PETERSON v. HOLMES et al

Filing 30

OPINION FILED. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/30/14. (js)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

BRADLEY C. PETERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER HOLMES, et al.,
Defendants.

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Civil No. 12-0865 (RBK)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Bradley C. Peterson, Pro Se
65655
P.O. Box 8200
Cranston, RI 02920

KUGLER, District Judge
On November 7, 2012, this Court filed an Opinion and Order
dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, without prejudice.
3, 4).

(ECF Nos.

Plaintiff was given the opportunity to file a motion to

reopen and an amended complaint. On December 11, 2012, Plaintiff
filed a motion to reopen his case (ECF No. 8) to address
deficiencies as stated in this Court’s November 7, 2012 Opinion.
Plaintiff’s motion to reopen included a document that this Court
construed as an amended complaint (ECF Nos. 8, 21).

Plaintiff has since filed three motions that remain
pending: two motions for summary judgment, and a motion for
default judgment.
This Court must now screen the submission construed as an
amended complaint to determine if Plaintiff’s claims should be
dismissed, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. For the following
reasons, the Court will dismiss the amended complaint.
Accordingly, the pending motions will be dismissed as moot.
BACKGROUND
In Plaintiff’s original complaint, he pled the following
facts, as set forth by this Court’s Opinion dismissing his
original complaint:
Plaintiff seeks to sue various employees of the
South Woods State Prison, including Administrator
Christopher Holmes, Assistant Administrator Judith
Gentile, Inmate Remedy Coordinator Valerie Farrow,
Education Department Supervisor Rosellen Muniah,
Supervisor of the Medical Department Lynn Kwap, Inmate
Property Inspector John Doe, Business Office Manager
Charlotte Chance, and Lieutenant Davidson. (Complt., ¶
4). He seeks monetary and other relief “for blatant
destruction of property, withholding of property,
denial of access to the courts, due process of
complaint forms, non-scheduling of routine reviews,
lack of medical treatment, degradation of strip
searches, etc.” (Complt. ¶ 7).
In his Statement of Claims, (Complt., ¶ 6),
Plaintiff states that:
• Upon arrival at South Woods State Prison on July
19, 2011, Plaintiff’s property (a radio) was
withheld until July 25, 2011. When he received his
2

radio, it was inoperable. Plaintiff surmises that
John Doe defendant tampered with the radio.
• Defendant Holmes denied Plaintiff’s request for
compensation or replacement of the radio, and
denied Plaintiff his television without valid
reason.
• Three to six times a week he was strip searched
with
“psychological degradation.”
• The Legal Department refused to allow Plaintiff
to make legal calls on a weekly basis. Plaintiff
was denied access to the inmate paralegal
assistance program, as well as access to law
books.
• Plaintiff’s inmate remedy forms were either
delayed or not processed from October to December
of 2011.
• Plaintiff did not receive adequate medical
treatment, and are “running a fraudulent medical
co-pay scam.” Plaintiff states that “Complaints
regarding ongoing pain are ignored until more
serious signs of ailments are present.” Plaintiff
states that he prefers an early diagnosis to treat
medical diseases, and that his health is
jeopardized.
• Plaintiff’s inmate account statements have been
withheld.
• Plaintiff states that Lt. Davidson denied him
property on January 22, 2011 for three days in an
attempt “to provoke and incite anger” causing him
emotional distress and sleep deprivation.
(Complt., ¶ 6).
On June 15, 2012, Plaintiff filed a letter
detailing his medical issues more fully (docket entry
2) and seeking to add William Briglia, D.O. at South
Woods State Prison, as a defendant. Plaintiff states
that he has made complaints about pain, and the doctor
is ignoring the seriousness of his claims, although
the facility deducts a co-payment from his account.
Plaintiff claims that his medication has been
discontinued, and he has been given a “placebo” that
is ineffective. (Letter, p. 2). He contends that he
has records demonstrating that he is at risk for
chronic kidney disease, increased risk for diabetes,
3

and high cholesterol. He argues that Dr. Briglia is
ignoring his health issues, and claiming Plaintiff
“has nothing to worry about.” (Letter, p. 3).

(Opinion, ECF No. 3 at pp. 2-3).
This Court dismissed the claims, finding that Plaintiff did
not plead an Eighth Amendment medical care claim, as he did not
plead deliberate indifference, but rather dissatisfaction with
treatment; Plaintiff’s property claim did not violate the
Constitution as there was a post-deprivation remedy available to
Plaintiff; Plaintiff’s legal claim did not demonstrate a
violation of the Constitution, as Plaintiff had not shown
“actual injury” and because even the right to make legal calls
is not unlimited; Plaintiff’s complaint about grievances did not
violate either the First Amendment or the Due Process Clause;
and finally, that Plaintiff’s strip search claim did not
implicate the Fourth Amendment as pled. (Opinion, ECF No. 3).
In his submission intending to cure these deficiencies,
Plaintiff agrees with this Court’s Opinion concerning legal
calls and grievances. Concerning his medical care claim,
Plaintiff again seeks to add Dr. Briglia as a defendant, and
asks this Court to order him to be sent to an outside medical
facility for treatment, as the doctors at the prison failed to
come up with a diagnosis to the source of his pain. However, he
has been prescribed pain medications.
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As to the property claims, Plaintiff continues to argue
that his property is being unlawfully withheld. He asks for
transfer, so that he can possess all of his property. This Court
notes that Plaintiff has since been transferred to Rhode Island.
Finally, as to his strip search claims, Plaintiff argues
that, in fact, his strip searches do violate the Constitution
because he is strip searched “outside of [his] cell in view of
the entire unit of inmates.” (Am. Complt., ECF No. 8 at p. 3).

DISCUSSION
1. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§

801-810,

110

Stat.

1321-66

to

1321-77

(April

26,

1996)

(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e.

The

PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant

who

is

immune

from

such

relief.

This

action

is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
5

1915(e)

and

§

1915A

because

Plaintiff

is

a

prisoner

and

is

proceeding as an indigent.
According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, “a pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
screening

for

failure

to

state

a

To survive sua sponte

claim, 1

the

complaint

must

allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible.
(3d

Cir.

2009)

plausibility
allows

the

Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210

(citation

when
court

the
to

omitted).

plaintiff
draw

the

“A

pleads

claim

factual

reasonable

Partners,

(quoting

Iqbal,

Inc.,

708

556

U.S.

F.3d
at

470,
678).

483

n.17

Moreover,

facial

content

inference

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Inv.

has

that

that

the

Belmont v. MB
(3d

Cir.

while

2012)

pro

se

pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”

“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure
to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is
the same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F.
App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)); Mitchell v. Beard, 492 F. App’x
230, 232 (3d Cir. 2012) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1));
Courteau v. United States, 287 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).
1

6

Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
2.

Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.

See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
3.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint Fails to State a Claim.
For the reasons set forth in this Court’s Opinion filed on

November 7, 2012, Plaintiff’s submission construed as an amended
complaint does not cure the deficiencies of his original
complaint, in order to allow the case to proceed.
As noted, Plaintiff has not pled an Eighth Amendment
violation as to his medical claim. He does not sufficiently
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plead under the mandates of Iqbal that he suffers from a serious
medical need; rather, he continues to cite “pain.” Further, he
has been seen by doctors for this pain and prescribed
painkillers. His allegations that the defendants refuse to
provide him with treatment are now moot, as Plaintiff has been
transferred to a new facility, and these defendants no longer
control his medical treatment. As such, this Court will not
allow this claim to proceed.
Plaintiff’s property claim, likewise, will not proceed past
sua sponte screening based on facts provided in the construed
amended complaint. As noted in this Court’s prior Opinion, it is
well-established that “an unauthorized deprivation of property
by a state actor, whether intentional or negligent, does not
constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available.” (Opinion, ECF No.
3 at p. 10)(citations omitted).
Finally, as to Plaintiff’s strip search claim, Plaintiff
attempts to correct the deficiency in his original complaint by
noting that the strip searches took place in view of other
inmates, for purposes of humiliation and psychological
degradation (Am. Complt., ECF No. 8 at p. 3). However, courts
have held that strip searches of prisoners in the presence of
8

other inmates and staff is not constitutionally defective,
especially in light of legitimate security concerns. See Baker
v. Reitz, 2012 WL 6055591 at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 6,
2012)(dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim under §
1915 where Plaintiff did not allege that search “was conducted
for an illegitimate or unjustified purpose” and citing Elliot v.
Lynn, 38 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1117
(1995) (visual body cavity search conducted in presence of other
inmates and correctional officers reasonable in context of
legitimate security concerns); Franklin v. Lockhart, 883 F.2d
654 (8th Cir. 1989) (legitimate security concerns justified
conducting strip searches in view of other inmates);
Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1988) (strip
searches conducted in hallway reasonable in light of legitimate
security and safety considerations)).
Plaintiff’s construed amended complaint asserts vague legal
conclusions that the strip searches conducted against him were
unfair treatment for which there was “no valid reason.” Since
strip searches are not unconstitutional, per se, even without
probable cause (if conducted in a reasonable manner), see, e.g.,
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), and because Plaintiff has
not plead that the searches were conducted unreasonably as to
him because searches conducted in view of others are not
9

necessarily unreasonable, see supra, Plaintiff’s claim will not
proceed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons discussed in
this Court’s Opinion filed November 7, 2012, Plaintiff’s amended
complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. As such, Plaintiff’s pending
motions for summary judgment and default (ECF Nos. 23, 24, 29)
will be dismissed as moot.
An appropriate Order follows.

s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
Dated:

June 30, 2014

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