MCKNIGHT v. TAYLOR et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 11/20/2012. (bdk, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
LOUIS S. MCKNIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC TAYLOR, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 12-1684 (RMB)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
LOUIS S. MCKNIGHT, #243978, Plaintiff Pro Se
Camden County Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 90431
Camden, NJ 08103
BUMB, District Judge:
Plaintiff, Louis S. McKnight, a prisoner incarcerated at
Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), seeks to file a
Complaint asserting violation of his rights under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 without prepayment of the filing fee.
This Court will grant
Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis.
Having
screened Plaintiff’s Complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A, this Court will dismiss the federal
claims raised in the Complaint, without prejudice to the filing
of an amended complaint, and decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND
Louis S. McKnight brings this Complaint for violation of his
constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Warden
of CCCF (Eric Taylor) and two Deputy Wardens (Anthony Pizarro and
Christopher Fosler).
He asserts the following facts in the body
of the Complaint:
Health issues, infection of boils going around, dietary
issues, prep[a]r[a]tions of serv[]ing foods, over
crowd[e]dness, at long periods of time, three to fo[u]r
people sleeping on the floor, no re[crea]tion in gym[,]
broken ele[]vators often going and coming back and
forth to court. Buying and consumers act, selling
products five times the[i]r retail prices, one bathroom
for eig[h]ty to 100 inmates in the every day reck area.
*
*
*
From 10/19/10 until[] the present time these issues
have still not been taken care of. The officers still
have the need to violate our rights when the[re] is a
administr[]ative search of cells, to strip search
inmates before going back in cells here in this
facility.
(Dkt. 1 at 3, 5.)
Two documents are attached to the Complaint.
Plaintiff
attached a memorandum to the “Inmate Population” dated March 21,
2011, from Karen Taylor, Lieutenant in the Camden County
Department of Corrections, regarding “Lock In/Lock Out Directive
(Grievance Response).”
(Dkt. 1 at 7.)
This memorandum states,
in relevant part:
Effective today, the Camden County Correctional
Facility implemented the Lock In/Lock Out directive
that mandates cell doors to be secured. The facility
will provide maximum lock-out time for its inmates and
2
will lock them in only when necessary to accomplish
facility business and during sleeping . . . . At each
interval during which inmate[s] are permitted to lockout (or lock-in) [] their cells, those inmates who wish
to do so, may return to their cells to retrieve
personal items and shall not be required to lock-in
their cells. Any inmate who chooses to remain in
his/her cell during lock-out periods shall be permitted
to do so.
Inmates shall have access to showers, toilets and
washbasins twenty four hours per day. Officers shall
permit access to bathroom facilities . . . . Inmates
will receive laundry, barbering, and hair care
services, and will be issued and exchanged clothing,
bedding, and linen on the same basis prior to the
implementation of the directive. Recreational
programs, visits, and religious activities will
continue as scheduled[;] however[,] it’s an individual
responsibility to avail yourself to these activities.
Medical care and food services shall be provided in
accordance to standards.
Inmates shall not be confined to their cells except
during the following periods:
a. At night during sleeping hours; and
b. During the daytime for conducting facility business,
which can only be accomplished while inmates, are
locked in their cells.
Security devices such as cell doors when left
unsecure[d] create an atmosphere of disorder promoting
aggression, theft, violent behavior, and fighting.
Neutralizing such attitudes will generate stability and
order.
(Dkt. 1 at 7.)
The second attachment is a five-page handwritten letter
dated May 26, 2011.
(Dkt. 1 at 8.)
The sender’s address at the
top of the first page is Louis S. McKnight, CCCF.
Id.
The
reference line reads “Class Action Suit Against Camden County
Correctional Facility,” and the salutation reads “Dear Sir/Madam
3
Attorney.”
Id.
The closing on the fifth page reads “Sincerely
Yours, Louis S. McKnight.”
Id. at 12.
The two pages following
the letter contain the signatures (with a number next to each
signature) of 119 persons, who are presumably inmates at CCCF.
Id. at 13-14.
The body of the letter concerns a request “that
your law firm represent our case before the honorable court.”
Id. at 8.
The letter states that the reasons for this suit are:
Preparation of the food and serving[] (3) regular
meal(s) of 1800 to 3000 [] diets. Not having the
proper dietary aide to make sure of the proper servings
seasoning ets. The housing conditions having three to
four inmates to a two man cell sleeping on the floor,
unsanitary serving conditions, meals being served in
foul trays, food being placed on the floor in (7) seven
day lock-in. With no sanitary tops to the trays. Tray
servers are not properly dress[ed] to serve food, no
face [illegible], no hairnets, no hand sanitizer
whatsoever. Health reasons, the showers have black
mol[d] on the walls, the drinking water that comes out
of one’s sink in the cells often comes out brown from
rusted or backed up septic pumps. Inmates are often
put in population with boils and other infections.
Also the elevators are unsafe, or is always broken
down, including that the Camden County Correctional
Facility has taken away its law library, so the inmates
cannot go research their case [to] prepare for trial or
file for prose on their own behalf, including the fact
that Camden County Correctional Facility also close[d]
sown its recreation gym[nasium] . . . . I am asking
Sir/Madam law firm and other agenc[ies] to look upon
this injustice, because we are not in prison, which is
to say we haven’t been found guilty of our suspicions .
. . . I live on a tier where there is eighty nine
inmates and every day more are brought in. The tier
only houses fifth two. The rest are forced to lay on
the floor . . . . Also there is only one toilet for
all the inmates to use. Upon walking in one would be
forced to hold their breath, for of the stench . . . .
Our bails are so high that it is impossible for one to
get out of jail. Now due to the living conditions they
have no heart to seek justice . . . . We are force[d]
4
to either lock in[] or be locked out the cells in the
day room. To make matters worse one would ha[ve] to[]
carr[y] any and everything he needs, like soap, shower
shoes, deodorant, tooth paste, tooth brush, underwear,
t-shirt, sox, lotion, even snacks off of commissary,
ID’s just in case an[] inmate gets medication. All of
these items are carrie[d] in clear plastic trash bags
like we are homeless . . . . The commissary prices
[are] jacked up so high, the items that are on their
list are twice and then some, against the code of
retail and consumers guidelines . . . . Ex-Senator
Kristy Whitteny husband owns the company name Keefe
Commissary Net Work Sales. Every institution in the
State of New Jersey gets their products from this exSenator’s husband . . . We the inmates that have
signed this petition of the Camden County Facility
seek[] to file a civil law suit[] against the Camden
County Correctional Facility.
(Dkt. 1 at 8-12.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (?PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996),
requires a District Court to screen a complaint in a civil action
in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis or a
prisoner is seeking redress against a government employee or
entity, and to sua sponte dismiss any claim if the Court
determines that it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
To survive dismissal “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face.’ A claim has facial plausibility
5
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.'”
(2009) (citation omitted).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
Officials may not be held liable
under § 1983 for the unconstitutional misconduct of their
subordinates.
Id. at 677.
Rather, the facts set forth in the
complaint must show that each defendant, through the person’s own
individual actions, has violated the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
Id.
The plausibility standard “asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.
Where a
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a
defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief,” and will
be dismissed.
Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bistrian v. Levy,
F.3d
, 2012 WL
4335958 *8 (3d Cir. Sept. 24, 2012) (“The touchstone of the
pleading standard is plausibility”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210-211 (3d Cir. 2009) (“a complaint must do more
than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief.
A complaint
has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts”) (emphasis
supplied).
The Court is mindful, however, that the sufficiency
of this pro se pleading must be construed liberally in favor of
the plaintiff, even after Iqbal.
See Erickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 (2007).
6
III.
DISCUSSION
Section 1983 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides
in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory . . . subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two
elements:
(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United
States, and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state
law.
A.
See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Conditions of Confinement
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
punishment of a pretrial detainee prior to an adjudication of
guilt in accordance with due process of law.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
See Bell v.
The maintenance of security,
internal order, and discipline are essential goals which at times
require “limitation or retraction of . . . retained
constitutional rights.”
Bell, 411 U.S. at 546.
“Restraints that
are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in
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maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute
unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and
are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had
he been released while awaiting trial.”
Id. at 540.
“In
assessing whether the conditions are reasonably related to the
assigned purposes, [a court] must further inquire as to whether
these conditions cause [inmates] to endure [such] genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, that the
adverse conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes
assigned to them.”
Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d at 159 (quoting
Union County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 713 F.2d 984, 992 (3d Cir.
1983)).
The Third Circuit has “distilled the Supreme Court’s
teachings in Bell into a two-part test.
We must ask, first,
whether any legitimate purposes are served by these conditions,
and second, whether these conditions are rationally related to
these purposes.”
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F. 3d 229, 232 (3d Cir.
2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Moreover,
the Fourteenth Amendment standard of unconstitutional punishment,
like the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments
standard, contains both an objective component and a subjective
component:
Unconstitutional punishment typically
includes both objective and subjective
components. As the Supreme Court explained
in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 . . .
8
(1991), the objective component requires an
inquiry into whether “the deprivation [was]
sufficiently serious” and the subjective
component asks whether “the officials act[ed]
with a sufficiently culpable state of
mind[.]” Id. at 298 . . . . The Supreme
Court did not abandon this bipartite analysis
in Bell, but rather allowed for an inference
of mens rea where the restriction is
arbitrary or purposeless, or where the
restriction is excessive, even if it would
accomplish a legitimate governmental
objective.
Stevenson, 495 F. 3d at 68.
Objectively, under the Due Process Clause, as well as the
Eighth Amendment, prison officials must satisfy inmates’ “basic
human needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and
reasonable safety.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993).
To satisfy the objective component, an inmate must show that he
was subjected to genuine privation and hardship over an extended
period of time.
See Bell, 441 U.S. at 542 (confining pretrial
detainees “in such a manner as to cause them to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time might
raise serious questions under the Due Process Clause as to
whether those conditions amounted to punishment”); Hutto v.
Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1978) (“the length of confinement
cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets
constitutional standards.
A filthy, overcrowded cell and a diet
of ‘grue’ might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel
for weeks or months”).
9
Applying the above principles to this Complaint, this Court
finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, as written, do not satisfy
the objective component because they do not show that Plaintiff
himself endured genuine privations and hardship over an extended
period of time.
See Hubbard, 538 F. 3d at 235 (holding that
triple celling of pretrial detainees and use of floor mattresses
did not violate Due Process because the inmates “were not
subjected to genuine privations and hardship over an extended
period of time”); Foreman v. Lowe, 261 Fed. App’x 401 (3d Cir.
2008) (immigration detainee’s confinement in maximum security did
not violate due process).
As written, Plaintiff’s allegations do
not satisfy the objective component of a conditions of
confinement claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Nor do Plaintiff’s allegations satisfy the subjective
component of a conditions of confinement claim under the Due
Process Clause.
First, an individual defendant in a civil rights
action must participate in the alleged wrongdoing, and Plaintiff
does not assert facts showing the personal involvement of each
defendant, that is, the Warden and the two Deputy Wardens.
See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is
inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead
that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”); Rode v.
10
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (“A defendant
in a civil rights action must have personal involvement in the
alleged wrongs”).
Second, Plaintiff does not assert facts showing that each
defendant was deliberately indifferent to his health or safety.
To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must set forth
facts “show[ing] that the official was subjectively aware” of the
allegedly substandard conditions.
U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511
Here, Plaintiff makes no allegations
whatsoever with respect to the subjective component.
Moreover,
the memorandum attached to the Complaint shows that officials
responded to (some) inmate grievances, and “prison officials who
actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety
may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to
the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted.”
844.
Id. at
Because the Complaint makes no factual allegations showing
the deliberate indifference of each defendant, and because
vicarious liability does not apply under § 1983, the Complaint
fails to satisfy the subjective component of a conditions of
confinement claim as to any of the three defendants.1
1
The letter attached to the Complaint, which was presumably
sent to unspecified lawyers, describes the general conditions of
confinement in more detail than the Complaint, but the letter
does not relate the general conditions to Plaintiff or assert
facts showing that the named defendants were deliberately
indifferent.
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B.
Strip and Cell Searches
Without setting forth facts regarding his own experience at
CCCF, Plaintiff generally complains that jail officials violate
the rights of inmates by searching cells and strip searching
inmates.
“[C]orrectional officials must be permitted to devise
reasonable search policies to detect and deter the possession of
contraband in their facilities.”
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders of County of Burlington, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012).
Where security is involved, “deference must be given to the
officials in charge of the jail unless there is substantial
evidence demonstrating their response to the situation is
exaggerated.”
omitted).
Id. at 1518 (citation and internal quotation marks
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558, the Supreme Court
held that a prison rule requiring pretrial detainees to expose
their body cavities for visual inspection as part of a strip
search conducted after every contact visit with a person from
outside the facility does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
This
year, in Florence, the Supreme Court held that a jail policy of
requiring that persons admitted to a jail remove their clothing
and expose their genital areas for visual inspection as a routine
part of the intake process does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
See Florence, 132 S.Ct. 1510.
Because Plaintiff did not allege
facts showing that he was strip searched and that the strip
search was so outside the scope of reasonable search policy that
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it would rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment violation, this
Court will dismiss the § 1983 strip search claim for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See Aruanno v.
Allen, 2012 WL 4320446 (3d Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff also complains generally that administrative cell
searches violate the rights of inmates.
This Court will dismiss
this claim under § 1983 because the Supreme Court held in Hudson
v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984), that “the Fourth Amendment
proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within
the confines of the prison cell.”
Accord Crosby v. Piazza, 465
Fed. App’x 168, 172 (3d Cir. 2012).
C.
Law Library Access
Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, prisoners retain
a right of access to the courts.
See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 346 (1996); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F. 3d 198, 205 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, Stover v. Beard, 129 S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
“Where
prisoners assert that defendants’ actions have inhibited their
opportunity to present a past legal claim, they must show (1)
that they suffered an ‘actual injury’ - that they lost a chance
to pursue a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and
(2) that they have no other ‘remedy’ that may be awarded as
recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the present denial
of access suit.”
Monroe at 205 (quoting Christopher v. Harbury,
536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)).
To establish standing, “[t]he
13
complaint must describe the underlying arguable claim well enough
to show that it is ‘more than mere hope,’ and it must describe
the ‘lost remedy.’” Monroe at 205-206 (quoting Christopher at
416-17).
In this Complaint, Plaintiff generally asserts that pretrial
detainees are not able to do legal research, but he provides no
facts showing actual injury.
Accordingly, the Complaint, as
written, fails to show that Plaintiff has standing to pursue an
access to courts claim.
This Court will dismiss the access to
courts claim without prejudice.
D.
Commissary Prices
Plaintiff complains that commissary prices are extremely
high and the commissary is operated by the brother of an exsenator.
Prisoners have no federal constitutional right to
purchase items from the jail commissary at any particular price,
or to restrain the vendor from charging exorbitant prices.
See
French v. Butterworth, 614 F.2d 23, 25 (1st Cir. 1980) (“We also
reject French’s contention that he and fellow inmates have a
constitutionally protected interest in buying food as cheaply as
possible”); Travillion v. Allegheny County Bureau of Corrections,
2008 WL 2699988 (S.D. Pa. 2008) (holding that jail inmates have
no constitutional right to purchase items from commissary at
lower prices); see also Tenny v. Blagojevich, 659 F.3d 578 (7th
Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim alleging that
14
prison officials marked up the price of commissary goods beyond
state statutory cap on grounds that no pre-deprivation process
could have predicted or prevented the alleged deprivation of
property and plaintiffs did not allege the absence of adequate
post-deprivation remedies); Myrie v. Commissioner, N.J. Dept. of
Corrections, 267 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting inmates’
constitutional claims challenging a ten percent surcharge on
purchases from jail commissaries in New Jersey).
Because
Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that high commissary
prices violate his constitutional rights, this Court will dismiss
the general challenge to commissary prices for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
E.
High Bail
The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall
not be required.”
U.S. Const. amend. 8.2
To state an excessive
bail claim under § 1983, an inmate must allege facts showing that
his bail was excessive in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Moreover, because “a public official is liable under § 1983 only
if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of
his constitutional rights,” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142
(1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original),
2
The Supreme Court has not held that the Excessive Bail
Clause has been incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment, but has
assumed without deciding that the Clause is incorporated against
the States. See Baker, 443 U.S. at 144 n.3.
15
Plaintiff must show that Warden Taylor, Deputy Warden Pizarro, or
Deputy Warden Fosler actually and proximately caused his bail to
be excessive.
See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652,
659 (9th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s Excessive Bail claim fails
because he has alleged no facts showing that his bail was
constitutionally excessive or that the prison official defendants
set or otherwise caused the setting of an excessive bail.
This
Court will dismiss the Excessive Bail Clause claim.3
F.
Amended Complaint
This Court will grant Plaintiff leave to file an amended
complaint which states a § 1983 conditions of confinement claim
under the Due Process Clause and/or an access to courts claim
under the First Amendment.
See DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly
Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012); Shane v.
Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).
If Plaintiff elects to
file an amended complaint, this Court suggests that he fill in
3
Under New Jersey court rules, initial bail may be set by a
New Jersey Superior Court judge for a person charged with any
offense, or by any other judge for a person charged with any
offense except murder, kidnapping, manslaughter, aggravated
manslaughter, aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault,
aggravated criminal sexual contact, arrest in an extradition
proceeding, or for violation of a restraining order. See N.J.
Ct. R. 3:26-2(a). However, “[a]ny person unable to post bail
shall have his or her bail reviewed by a Superior Court judge no
later than the next day which is neither a Saturday, Sunday nor a
legal holiday.” N.J. Ct. R. 3:26-2(c). As judges are absolutely
immune from damages under § 1983 for setting bail, this Court
will not grant leave to amend the Excessive Bail claim. See
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978); Smith v. Rosenbaum, 460 F.2d 1019 (3d Cir. 1972).
16
all the blanks on a § 1983 form complaint, which is designed to
elicit facts, list each defendant in the caption, and set forth
in numbered paragraphs in the body of the complaint facts
describing what each defendant did to violate Plaintiff’s due
process or First Amendment rights.
Also the amended complaint
must be complete on its face.4
G.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
"Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and
decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims when they
are so related to claims in the action within such original
jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or
controversy."
Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524
U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Where a district court has original jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal claims and supplemental
jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a),
the district court has discretion to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over
4
This Court will not attempt to construct a jigsaw puzzle
by piecing together the allegations in two complaints and the
letter attached to the original complaint. Once an amended
complaint is filed, previous dismissed complaints no longer
perform any function in the case and cannot generally be utilized
to cure defects in the current amended complaint. See 6 Wright,
Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 1476
(1990). Thus, if Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint,
he should name the defendants and on the face of the amended
complaint, state facts amounting to a claim against each named
defendant.
17
which it has original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d
1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993).
In this case, the Court is
dismissing every claim over which it had original subject matter
jurisdiction at an early stage in the litigation and declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
V.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court will grant Plaintiff’s
application to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss the federal
claims raised in the Complaint, and decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: November 20, 2012
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