CATLETT v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE et al

Filing 137

MEMORANDUM OPINION filed. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 12/18/2015. (drw)n.m.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

AMY K.Z. CATLETT,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 12-cv-153 (JBS/AMD)

v.
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE,
et al.,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.

SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this action, Plaintiff Amy Catlett alleges that she was
tortiuously and unconstitutionally detained by police and
medical professionals and was administered unwanted medical
treatment upon suspicion that she was suicidal. (See generally
Am. Compl. [Docket Item 72].) Several defendants have already
been dismissed from the case [see Docket Items 31, 52, 127], and
the remaining defendants, specifically, Vineland Police Officer
John Calio, South Jersey Healthcare, Dominic Diorio, M.D., and
Diane Stavoli, LP, have filed three unopposed motions for
summary judgment to dismiss all claims against them. [Docket
Items 128, 129, 130.] They seek dismissal of constitutional
search and seizure claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act, as well as various state tort
claims, including battery, false imprisonment, and medical

negligence. Plaintiff did not file opposition to any of the
motions. For the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant
the motions for summary judgment and dismiss the claims against
Defendants Calio, Diorio, Stavoli, and South Jersey Healthcare.
The Court finds as follows:
1.

The factual record for purposes of the pending motions

are straightforward and undisputed. 1 On November 21, 2009, Police
Officer John Calio was sent to a home in Vineland, New Jersey to
check on the well-being of Plaintiff Amy Catlett because the
Vineland Police Department had received a report that Catlett
was possibly suicidal. (Calio Statement of Material Facts
)(“SMF”) [Docket Item 131] ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff’s mother, who
owned the home, answered the door and Officer Calio explained
that he was responding to a report that Catlett was suicidal.
Plaintiff’s mother consented to Calio’s entry and led him
upstairs to Plaintiff’s bedroom. She told Calio that her
daughter was depressed. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 12, 15.)
2.

Catlett agreed to speak to Calio outside. She stated

that she had nothing to live for, or that she could no longer
see the purpose of life, since she lost her fiancé and her
daughter was off to college. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.) She told Calio

1

Because Plaintiff has filed no opposition, the Court deems the
facts set forth by Defendants undisputed for purposes of the
pending summary judgment motion. See L. CIV. R. 56.1(a).
2

that she was depressed and “probably” told him that she was
taking Xanax for her depression. When asked if she wanted to
harm herself, she replied, “Of course, hasn’t everyone thought
of doing that?” (Id. ¶¶ 18, 21, 22.) Based on these statements,
Calio determined that Catlett was a potential harm to herself
and called Vineland EMS to transport her to the nearest medical
facility. (Id. ¶¶ 23, 26-27.)
3.

Catlett was “very agitated” and “very upset,” and was

“very uncooperative” about getting into the ambulance before
ultimately relenting. (Diorio SMF [Docket Item 128-2] ¶¶ 9-10.)
As she was getting into the ambulance, she said something to the
effect of wanting to be placed in a coma for the rest of the
year. (Calio SMF ¶¶ 24-25.) She was not handcuffed.
4.

According to the report of Police Practices Expert

Joseph Stine, Officer Calio’s actions were in good faith and
within accepted police standards. (Id. ¶ 31; Report of Joseph J.
Stine, Calio Ex. I [Docket Item 131-10].) Specifically, he noted
that Calio’s actions throughout the encounter were “in accord
with generally accepted [law enforcement] practices and
procedures while showing concern for a visibly depressed and
possibly suicidal person.” (Report of Joseph J. Stine, at 14.)
5.

Catlett was taken to South Jersey Regional Medical

Center. Hospital policy required medical providers to screen
each patient who enters for medical conditions. (South Jersey
3

Healthcare (“SJH”) and Stavoli SMF [Docket Item 129], at 5-6;
SJH and Stavoli Ex. G [Docket Item 129-11].) Dr. Dominic Diorio
told Catlett that she needed to give blood and a urine sample so
that she could be deemed medically stable, but she initially
refused. (SJH and Stavoli SMF, at 10; Diorio SMF ¶¶ 16-18.)
These tests were in accordance with hospital policy. (SJH and
Stavoli SMF, at 5-6.)
6.

Ms. Catlett was restrained twice while at the

hospital. According to records, while in the Emergency Room,
Catlett became “physically abusive,” and was documented to be
“combative/hitting” and a “danger to self/others.” As a result,
Catlett was placed in restraints for approximately 35 minutes.
(SJH and Stavoli SMF, at 7; Diorio SMF ¶¶ 19-20.) At another
point during her evaluation, Nurse Diane Stavoli attempted to
perform a routine lab draw, and Catlett bit Stavoli in the arm.
(SJH and Stavoli SMF, at 5; SJH and Stavoli Ex. F [Docket Item
129-10].) 2 Catlett ran out of the Emergency Room to the parking
lot, ignoring orders to return, and attempted to hit and kick
the security guards who brought her back inside. (SJH and
Stavoli SMF, at 6-7; Diorio SMF ¶¶ 25-26.) Catlett was deemed a
“risk to self and others” and was placed in restraints “for
patient and staff safety.” (SJH and Stavoli SMF, at 7.) The

2

For this conduct, Catlett pled guilty to a charge of disorderly
conduct. (SHJ and Stavoli SMF, at 6.)
4

restraints were removed once Catlett became calm and
cooperative. (Diorio SMF ¶ 26.) In both instances, the
appropriate orders for restraints were entered. (SJH and Stavoli
SMF, at 7.)
7.

Ms. Catlett ultimately consented to the drawing of

blood and to a urine sample. (Diorio SMF ¶¶ 23, 28-29.)
8.

After his evaluation, Dr. Diorio arranged to transfer

Catlett to the Crisis Unit at the Bridgeton location of South
Jersey Health System for crisis evaluation, noting the following
diagnosis: “(1) Psychotic thoughts (2) suicidal ideation.
Treatment/therapy recommended: Crisis evaluation to determine
risk to self and others.” (Diorio SMF ¶ 34; SJH and Stavoli SMF,
at 7-8.)
9.

According to an expert report by Dr. Michael Chansky,

the use of restraints was appropriate, as was the need to
perform medical screening and urine tests to ensure that a
patient is medically stable. (SJH and Stavoli SMF, at 15-16;
Report of Michael E. Chansky, M.D., SJH and Stavoli Ex. L
[Docket Item 129-16], at 7.) SHJ was required to medically
screen Catlett for conditions that might cause inappropriate
behavior and, “once medically cleared, transport her to a
specialty center [such as the Crisis Unit at Bridgetown] for
professional psychiatric screening.” (Report of Michael E.
Chansky, M.D., at 6.) Dr. Chansky opined that the medical staff
5

at SJH “provided appropriate care in [Catlett’s] best interest
and safety,” and met the expected standard of emergency care.
(Id. at 7.)
10.

According to an expert report by Dr. Barbara Ziv,

“[a]ll available records indicate that the individuals involved
in Ms. Catlett’s care acted appropriately and within standards
of care.” (SJH and Stavoli SMF, at 16; Report of Barbara Ziv,
M.D., SJH and Stavoli Ex. M [Docket Item 129-17], at 36.)
11.

Plaintiff commenced this action in the Superior Court

of New Jersey, Law Division, Cumberland County. Defendants South
Jersey Healthcare and Diane Stavoli, LPN, filed a notice of
removal on January 9, 2012. [Docket Item 1.] 3
12.

The New Jersey State Police, City of Vineland Police

Department, and Vineland Emergency Medical Service were
dismissed from the suit in earlier opinions by this Court.
[Docket Items 31 & 52.] Since the filing of the Amended
Complaint on February 11, 2014 [Docket Item 72], the parties
have also stipulated to the dismissal of Vineland EMTs DiNunzio
and Watson [Docket Item 127].
13.

Pending before the Court are motions for summary

judgment filed by the remaining named defendants, Officer Calio
[Docket Item 130], Dr. Diorio [Docket Item 128], and South

3

The Court exercises jurisdiction over this action pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1367.
6

Jersey Healthcare and Nurse Stavoli, who together filed a single
motion [Docket Item 129]. Officer Calio seeks dismissal of the
constitutional search and seizure claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, as well as various state tort
claims (Counts One through Four). Dr. Diorio, Nurse Stavoli, and
South Jersey Healthcare seek dismissal of the state tort claims
for medical negligence, assault and battery, and false
imprisonment (Counts Five through Eight). Plaintiff has not
filed any opposition to these motions. 4
14.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) generally

provides that the “court shall grant summary judgment if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact” such that the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court finds that based on
the undisputed facts in the record, summary judgment is
warranted for the defendants.
Officer Calio
15.

With respect to Officer Calio, the Court agrees that

Plaintiff has presented no evidence to support her Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First,

4

Plaintiff’s deadline to file oppositions to the three motions
expired on May 18, 2015 and June 1, 2015. Despite filing no
opposition, Plaintiff has, through counsel, actively
participated in this litigation since the opposition deadline.
[See Docket Item 135.]
7

Calio’s warrantless entry into the Catlett residence was not
unlawful because Catlett’s mother, the owner of the home,
expressly consented to the entry. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547
U.S. 103, 109 (2006) (Fourth Amendment generally prohibits
warrantless entry into a home but prohibition does not apply
where entry is made “with the voluntary consent of an individual
possessing authority”); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181
(1990). Additionally, because Calio was told that Catlett was
possibly suicidal, exigent circumstances also existed to justify
the entry. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 (1990)
(exigent circumstances exist to justify warrantless entry into a
home where there is a risk of danger to persons inside a
dwelling); Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 496 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[E]xigent circumstances exist where officers reasonably . . .
believe that someone is in imminent danger.”) (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
16.

Nor did Officer Calio violate Catlett’s Fourth

Amendment rights when he placed her into an ambulance and sent
her to the hospital for a mental health evaluation. The Fourth
Amendment also applies to warrantless seizures for purposes of
involuntary commitment, and the fundamental inquiry remains the
same: whether the government’s conduct was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Doby v. DeCrescenzo, 171
F.3d 858, 871 (3d Cir. 1999). When there is probable cause to
8

believe that a person is a danger to himself or others, an
officer may reasonably seize and detain a person for a
psychiatric evaluation without offending the Fourth Amendment.
See Must v. West Hills Police Dep’t, 126 Fed. App’x 539, 542-43
(3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he temporary involuntary commitment of those
deemed dangerous to themselves or others qualifies as a ‘special
need’ permitting the state to act without a warrant.”); see also
Cole v. Town of Morristown, ___ Fed. App’x ____, 2015 WL
5559462, at *3 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2015) (“[I]t is not
unreasonable to temporarily detain an individual who is
dangerous to herself or others.”).
17.

Based on the evidence, the question of whether there

was probable cause to believe that Catlett posed a danger to
herself is not a close one. See Monday v. Oulette, 118 F.3d
1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1997) (noting that “a showing of probable
cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a
‘probability or substantial chance’ of dangerous behavior, not
an actual showing of such behavior.”). Calio was told by the
dispatcher that Catlett was “possibly suicidal,” and Catlett’s
mother told Calio that Catlett was depressed. Calio also spoke
to Catlett and observed her behavior before taking action.
Catlett admitted that she was depressed and was taking
medication. When asked whether she wanted to harm herself, she
responded, “Of course, hasn’t everyone?” Catlett also stated
9

that she no longer saw a purpose to her life after her fiancé
passed away. No rationale jury could find that Calio’s decision
to send Catlett to the hospital for a mental health evaluation
under these circumstances was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. See, e.g., Roberts v. Anderson, 213 Fed. App’x 420,
427 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that summary judgment was
appropriate and officers had probable cause to transport
plaintiff to hospital because they were told that plaintiff was
attempting to commit suicide and plaintiff stated that he was
going back to his van to die).
18.

Having established that there was no federal

constitutional violation, the state constitutional claims under
the New Jersey Civil Rights Act must also be dismissed. See
Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 120 n.12 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting
that, with respect to unlawful searches and seizures, the New
Jersey Constitution does not provide any greater protection than
its federal counterpart); Desilets v. Clearview Reg’l Bd. of
Educ., 627 A.2d 667, 673 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(stating same); see also Trafton v. City of Woodbury, 799 F.
Supp. 2d 417, 443 (D.N.J. 2011) (analyzing all of plaintiffs’
NJCRA claims, including claims of improper search and seizure
and false arrest, through the lens of § 1983 because “[t]his
district has repeatedly interpreted NJCRA analogously to §
1983.”); Major Tours, Inc. v. Colorel, 720 F. Supp. 2d 587, 604
10

(D.N.J. 2010) (Simandle, J.) (applying one analysis to equal
protection claim brought under both § 1983 and the NJCRA because
there was no reason to believe analysis would be different).
19.

Finally, the remaining state tort claims must be

dismissed because New Jersey law, specifically N.J.S.A. § 30:427.7(a), shields Officer Calio from suit. In the civil
commitment context, N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27.7(a) grants law
enforcement officers who are involved in the process of
commitment immunity from civil and criminal liability so long as
they “act in good faith” and “[take] reasonable steps to assess,
take custody of, detain or transport [the] individual for the
purposes of mental health assessment or treatment.” N.J.S.A. §
30:4-27.7(a). There is no indication that Calio acted in bad
faith, or that the steps he took to detain Catlett and call for
a mental health evaluation were unreasonable in light of the
circumstances. To the contrary, in addition to the evidence
already discussed which supports the dismissal of the
constitutional claims, the record includes an expert witness
report by Dr. Stine which concludes that Calio’s actions were
“in accord with generally accepted [law enforcement] practices
and procedures.” Plaintiff has presented no evidence to
contradict Defendant’s facts. Accordingly, the Court finds that
Officer Calio is entitled to immunity from suit on the state law
claims. See Cole v. Town of Morristown, ___ Fed. App’x _____,
11

2015 WL 5559462, at *4 (3d Cir. Sept. 22, 2015) (affirming
dismissal of state law claims because police officers who
responded on the scene and called for a mental health screening
of plaintiff were immune from suit under § 30:4-27.7(a) and
there was no evidence of bad faith).
20.

The Court will grant Calio’s motion for summary

judgment and will dismiss Calio from the suit.
South Jersey Healthcare, Nurse Stavoli, and Dr. Diorio
21.

The only claims against South Jersey Healthcare, Nurse

Stavoli, and Dr. Diorio are state tort claims. (See Am. Compl.
Counts Five, Six, Seven, and Eight.) Because the New Jersey
statute noted above also provides immunity from civil and
criminal liability to health care workers and medical providers
when they act reasonably and in good faith, the claims against
these Defendants must also be dismissed. See N.J.S.A. § 30:427.7 (providing immunity to “outpatient treatment provider or
short-term care facility designated staff person or their
respective employers”); Browne v. Kimball Med. Ctr., No. L-305402, 2005 WL 2510226, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 12,
2005).
22.

Plaintiff has presented no evidence from which the

Court may infer that the Defendants’ conduct was unreasonable or
in bad faith. Nurse Stavoli and Dr. Diorio followed hospital
procedure to screen mental health patients, and Ms. Catlett was
12

told that she needed to provide blood and urine samples in
accordance with hospital policy. Appropriate orders were also
followed for the placement of restraints. In both instances,
Catlett was restrained only after she was regarded as a “danger
to self/others.” She was documented to be aggressive,
“combative/hitting,” and physically abusive; bit Stavoli in the
arm; attempted to flee the hospital; and tried to hit and kick
security officers. Further, restraints were promptly removed
once Catlett became calm and cooperative. Under these
circumstances, it was not unreasonable to order restraints for a
short period of time “for patient and staff safety.”
23.

Expert reports in the record further support this

conclusion. After a review of the evidence, both Dr. Chansky and
Dr. Ziv opined that SJH personnel acted appropriately in
Catlett’s best interest and safety, and met the expected
standard of emergency care. Dr. Chansky specifically stated that
the use of restraints in this case was appropriate, as was the
need to perform medical screening and urine tests.
24.

Dr. Diorio is also entitled to immunity under N.J.S.A.

§ 30:4-27.7 for his decision to transfer Catlett to the Crisis
Unit at Bridgeton for further professional psychiatric screening
“to determine risk to self and others.” Dr. Diorio knew that
Catlett had expressed thoughts of suicide and observed her being
aggressive and physically violent towards hospital staff. She
13

had also been restrained twice during her time at SJH. Based on
this, Dr. Diorio reasonably believed Catlett to be a risk to
herself and others and needed further psychiatric evaluation. In
his expert report, Dr. Chansky also noted that after performing
the requisite medical screening tests, SJH was required to
transport Catlett to a specialty center such as the Crisis Unit
at Bridgeton for professional psychiatric screening. There is
simply no evidence in the present record from which a reasonable
juror could conclude that Diorio’s decision to transfer Catlett
to Bridgetown was unreasonable or in bad faith. 5 The Court
therefore finds that SJH, Stavoli, and Diorio are entitled to
immunity under N.J.S.A. § § 30:4-27.7.
25.

Although Defendants are immune from suit, the Court

notes that the evidence is also insufficient as a matter of law
to establish Defendants’ liability for the torts alleged in the
Amended Complaint.
26.

Plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim of battery

(Count Six).

Battery in the medical malpractice context “‘is

reserved for those instances where either the patient consents

5

Dr. Diorio’s decision was also in accordance with N.J.S.A. §
2A:62A-16, which provides that, when a medical professional
believes a patient intends to carry out an act of imminent
serious violence against herself or others, the medical
professional has a duty to warn and protect by arranging for
voluntary or involuntary commitment to a psychiatric unit of a
general hospital or outpatient treatment center. N.J.S.A. §
2A:62A-16(c)(1)-(2).
14

to one type of operation but the physician performs a
substantially different one from that for which authorization
was obtained, or where no consent is obtained.’” Starozytnyk v.
Reich, 871 A.2d 733, 742 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(quoting Howard v. Univ. of Medicine and Dentistry of N.J., 800
A.2d 73, 80 (N.J. 2002)); see also Samoilov v. Raz, 536 A.2d
275, 280-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987). The undisputed
record shows that while Catlett initially resisted, she
ultimately consented to giving urine and blood samples for
medical screening purposes. Moreover, there is nothing in the
record to suggest that Defendants used her samples for anything
other than screening to ensure that Catlett was medically
stable.
27.

Nor can Plaintiff maintain a claim against Defendants

for false imprisonment (Count Six). The “essence of the tort [of
false imprisonment] consists in depriving the plaintiff of [her]
liberty without lawful justification. 32 Am. Jur. 2d, False
Imprisonment § 4 (1982). To support such a cause of action, the
plaintiff must show that she was arrested or detained against
her will, and without proper legal justification. Mesgleski v.
Oraboni, 748 A.2d 1130, 1138 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000).
The Court need not repeat its discussion of the record in this
case, but suffice it to say that the evidence as a whole, even
when viewed in light most favorable to Plaintiff, provides ample
15

support that Defendants were justified in holding Catlett until
the required medical screening was completed, and in ordering a
psychiatric evaluation at a designated mental health screening
facility pursuant to N.J.S.A. §4-27.4. See Beatty v. Cahill,
2006 WL 2805450, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 3, 2006)
(finding no support for false imprisonment claim where officer
requested mental health screening for plaintiff who was giving
non-responsive answers and had been under treatment for mental
illness). A reasonable jury could not find for Plaintiff on the
basis of the factual record.
28.

Catlett also cannot sustain a claim for medical

malpractice (Count Five). It is well-settled that in medical
negligence actions, the plaintiff must establish the requisite
standard of medical care and the deviations from that standard
that resulted in injury. See Rosenberg v. Tavorath, 800 A.2d
216, 225 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002); Toy v. Rickert, 146
A.2d 510, 513 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958). Moreover, with
“rare exceptions,” evidence of deviation from accepted medical
standards must be provided through expert testimony from
qualified physicians. Schueler v. Strelinger, 204 A.2d 577, 585
(N.J. 1964); see also Mottola v. City of Union City, No. 053964, 2007 WL 2079939, at *2 (D.N.J. July 17, 2007) (“[A]
plaintiff must produce expert testimony both defining the
recognized standard of care, skill and knowledge, as well as the
16

departure therefrom.”); Estate of Chin ex rel. Chin v. St.
Barnabas Med. Ctr., 734 A.2d 778, 785 (N.J. 1999) (expert
testimony not required only in the “unusual medical malpractice
case” where the trial is essentially no different from an
ordinary negligence case) (citations omitted). Since Catlett has
not carried her burden of establishing the proper standard of
care or that Defendants failed to meet that standard, nor has
she produced relevant expert testimony of any kind, 6 her medical
malpractice claim fails. See Tavorath, 800 A.2d at 225 (“Absent
competent expert proof of [the relevant standard of medical
care, doctor’s breach of that standard, and causal connection to
plaintiff’s injuries], the case is not sufficient for
determination by the jury.”).
29.

Finally, because there is simply nothing in the record

documenting SJH’s training and supervision practices, nor any
evidence that the SJH protocols followed by the Defendants were

6

For a medical malpractice claim in New Jersey, Plaintiff is
required to serve an Affidavit of Merit “within 60 days
following the date of filing of the answer to the complaint by
the defendant.” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27. In the present case, there
is no indication that any medical expert subscribed to the
requisite Affidavit of Merit, and the medical malpractice claims
are alternatively subject to dismissal on that ground. See Ryan
v. Renny, 999 A.2d 427, 435 (N.J. 2010) (noting that Affidavit
of Merit statute requirement “applies to all actions for damages
based on professional malpractice.”) It thus appears that
Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claims against Dr. Diorio, Nurse
Stavoli and South Jersey Healthcare in Count Five were without
even plausible merit under New Jersey law from the outset.
17

inconsistent with New Jersey or federal law, and because there
are no viable tort claims against SJH’s employees, Plaintiff
cannot sustain her claims against SJH in Counts Seven and Eight.
30.

For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant the

unopposed motions for summary judgment by Defendants Calio,
Diorio, Stavoli, and South Jersey Healthcare. Calio, Diorio,
Stavoli, and South Jersey Healthcare will be dismissed from the
case.
31.

The only remaining defendants in this case are unnamed

John Doe hospital employees (1-XX), ABC partnerships (1-X), and
XYZ corporations (1-X). (See Am. Compl.) There is nothing before
the Court or on the docket to suggest that Plaintiff has
identified and named these individuals and entities, and it
follows that there is no indication that they were ever served
with the Complaint or Amended Complaint. The time for service
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) has long expired, 7 and Plaintiff has
neither moved to extend time for service nor demonstrated good
cause for her noncompliance. See McCurdy v. Am. Bd. of Plastic
Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir. 1998). The time for
completing discovery expired long ago. 8 Moreover, the Court does

7

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint was filed on February 11, 2014.
The 120-day period of Rule 4(m), Fed. R. Civ. P., expired June
11, 2014.
8 Under the Amended Scheduling Order entered on October 23, 2014
[Docket Item 114], the time to complete factual discovery
expired on December 5, 2014.
18

not have the ability to direct service on these unnamed
Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to specifically identify
them. Accordingly, the Court will exercise its discretion and
dismiss these defendants. See, e.g., Mote v. Murtin, No. 071571, 2008 WL 2761896, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2008)
(dismissing John Doe defendants because plaintiff has made no
showing of good cause for failing to effectuate service within
specific time limit).
32.

An accompanying order will be entered granting

Defendants’ motions in their entirety.

December 18, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

19