COTTRELL et al v. NORMAN et al

Filing 95

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 7/21/2016. (dmr)(n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________
MARYANN COTTRELL and RICHARD
HOLLAND,
Plaintiffs,

Civil No. 12-1986 (NLH/JS)

v.
OPINION
KEYSHONNA NORMAN,
Defendant.
__________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Maryann Cottrell and Richard G. Holland
31 South Academy Street
Glassboro, New Jersey 08028
Pro Se Plaintiffs
Stephen Guice
Law Offices of Stephen Guice, P.C.
413 Clements Bridge Road
Barrington, NJ 08007
Attorney for Defendant Keyshonna Norman
HILLMAN, District Judge
Presently before the Court is Defendant Keyshonna Norman’s
motion for attorneys’ fees and sanctions [Doc. No. 88].
Plaintiffs Maryann Cottrell and Richard Holland filed a late
opposition after multiple extensions of time.

For the reasons

that follow, Norman’s motion will be denied.
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
As set forth in the Court’s February 8, 2016 Opinion, this

case concerns events which took place on April 1, 2010 on the
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Rowan University campus.

On that date, Plaintiffs Maryann

Cottrell and Richard Holland1 noticed Norman’s car parked in a
handicap parking space with an expired handicap placard.

This

led to a verbal altercation between Cottrell and Norman.

Norman

alleges that during this altercation Cottrell took the handicap
placard from inside her car.

Both parties filed criminal

complaints against each other in municipal court but eventually
all charges were withdrawn.
On April 2, 2012, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against
Norman and various Rowan individuals.
Defendants filed motions to dismiss.

Both Norman and the Rowan
[Doc. Nos. 41, 49.]

In

light of Magistrate Judge Schneider’s Order granting Plaintiffs’
motion to amend on December 4, 2013 [Doc. No. 59], the Court
denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss without prejudice.
Dec. 6, 2013 Order [Doc. No. 60].)

(See

Judge Schneider further

ordered that all Defendants were required to respond to
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint by January 6, 2014.

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Plaintiff Maryann Cottrell is the mother of a severely disabled
daughter, and she and Plaintiff Richard Holland share the
responsibility of her care. Plaintiffs inform local authorities
about businesses that fail to maintain handicap accessible
parking and fail to discourage unauthorized use of handicapped
parking spaces. Plaintiffs have filed numerous cases throughout
this district against businesses for conduct they allege
violates the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”).
2 

On December 24, 2013, the Rowan Defendants filed a renewed
motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 61], which was granted.
25, 2014 Op. and Order [Doc. Nos. 66, 67].)

(See July

Norman did not

renew her motion or otherwise respond to Plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint.

On April 20, 2015, Plaintiffs requested

default judgment be entered against Norman for failing to
respond to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint by January 6,
2014 per Judge Schneider’s Order.
entered default the following day.

[Doc. No. 69].

The Clerk

On May 11, 2015, Norman

moved to set aside default judgment, which the Court granted.
(See Oct. 1, 2015 Op. and Order [Doc. Nos. 77, 78].)
Subsequently, Norman filed a motion to dismiss and the
Court granted the motion in its entirety and dismissed the case.
First, the Court found that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert
a discrimination claim under the ADA and NJLAD because they are
not disabled.

Second, the Court found that although the Third

Circuit has not directly ruled on whether there may be
individual liability for retaliation under the ADA, courts in
this district have found no such individual liability exists.
Further, even if Plaintiffs could assert a retaliation claim
against an individual under the ADA, the only relief available
would be prospective injunctive relief.

The Court found that

Plaintiffs failed to establish “a real and immediate threat”
that they would suffer a future injury because they alleged no
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facts suggesting there would be future contact with Norman.
Third, the Court found Plaintiffs insufficiently pled a
malicious prosecution claim because it was already determined in
this case that Plaintiffs failed to allege facts that could show
the absence of probable cause for Norman’s disorderly conduct
complaint against Plaintiffs.

Cottrell v. Norman, No. 12-1986,

2014 WL 3729215, at *8 (D.N.J. July 25, 2014).
In the instant motion, Norman asserts that because this
lawsuit was frivolously filed in bad faith and all claims have
been resolved in her favor, Plaintiffs are subject to attorneys’
fees and sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927.
II.

JURISDICTION
Plaintiffs have brought their claims under federal law, as

well as under New Jersey state law.

This Court has jurisdiction

over Plaintiffs' federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
III. STANDARDS OF LAW
A. Rule 11
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 “imposes on any party
who signs a document submitted to the court an affirmative duty
to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law before
filing.”

Bradgate Assocs., Inc. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs.,
4 

Inc., 999 F.2d 745, 751 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Bus. Guides, Inc.
v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 498 U.S. 533, 543 (1991)).
The Rule is intended to discourage the filing of frivolous,
unsupported, or unreasonable claims.

Lieb v. Topstone Indus.

Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 1986).

Specifically, Rule 11

states that pleadings, motions, or other papers presented to the
court must be signed by an attorney or unrepresented party
certifying that the submission: (1) is not presented for any
improper purpose such as to harass or increase the costs of
litigation, and (2) the legal contentions contained “are
warranted by existing law or by a non-frivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.”
Civ. P. 11(b) (1), (2).

Fed. R.

Rule 11 sanctions are “aimed at curbing

abuses of the judicial system,” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmax Corp.,
496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990), and “intended to discourage the filing
of frivolous, unsupported, or unreasonable claims,” Leuallen v.
Borough of Paulsboro, 180 F. Supp. 2d 615, 618 (D.N.J. 2002).
B. 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Tile 28 U.S.C. § 1927 provides: “Any attorney or other
person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United
States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of
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such conduct.”2

“The statute thus limits attorney sanctions

imposed thereunder to those situations where an attorney has:
(1) multiplied proceedings; (2) unreasonably and vexatiously;
(3) thereby increasing the cost of the proceedings; (4) with bad
faith or with intentional misconduct.”

LaSalle Nat. Bank v.

First Conn. Holding Grp., LLC., 287 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir.
2002).

Sanctions may not be imposed based on misunderstanding,

bad judgment, or well-intentioned zeal; rather, there must be
evidence of bad faith.

Id. at 289.

“Indications of this bad

faith are findings that the claims advanced were meritless, that
counsel knew or should have known this, and that the motive for
filing the suit was for an improper purpose such as harassment.”
Great W. Min. & Mineral Co. v. ADR Options, Inc., 882 F. Supp.
2d 749, 758 (D.N.J. 2012), aff'd, 533 F. App'x 132 (3d Cir.
2013) (further citation omitted).
IV.

DISCUSSION

As the Court set out in a similar case, Cottrell v. Recreation
Ctr. LLC, No. 13-2847, 2016 WL 1717577, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 28,
2016), Plaintiffs have filed many cases in this Court based on

2
 The Third Circuit has held that even if 28 U.S.C. § 1927 does

not apply to pro se litigants, sanctions may be imposed on pro
se litigants through the court’s inherent powers. Inst. for
Motivational Living, Inc. v. Doulos Inst. for Strategic
Consulting, Inc., 110 F. App'x 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 48 (1991)).

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their assessment and documentation of alleged parking violations
in public places.

After documenting violations, they bring

federal complaints in this Court, which are generally resolved
in the defendant's favor or settled.

See Cottrell, et al. v.

Good Wheels, et al., No. 08-1738 (summary judgment granted for
Defendants where Plaintiffs offered no evidence that Defendants'
decision to ban Plaintiffs from business premises for disrupting
customers was pretextual); Cottrell, et al. v. Rowan Univ., et
al., No. 08-1171 (summary judgment granted for Defendants on
Plaintiffs' retaliation claims (and all other claims) because
they did not show their ban from campus was a result of their
protected activity, rather ban from campus was based on ten
documented incidents over the course of three months where
Plaintiffs acted hostile, harassing, disruptive, and aggressive
to Rowan University staff, students, and visitors, including a
nine-year-old child, a diabetic pregnant woman, and a student
with spinal meningitis); Cottrell, et al. v. Heritages Dairy
Stores Inc., No. 09-1743 (case settled after retaliation claims
were dismissed for lack of standing; Plaintiffs permitted to
amend complaint); Cottrell, et al. v. Bob's Little Sport Shop,
Inc., No. 09-1987 (Defendant's motion to dismiss granted because
Plaintiffs lacked standing); Cottrell, et al. v. Duffield's
Inc., et al., No. 14-3309 (stipulated dismissal); Cottrell, et
al., v. Murphy's Auto Care and Performance Ctr., et al., No. 147 

4831 (complaint dismissed in part because Plaintiffs lacked
standing); Cottrell, et al. v. Glassboro Public School, No. 061163 (case administratively terminated); Cottrell, et al. v.
Dante J. Masso & Sons, Inc., 08-1700 (case settled); Cottrell,
et al. v. Long Self Storage Inc., et al., No. 08-2827 (case
settled); Cottrell, et al. v. Zagami, LLC, et al., No. 08-3340
(summary judgment granted for Defendants because Plaintiffs'
disruption of business operations was the reason for the
property ban and Plaintiffs could not establish the causal
connection prong of their retaliation claims; summary judgment
also granted because Plaintiffs lacked standing); Cottrell, et
al. v. J&R Discount Liquor Gallery, No. 08-5418 (case settled);
Cottrell v. Woodbury Nissan, et al., No. 09-240 (case settled);
Cottrell, et al. v. Matt Blatt, Inc., No. 11-610 (case settled);
Cottrell, et al. v. Fosters, et al., No. 11-6662 (case settled);
Cottrell, et al. v. Norman, et al., No. 12-1986 (case dismissed,
among other reasons, for lack of standing; motion for sanctions
against Plaintiffs pending); Holland v. Deptford Mall Security,
et al., No. 09-714 (summary judgment granted for Defendants
because they did not ban Plaintiff from the mall, rather, police
asked Plaintiff to leave); Holland v. Terra Nova, et al., No.
06-4599 (summary judgment sua sponte entered in favor of
Defendants); Holland v. Murphy's Auto Care and Performance

8 

Center, et al., No. 14-4831 (Defendants' motion to dismiss
granted because Plaintiff lacked standing).
In at least four of these cases, Plaintiffs’ complaints
were similarly dismissed for lack of standing.

See Cottrell, et

al. v. Heritages Dairy Stores Inc., No. 09-1743; Cottrell, et
al. v. Bob's Little Sport Shop, Inc., No. 09-1987; Cottrell, et
al., v. Murphy's Auto Care and Performance Ctr., et al., No. 144831; Cottrell, et al. v. Zagami, LLC, et al., No. 08-334.
While we do not charge a layman with a sophisticated
understanding of complex legal issues, here, the time has long
passed that Plaintiffs could claim ignorance of the standard the
Court will apply in determining their ability to bring claims on
their own behalf.

It follows then that the number of cases

Plaintiffs have brought and lost raises questions of harassment
and malice.

The wide variety of defendants Plaintiffs sue

motivated by their purported defense of the disabled has
resulted in overzealous advocacy which asserts claims outside
the legal bounds of disability law.
Against this backdrop, and by a thin margin, the Court
declines to award sanctions in this particular case under Rule
11 or statute.

That does not mean that if Plaintiffs continue

to file frivolous complaints, particularly when they lack
standing, the time will not arise that this Court feels
differently.

At this juncture, the Court declines to impose
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sanctions, but Plaintiffs are placed on notice that future
violations of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 or Title 28 U.S.C. § 19273
found by the Court will result in appropriate sanctions.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Norman’s motion for fees

and sanctions will be denied.

An Order consistent with this

Opinion will be entered.

Dated: July 21, 2016

__s/ Noel L. Hillman________
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

3
 The Third Circuit has held that even if 28 U.S.C. § 1927 does

not apply to pro se litigants, sanctions may be imposed on pro
se litigants through the court’s inherent powers. Inst. for
Motivational Living, Inc. v. Doulos Inst. for Strategic
Consulting, Inc., 110 F. App'x 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 48 (1991)).

10