LAWRENCE v. LANIGAN et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 9/26/2012. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
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DERICK D. LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
GARY LANIGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action No. 12-0393 (JBS)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
DERICK D. LAWRENCE, #855937A, Plaintiff Pro Se
South Woods State Prison
215 S. Burlington Rd.
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
Plaintiff, Derick D. Lawrence, a prisoner incarcerated at
South Woods State Prison, seeks to file a Complaint asserting
violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without prepayment
of the filing fee.
This Court will grant Plaintiff’s application
to proceed in forma pauperis.
Having screened Plaintiff’s
Complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A,
this Court will allow the First Amendment retaliation claim to
proceed against defendant Charles Warren and dismiss the
remaining federal claims and defendants.
I.
BACKGROUND
Derick D. Lawrence brings this Complaint for violation of
his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from his
incarceration at Southern State Correctional Facility (“SSCF”)
against the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of
Corrections (Gary Lanigan), Assistant Commissioner Rogers,
Administrator Charles Warren, Asst. Administrator Jalloh, Head
Disciplinary Officer Oszvart, Disciplinary Officer Norma Morales,
and several corrections officers at SSCF (Sgt. Santoro, officer
Berry, Captain St. Hill, Captain Sheppard, Lt. Bonds, Lt.
Walters, and “John Doe”).
He asserts the following facts.
On
June 14, 2011, while in the recreation yard at SSCF, Plaintiff
was paged, and Captain St. Hill escorted him to the dayroom of
his housing unit.
Plaintiff states that he was instructed to sit
with five other inmates, i.e., James Revell, Mike Hunter, Alonzo
Hammer, William Only, and Elvis Alicia.
Administrator Warren, in
the presence of Capt. St. Hill, Capt, Sheppard, Lt. Walters, Lt.
Bond, Sgt. Santoro, CO Berry, and several other unknown officers,
read the names of the six inmates from six Remedy Forms which
Warren held in his hands.
Lawrence asserts that Warren then
asked if anyone would like to speak about his Remedy Form, and
the following events occurred:
As soon as the plaintiff raised his hand and began to
speak by saying, “there is a ,” Admin. Warren said,
“lock him up.” Then Admin. Warren said, “you look like
you were going to say something, lock him up also.” He
was referring to inmate Only . . . . The plaintiff and
inmate Only were immediately taken to lock up and
placed in Pre-Hearing Detention by Admin. Warren.
(Dkt. 1 at 3.)
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Plaintiff alleges that the next day, he was charged with
violation of code 253 (engaging in or encouraging a group
demonstration) and code 306 (conduct which disrupts the orderly
running of the facility).
Disciplinary Hearing Officer Morales
allegedly adjourned the disciplinary hearings several times
because Plaintiff requested to confront Administrator Warren,
Sgt. Santoro, and CO Berry.
Plaintiff asserts that on July 18,
2011, substitute counsel
relayed the information from H.O. Morales, that if
plaintiff retracted his request for Confrontation with
Administrator Warren and Sergeant Santoro and C/O
Berry, that she, H.O. Morales, would downgrade his
charge from a *253 to a 304 Abusive Language. Again
the *306 charge was believed to have not been an issue
at this time. The substitute counsel informed the
plaintiff that the confrontation would not take place
that day and he would be postponed again. That was the
35th day in Pre-hearing-detention.
Because the plaintiff could not fathom being on Pre
Hearing Detention any longer he retracted his request
for confrontation. The H.O. found plaintiff guilty of
304 and gave him 15 days lock-up, 90 days
Administrative Segregation, and 60 days loss of
commutation time. However, she also found plaintiff
guilty of the *306 charge and gave him 15 days lock-up
for that, even after she stated that charge was no
longer an issue or in contention, in which she stated
on June 24th, 2011, and agreed that no code was called,
but that extra officers came with Administrator Warren.
Assistant Administrator Mr. Jalloh upheld the hearing
officer[’]s decision and his reason was that,
“encouraging other inmates to not follow new security
measures will not be tolerated.” That charge was
thrown out because nothing on the record supported that
actually took place, and the plaintiff was found guilty
of 304, Abusive Language, which had nothing to do with
anyone not following newly implemented security
measures . . .
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The Administrator could have taken those six (6)
inmates in many other rooms that were available in the
Gateway building in the Southern State Minimum Complex.
The plaintiff however asserts that, the administrator’s
agenda was to create a situation to make it seem as
though there was a group demonstration and then falsify
write-ups and reports to support the fabricated
incident that NEVER took place. This was to discourage
any other inmates from filing Administrative Remedies
concerning the movements in the Minimum Complex at
Southern State.
The plaintiff had never received any other write-ups.
He was a model inmate. He had been approved four (4)
weeks for transfer to the Assessment Center at either
Talbot Hall or Boe Robinson, to be transferred to a
Halfway House. It would have made no sense to raise
his voice or act disruptive towards the Administrator
at any time, but especially at that point in time, and
in the presence of Captains, Lieutenants, and Sergeants
in charge of Security.
(Dkt. 1 at 4.)
Plaintiff maintains that defendants inflicted Cruel and
Unusual Punishments by placing him in Pre-Hearing Detention and
falsifying reports to justify false charges, they retaliated, and
they violated his rights to due process and equal protection.
(Id. at 5-6.)
He seeks damages, attorney fees, and injunctive
relief placing a hearing officer at SSCF who will adhere to the
New Jersey Administrative Code.
II.
(Dkt. 1 at 6.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action
in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a
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prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or
entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court
determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), hammered the “final
nail-in-the-coffin” for the “no set of facts” standard set forth
in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),1 which was
previously applied to determine if a federal complaint stated a
claim.
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir.
2009).
To survive dismissal under Iqbal, “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.' ” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citation omitted).
Officials may not be held liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional misconduct of their
subordinates.
Id. at 677.
Rather, the facts set forth in the
complaint must show that each defendant, through the person’s own
1
The Conley court held that a district court was permitted
to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if “it
appear[ed] beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. at 45-46.
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individual actions, has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
Id.
This Court must disregard labels, conclusions,
legal arguments, and naked assertions.
Id. at 678-81.
The
plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a complaint pleads
facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it
stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
entitlement to relief,” and will be dismissed.
Id. at 678
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Bistrian v. Levi,
F.3d
, 2012 WL 4335958 (3d Cir.
Sept.
24, 2012); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d
Cir. 2009) (“a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief.
A complaint has to “show” such an
entitlement with its facts”) (emphasis supplied).
The Court is
mindful, however, that the sufficiency of this pro se pleading
must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff, even after
Iqbal.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007).
III.
A.
DISCUSSION
Federal Claims
Section 1983 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
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any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two
elements:
(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state
law.
A.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Segregated Confinement
Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his due process
and Eighth Amendment rights by holding him in Pre-Hearing Lock-Up
for 35 days and sanctioning him with 30 days in lock-up and 90
days in administrative segregation for disciplinary offenses.
A prisoner facing the loss of a legally cognizable liberty
interest following disciplinary proceedings has a due process
right to certain procedural protections.
418 U.S. 539, 566-67 (1974).
See Wolff v. McDonnell,
However, a prisoner is deprived of
a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause only when
the conditions of confinement “impose[] atypical and significant
hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.”
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
In
considering whether the conditions impose atypical and
significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of
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prison life, a court must consider “two factors:
1) the amount
of time the prisoner was placed into . . . segregation; and 2)
whether the conditions of his confinement . . . were
significantly more restrictive than those imposed upon other
inmates in solitary confinement.”
Shoats v. Horn, 213 F. 3d 140,
144 (3d Cir. 2000).
To state an Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement
claim, an inmate must allege facts plausibly showing (1)
objectively, his conditions were so severe that they deprived him
of an identifiable, basic human need, such as food, clothing,
shelter, sleep, recreation, medical care, and reasonable safety,
see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Helling v.
McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
305 (1991), and (2) defendant was deliberately indifferent to the
risk of harm to the plaintiff’s health or safety.
See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 837.
In this Complaint, Lawrence asserts that he was confined in
Pre-Hearing Detention for 35 days and, as a result of the
disciplinary sanctions, officials confined him in lock-up for 30
days and Administrative Segregation for 90 days, for a total of
155 days.
He did not present any facts to support a conclusion
that the conditions in segregated confinement “were significantly
more restrictive than those imposed upon other inmates in
solitary confinement.”
Shoats, 213 F. 3d at 144.
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Moreover, the
Third Circuit has held that time exceeding 155 days in
segregation does not constitute an “atypical and significant
hardship” under Sandin.
See Dunbar v. Barone, 2012 WL 2775024
(3d Cir. July 10, 2012) (18 months in segregation did not amount
to atypical and significant hardship); Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641, 654 (3d Cir. 2002) (seven months in disciplinary
confinement did not impose atypical and significant hardship);
Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 705-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (15 months
in segregation was not an atypical and significant hardship).
Because Lawrence’s allegations fail to establish that he was
deprived of a protected liberty interest, his due process claim
necessarily fails.
Nor do Lawrence’s allegations state an Eighth Amendment
claim because they do not show that:
(1) his conditions in
segregation were so severe that they deprived him of an
identifiable, basic human need, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834;
Helling, 509 U.S. at 32; Wilson, 501 U.S. at 305, (2) he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm, Farmer, 511 U.S. at 828, or (3) prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to his health or safety.
See
Johnson v. Chambers, 2012 WL 2393086 (3d Cir. June 26, 2012);
Williams v. Clancy, 449 Fed. App’x 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2011);
Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 338 (3d Cir. 2010).
Court will accordingly dismiss the Eighth Amendment and Due
This
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Process Claus claims based on his placement in segregation for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
B.
False Reports and Charges
Lawrence asserts that defendants violated his constitutional
rights by including false allegations in misconduct reports
However, the Third Circuit held in Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d
641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002), that, “so long as . . . procedural
requirements are satisfied, mere allegations of falsified
evidence or misconduct reports, without more, are not enough to
state a due process claim.”
In this case, Lawrence’s allegations
do not show any procedural due process violations.
Under these
circumstances, the false misconduct reports do not assert a due
process or other constitutional violation under § 1983.
See id.;
Thomas v. McCoy, 467 Fed. App’x 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2012).
C.
Retaliation
This Court construes Lawrence’s allegations as asserting
that prison officials submitted false misconduct reports and
confined him in segregation in retaliation for his submission of
an administrative remedy and his attempt to answer Administrator
Warren’s solicitation for comments concerning the remedy.
“Retaliating against a prisoner for the exercise of his
constitutional rights is unconstitutional.”
F.3d
Bistrian v. Levi,
, 2012 WL 4335958 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2012).
“Official
reprisal for protected speech ‘offends the Constitution [because]
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it threatens to inhibit exercise of the protected right.’”
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 256 (2006) (quoting Crawford-El
v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 n.10 (1998)).
“A prisoner alleging
retaliation must show (1) constitutionally protected conduct, (2)
an adverse action by prison officials sufficient to deter a
person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional
rights, and (3) a causal link between the exercise of his
constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him.”
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Whether the allegedly adverse action was “‘sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his
constitutional rights’ is an objective inquiry and ultimately a
question of fact.”
Bistrian, 2012 WL 4335958 at *19 (quoting
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 333).
To establish a causal link, the
prisoner must show that the “constitutionally protected conduct
was a ‘substantial or motivating factor’” in the decision to take
adverse action.
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333-34 (3d Cir.
2001) (quoting Mount Healthy City School Dist. B. of Ed. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
However, “once a prisoner has
demonstrated that his exercise of a constitutional right was a
substantial or motivating factor in the challenged decision, the
prison officials may still prevail by proving that they would
have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for
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reasons reasonably related to legitimate penological interest.”
Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334 see also Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152,
154 (3d Cir. 2002) (retaliation claim fails where prison
officials would have disciplined inmate for policy violations
notwithstanding his protected activity).
Lawrence’s allegations satisfy the first element, as he
alleges that he engaged in conduct protected by the First
Amendment, i.e., he submitted an administrative remedy request
and he verbally responded to Administrator Warren’s question
asking for comments about the request.
His allegations satisfy
the second element, as the time Lawrence spent in segregation
could be sufficient to deter a reasonably firm prisoner from
exercising his First Amendment rights.
See Bistrian at *19
(allegations of continued placement in administrative confinement
were sufficient to assert adverse action); Thomas v. McCoy, 467
Fed. App’x 94, 96 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[F]alse misconduct reports may
constitute a constitutional violation ‘when they are instituted
for the sole purpose of retaliating against an inmate for his . .
. exercise of a constitutional right’”) (quoting Smith, 293 F.3d
at 653); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 2000)
(“Although it is possible that in some cases placement in
administrative segregation would not deter a prisoner of ordinary
firmness from exercising his or her First Amendment rights, we
cannot say that such action can never amount to adverse action”).
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As to causation, Lawrence asserts that Administrator Warren
ordered subordinates to put Lawrence into segregation as a direct
result of Lawrence’s verbal response to Warren’s question about
his administrative remedy.
Lawrence has alleged a causal link
between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse
action taken by defendant Warren.
This Court will accordingly
allow the First Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against
defendant Charles Warren.
As to the other defendants, Lawrence generally alleges that
they prepared false misconduct reports, but he does not identify
the writer of any specific report, describe what each defendant
falsely stated in any report, or provide facts establishing a
causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and
adverse action taken by that defendant.
Because Lawrence makes
no non-conclusory allegations causally linking defendants other
than Warren to the alleged adverse action, the Complaint does not
sufficiently plead a retaliation claim against the remaining
defendants.
This Court will therefore dismiss the retaliation
claims against the remaining defendants without prejudice.
D.
Equal Protection
Lawrence contends that defendants were biased against him in
violation of his right to equal protection of the laws.
"The
Equal Protection Clause commands that no State shall 'deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
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laws.'"
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997).
"This is not
a command that all persons be treated alike but, rather, 'a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated
alike.'"
Artway v. Attorney General of New Jersey, 81 F.3d 1235,
1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
As Lawrence does not claim membership in a protected class,
he must allege arbitrary and intentional discrimination in order
to state and equal protection claim.
See Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000).
To state an equal protection
claim, Lawrence must assert facts showing:
“(1) the defendant[s]
treated him differently from others similarly situated, (2) the
defendant[s] did so intentionally, and (3) there was no rational
basis for the difference in treatment.”
Hill v. Borough of
Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Johnson v.
Horn, 150 F.3d 276, 284 (3d Cir. 1998).
Here, Lawrence does not assert facts showing that he
received different treatment from other similarly situated
individuals, that the defendants did so intentionally, or that
there was no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
Accordingly, he does not state an equal protection claim.
See
Brown v. Beard, 445 Fed. App’x 453, 455 (3d Cir. 2011); Hodges v.
Klein, 562 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1977).
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V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court will grant Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis, allow the First
Amendment retaliation claim to proceed against defendant Warren,
and dismiss the remaining federal claims and defendants.
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief Judge
Dated:
September 26
, 2012
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