plaintiff clarified in her opposition papers that she
intends to sue Defendants Velez, the Commissioner of DHS, and
Boyer, the CEO of Ancora, in their official capacities, as
representatives of their respective state entities.4
Hafer v.
Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (official-capacity suit exists where
4
Plaintiff stated in relevant part:
[I]t is not Allen Boyer or Jennifer Velez individually
responsible for the complaint. It is Ancora the agency
state created and largely state funded, but
‘independent’ and directs its own actions that holds
the key to responsibility.
(Pl.’s Opp. 5 (errors in original).)
5
real party in interest is the state and not the named official).
Where the plaintiff sues a state official in her official
capacity, the Eleventh Amendment bars the plaintiff from
recovering damages.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
The plaintiff may, however, sue for prospective equitable relief.
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 666-67; C.H., 226 F.3d at 202.
When sued
for such prospective relief, the state official is a “person” for
§ 1983 purposes, despite the fact that she has been sued in her
official capacity.
Will, 491 U.S. at 71, n.10 (“Of course a
state official in his or her official capacity, when sued for
injunctive relief, would be a person under § 1983 because
‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated
as actions against the State.’”).
Accordingly, the Court
dismisses Plaintiff’s 1983 claims against Velez and Boyer for
damages but permits those claims for prospective injunctive
relief to proceed.5
2.
State Law Claims
The Eleventh Amendment also bars federal courts from
exercising jurisdiction over state law claims, unless the state
has waived its sovereign immunity.
5
Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of
The fact that the injunctive relief requested here - the
establishment of a pica center at Ancora - may very well require
substantial state expenditures does not preclude its recovery
under the Eleventh Amendment. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,
289-90 (1977) (upholding injunction requiring substantial state
expenditures for educational aspects of a desegregation plan,
where relief requested was prospective).
6
Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 541-42 (2002) (supplemental jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) does not extend to claims against nonconsenting state defendants); Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 121
(Eleventh Amendment bars state law claims brought in federal
court under supplemental jurisdiction).
Although the New Jersey
Tort Claims Act permits suit against public entities and their
employees in state court, it does not expressly permit suit in
federal court and therefore does not constitute an Eleventh
Amendment waiver.
Hyatt v. Cnty. of Passaic, 340 F. App’x 833,
837 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-2(a)); Maynard
v. New Jersey, 719 F. Supp. 292, 296-97 (D.N.J. 1989) (“Federal
district courts in New Jersey have historically rejected attempts
to have the [New Jersey] Tort Claims Act doctrine of respondeat
superior supersede New Jersey’s state sovereign immunity under
the Eleventh Amendment.”) (citing Ritchie v. Cahall, 386 F. Supp.
1207, 1209 (D.N.J. 1974) and Thomas v. Dietz, 518 F. Supp. 794,
800 n.6 (D.N.J. 1981)).
The Court therefore dismisses the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction to the extent that it asserts
state law claims against the Defendants.
B.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment
After Defendants’ motion to dismiss became ripe for
adjudication, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
20.]
[Dkt. Ent.
She cites press coverage of a multi-state settlement in
which New Jersey and several other states resolved claims against
7
Janssen Pharmaceuticals for promoting “off-label” uses of the
drug Risperdal in violation of federal regulations.
While not a
model of clarity, Plaintiff’s brief appears to claim entitlement
to some of the proceeds of this settlement on the grounds that
her son was given Risperdal for nineteen years at Ancora and
suffered adverse effects from it.
Since the Complaint is devoid
of any such allegations, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to amend
the Complaint, she shall comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(a).
Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s motion on the grounds that it
is premature.
They note that they have not yet filed an answer
in this case, nor have they had the benefit of discovery, and
therefore the record is insufficiently developed to allow them to
properly respond.
The Court agrees and finds Plaintiff’s summary
judgment motion again premature.6
It is denied without
prejudice.
II.
ORDER
FOR THESE REASONS, it is on this 11th day of October 2012,
hereby:
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED with
respect to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims against Velez
6
This is Plaintiff’s second motion for summary judgment. She
filed her first such motion while a motion by the Defendants to
vacate a default that had been entered against them was still
pending. [Dkt. Ent. 13.] The Court therefore dismissed that
motion without prejudice as premature. [Dkt. Ent. 14.]
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and Boyer for prospective injunctive relief and GRANTED with
respect to Plaintiff’s remaining claims, which are hereby
DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is finally
ORDERED that DHS and Ancora are accordingly DISMISSED from
this action, and the Clerk of Court shall therefore remove them
from the docket caption.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
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