DAVID v. MILLER et al

Filing 63

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 12/17/2012. (TH, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. Nos. 10, 12, 31, 38, 41, 62 )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
FREEMAN ERICK DAVID,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civil No. 12-969 (RBK/KMW)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
DON MILLER, et al.
:
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Freeman Erick David (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against more than twenty
defendants alleging, among other things, that these persons deprived him of his civil rights under
color of law in violation of criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006). Currently before the Court
are motions to dismiss filed by ten Defendants (Doc. Nos. 10, 12, 31, 41, and 62) and one motion
for summary judgment filed by Defendant Michael Legatie 1 (Doc. No. 38). For the reasons
stated below, all of Defendants’ motions will be granted.
I.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2
Plaintiff was arrested on March 23, 2011 by police officers Defendants Gibison,

Wariwanchik, and Efelis. Amended Compl. ¶ 6. He was incarcerated at the Salem County
Correctional Facility in Woodstown, NJ from March 23 until May 26, 2011. Id.

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Plaintiff’s Complaint spells Defendant’s name “Legetti” or “Legeti.” Defendant’s own filings, however, spell the
name “Legatie.” The Court will accept the Defendant’s spelling and will use it throughout this opinion.
2
For purposes of deciding a defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations set forth
in a plaintiff’s complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

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Thereafter, on January 25th, 2012, Plaintiff was driving on a New Jersey highway when
he was stopped by state patrolman Defendant Legatie. Id. at ¶ 3. Defendant Legatie arrested
Plaintiff pursuant to a bench warrant that had been issued by Defendant Farrell, a New Jersey
Superior Court Judge. Legatie Statement of Undisputed Mat. Facts ¶¶ 4-5.
At times unspecified, Plaintiff filed a “Demand for Proof of Jurisdiction” with the New
Jersey Superior Court. Amended Compl. ¶ 2. In addition, he filed an “Oath and Affirmation to
the sovereign people on this land known as North America and all fifty united states” with the
same court. Id. at ¶ 2. Finally, he filed an “Order for Freedom” with Defendant Charles Miller,
Sheriff for Salem County. Id. at ¶ 4. None of these filings garnered a response.
On February 16, 2012, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, alleging that Defendants had
deprived him of his civil rights in violation of the federal criminal statute 18 U.S.C. § 242
(2006). 3 The instant motions to dismiss and for summary judgment followed, the first being
filed by Defendant Charles Miller on March 19, 2012 (Doc. No. 10) and the last by Defendant
Lisa Cummings on November 1, 2012 (Doc. No. 62).
II.

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

A.

Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Where, as here, a complaining party comes to
this Court pro se, the Court must construe the complaint liberally in that plaintiff’s favor. Haines
v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir.1992). In
such cases, the Court must “accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all

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Of course, a Plaintiff may not generally rely on a criminal statute as a basis for asserting a civil liability claim.
However, recognizing its duty to construe a pro se complaint liberally in the plaintiff’s favor, Haines v. Kerner, 404
U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), the Court will consider each of his claims as if they were asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006), which creates a federal civil cause of action for deprivation of a person’s civil rights under color of state law.

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reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff.” Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997). Seen in
this light, a complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009);
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second,
the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). 4 Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679. A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible
rather than plausible. Id.
i. Defendant Charles Miller (Doc. No. 10)
Defendant Charles Miller acknowledges that as Sheriff of Salem County, he held Plaintiff
in custody at the county correctional facility starting January 25, 2012. Def. Miller’s Br. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss 6 (Doc. No. 10). But, Defendant continues, he took such action
pursuant to a court order issued by Defendant Judge Farrell. Id. Under these circumstances, the
Court is inclined to conclude that Defendant Charles Miller is entitled to the sort of quasi-judicial

4

Even under the liberal pleading standards afforded a pro se plaintiff, the Court need not credit such a party’s “bald
assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Haines, 404 U.S. at 520-21; Day, 969 F.2d at 42.

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absolute immunity from suit that this and other Circuits have accorded officials acting pursuant
to a facially valid court order. See Bickel v. Disantis, No. 11-3819, 2012 WL 5279245 (3d Cir.
Oct. 26, 2012) (finding no basis to challenge magistrate judge’s finding that court official
enjoyed absolute immunity from suit when his complained of actions were taken pursuant to a
facially valid court order) (citing Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003); see
generally Patterson v. Von Riesen, 999 F.2d 1235, 1240 (8th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that courts
have consistently found officials are entitled to absolute immunity for actions taken to execute a
facially valid court order) (citing Rogers v. Bruntrager, 841 F.2d 853 (8th Cir.1988) (court
clerk); Tymiak v. Omodt, 676 F.2d 306, 308 (8th Cir.1982) (sheriff); Valdez v. City & County of
Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1290 (10th Cir.1989) (sheriffs); Coverdell v. Department of Social &
Health Servs., 834 F.2d 758, 764-65 (9th Cir.1987); Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d
1228, 1238-40 (7th Cir.1986); Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.1981) (court clerk);
Slotnick v. Garfinkle, 632 F.2d 163, 166 (1st Cir.1980) (sheriff); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco
Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1976) (receiver); Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747,
750 (3d Cir.1976) (official); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 206 & n. 6 (3d Cir.1975) (police
officers); Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir.1973) (sheriff and jailor); Lockhart v.
Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941, 90 S.Ct. 378, 24 L.Ed.2d 244
(1969) (public official)). Thus, because he held Plaintiff in the Salem County jail pursuant to
Defendant Judge Farrell’s facially valid bench warrant, Defendant Charles Miller is absolutely
immune from civil liability arising out of this act. Accordingly, his motion to dismiss will be
granted.
ii. Tom DeSimone (Doc. No. 12)
Defendant DeSimone was the Salem County prosecutor assigned to prosecute an

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indictment that had been returned against Plaintiff on May 18, 2011. Def. DeSimone’s Br. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss 4. It was Plaintiff’s failure to show up to the January 23, 2012
hearing on the indictment that caused Defendant Judge Farrell to issue the bench warrant that
eventually resulted in Plaintiff’s arrest on January 25, 2012 by Defendant officer Legatie.
Plaintiff’s sole allegation concerning Defendant DeSimone was that he “violated [Plaintiff’s]
unalienable Right to witness the . . . [January 23] proceeding . . . by threatening [Plaintiff’s]
three (3) witnesses . . . with incarceration.” Compl. ¶ 7.
Even accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court is bound to do on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s claim cannot proceed because Defendant DeSimone was acting in
his prosecutorial capacity when he encountered Plaintiff’s witnesses. That is, he interacted with
them at the Salem County courthouse as part of his preparation for the hearing on the indictment
against Plaintiff. Thus, he is entitled to absolute immunity from a suit for money damages based
on these actions. See Imber v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-27 (1976) (prosecutor immune from
section 1983 suit for acts taken in the course of his prosecutorial duties). 5 Accordingly,
Defendant DeSimone’s motion to dismiss will be granted.
iii.

Timothy Farrell, Don Miller, Scott Volk (Doc. No. 31)

Defendant Timothy Farrell is a judge on the New Jersey Superior Court for Salem
County who heard a criminal case involving Plaintiff. Defs. Farrell, Miller, Volk’s Br. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss 9. Defendants Don Miller and Scott Volk are both employees of the
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Criminal Part, Salem county. Id. at 1.
5

It bears mention that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Imbler specifically notes that absolute prosecutorial immunity
will not extend to criminal prosecutions against public officials for willful deprivations of constitutional rights.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. In this context, the Court specifically mentions 18 U.S.C. § 242, the precise statute that
Plaintiff invokes in his Complaint. However, as the Court noted earlier, it is clear that Plaintiff is not privileged to
rely on a criminal statute as a basis for maintaining a civil suit seeking money damages against Defendant
DeSimone and others. Thus, Plaintiff cannot rely on the dictum of Imbler to get around the absolute immunity that a
prosecutor enjoys against suits for money damages arising out of acts the prosecutor took in his prosecutorial
capacity.

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Nowhere in the eight paragraphs of his complaint does Plaintiff make mention of
Defendants Timothy Farrell, Don Miller, or Scott Volk. This alone should suffice to grant these
Defendants’ joint motion to dismiss. Alternatively, to the extent that Plaintiff’s action against
Defendant Farrell concerns any of the rulings Judge Farrell made on the New Jersey Superior
Court for Salem County, Judge Farrell is absolutely immune from a private suit for money
damages. See, e.g., Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (citing “a long line of [Supreme Court]
precedents acknowledge[ing] that, generally, a judge is immune from a suit for money
damages”). Finally, for the reasons stated above in subsection i, to the extent that Defendants
Miller and Volk took action pursuant to a facially valid court order that resulted in some sort of
alleged harm to Plaintiff, both Miller and Volk are entitled to quasi-judicial absolute immunity
from suit for money damages. See Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003).
iv.

Allen Cummings, Jason Efelis, Michael Gibison, John Jordan, Harry
Wariwanchik (Doc. No. 41)

Defendants Michael Gibison, Jason Efelis, and Harry Wariwanchik are police officers
who arrested Plaintiff on March 23, 2011. Compl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff states that his “Rights were
violated” when these officers “forcibly remov[ed]” him from his automobile. Id. Without any
other allegations, however, Plaintiff has failed to state sufficient facts that give rise to a plausible
claim that he suffered any violation of his constitutional rights. See Iqbal 556 U.S. at 677.
Accordingly, these Defendant’s motions to dismiss will be granted.
Defendant Allen Cummings is also a police officer, while Defendant John Jordan is a
judge. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contain a single factual allegation describing what conduct

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either of these persons engaged in that in any way affected Plaintiff. 6 Thus, their motions to
dismiss will be granted.
v.

Lisa Cummings, Kara Efelis, Stephanie Gibison, Lois Jordan (Doc. No. 62)

Defendants Lisa Cummings, Kara Efelis, Stephanie Gibison are the wives of the police
officers Allen Cummings, Jason Efelis, and Michael Gibison. Def. L. Cummings et al.’s Br. in
Support of Mot. to Dismiss 1. Defendant Lois Jordan is the wife of Defendant Judge John
Jordan. Id. Plaintiff’s complaint makes no factual allegations against any of these four
defendants. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants will be dismissed.
B. Motion for Summary Judgment
Finally, Defendant Michael Legatie has moved for summary judgment in this matter.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact
exists only if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When the Court weighs the evidence
presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
The burden of establishing the nonexistence of a “genuine issue” is on the party moving
for summary judgment. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1080 (3d Cir.
1996). The moving party may satisfy its burden either by “produc[ing] evidence showing the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact” or by ‘showing’ – that is, pointing out to the district

6

In addition, to the extent that Plaintiff alleged facts involving actions Defendant Jordan took in his judicial
capacity, Defendant Jordan would be absolutely immune from a private suit for money damages. See Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991).

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court – that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 325.
Once the moving party satisfies this initial burden, the nonmoving party must “set out
specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). To do so, the nonmoving
party must “do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Rather, to
survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must “make a showing sufficient to establish
the existence of [every] element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Furthermore, “[w]hen opposing summary
judgment, the nonmovant may not rest upon mere allegations, but rather must ‘identify those
facts of record which would contradict the facts identified by the movant.’” Corliss v. Varner,
247 Fed. Appx. 353, 354 (3d Cir. Sept. 17, 2007) (quoting Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. v.
Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002)).
In deciding the merits of a party’s motion for summary judgment, the court’s role is not
to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province
of the factfinder, not the district court. BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363
(3d Cir. 1992).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that, as he was driving on New Jersey highways, he
was detained Defendant Legatie. Compl. ¶ 3. Defendant Legatie responds that he did in fact
stop Plaintiff for an unrelated traffic violation as he was driving along Interstate 295 in New
Jersey on January 23, 2012. Def.’s Br. in Support of Mot. for Summary Judgment 1. He further
explains that upon examining the National Crime Information Center database, he learned that

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there was an outstanding bench warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest. Id. Therefore, Defendant Legatie
arrested Plaintiff. Id.
Again, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to describe any proper legal basis
for civil relief against Defendant Legatie and others. However, in his response to Defendant’s
summary judgment motion, Plaintiff does make reference to a federal statute which could
conceivably provide a basis for a valid claim. Specifically, he alleges that Defendant Legatie
violated 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) (2006), involving a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights.
However, for the same reasons stated above in subsection II.A.i, Defendant Legatie
enjoys absolute immunity in this case. The conduct of which Plaintiff complains arose out of
Defendant Legatie’s official duties performed pursuant to a facially valid court order: that is, he
detained Plaintiff because a judge had issued a warrant for his arrest. Under these circumstances,
Defendant Legatie’s motion for summary judgment must be granted because he is immune from
suit. See Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003).
III.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant all of Defendants’ pending motions to

dismiss (Doc. Nos. 10, 12, 31, 41, and 62) as well as Defendant Legatie’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. No. 38). The Court will issue an appropriate order.

Dated:

12/17/2012

/s/ Robert B. Kugler
_
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge

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