FREEMAN v. MCLAUGHLIN et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/5/2012. (dmr)(n.m.)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AKEEM FREEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
THERESA MCLAUGHLIN, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 12-1044 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiff pro se
Akeem Freeman
259464
Camden County Jail
P.O. Box 90431
Camden, NJ 08102
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Akeem Freeman, a pre-trial detainee confined at
Camden County Jail in Camden New Jersey, brings this action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his
constitutional rights.
Plaintiff has paid the filing fee.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who
is immune from such relief.
I.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s
Complaint and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.
Plaintiff states that he is accused of alleged sexual assault
which occurred on October 7, 2007.
He states that on December
29, 2011, while incarcerated at the Camden County Jail, he
received discovery related to his criminal matter.
Plaintiff
states that the sexual assault examination report from October 7,
2007 was “negatively altered to disruped [sic] or influene [sic]
the decisions of plaintiff Freeman’s criminal case.”
¶ 3.
Complaint,
Plaintiff states that the date on the chain of custody form
for the medical report provided by Francina Pendergrass, a
“S.A.N.E.” (Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner) nurse who works with
the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office indicates that the exchange
of evidence occurred on October 31, 2007, but that date differed
from the date of November 1, 2007, which was entered on the chain
of custody form received by Ava Berry from the Camden City Police
Department.
Plaintiff further states that the “S.A.N.E.” nurse Theresa
McLaughlin who conducted the examination was missing from the
chain of custody forms.
Plaintiff asserts that “the sexual
assault report in question was altered by Theresa McLaughlin for
Kelly Testa the prosecutor, prosecuting Plaintiff Freeman during
his criminal case.”
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Plaintiff does not indicate that his criminal matter has
reached a conclusion.1
Plaintiff’s requested relief includes (1)
declaration that the acts alleged in the Complaint violate his
constitutional rights, (2) injunctive relief “ordering all
defendants to cease all negatively and malicious actions towards
peaple [sic] during there [sic] criminal cases,” (3) compensatory
damages in the amount of $50,000 against each defendant for
violation of his constitutional rights, (4) compensatory damages
in the amount of $50,000 against each defendant for “abuse of
process,” (5) punitive damages in the amount of $50,000 against
each defendant, (6) punitive damages in the amount of $50,000 for
“the violations of all rights, constitutional and other,” (7) a
“jury trial on all issues triable by jury,” and (8) any
additional relief deemed proper by this Court.
II.
A.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104–134, §§
801–810, 110 Stat. 1321–66 to 1321–77 (April 26, 1996), requires
a district court to review a complaint in a civil action in which
a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis or seeks redress
against a governmental employee or entity.
The Court is required
to identify cognizable claims and to sua sponte dismiss any claim
1
He identifies himself as a pretrial detainee on page 2 of
the Complaint.
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that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
This action is subject to sua sponte
screening for dismissal under 1915A.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
The Supreme Court refined the standard for summary dismissal
of a complaint that fails to state a claim in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
The Court examined Rule 8(a)(2) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a complaint
must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
8(a)(2).
Fed. R. Civ. P.
Citing its opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007) for the proposition that “[a] pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do,’” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at
1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555), the Supreme Court held
that, to prevent a summary dismissal, a civil complaint must now
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible.
This then “allows the court to draw the
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reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.”
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009)(citing Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948).
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Iqbal emphasizes that a
plaintiff must demonstrate that the allegations of his complaint
are plausible.
See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949–50.
See also
Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n.3; Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc.,
643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011).
“A complaint must do more than
allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief.
‘show’ such an entitlement with its facts.”
A complaint has to
Fowler, 578 F.3d at
211 (citing Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234–35
(3d Cir. 2008)).
B.
Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
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alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir.
1994); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
III.
DISCUSSION
As Plaintiff is currently a pretrial detainee, presumably in
criminal proceedings in the state court, this Court must abstain
from ruling on Plaintiff’s claims of constitutional violations.
In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal
courts may not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings,
even if there is an allegation of a constitutional violation and
even though all jurisdictional and justiciability requirements
are met.
See 401 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1971).
In subsequent cases,
the Court has adopted the application of Younger to claims for
declaratory and injunctive relief.
See Samuels v. Mackell, 401
U.S. 66 (1971) (holding that the principles of Younger are fully
applicable to requests for declaratory relief).
Further, while
the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the application of Younger
to monetary relief, this Circuit applies the Younger abstention
to bar damage suits.
See Gwynedd Properties v. Lower Gwynedd
Township, 970 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1992); Williams v. Hepting, 844
F.2d 138 (3d Cir. 1988).
Abstention is appropriate only absent a showing of bad faith
prosecution, harassment, or a patently unconstitutional rule.
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The specific elements of the Younger abstention are: “(1) there
are ongoing state proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2)
the state proceedings implicate important state interests; and
(3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims.”
1989).
Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint indicates that he is facing a
criminal prosecution, which implicates an important state
interest (i.e., punishing criminal conduct), and New Jersey state
courts offer Plaintiff an adequate opportunity to raise his
federal claims, if any.
Further, if Plaintiff is convicted of these charges, he
cannot challenge the fact or duration of his confinement by means
of an action under § 1983; rather he must exhaust his state
remedies and then, if appropriate, file a federal habeas
application.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
Nor can
he seek relief under § 1983 if this Court’s adjudication would
call into question the validity of his criminal conviction,
unless his conviction first has been overturned on appeal or in
state or federal collateral proceedings.
U.S. 477 (1994).
Heck v. Humphrey, 512
Therefore, Plaintiff’s challenge to any pending
criminal charges arising out of the alleged facts must be
dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim.
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IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Complaint will be
dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
An
appropriate order follows.
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: November 5, 2012
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