CATLETT v. NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE et al
Filing
51
OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/20/2013. (tf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AMY K.Z. CATLETT,
Plaintiff,
HON. JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Civil No. 12-153 (JBS/AMD)
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE POLICE, et
al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Ms. Amy K.Z. Catlett
3137 Swan Drive
Vineland, NJ 08361
Plaintiff Pro Se
Paola F. Kaczynski, Esq.
WILLIAM J. FERREN & ASSOCIATES
1500 Market Street Suite 2920
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Attorney for Defendants City of Vineland Police Department
& Vineland Emergency Medical Service
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff Amy K.Z. Catlett, pro se, brings this suit
alleging a series of constitutional and common law tort claims
against the City of Vineland Police Department, Vineland
Emergency Medical Service (“EMS”), and unnamed police officers
and emergency medical technicians (“EMTs”), among others.
Plaintiff claims that she was tortiously and unconstitutionally
detained by police and medical professionals and was administered
unwanted medical treatment upon suspicion that she was suicidal.
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss by Defendants City of
Vineland Police Department and Vineland EMS [Docket Item 43].
Plaintiff Catlett opposes the motion. [Docket Item 50.]
The key inquiries for the Court are (1) whether Plaintiff
sufficiently pleads the existence of a police department or EMS
policy or custom that can be causally linked to her alleged
injury, in order to ground liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
analogous state-law claims, and (2) whether it can be determined
from the Complaint that the police and the EMTs acted reasonably
in the circumstances, thus precluding liability on state-law
claims against the moving Defendants. For the reasons explained
below, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss without
prejudice and permit Plaintiff to file a motion to amend her
complaint, consistent with this Opinion and the Court’s previous
orders.
II.
Background
A. Facts
In the afternoon of November 21, 2009, a state trooper
(“Trooper Scott”) received an anonymous tip that Plaintiff had
posted a suicidal message on the social networking website,
Facebook.1 (Compl. ¶¶ 2, 13.) Plaintiff alleges that Trooper
1
The Court previously recounted the facts of this case in
Catlett v. New Jersey State Police, No. 12-153, 2012 WL 3757005,
at *1-*2 (D.N.J. Aug. 28, 2012) and Catlett v. New Jersey State
2
Scott then contacted the Vineland Police Department (“VPD”) and
relayed the information about Plaintiff’s suicidal posting. (Id.
¶ 13.) Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he aforesaid calls” -- those
made by the unnamed “Caller(s)/Informant(s)” and Trooper Scott -“were baseless and wrongfully and unlawfully conveyed false
information” about Plaintiff to the police. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 15.)
Vineland police officers and EMTs responded to Plaintiff’s
residence, “removed [her] from her home and forced [her] to go to
South Jersey Healthcare-Regional Medical Center in Vineland,”
where she claims she suffered injuries to her mouth and shoulder
when medical staff attempted to restrain her, among other
injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 43.) Plaintiff alleges that during her
interactions with the police and EMTs she “was acting peaceably
and in a lawful manner.” (Id. ¶ 16.) She further alleges that “no
advanced call was placed to South Jersey Healthcare-Regional
Medical Center to ensure that appropriately trained individuals
were present to assess Plaintiff’s status.” (Id. ¶ 38.)
Plaintiff claims she was falsely imprisoned and otherwise
injured at the medical center and “released from imprisonment
during the late evening hours of November 21, 2009 . . . .” (Id.
¶ 18.) Thus, the incident lasted, at most, several hours.
B. Complaint
Police, No. 12-153, 2013 WL 941059, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2013).
Here, the Court only recounts those facts relevant to the present
motion.
3
Count Two alleges the VPD and Vineland EMS “[d]eprived
Plaintiff of rights and liberties guaranteed her by the
Constitution of the United States, the Constitution of the State
of New Jersey and the laws of the State of New Jersey.” (Id. ¶
20.) The count also alleges that the police and EMTs failed to
investigate and verify the information upon which they were
acting and failed to take “proper steps to ensure that
appropriate individuals would evaluate and assess the situation.”
(Id.)
Count Four alleges that the VPD “is vicariously liable for
the negligent acts of its agents, servants and/or employees . . .
.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Plaintiff claims that the VPD was negligent in
hiring, training and supervising its officers and negligent in
implementing proper procedures to ensure the safety and rights of
individuals. (Id. ¶ 30.) Count Five alleges substantially similar
claims against Vineland EMS. (Id. ¶¶ 32-36.) Both counts allege
that Plaintiff sustained physical and emotional harm, temporary
and permanent injuries, medical expenses, and a loss of earnings
and earning capacity. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 36.) She seeks compensatory and
punitive damages. (Id.)
C. Procedural history
Plaintiff brought the current suit in New Jersey Superior
Court, and Defendants removed the matter to this Court based on
federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction.
4
[Docket Item 1.] Following a motion for dismissal and summary
judgment by Defendant New Jersey State Police (“NJSP”), the Court
terminated the NJSP from the suit. Catlett, 2012 WL 3757005, at
*2-*4. The Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to file an amended complaint, because the proposed amended
complaint repeated deficient claims against Defendant NJSP. Id.
at *4. Plaintiff did not move to amend the complaint until
opposing Defendant Dr. Dominic Diorio’s motion to dismiss.
[Docket Item 29]. Catlett, 2013 WL 941059, at *2.
The Court dismissed with prejudice all § 1983 and New Jersey
Civil Rights Act claims against Defendant Diorio and all civil
rights claims against Defendants Diane Stavoli and South Jersey
Healthcare, because Plaintiff did not and could not plead those
Defendants acted under color of state law. Id. at *4. The Court
denied without prejudice Dr. Diorio’s motion to dismiss state-law
tort claims, because his defense relied on matters outside the
pleading. Id. at *6. At the same time, the Court denied without
prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint, because the
proposed Amended Complaint included allegations that Dr. Diorio
and others acted under color of state law. Id. The Court granted
Plaintiff leave to file one final motion to amend, with a
proposed Amended Complaint that cured all deficiencies previously
noted in the Court’s opinions and orders, but ordered Plaintiff
to refrain from filing such a motion until the Court ruled on the
5
present motion. Id. at *6 n.8; see also Order, Catlett v. New
Jersey State Police, No. 12-153 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2013), ECF No.
47 at 1-2.
In this motion to dismiss, the Vineland Defendants argue
that the constitutional claims must be dismissed because the
Vineland Defendants had probable cause to “seize” Plaintiff and
they acted to protect and preserve Plaintiff’s physical safety.
(Def. Mot. at 2-3.) The Vineland Defendants also argue that (1)
the VPD is not a proper defendant, (2) Vineland EMS is not a
state actor, (3) Plaintiff has not stated a proper claim against
a municipal entity, and (4) state-law claims should be dismissed
because the Defendants acted reasonably or Plaintiff’s pleading
is otherwise deficient. (Id. at 3-6.) Plaintiff opposes the
motion. [Docket Item 50.] The Vineland Defendants did not file a
reply in support of their motion.
III.
Standard of review
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the court must “accept all
factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be
entitled to relief.” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116,
120 (3d Cir. 2012). The complaint must contain “sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
6
(2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Allegations
that are no more than legal conclusions are not entitled to the
same assumption of truth. Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d
Cir. 2012). To determine if a complaint meets the pleading
standard, the Court must strip away conclusory statements and
“look for well-pled factual allegations, assume their veracity,
and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Pro se filings must be liberally construed. Liggon-Redding v.
Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV.
Discussion
A. Whether Plaintiff has stated constitutional claims
The Vineland Defendants seek to dismiss all claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and analogous claims under the New Jersey
Constitution. They advance several theories supporting dismissal.
First, the Defendants construe the Complaint as alleging a
violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore argue that
dismissal is appropriate because any seizure that occurred was
reasonable in the circumstances. (Def. Mot. at 2-3, 5.) Second,
Defendants argue that a “municipal police department is not a
proper defendant in a case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” (Id. at 3.)
7
Third, Defendants contend that Vineland EMS is not a state actor,
and therefore any claim that requires a showing of action under
color of state law must be dismissed. (Id. at 4.) Finally,
Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to plead that she suffered
injury as a result of any action by an official within the VPD or
Vineland EMS or that a policy or custom of the VPD or Vineland
EMS caused her injuries. (Id. at 5.) Because § 1983 does not
permit liability on the basis of respondeat superior, Plaintiffs
urge dismissal. (Id. at 4-5.)
Plaintiff responds that Defendants acted unreasonably. (Pl.
Opp’n at 2-3.) She asserts that if the police or EMTs were taking
Plaintiff for mental health screening against her will, New
Jersey law requires she be taken to a screening service, which
the Regional Medical Center was not. (Id. at 2-3, citing N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.1, et seq., and Fair Oaks Hosp. v. Pocrass,
628 A.2d 829, 833 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993).) Plaintiff
also argues that the EMTs “acted upon the direction and
instruction of the Vineland Police Officers” and “assum[ed] the
duty of law enforcement” when transporting Plaintiff to the
medical center. (Id. at 3.) Therefore, she argues, the EMTs
“became state actors.” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff responds to the
charge that she failed to identify a policy or custom by stating
that to “determine whether this is a local policy, practice or
8
custom . . . requires discovery.”2 (Id.)
As an initial matter, the Court observes that police
departments and municipalities are treated as a single entity for
purposes of § 1983, and courts in the Third Circuit frequently
dismiss claims against police departments or grant summary
judgment in their favor when those departments are sued in
conjunction with the municipalities. See, e.g., Trafton v. City
of Woodbury, 799 F. Supp. 2d. 417, 429 (D.N.J. 2011) (granting
summary judgment in favor of the police department when it was
sued in conjunction with the city); Padilla v. Twp. of Cherry
Hill, 110 F. App’x 272, 278 (3d Cir. 2004) (affirming summary
judgment for the same reason); Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132
F.3d 20, 25 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating a municipality and a
police department are to be treated as a single entity for § 1983
claims). Here, however, Plaintiff has not sued the City of
Vineland in conjunction with the VPD, so there is no concern
2
Plaintiff also advances the argument that “certain factual
assertions [that] were made in my Complaint” were repeated in
this Court’s two previous opinions and therefore “are res
judicata.” (Id.) The doctrine of res judicata applies only when
there is a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving
the same parties and a subsequent suit is brought on the same
cause of action. Morgan v. Covington Twp., 648 F.3d 172, 177 (3d
Cir. 2011). Res judicata does not apply in this case. When a
court addresses a dismissal motion, its opinion repeats the
factual statements of a plaintiff’s complaint as if they were
true for purposes of determining whether the complaint states a
claim that can be tested in court. Such facts are neither
established nor adjudicated during the motion to dismiss; they
are merely assumed for the sake of conveying the plaintiff’s
allegations.
9
about cumulative claims. To the extent that Defendants suggest
the Court must dismiss claims against the police department
because the police department is somehow immune from suit under §
1983, they are mistaken. The Court, at most, needs to construe
the Complaint, which does not name the city as a defendant, as
bringing an action against the City of Vineland. See N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 40A:14-118 (providing that municipalities may establish
police forces as “an executive and enforcement function of
municipal government”).3
The Court assumes for present purposes, but does not hold,
that the Complaint states a claim for a violation of the Fourth
or Fourteenth Amendments. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47
F.3d 628, 636 (3d Cir. 1995) (“A false imprisonment claim under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 is based on the Fourteenth Amendment protection
against deprivation of liberty without due process of law” and
“is grounded in the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against
3
Defendants have not argued that the police are immune from
state-law claims based on immunity from N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:427.7. See Browne v. Kimball Med. Ctr., No. L-3054-02, 2005 WL
2510226, at *6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 12, 2005)
(recognizing absolute immunity for police officers involved in
the commitment of an individual so long as they “‘acted in good
faith and took reasonable steps’ in the assessment, detainment
and transportation of the individual in the course of obtaining
mental health treatment for the individual”). Therefore, the
Court need not consider the statutory immunity further. Of
course, a “state statute that creates immunity from suit under
state law does not define the scope of immunity from suit under
federal law.” Bates v. Paul Kimball Hosp., 346 F. App’x 883, 885
(3d Cir. 2009).
10
unreasonable seizures”).4 Under federal and New Jersey law, a
plaintiff states a claim for false imprisonment by demonstrating
(1) she was detained and (2) the detention was unlawful, but the
existence of probable cause defeats a claim of false
imprisonment. Tringali v. Twp. of Manalapan, No. 12-4597, 2013 WL
1701764, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2013).
Construing the facts of the Complaint and drawing all
reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff, the police received
an unsubstantiated, anonymous tip that Plaintiff had posted
suicidal thoughts on Facebook. Plaintiff contends that the
anonymous tip to the State Police and the relay of the
information to local police was “false,” arguably permitting the
inference that the alleged post on Facebook could not properly be
4
The Court also assumes, without holding, that Vineland EMS
acted under color of state law. The Court disagrees with
Defendants’ contention that the “Complaint contains no allegation
that the Vineland EMS acted in concert with any state actor.”
(Def. Mot. at 4.) It seems obvious from the Complaint that
Plaintiff alleges Vineland EMS acted in concert with the VPD to
deprive her of constitutional rights. (See Compl. ¶ 14 (stating
she was removed from her home by police officers and EMTs).)
The Court observes that EMTs have been found to be state
actors in other Third Circuit cases. See, e.g., Rivas v. City of
Passaic, 365 F.3d 181, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding two EMTs
were state actors). However, whether a private individual acts
under color of state law is a fact-specific inquiry. Groman, 47
F.3d at 638. The plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the issue
of whether an individual acts under color of state law. Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain factual allegations that
illuminate whether Vineland EMS was a state actor. As discussed
herein, because Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend her
Complaint, Plaintiff’s amended complaint should include facts
from which it may be reasonably inferred that Vineland EMS was a
state actor for purposes of § 1983.
11
characterized as suicidal or even that the post never existed.
Plaintiff asserts that she was calm, peaceful and gave no
indication that she was suicidal when the police and EMTs arrived
at her residence. The Complaint permits the inference that
Plaintiff declined medical attention by the EMTs. The Defendants
removed Plaintiff from her home against her will and took her to
a medical center in apparent contravention of state law. See N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 30:4-27.6 (stating that a “local law enforcement
officer shall take custody of a person and take the person
immediately and directly to a screening service if: a. On the
basis of personal observation, the law enforcement officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person is in need of
involuntary commitment to treatment[.]”). Although evidence may
exist to show that Defendants acted reasonably, the Complaint
itself does not appear to compel the conclusion that Defendants
acted reasonably in the circumstances.
The Court need not decide the issue, however, because, even
assuming the Vineland Defendants acted unreasonably and
unlawfully, Plaintiff fails to assert facts from which it may
reasonably be inferred that a municipal policy or custom caused
Plaintiff’s injury, and, therefore, Plaintiff fails to state a
claim under § 1983 and analogous state law against the Vineland
Defendants. It is well established that municipalities cannot be
12
liable under § 1983 on the basis of respondeat superior.5 See
B.S. v. Somerset Cnty., 704 F.3d 250, 261 n.21 (3d Cir. 2013)
(stating municipal liability under § 1983 cannot be based upon
respondeat superior and that, to state a claim, the plaintiff
must allege that the execution of a government policy or custom
inflicted the plaintiff’s injury); Kelly v. Borough of Carlisle,
622 F.3d 248, 263 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of claims
against a municipality for failure to identify a policy that
amounted to deliberate indifference of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights). Consequently, Plaintiff only states a
claim against the Vineland Defendants under § 1983 and analogous
state law if she alleges a municipal policy or custom caused her
injury. See Mulholland v. Cnty. of Berks, 706 F.3d 227, 237 (3d
Cir. 2013) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978)); see also Ingram v. Twp. of Deptford, No. 11-2710, 2012
WL 5984685, at *8 (D.N.J. Nov. 28, 2012) (stating that New Jersey
courts interpret the New Jersey Civil Rights Act as analogous to
§ 1983 and holding that the New Jersey Constitution does not
permit claims against municipalities on the basis of respondeat
superior) (citing C.P. ex rel. J.P. v. Twp. of Piscataway Bd. of
5
In other words, an employer or supervisor cannot be liable
for the actionable conduct of an employee or subordinate based
solely on the relationship between the employer and employee or
the supervisor and subordinate. To put this in terms used by
Plaintiff in her Complaint, there can be no vicarious liability
for municipalities under § 1983.
13
Educ., 681 A.2d 105, 112 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996), among
others).
Plaintiff does not contend that her Complaint identifies a
municipal policy or custom that caused her injury. Rather, she
suggests that articulating such a policy or custom without the
benefit of discovery is impossible. (Pl. Opp’n at 3.) To the
contrary, the Third Circuit requires a plaintiff to “identify a
custom or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy
was” in his or her complaint. McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d
636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009); see also Santiago v. Warminster Twp.,
629 F.3d 121, 135 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of claims
against a municipality because the amended complaint failed to
identify what action a municipal official took “that could fairly
be said to be policy”); Lapella v. City of Atl. City, No. 102454, 2012 WL 2952411, at *5 (D.N.J. July 18, 2012) (“Factual
allegations must give notice . . . ‘as to the alleged policy and
custom of the municipality as issue.’”) (citing Muller v. Bristol
Twp., No. 09-1086, 2009 WL 3028949, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 17,
2009)). Having failed to identify any municipal policy or custom,
Plaintiff fails to state a claim under § 1983 and analogous state
law. Therefore, all constitutional claims against the Vineland
Defendants must be dismissed.
Because this Court will permit Plaintiff to file one final
motion to amend the Complaint, see Catlett, 2013 WL 941059, at *6
14
n.8, the dismissal of the constitutional claims will be without
prejudice. Plaintiff may attempt to plead an unconstitutional
policy or custom in her proposed Amended Complaint, should she
choose to file one against the municipal defendants.
B. Whether Plaintiff states a claim under New Jersey law
In addition to the state-law claims analogous to § 1983,
which the Court dismissed above, Plaintiff alleges that both the
VPD and Vineland EMS were negligent in hiring, training and
supervising its officers and EMTs, respectively. (Compl. ¶¶ 30,
35.) Defendants argue that these claims must be dismissed because
Plaintiff has not pleaded the municipality knew or should have
known of the police officer’s “‘dangerous propensities and the
risk of injury he or she presents to the public.’” (Def. Mot. at
6, quoting Denis v. City of Newark, 704 A.2d 1003, 1008 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).) Defendants deny that any “police
officer acted in a way that risked injury to the Plaintiff. Even
if an officer acted in such a manner, Plaintiff has not alleged
that the City of Vineland or its Police Department knew or should
have know[n] of dangerous tendencies of any officer involved with
the incident in question.” (Def. Mot. at 6.) Regarding the EMTs,
Defendants likewise maintain that “there is no allegation of any
negligent or dangerous act on their part which could then support
a claim against Vineland EMS for negligent hiring.” (Id.)
Defendants move for dismissal. (Id.) Plaintiff does not directly
15
address these arguments in her opposition.
In New Jersey, an employer is liable for negligent hiring
when an employee commits a tort beyond the scope of her
employment and the employer “knew or had reason to know of the
particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous attributes of the
employee and could reasonably have foreseen that such qualities
created a risk of harm to other persons.” Denisco v. Boardwalk
Regency Corp., No. 10-3612, 2013 WL 179484, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan.
16, 2013) (citing Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (N.J.
1982)). The employee’s incompetence, unfitness or dangerous
characteristics also must proximately cause the injury. Id.
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege facts which permit an
inference that the VPD or Vineland EMS knew or had reason to know
of the particular unfitness, incompetence or dangerous attributes
of its employees, or that these characteristics caused
Plaintiff’s injuries. Therefore, to the extent the Complaint
alleges negligent hiring against the Vineland Defendants, those
claims are dismissed without prejudice to amending the Complaint.
The torts of negligent supervision and negligent training
both require that the plaintiff show a duty, breach of duty,
causation and injury. Id. at *4-*5 (citing Stroby v. Egg Harbor
Twp., 754 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (D.N.J. 2010) and Dixon v. CEC
Entm’t Inc., No. L-4087-04, 2008 WL 2986422, at *18 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Aug. 6, 2008)). At the very least, Plaintiff’s
16
Complaint is devoid of any facts that permit the inference that
the Vineland Defendants breached their duty to Plaintiff or that
such a breach caused Plaintiff’s injury. There are no facts that
suggest the Vineland Defendants were derelict in their duties to
train or supervise their officers and EMTs in this instance.
Therefore, the remaining state-law claims against the
Vineland Defendants will be dismissed without prejudice.
As previously discussed, Plaintiff may file one final motion
to amend the Complaint, along with a proposed Amended Complaint
curing the deficiencies noted in this Opinion, the Opinion of
March 11, 2013, and the Opinion of August 28, 2012. Plaintiff
must file the motion to amend within fourteen (14) days of the
date of entry of this Opinion and Order. See Catlett, 2013 WL
941059, at *6 n.8 (alerting Plaintiff to this order and
schedule). Plaintiff’s failure to cure deficiencies noted by this
Court will result in dismissal of those claims with prejudice.
V.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, Defendants’ motion to
dismiss will be granted without prejudice, and Plaintiff will be
granted leave to file a motion to amend consistent with this
Opinion. Any motion to amend must be accompanied by the proposed
Amended Complaint, as required in Local Civil Rule 7.1(f), and
17
the Amended Complaint serves to take the place of all previous
pleadings. An accompanying Order will be entered.
May 20, 2013
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge
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