VASQUEZ v. WARDEN F.C.I. FAIRTON et al
Filing
2
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER the Petition is dismissed. ORDER Clerk shall administratively terminate this case by making a new and separate entry reading "CIVIL CASE ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED". ORDER Clerk shall alter the docket to change Petitioner's name to Tomas Vasquez. ORDER Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion and Order upon Petitioner. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 5/29/2012. (bdk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
WARDEN F.C.I. FAIRTON et al.,:
:
Respondents. :
:
THOMAS VASQUEZ,
Civil Action No. 12-2528 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
IT APPEARING THAT:
1.
On April 30, 2012, Petitioner, a federal inmate, initiated
this § 2241 proceeding by submitting a petition seeking
habeas corpus relief (“Petition”).
2.
On May 8, 2012, Petitioner submitted the applicable filing
fee of $5.00.
3.
See Docket Entry No. 1.
See Docket Entry No. 2.
The Court is unable to distill either the facts or nature of
Petitioner’s challenges with any measurable degree of
certainty.
The Petition consists primarily of citations to
the law, with few, if any, facts related thereto.
generally, Docket Entry No. 1.
See,
The best this Court can
surmise, it appears that:
a.
at a certain point in time, the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania (“Commonwealth”) seemingly lodged a
detainer against Petitioner on the basis of his preexisting conviction rendered by the Commonwealth on the
charges of murder, conspiracy and illegal possession of
a weapon, although the Petition does not allow the
Court to determine with any degree of certainty whether
that conviction (and the Commonwealth sentence rendered
in connection with that conviction) are still pending
and when such sentence, if any, is expected to begin;
and
b.
being appraised by the Commonwealth of Petitioner’s
upcoming incarceration on these charges, the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) either declined Petitioner’s request to
have him serve the end period of his currently-served
federal sentence in a community correctional center
(“CCC”) or, in the alternative, the BOP simply did not
schedule Petitioner for an evaluation for suitability
for transfer to a CCC.
See, generally, id.
4.
As submitted, the Petition fails to comply with the
requirements posed by Habeas Rule 2(c).
“Habeas corpus
petitions must meet heightened pleading requirements.”
McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 (1994).
Habeas Rule
2(c) requires a petition to “specify all the grounds for
relief,” “state the facts supporting each ground” and “state
the relief requested.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c),
applicable to § 2241 through Rule 1(b).
Here, the Petition
failed to clarify Petitioner’s facts and has left the Court
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guessing the relief requested (e.g., it could be either
withdrawal of Petitioner’s Commonwealth charges, or
withdrawal of the detainer or transfer to a CCC), and the
Petition did not explain Petitioner’s grounds for seeking
the whatever relief he wishes to obtain.
Since the Court
cannot distill with a measurable degree of certainty the
facts and nature of Petitioner’s challenges, the Court will
not direct Respondents to address the claims the Court
itself cannot comprehend.
Therefore, the Petition at bar
will be dismissed without prejudice, and Petitioner will be
allowed an opportunity to submit an amended pleading
complying with the requirements of Habeas Rule 2(c).
5.
In addition, Petitioner’s submission at bar strongly
suggests that Petitioner’s challenges are unexhausted
administratively.
Since Petitioner is being allowed an
opportunity to submit an amended petition, the Court finds
it warranted to explain to Petitioner the concept of
administrative exhaustion in order to ensure against the
scenario where Petitioner submits a § 2241 amended petition
but such petition would be subject to dismissal as
unexhausted.
6.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 2241 contains no statutory exhaustion
requirement, a federal prisoner ordinarily may not bring a
petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
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challenging
the execution of his sentence, until he has
exhausted all available administrative remedies.
See, e.g.,
Callwood v. Enos, 230 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2000); Bradshaw
v. Carlson, 682 F.2d 1050, 1052 (3d Cir. 1981); Arias v.
United States Parole Comm'n, 648 F.2d 196, 199 (3d Cir.
1981); Soyka v. Alldredge, 481 F.2d 303, 306 (3d Cir. 1973).
The exhaustion doctrine promotes a number of goals: it is
“(1) allowing the appropriate agency to develop a factual
record and apply its expertise facilitates judicial review;
(2) permitting agencies to grant the relief requested
conserves judicial resources; and (3) providing agencies the
opportunity to correct their own errors fosters
administrative autonomy.”
Goldberg v. Beeler, 82 F. Supp.
2d 302, 309 (D.N.J. 1999), aff'd, 248 F.3d 1130 (3d Cir.
2000); see also Moscato v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 98
F.3d 757, 761 (3d Cir. 1996).
Although exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required where exhaustion
would not promote these goals, see, e.g., Gambino v. Morris,
134 F.3d 156, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) (exhaustion not required
where petitioner demonstrates futility); Lyons v. U.S.
Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988) (exhaustion may
be excused where it “would be futile, if the actions of the
agency clearly and unambiguously violate statutory or
constitutional rights, or if the administrative procedure is
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clearly shown to be inadequate to prevent irreparable
harm”); Carling v. Peters, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10288, 2000
WL 1022959, *2 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (exhaustion not required
where delay would subject petitioner to “irreparable
injury”), the exhaustion requirement is not excused lightly.
Indeed, it has been long established that an inmate’s
unjustified failure to pursue administrative remedies
results in procedural default warranting decline of judicial
review.
The Court of Appeals addressed this issue in
Moscato, 98 F. 3d 757, the case where an inmate filed a §
2241 petition after the Central Office had denied his
administrative appeal as untimely.
The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the inmate’s failure to satisfy the time
limits of the BOP's administrative remedy program resulted
in a procedural default, see id. at 760, rendering judicial
review of his habeas claim unwarranted, that is, unless the
inmate can demonstrate cause for his failure to comply with
the procedural requirement1 and, in addition, actual
1
The “cause” standard requires a showing that some external
objective factor impeded the inmate’s efforts to comply with the
procedural bar. See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488
(1986); United States v. Pelullo, 399 F. 3d 197, 223 (3d Cir.
2005) (“Examples of external impediments . . . include
interference by officials”) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted); Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 563 (3d Cir.
2004) (“cause” typically involves a novel constitutional rule, a
new factual predicate, hindrance by officials in complying with
the procedural rule, or akin). In contrast, a procedural default
caused by ignorance of the law or facts is binding on the habeas
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prejudice resulting from the alleged violation.
761.
See id. at
Clarifying the rationale of its decision, the Moscato
Court explained that application of the cause and prejudice
rule to habeas review of BOP proceedings insures that
prisoners do not circumvent the agency and needlessly swamp
the courts with petitions for relief, and promotes such
goals of the exhaustion requirement, such as allowing the
agency to develop a factual record and apply its expertise
facilitates judicial review, conserving judicial resources,
and fostering administrative autonomy by providing the
agency with an opportunity to correct its own errors.
See
id. at 761-62; see also Gambino, 134 F.3d at 171; Lyons v.
U.S. Marshals, 840 F.2d 202, 205 (3d Cir. 1988).
7.
The BOP Administrative Remedy Program is a three-tier
process that is available to inmates confined in
institutions operated by the BOP for “review of an issue
which relates to any aspect of their confinement.”
C.F.R. § 542.10.
28
An inmate must initially attempt to
informally resolve the issue with institutional staff.
28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a).
See
If informal resolution fails or is
waived, an inmate shall submit a BP-9
Request to “the
institution staff member designated to receive such Requests
(ordinarily a correctional counsel)” within 20 days of the
petitioner. See Murray, 477 U.S. at 485-87.
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date on which the basis for the Request occurred, or within
any extension permitted.
28 C.F.R. § 542.14.
An inmate who
is dissatisfied with the Warden's response to his BP-9
Request shall submit a BP-10 Appeal to the Regional Director
of the BOP within 20 days of the date the Warden signed the
response.
See 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).
The inmate shall
appeal to the BOP's General Counsel on a BP-11 form within
30 days of the day the Regional Director signed the
response. See id.
Appeal to the General Counsel is the
final administrative appeal.
See id.
If responses are not
received by the inmate within the time allotted for each
reply, “the inmate may consider the absence of a response to
be a denial at that level.”
8.
28 C.F.R. § 542.18.
Therefore, Petitioner shall file his amended petition only
if his challenges were duly exhausted administratively or
Petitioner can make a showing as to why such exhaustion
shall be excused in compliance with the high standard
explained to him in this Memorandum Opinion and Order.
IT IS, therefore, on this 29th day of May 2012,
ORDERED that the Petition, Docket Entry No. 1, is dismissed
for failure to comply with the requirements of Habeas Rule 2(c);
and it is further
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ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this
action by making a new and separate entry on the docket reading
“CIVIL CASE ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATED”; and it is further
ORDERED that administrative termination is not a dismissal
on merits, and the Court does not withdraw its jurisdiction over
this matter; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall alter the docket in this matter
by changing Petitioner’s name from “Thomas Vasquez” to “Tomas
Vasquez,” accord <> (showing Petitioner’s public BOP record) and
<> (showing that all six “Thomas”
Vasquezs who were held in BOP custody have been, as of now, long
released); and it is further
ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner’s challenges were duly
exhausted administratively or Petitioner can show a valid basis
for excuse of exhaustion (in accordance with the guidance
provided to him in this Memorandum Opinion and Order), Petitioner
may have this matter reopened if, within thirty days from the
date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, he files with
the Clerk his amended § 2241 petition, stating clearly and
concisely the facts underlying his challenges, the remedy sought,
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the bases for such remedy, and – in addition – detailing the
exhaustion efforts Petitioner undertook administratively and the
outcome of these efforts at every level of the BOP; and it is
further
ORDERED that, in the event Petitioner timely files such
amended petition, the Court will direct the Clerk to reopen this
matter and will examine the amended petition on merits; and it is
finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion
and Order upon Petitioner.
Such mailing shall be executed by
regular U.S. mail, and shall include – in addition to this
Memorandum Opinion and Order – a blank § 2241 petition form.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
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