RAZZOLI v. US PAROLE COM'N et al

Filing 12

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 2/2/2022. (tf, n.m.)

Case 1:11-cv-07227-RMB Document 12 Filed 02/02/22 Page 1 of 3 PageID: 70
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
KEVIN RAZZOLI,
v.

Petitioner

U.S. PAROLE COM’N, et al.,
Respondents
______________________________

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CIV. NO. 11-7227 (RMB)
OPINION

BUMB, United States District Judge
Pro Se Petitioner Kevin Razzoli, who was incarcerated in the
Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton, New Jersey when he
filed this action in December 2011, seeks to reopen his petition
for writ of habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, seeking a hearing on
his claim of illegal detention based on a U.S. Navy sentence.
Petitioner, however, indicates that he is no longer incarcerated.
(Mot. to Reopen, Dkt. No. 11 at 2.)
On November 5, 2012, the late Honorable Jerome B. Simandle
construed the habeas petition as a challenge to Petitioner’s
revocation of parole and dismissed the petition as unexhausted,
and for lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate a challenge to the
Hearing Officer’s Notice of Action. (Opinion, Dkt. No. 8 at 7;
Order, Dkt. No. 9.) Petitioner, in his motion to reopen, alleges
that Judge Simandle’s ruling was based on false and misleading
information, citing to the footnote on page 5 of the opinion, the
date of November 2, 2012, and “other information” that Petitioner

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did not identify. (Mot. to Reopen, Dkt. No. 11 at 1.) November 2,
2012 is the date the opinion was signed by Judge Simandle. In the
footnote on page 5 of the opinion, Judge Simandle stated that:
This Court agrees [with Petitioner’s
assertion in his original petition that he
was an “old law prisoner.] In Razzoli v. FCI
Allenwood, 200 Fed. Appx. 166 (3d Cir.
2006), the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit determined that Petitioner committed
his offense on October 15, 1986, as a result
of which his parole claims are governed by
the “old” parole law.
It is unclear what Petitioner is challenging, and, more
importantly, what relief he seeks by reopening the petition now
that he is no longer incarcerated.
The case or controversy requirement of Article III, § 2 of
the Constitution requires that throughout the litigation a
petitioner “‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an
actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be
redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (quoting Lewis at 477. In Spencer, the
Supreme Court “decline[d] to presume that collateral
consequences adequate to meet Article III's injury-in-fact
requirement resulted from petitioner's parole revocation.” Id.
at 14. The Court rejected each basis offered by the petitioner
to show collateral consequences, and found that the petition for
writ of habeas corpus was moot because there was nothing for the
Court to remedy. Id. at 18 (“We are not in the business of

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pronouncing that past actions which have no demonstrable
continuing effect were right or wrong.”)
Here, Petitioner is no longer incarcerated, and his motion
to reopen does not describe any collateral consequences arising
from the revocation of his parole with respect to the October 7,
2011, U.S. Parole Commission “Notice of Action” attached to his
original petition. Therefore, the Court will deny Petitioner’s
motion to reopen without prejudice because the petition is moot.

An appropriate Order follows.

Date:

February 2, 2022
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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