ALI-X v. ALL THE EMPLOYEES OF MAIL ROOM STAFFS

Filing 27

OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/25/2014. (dmr)(n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KASEEM ALI-X,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 12-3147 (JBS/KMW)

v.
ALL THE EMPLOYEES OF MAIL ROOM
STAFFS, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Mr. Kaseem Ali-X
260516
N.J.S.P.
P.O. Box 861
Trenton, NJ 08625
Pro Se Plaintiff
Alex Joseph Zowin, Esq.
Lucy Elizabeth Fritz, Esq.
State of New Jersey
Office of the Attorney General
Hughes Justice Complex
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08611
Attorneys for Defendant Christopher Holmes
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Kaseem Ali-X, who is representing himself,

asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that mail room
employees in South Woods State Prison (“SWSP”) opened his
properly-marked incoming legal mail outside of his presence and

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that SWSP administrators allowed subordinates to discard his
written complaints about the opening of his mail. This matter
comes before the Court on Defendant Christopher Holmes’ motion
to dismiss [Docket Item 18], Plaintiff’s motion to stay [Docket
Items 22] adjudication of the motion to dismiss until he can
conduct discovery, and Plaintiff’s motion to stay/amend his
complaint [Docket Item 25].
Claims against Defendant Holmes in his official capacity
will be dismissed with prejudice because, in his official
capacity, he is not a person amenable to suit under § 1983 and
is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Claims against
Defendant Holmes in his individual capacity will proceed because
Plaintiff has satisfied the pleading standards under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Plaintiff’s motion to amend his
complaint will be granted.

II.

BACKGROUND
A. Plaintiff’s Allegations
Plaintiff Kaseem Ali-X, who is currently incarcerated at

New Jersey State Prison, brought this action against Defendants
Christopher Holmes, Karen Balicki, and All the Employees of Mail
Room Staffs. Balicki and Holmes are sued in their individual and
official capacities. The mail room employees are sued in their
individual capacities. The Defendants are employees of
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Southwoods State Prison (“SWSP”), where Plaintiff was previously
incarcerated, and Plaintiff’s allegations describe events that
occurred while he was at SWSP.
Plaintiff alleges that mail room employees opened his
properly marked, incoming legal mail outside his presence on May
24, 2010; June 12, 2010; July 9, 2010; July 23, 2010; August 13,
2010; March 27, 2011; July 11, 2011; September 27, 2011; and
September 30, 2011. [Docket Item 11 (Am. Compl.) ¶ 6(a).) He
also alleges that mail room employees took his legal papers on
April 2, 2011; July 11, 2011; September 27, 2011; and September
30, 2011. (Id. ¶ 6(b).)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Balicki, a SWSP
administrator, allowed the unlawful mail-opening to occur
because her subordinates had a known and customary practice of
discarding Inmate Remedy System Forms (“IRSFs”). (Id. ¶ 6(c).)
Plaintiff also alleges that Balicki failed to intervene when
Plaintiff mailed her copies of the unprocessed IRSFs and
informed her about the unlawful conduct during wing
representative meetings. (Id. ¶ 6(c).)
Defendant Holmes, also a SWSP administrator, allegedly
allowed subordinates’ known practice of processing certain ISRFs
and discarding others. (Id. ¶ 6(d).) Plaintiff alleges that he
mailed copies of the unprocessed ISRFs to Defendant Holmes and

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informed Holmes of the problems when Holmes toured the prison.
(Id. ¶ 6(d).)
Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages
for each instance of unlawfully opened mail and costs of suit.
(Id. ¶ 7.)
B. Procedural History
The Court issued an order on June 8, 2012 [Docket Item 2]
allowing, inter alia, Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against
the mail room employees to proceed past an initial screen
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The June 8, 2012 Order mandated
that “within 180 days after entry of this Order, Plaintiff shall
file an amended complaint identifying by name the fictitious
defendants who are alleged to have engaged in a pattern and
practice of opening his properly-marked legal mail outside of
his presence. . . .” [Docket Item 2 at 4.]
Because Plaintiff could not identify the mail room
employees despite his reasonable efforts, the Court issued an
Order [Docket Item 8] permitting Plaintiff to file an amended
complaint naming the Administrator of South Woods State Prison
as a nominal Defendant and naming the unidentified mail room
employees as Defendants John Does 1-10.
Plaintiff then submitted a motion to file an Amended
Complaint. [Docket Item 9.] The Amended Complaint named
Defendants Karen Balicki, Christopher Holmes, and Jane Doe and
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John Doe of the SWSP mail room staff. The Court issued an order
allowing Plaintiff to file the Amended Complaint and noting that
“[a]fter the named Defendants are served and respond to the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff will have the opportunity in due
course to seek discovery of the identities of the John Doe
Defendants and to promptly thereafter propose a Second Amended
Complaint that names them.” [Docket Item 10 at 3.]
Holmes was served [Docket Item 14], but Balicki’s summons
was returned unexecuted [Docket Item 13].
Holmes then filed a motion to dismiss [Docket Item 18] the
Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff filed two motions to stay
[Docket Items 22 & 25].
C. Parties’ Arguments
In his motion to dismiss, Defendant Holmes argues that, in
his official capacity, he is not amenable to suit under § 1983
and is barred from suit by the Eleventh Amendment; claims
against him in his individual capacity fail because of his lack
of personal involvement; he cannot be held liable under
respondeat superior; Plaintiff has not pled the dates when he
complained to Holmes about the mail room staff’s behavior and
whether he complained after the last incident of mail-opening;
and Plaintiff’s claims are moot because Plaintiff is no longer
at SWSP.

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In opposition [Docket Item 20], Plaintiff argues that he
adequately alleged Holmes’ personal involvement by pleading that
Holmes allowed the known, customary practice of discarding IRSFs
to continue and failed to respond after Plaintiff informed him,
via mail and in person, about his unprocessed ISRFs; Plaintiff
cannot provide exact dates because his notes were lost;
discovery would show the exact dates when Holmes visited
Plaintiff’s unit and, thus, when Plaintiff personally
complained; and his claims are not moot because he could be
transferred back to SWSP during his life sentence.
In reply [Docket Item 21], Defendant Holmes argued that the
issue is not whether Plaintiff could be transferred back to
SWSP, but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that he would
be transferred back.
In Plaintiff’s first motion to stay, he sought a stay of
adjudication of the motion to dismiss until he could conduct
discovery. In Plaintiff’s second motion to stay, he sought a
stay until the Court adjudicated an attached request to amend
his complaint.
Defendant Holmes also opposed Plaintiff’s first motion to
stay, arguing that, if he is entitled to qualified immunity,
then he should not be subject to the discovery process. Holmes
opposed Plaintiff’s motion to stay/amend on the grounds that
amendment would be futile.
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III. MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant Holmes’ motion to dismiss will be granted in part
and denied in part. Claims against Holmes in his official
capacity will be dismissed with prejudice; claims against him in
his individual capacity will proceed.
A. Standard of Review
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss if it contains
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Although a court must
accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint, that
tenet is “inapplicable to legal conclusions,” and “[a] pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.
A “district court ruling on a motion to dismiss may not
consider matters extraneous to the pleadings” except that a
“document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint
may be considered . . . .” In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114
F.3d at 1426 (citations omitted).
B. Mootness
As a preliminary matter, the Court “must determine whether
the [Plaintiff’s] claims are moot because ‘a federal court has
neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide
questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case
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before them.’” Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir.
2003) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)).
“An inmate's transfer from the facility complained of generally
moots the equitable and declaratory claims.” Sutton, 323 F.3d at
248. But a transfer does not moot claims for damages:
“plaintiffs’ claims for damages remain despite their transfer
out of the [prison unit] . . . .” Id. at 249.
In this case, Plaintiff seeks damages and, therefore, his
claims are not moot.1
C. Official Capacity
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Holmes in his official
capacity will be dismissed with prejudice because he is a New
Jersey state employee and both § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment
prohibit suits against state employees in their official
capacities. “A state, its agencies, and its actors in their

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Furthermore, even if Plaintiff were seeking declaratory or
injunctive relief, his claims are not necessarily moot. Such
claims “are not mooted when a challenged action is (1) too short
in duration ‘to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration’; and (2) ‘there [is] a reasonable likelihood that
the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action
again.’” Sutton, 323 F.3d at 248 (quoting Abdul Akbar v. Watson,
4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993)). While Plaintiff has been
transferred out of SWSP, the Court cannot determine whether
there is a “reasonable likelihood” that Plaintiff would return
to SWSP or whether the alleged wrongs were “too short in
duration” to be fully litigated. The parties’ briefing did not
discuss New Jersey state prison transfer policies for inmates
with life sentences, the average length of incarceration at SWSP
before transfer, or the circumstances that led to Plaintiff’s
transfer.
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official capacities are not persons who may be sued under §
1983.” Smith v. New Jersey, 908 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563 (D.N.J.
2012); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 71 (1989) (“neither a State nor its officials acting in
their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”).
“Individual state employees sued in their official capacity are
also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity because ‘officialcapacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading
an action’ against the state.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev.
Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 254 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hafer v. Melo,
502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)).
Claims against Holmes in his individual capacity are,
however, permissible under § 1983 and the Eleventh Amendment.
See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 23 (“state officials sued in their
individual capacities are ‘persons’ for purposes of § 1983”);
Walker v. Beard, 244 F. App'x 439, 440 (3d Cir. 2007)
(“the Eleventh Amendment does not preclude a suit against a
state official in his or her individual capacity”).
The Court will dismiss claims against Defendant Holmes in
his official capacity, but not in his individual capacity.2

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In the motion to dismiss, Holmes’ counsel noted that Defendant
Balicki has not been properly served and that Holmes’ arguments
also apply to Balicki. (Def. Br. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 1 n.1.)
Because Balicki has not been served and, thus, has not responded
to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court will not adjudicate
claims against her at this time.
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D. Specificity of Pleading
Defendant Holmes also challenges Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff is suing him based on a
respondeat superior theory and has not adequately alleged that
Plaintiff was involved with the wrongs at issue in this case.
Holmes argues that Plaintiff failed to plead the exact dates
when he complained to Holmes about the mail room staff’s
behavior and has not pleaded whether his complaints to Holmes
occurred after the last instance that his legal mail was opened,
in which case Holmes would not have had actual knowledge of the
mail-opening while it was occurring.
“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs; liability cannot be
predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988). Plaintiff
has not relied on respondeat superior and has, instead, alleged
a basis for Holmes’ personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.
Plaintiff pleaded that Holmes was aware of the mail-opening
practice, that he personally complained to Holmes about the
mail-opening practice, that he personally complained about the
practice of discarding certain ISRFs, and that he mailed Holmes
copies of his unprocessed ISRFs. These allegations are
sufficient to survive Holmes’ motion to dismiss.

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To state a claim for relief, a complaint must contain “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Plaintiff must
plead a plausible claim for relief, but he need not plead every
date that particular incidents occurred. Furthermore, pro se
complaints are “h[e]ld to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520 (1972); see also Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234
(3d Cir. 2004) (“pro se complaints in particular should be
construed liberally”).
Holmes emphasizes that Plaintiff has not pleaded specific
dates showing that he knew about the mail-opening while it was
occurring. But Plaintiff has pleaded that Holmes was aware of
the practice of discarding certain ISRFs, including Plaintiff’s
ISRFs complaining about the opening of his mail, which, assuming
the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations, is tantamount to condoning
the practice of opening legal mail. Holmes’ argument lacks
merit.
In sum, Defendant Holmes’ motion to dismiss will be granted
in part and denied in part. Claims against Holmes in his
official capacity will be dismissed with prejudice. Claims
against Holmes in his individual capacity will not be dismissed.
Holmes shall file an answer to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

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within 21 days of the entry of this Opinion and the accompanying
order on the docket. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i).
IV.

PLAINTIFF’S FIRST MOTION TO STAY
Plaintiff’s first motion to stay [Docket Item 22] seeks an

order staying Defendant Holmes’ motion to dismiss until
Plaintiff obtains discovery of the names of the mail room
employees who were working on the days his mail was opened. In
addition to staying the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff also asks
the Court to compel the discovery he seeks.
“A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the
legal sufficiency of a claim, and therefore may be decided on
its face without extensive factual development.” Mann v.
Brenner, 375 F. App'x 232, 239 (3d Cir. 2010). The Mann court
held that “the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
staying discovery pending resolution of the motions to dismiss.”
Id. at 239-40; see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 32627 (1989) (Rule 12(b)(6) “streamlines litigation by dispensing
with needless discovery and factfinding”).
Holmes’ motion to dismiss has now been adjudicated and
Plaintiff’s claims against Holmes in his individual capacity
will proceed. Defendant Holmes shall file an answer within 21
days and then, as the Court previously explained, “Plaintiff
will have the opportunity in due course to seek discovery of the
identities of the John Doe Defendants and to promptly thereafter
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propose a Second Amended Complaint that names them.” [Docket
Item 10 at 3.]
V.

PLAINTIFF’S SECOND MOTION TO STAY/MOTION TO AMEND
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), a party may amend its

pleading with the court’s leave, and “[t]he court should freely
give leave when justice so requires.” However, the court may
deny leave to amend on grounds “such as undue delay, bad faith,
dilatory motive, prejudice and futility.” Calif. Pub. Employees’
Ret. Sys. V. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 165 (3d Cir. 2004). An
amendment is futile where the complaint, as amended, would fail
to state a claim for which relief could be granted under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1434 (3d Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff’s second motion to stay seeks an order “to stay
the Defendant’s motion to dismiss complaint pending the
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint with
supporting documents.” [Docket Item 25 at 1.] Plaintiff seeks to
attach a declaration dated January 28, 2014 [Docket Item 25 at
12-15] to his Amended Complaint with new allegations relating to
the same conduct in his original complaint. He alleges that,
from August 2011 to January 2012, he was in the
detention/administrative segregation unit (“ASU”). (Id. ¶ 1.)
While he was in ASU, he submitted multiple ISRFs, personally

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informed Holmes twice of the problems with opening of his mail,
and received no response to his ISRFs. (Id. ¶¶ 2-9.)
Holmes opposed this motion, arguing that amendment would be
futile because Plaintiff’s new allegations still do not show
Holmes’ knowledge of the mail-opening and because Plaintiff’s
transfer out of SWSP moots his claims. The Court has already
dispensed with both of Holmes’ arguments above. Plaintiff’s
amendment would not be futile, and the Court will permit it.
VI.

CONCLUSION
Defendant Holmes’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and

denied in part. Claims against Holmes in his official capacity
are dismissed with prejudice. Claims against him in his
individual capacity will proceed, and Holmes shall file an
answer within 21 days. Plaintiff’s motion to stay is denied, but
his motion to amend his complaint is granted. The declaration
dated January 28, 2014 [Docket Item 25 at 12-15] shall be added
to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, so that the Amended Complaint
shall be deemed to also include the allegations in Plaintiff’s
declaration of January 28, 2014.
The accompanying Order will be entered.

April 25, 2014
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

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