LEE v. ZICKEFOOSE et al
Filing
7
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/5/2012. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
SEAN W. LEE,
Petitioner,
v.
DONNA ZICKEFOOSE, et al.,
Respondents.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Civil Action No. 12-0130 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Petitioner pro se
Sean W. Lee
U.S.P. Marion
Marion, IL 62959
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner Sean W. Lee, a prisoner previously confined at
the Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey, has
submitted a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 22411 and an application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis.
1
The respondents are FCI Fort Dix Warden Donna
Section 2241 provides in relevant part:
(a) Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the
Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts
and any circuit judge within their respective
jurisdictions.
(c) The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a
prisoner unless-- ... (3) He is in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States ... .
Zickefoose, A. Martusciello (an SIS Lieutenant at FCI Fort Dix),
and A. Boyce (a Disciplinary Hearing Officer at Fort Dix).
Based on Petitioner’s affidavit of indigence, this Court
will grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
Because it appears from a review of the Petition that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to hear this Petition, it will be dismissed
without prejudice.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
I.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a federal prisoner serving a 188-month
sentence imposed by the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Tennessee.
See United States v. Lee, Criminal No.
05-20120 (W.D. Tenn.).
Petitioner asserts that in 2011, while he was confined at
the Federal Correctional Institution at Fort Dix, New Jersey, he
was charged with various infractions, was found guilty of
violating Code 10.219A (attempted stealing), and was sanctioned
with loss of 27 days of good conduct time.
Thereafter, on August
21, 2011, Petitioner was transferred to the Federal Correctional
Institution at Three Rivers, Texas, where he was confined when he
filed this Petition for writ of habeas corpus.2
Petitioner challenges the disciplinary proceeding on the
grounds that he was denied a fair hearing procedure in violation
2
During the pendency of this action, Petitioner was
transferred to the U.S. Penitentiary at Marion, Illinois.
2
of his due process rights, as evidenced by the creation of a
factually inaccurate and incomplete agency record in violation to
5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
Petitioner asserts that he was not permitted
to present the witnesses he requested and that the respondents
falsely reported that one witness, who was not present, did
appear.
He also asserts that he was not permitted to question
one witness who was present.
Petitioner seeks restoration of his good time credits, among
other requested relief.3
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
United States Code Title 28, Section 2243 provides in
relevant part as follows:
A court, justice or judge entertaining an
application for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith
award the writ or issue an order directing the
respondent to show cause why the writ should not be
granted, unless it appears from the application that
the applicant or person detained is not entitled
thereto.
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than
more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).
3
To the extent Petitioner seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief based upon these alleged improper acts, any such action
for declaratory and injunctive relief is premature until such
time as the results of the disciplinary proceeding are overturned
by habeas relief or otherwise. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994);
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).
3
A pro se habeas petition and any supporting submissions must be
construed liberally and with a measure of tolerance.
See Royce
v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1998); Lewis v. Attorney
General, 878 F.2d 714, 721-22 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v.
Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399
U.S. 912 (1970).
Nevertheless, a federal district court can
dismiss a habeas corpus petition if it appears from the face of
the petition that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
See
Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320 (1996); Siers v. Ryan, 773
F.2d 37, 45 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1025 (1989).
See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2243, 2255.
III.
ANALYSIS
A habeas corpus petition is the proper mechanism for a
prisoner to challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement,
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 498-99 (1973), including
challenges to prison disciplinary proceedings that affect the
length of confinement, such as deprivation of good time credits,
Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749 (2004) and Edwards v. Balisok,
520 U.S. 641 (1997).
See also Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74
(2005).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, United States district courts
have power to issue writs of habeas corpus “within their
respective jurisdictions.”
Thus, the court issuing the writ must
4
be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the custodian of
the petitioner.
In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 2242 requires the petition for a
writ of habeas corpus to allege “the name of the person who has
custody over [the petitioner].”
See also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The
writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person
having custody of the person detained.”).
“[T]hese provisions contemplate a proceeding against some
person who has the immediate custody of the party detained, with
the power to produce the body of such party before the court or
judge, that he may be liberated if no sufficient reason is shown
to the contrary.”
Wales v. Whitney, 114 U.S. 5674, 574 (1885).
In accord with the statutory language and Wales’
immediate custodian rule, longstanding practice
confirms that in habeas challenges to present physical
confinement - “core challenges” - the default rule is
that the proper respondent is the warden of the
facility where the prisoner is being held, not the
Attorney General or some other remote supervisory
official.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435 (2004) (citations omitted)
(involving the question who was the proper respondent in a § 2241
petition filed by a United States citizen designated as a federal
“enemy combatant,” and confined in a navy brig in South Carolina
on a material witness warrant issued by the U.S. District Court
for the Southern District of New York).
The proviso that district courts may issue the
writ only “within their respective jurisdictions” forms
an important corollary to the immediate custodian rule
5
in challenges to present physical custody under § 2241.
Together they compose a simple rule that has been
consistently applied in the lower courts, including in
the context of military detentions: Whenever a § 2241
habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present
physical custody within the United States, he should
name his warden as respondent and file the petition in
the district of confinement.
Padilla, 542 U.S. at 446-47 (citations and footnote omitted).
Jurisdiction is determined as of the time the petition is
filed.
See United States v. Moruzin, 2012 WL 1890402 (3d Cir.
May 25, 2012).
Cf. Padilla, 542 U.S. at 441 (“when the
Government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a
petition naming her immediate custodian, the District Court
retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent
within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the
prisoner’s release”); Chavez-Rivas v. Olsen, 194 F.Supp.2d 368
(D.N.J. 2002) (where an INS detainee properly files a habeas
petition in the district where he is confined, and the INS
subsequently transfers the petitioner to a facility outside that
district, the United States Attorney General may be deemed a
“custodian” to allow the original district court to retain
jurisdiction).
Here, Petitioner was confined in Texas, not New Jersey, at
the time he filed this Petition.
Accordingly, this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear the Petition and will dismiss the Petition
6
without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.4
This Court
expresses no opinion as to the merits of the Petition.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition will be
dismissed without prejudice.
An appropriate order follows.
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
Noel L. Hillman
United States District Judge
Dated: November 5, 2012
4
As Petitioner is no longer confined in Texas, and there do
not appear to be any witnesses or evidence located in Texas, and
there is no statute of limitations that would limit Petitioner’s
ability to file a new petition in the district where he is
presently confined, it would not be in the interest of justice to
transfer this Petition to a District Court in Texas where it
could have been brought at the time it was incorrectly filed
here. See 28 U.S.C. § 1631.
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?