LAMONT DURELL BELTON v. MALFEASANCE TASK FORCE
Filing
2
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER that Docket Entry No. 1 is dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing. ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate each action. ORDERED that Clifton McMillan and/or Drexel McMillan have 60 days from th e date of entry to have their own duly executed civil complaints and accompany each complaint with the $350.00 filing fee or their own executed IFP application. ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion and Order and include 2 blank IPF applications, and 2 blank civil complaint forms. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 10/15/2012. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
:
MOHAMMEDAN CONSUL ES
LAMONT DURELL BELTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil Action No. 12-3519 (RBK)
:
:
:
MALFEASANCE TASK FORCE,
Defendant.
MOHAMMEDAN CONSUL ES
LAMONT DURELL BELTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
:
:
Civil Action No. 12-3520 (RBK)
:
:
:
MALFEASANCE TASK FORCE,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
:
APPLIES TO BOTH ACTIONS
Defendant.
:
These two, seemingly related, matters come before the Court upon submissions of two
sets of paperwork; each of these submissions arrived unaccompanied by either a filing fee or by
an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and it appearing that:
1.
The submission docketed in Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton v.
Malfeasance Task Force (“Malfeasance-I”), Civil Action No. 12-3519 (RBK) (D.N.J.), is
executed in the style indicating that the draftor(s) was/were affected by “Moorish,”
“Marrakush,” “Murakush” or akin perceptions, which often coincide with
“redempotionist” and/or “sovereign citizen” socio-political beliefs. See Bey v. Stumpf,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120076, at *2-13 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2011) (detailing various aspects
of said position). Heavily peppered with senselessly used Latin phrases, references to
maritime law and the treaties having no relation to any events that could have taken place
in the modern United States, often relying on self-created nearly-gibberish terminology,
that particular submission strives to impress the reader by mimicking a set of enforceable
legal documents and, seemingly aiming at that goal, self-designates itself as a “Writ of
Prohibition.” See Malfeasance-I, Docket Entry No. 1. The best this Court can surmise,
the Malfeasance-I submission was executed in light of commencement of a certain
criminal proceeding in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County
(“Law Division”); that criminal prosecution is, seemingly, underway and is conducted
against a certain individual named Clifton McMillan (“Clifton”). See id. at 2. It appears
that the Malfeasance-I submission seeks this Court’s order directing the Law Division to
halt or wholly abandon Clifton’s prosecution. See id.
2.
The submission docketed in Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton v.
Malfeasance Task Force (“Malfeasance-II”), Civil Action No. 12-3520 (RBK) (D.N.J.), is
executed in exactly same style. See Malfeasance-II, Docket Entry No. 1. The best this
Court can surmise, the Malfeasance-II submission was executed in light of
commencement of a certain proceeding in the Supreme Court of New York, Family Court
Division (“Family Court”), against a certain individual named Drexel McMillan
(“Drexel”). See id. at 2. The Malfeasance-II seemingly seeks this Court’s intervention in
the aforesaid Family Court action. See id.
Page 2 of 15
3.
Being drafted in “Marrakush”-style argot and asserting “Marrakush”-type rights and
claims, each of these submissions presents a facially deficient pleading.
Moorish and Redemptionist Movements. Two concepts, which may or
may not operate as interrelated, color the issues at hand. One of these
concepts underlies ethnic/religious identification movement of certain
groups of individuals who refer to themselves as “Moors,” while the other
concept provides the basis for another movement of certain groups of
individuals, which frequently produces these individuals’ denouncement
of United States citizenship, self-declaration of other, imaginary
“citizenship” and accompanying self-declaration of equally imaginary
“diplomatic immunity.”
[a].
Moorish Movement
In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - being
one of the first courts to detail the concept of Moorish movement,
observed as follows:
[The Moorish Science Temple of America is a] black Islamic sect .
. . . [T]hree-fourths of its temples (congregations) are inside
prisons. The Moors, as adherents to the Moorish Science Temple
are called, have their own version of the Koran and a list of
prophets that includes, in addition to the prophets recognized by
orthodox Islam, Buddha, Confucius, and the founder . . . of the
Moorish Science Temple . . . . Two groups vie for leadership of
the sect: one in Mt. Clemens, Michigan, headed by [someone
referred to as] Grand Sheik/Moderator Brother R. Love-El, and one
in St. Louis headed by [someone referred to as] Grand Sheik Jerry
Lewis-Bey. (The suffixes “El” and “Bey” refer to the African tribes
from which the Moors believe black people are descended.)
Johnson-Bey v. Lane, 863 F.2d 1308, 1309 (7th Cir. 1998).1
[b].
“Redemptionism,” “Paper Terrorism” and Related Concepts
1
The underlying term “Moors” seemingly reflects the adherents’ interest in highlighting
their actual or alleged “ancestry in ancient Moors, i.e., the seventeenth century Muslims of the
Islamic Iberian Peninsula and North Africa, who were of Berber and Arab descent.” Marrakush
Soc’y v. N.J. State Police, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *4, n.1 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009).
Page 3 of 15
Shortly after the concept of Moorish movement was outlined by the
Seventh Circuit, discussions of another movement appeared on the pages
of legal opinions issued by the federal judiciary; that other movement was
dubbed as “sovereign citizenship” movement. This movement was
fostered by
a loosely organized collection of groups and individuals who have
adopted a right-wing anarchist ideology originating in the theories
of a group called the Posse Comitatus in the 1970s. Its adherents
believe that virtually all existing government in the United States is
illegitimate . . . . [Therefore, such] “sovereign citizens” wage war
against the government and other forms of authority using “paper
terrorism” harassment and intimidation tactics, and occasionally
resorting to [physical] violence.
Sovereign Citizen Movement, Anti-Defamation League, at
<> (visited on Mar. 31, 2011).2 Consequently, a decade
2
The concept of “sovereign citizenship” does, occasionally, relate to the phenomenon of
“world passports.” “World passports,” issued by the so-called World Service Authority
(“WSA”), are not recognized, in the United States and in the majority of world nations, as
substitutes to official documents, such as national passports or drivers’ licenses. See, e.g.,
Eugenio J. Huot Calderon, The Concept of Puerto Rican Citizenship, 35 Rev. D.P. 321, 333-36
(1996); <>. A former-World-War-II-bomber-pilot-turned-peace-activist Garry Davis
created the WSA in 1953 after renouncing his U.S. citizenship and gaining notoriety by picketing
the United Nations to argue that world peace requires a global government rather than a system
of nation-states. See Daniel Engber, What’s a World Passport? Slate Mag. (Mar. 24, 2006). The
WSA has been promoting “world citizenship” by issuing documents largely similar in their
appearance to regular national passports, which the WSA called “world passports,” to any person
who wanted to declare himself/herself “a citizen of the world.” One can inexpensively obtain
such “passport” by filling out an application form at the WSA website. See <>. Therefore, while some persons just denounce their United States citizenship
under the claim of sovereign citizenship, see, e.g., Roche v. Attorney General, 420 Fed. App’x
124, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5773, at 1-2, nn. 1 and 2 (3d Cir. 2011), others accompany their
denouncements of United States citizenship by applications for “world passports” and attempts to
use these passports as legally cognizable documents, sometimes for the purposes of perpetrating
criminal schemes in the United States. See, e.g., Asghar v. State, 698 N.E.2d 879 (Ind. Ct. App.
1998). Moreover, a person’s denouncement of his/her United States citizenship (being
occasionally accompanied by the person’s obtaining of a “world passport”) frequently produces a
peculiar “side effect” in the form of that person’s self-grant of alternative, imaginary citizenship
Page 4 of 15
after the Seventh Circuit’s issuance of Bey v. Lane, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted a stream of
government actions aimed at controlling the “paper terrorism”
activities of sovereign citizens, which - by then - matured into a
wide-spread criminal scheme, where the scheme participants’
“self-legitimized” their names for the purposes of initiating
fraudulent legal transactions. The Court of Appeals explained:
Evidently, [adherents of this scheme have been] filing
[fraudulent] financing statements under Article 9 of the
UCC, which sets forth a process for perfecting security
interests in property. These liens and judgments, accessible
on financing statement forms, are easy to file. Once
registered, however, the fraudulent liens are very
burdensome to remove. For example, in a New Jersey
incident, [one group] registered a fraudulent $ 14.5 million
lien with the New Jersey Department of Revenue against a
federal prosecutor and a $ 3.5 million lien against a federal
judge for using [the group participants’] “copyrighted”
names in court papers and hearings . . . . [Adherents of this
scheme] have filed these commercial liens with state
departments of revenue, departments of state, or other the
state agencies responsible for receiving and recording these
financial instruments. Further investigation revealed that
various publications were advocating the exploitation of the
UCC filing process and provided explicit instructions on
how to perfect these fraudulent security interests, including
sample financing statements forms. [These publications
built on] the “Redemptionist” theory, which propounds that
a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional
person called the “strawman.” . . . Redemptionists claim
that government has power only over the strawman and not
over the live person, who remains free [and, thus,]
individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing
statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman.
Thereafter, [pursuant to this “theory,”] the real person can
demand that government officials pay enormous sums of
money to use the strawman’s name or, in the case of
which, in turn, results in that person’s insistence upon his/her “diplomatic immunity” for the
purposes of United States law or, better say, for the purposes of the “grantee’s” attempts to avoid
the reach of law. See, e.g., U.S. Dist. Court v. Ephriam, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103284 (D. Kan.
Nov. 4, 2009).
Page 5 of 15
prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials
refuse, [adherents of this scheme] file liens against
[government officials] . Adherents of this scheme also
advocate that [they] copyright their names to justify filing
liens against officials using their names in public records
such as indictments or court papers.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 and nn. 3 and 4 (3d Cir.
2008); accord Roche, 420 Fed. App’x 124, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
5773, at 2 (noting that the “sovereign citizen” litigant elected to
present the district court’s dismissal of his petition as a “contract”
between the court and the litigant).
The “strawman” concept is, occasionally, presented/exploited somewhat
differently by those redemptionists who claim that - at the moment of their
denouncement of United States citizenship and/or their accompanying
self-grant of imaginary alternative citizenship - their “strawman”
incarnation became “deceased,” and their live persons quasi-expatriated
from the U.S. (while continuing their actual physical residence in the
United States). In connection with this odd quasi-expatriation scheme,
such redemptionists often claim that their live persons: (a) hold “estates”
in the form of actual physical bodies of their respective “quasi-deceased”
strawmen;3 and (b) reside in geographic locales “self-claimed away” from
the United States.
3
This “estate” concept is legally deficient on its face. As one court explained,
[such] “estates” of [litigants] cannot qualify as [actual] litigants since [these
“estates”] offer no order by a probate court acknowledging the existence of these
“estates” and, indeed, it would be surprising had such order been entered because
it is well established that the body of a decedent cannot be an estate, or even a part
of an estate. See Greneker v. Sprouse, 263 S.C. 571, 574, 211 S.E.2d 879 (1975)
(clarifying that the estate is limited to the real and personal property of a
decedent); see also In re Estate of Medlen, 286 Ill. App. 3d 860, 864, 677 N.E.2d
33, 222 Ill. Dec. 220 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (explaining that “there is no property
right in a dead body, and the body forms no part of the decedent’s estate . . .” and
citing 22A Am. Jur. 2d Dead Bodies §§ 2 and 3 and In re Estate of Fischer, 1 Ill.
App. 2d 528, 535, 117 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. App. Ct. 1954)); In re Estate of Moyer,
577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) (same); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hospital, 30 Md.
App. 317, 352 A.2d 334 (Md. App. Ct. 1976) (same).
Estate of Casimir v. New Jersey, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78113, at *9 (D.N.J. Aug. 31, 2009).
Page 6 of 15
[c].
Interplay Between Moorish and Sovereign Citizenship Movements
It does not appear that one’s Moorish ethnic roots (or Moorish religious
convictions, or both) have any reason to go hand-in-hand with one’s
adhesion to the sovereign citizenship movement (or with one’s professing
the theory of redemptionism, or with one’s practice of “paper terrorism,”
claims of self- granted “diplomatic immunity,” etc.). However, and
unfortunately enough, certain groups of individuals began merging these
concepts by building on their alleged ancestry in ancient Moors (and/or on
their alleged or actual adhesion to Moorish religious convictions) for the
purposes of committing criminal offenses and/or initiating frivolous legal
actions on the grounds of their self-granted “diplomatic immunity,” which
these individuals deduce either from their self-granted “Moorish
citizenship” and from their correspondingly-produced homemade
“Moorish” documents (or from correspondingly-obtained “world
passports”) or from a multitude of other, equally non-cognizable under the
law, bases, which these individuals keep creating in order to support their
allegations of “diplomatic immunity.”4
Murakush-Amexem, 790 F. Supp. 2d 241, 2452-12 (footnotes in original).
4.
Moreover, any drafter’s reliance on an ancient treaty wholly unrelated to the factual
events alleged brings that drafter’s submission dangerously close to being frivolous.
4
Such claims of “diplomatic immunity” are without merit. As it was already observed,
[Plaintiffs err in conflating their] expatriation and [diplomatic] immunity
arguments, since: (a) Plaintiffs seem to focus on an irrelevant fact that anyone
may renounce his/her United States citizenship, but this fact in no way establishes
that Plaintiffs actually expatriated in accordance with the applicable legal
requirements, see, e.g., Memorandum Opinion for the Solicitor General of June
12, 2000, . . . ; Marks v. Esperdy, 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963) . . . ; and (b) even if
the Court were to hypothesize that Plaintiffs duly expatriated, the fact of
expatriation has no effect on the state court’s jurisdiction to conduct Plaintiffs’
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1996); see also Cara S. O’Driscoll, The Execution of Foreign Nationals
in Arizona, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 323 (2000); [accord] Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F.
Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) . . . .
Casimir, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78113, at *19, n. 8 (parenthetical explanations omitted).
Page 7 of 15
[The key] feature present virtually in every submission made [in this type
of cases] is these litigants' nearly invariable invocation of the Barbary
Treaties (and, specifically, the Treaty with Morocco) in the context of
challenging their searches, arrests, confinements, criminal proceedings,
bails, fees, convictions, etc. that took place entirely within the United
States territory and were effectuated by the law enforcement and judicial
officers of the States of New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, Florida, etc. All
provisions of the Treaty with Morocco are, however, wholly inapposite to
the type of challenges . . . . As noted supra, the Treaty with Morocco was
executed, as all Barbary Treaties, with the aim to: (a) eliminate, or at least
curtail, the ill of piracy plaguing the coastal waters and ports of the
post-medieval North African geopolitical bodies; and (b) eliminate, or at
least halt the rise of, the fees charged by the rules of these geo-political
bodies to the then-developing American merchantry for keeping "peace" in
the ports and coastal waters subject to their dominion. See Frank Lambert,
The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World (2007).
It is, therefore, hardly surprising that the bulk of the provisions of the
Barbary Treaties: (a) focused on issues of maritime/admiralty, war,
merchant purchases/sales and akin matters; and (b) were set forth in terms
of protections of “vessels.” This is particularly obvious in the Treaty with
Morocco, which was a short accord consisting of mere twenty-five
Articles, with only three Articles focusing not on acts of war, vessels,
merchant activities, etc. but on the acts against generic civilian human
beings. See 1836 U.S.T. LEXIS 10, arts. 6, 20 and 21. . . . None of these
three Articles could be read as applying to habeas or civil rights claims
raised by [the “Marrakush” litigants] against state police or prosecutorial
officers, or judges, as to the claims based on the events of [their] arrests,
incarceration, bailing, prosecution, convictions, etc. See, e.g., Seals-Bey
v. Cross, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87794 (N.D. W. Va. July 23, 2010) . . . .
Indeed, Article Six of the Treaty, was fashioned to prevent undue
enslaving of American citizens (and also to prevent theft of American
citizens' goods) in the Mediterraneans by pirating Moors who were either
of Morrocan or of non-Morrocan domicile and who were taking undue
advantage of the passage ways, trade, accommodations, etc. in Moroccan
coastal waters and ports. This Article is facially inapplicable to the
[events which did] not occur anywhere near the coastal waters and ports of
the Kingdom of Morocco and, to top it all off, were not conducted by
Moors. See Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort
Statute, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 830, 876 (2006) (under the “Treaty with
Morocco, . . . the locus of the [T]reaty partners' interaction [was] confined
to the Mediterranean and therefore not within the [geographical]
jurisdiction of the United States”); accord Pitt-Bey v. District of Columbia,
942 A.2d 1132 (D.C. 2008) (a self-proclaimed “Moorish” minister has no
Page 8 of 15
diplomatic immunity protection from criminal proceedings conducted
within the United States territory). Analogously, Articles Twenty and
Twenty-One of the Treaty are facially inapplicable to [the “Marrakush”
litigants], since they had no right to consular assistance, and no United
States citizen killed or wounded them in the Mediterranean: all the events
they complaint about occurred] well within the borders of the United
States . . . . See United States v. Casey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39785
(E.D. Mo. July 21, 2005) (the decision to criminally prosecute a
self-declared “Moor” is constitutionally independent of any consular
interest in assistance) (citing United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 886 (8th
Cir. 2002); United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165-66 (2nd Cir.
2001); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391-94 (6th Cir.
2001); United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885-86 (9th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1195-96
(11th Cir. 2000)). Two conclusions ensue from the aforesaid analysis.
The first one is that all . . . claims challenging any events . . . that occur
within what is the United States' actual geographical territory (and,
especially, if these events involve those individuals who reside within that
territory) cannot implicate any provision of the Treaty with Morocco. The
second conclusion, building on the prior one, is that all such . . . claims . . .
are necessarily frivolous which, in turn, means that any pleading asserting
such claims is not bona fide and warrants no examination on merits.
Murakush-Amexem, 790 F. Supp. 2d 241, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887 at *78-88
(footnotes omitted).
5.
Deficiencies seemingly ensuing from the above-described “Marrakush” style of drafting
and “Marrakush”-type claims mired the submissions currently before the Court.
Specifically, the intended plaintiffs in these two matters seem to be Clifton and Drexel,
but these de facto plaintiffs are, allegedly, “represented” by a person who designated
himself/herself by using the alias “Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton.” See
Malfeasance-I, Docket Entry No. 1; Malfeasance-II, Docket Entry No. 1.
a.
Under the “next friend” doctrine, standing is allowed to a third person so this third
person could file and pursue a claim in court on behalf of someone who is unable
Page 9 of 15
to do so on his or her own. The doctrine dates back to the English Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679 and provides a narrow exception to the “case or controversy”
requirement set forth in the Article III of Constitution. See Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990). The Whitmore Court set out two
requirements that should be met by the one seeking to qualify for “next friend”
standing: (1) “the ‘next friend’ must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the
person on whose behalf [(s)he] seeks to litigate” (and it has been suggested that a
“‘next friend’ must have some significant relationship with the real party in
interest”); and (2) “the ‘next friend’ must provide an adequate explanation — such
as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability — why the real party
in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action.” Id. at 163-64.
Since Witmore, the Supreme Court further elaborated the standing requirements
of Article III in terms of a three-part test, i.e., whether the plaintiff can
demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged actions of
the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 102-103 (1998).
However, “the point has always been the same: whether a plaintiff ‘personally
would benefit in a tangible way from the court’s intervention.’” Id., at 103 n. 5
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)); see also, Sprint Communs.
Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., 554 U.S. 269, 301 (2008) (Roberts, J., dissenting)
(“The absence of any right to the substantive recovery means that respondents
cannot benefit from the judgment they seek and thus lack Article III standing.
Page 10 of 15
‘When you got nothing, you got nothing to lose’”) (quoting, with correction of
grammar, Bob Dylan, Like A Rolling Stone, in On Highway 61, Revisited
(Columbia Records 1965)). Here, it is self-evident that “Mohammedan Consul Es
Lamont Durell Belton” neither has Clifton and/or Drexel’s best interests at heart,
nor can “Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton” show Clifton and/or
Drexel’s lack of capacity to prosecute violations of their rights. Thus,
“Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton” cannot proceed jus tertii on
behalf of either Clifton or Drexel.
b.
With the same token, “Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton” cannot
act as Clifton or Drexel’s legal counsel.
“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and
conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of
such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (emphasis supplied). . . . While
a duly licensed attorney may [operate as] a law firm, see Puckett v.
McPhillips Shinbaum, LLP, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26215 (M.D.
Ala. Mar. 31, 2008), [an entity self-designating itself as a “law
firm”] cannot qualify as “counsel” . . . A fortiori, an entity not
qualified as an actual law firm cannot represent anyone in the court
of law. Similarly, a person not duly admitted to legal practice but
merely self-describing himself as an attorney . . . cannot act as an
attorney to any juridical entity or natural person in the court of law;
he can only act as his own counsel. Hence, [no self-designated
“attorney”] may represent any [plaintiff unless] he is an attorney
duly admitted to practice in this District; otherwise, [the party] can
act only represent himself. Accord Local Civil Rule 11.1 (“In each
case, the attorney of record who is a member of the bar of this
Court shall personally sign all papers submitted to the Court or
filed with the Clerk”).
Marrakush Soc’y v. N.J. State Police, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68057, at *94-95
(D.N.J. July 30, 2009).
Page 11 of 15
Since “Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton” neither provided this Court with
any verifications of his/her admission to practice in this District, and this Court’s official
records of admitted counsel contain no reference to “Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont
Durell Belton,” “Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton” cannot act as a legal
counsel to Clifton or Drexel.
6.
Furthermore, while both Clifton and Drexel, being – seemingly – natural persons, can
litigate their claims in forma pauperis, they must first obtain in forma pauperis status by
submitting a valid application to that effect or, in alternative, by submitting the filing fee
of $350 per each action.
7.
Finally, and paramountly here, a pleadings executed by either Clifton or Drexel could
operate as a cognizable civil complaint only if such pleading complies with the
requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, a civil
complaint must conform to the requirements set forth in Rules 8(a) and (e). The Rules
require that the complaint be simple, concise, direct and set forth “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993);
cf. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (procedural rules in civil litigation
should not be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without
counsel); Burks v. City of Philadelphia, 904 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (pleading
which represented a “gross departure from the letter and the spirit of Rule 8(a)(2)” in
failing to contain a short and plain statement of claims struck by District Court);
Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming dismissal of pro se civil
Page 12 of 15
rights complaint naming numerous defendants, setting forth numerous causes of action,
and numbering fifteen pages and eighty-eight paragraphs). Here, each of the submissions
at bar fails to comply with the requirements of Rule 8. “A District courts should not have
to read and decipher tomes disguised as pleadings.” Lindell v. Houser, 442 F.3d 1033,
1035 n.1 (7th Cir. 2006). A fortiori, the Court has no obligation to weed its way through
the thickets of“Marrakush” argot, senseless Latin phrases, references to the treaties
having no relation to the factual allegations raised, etc.
IT IS, THEREFORE, on this
15th
day of
October
, 2012,
ORDERED that the submission docketed as Docket Entry No. 1 in Mohammedan Consul
Es Lamont Durell Belton v. Malfeasance Task Force, Civil Action No. 12-3519 (RBK) (D.N.J.),
is dismissed for Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton’s lack of standing. Such
dismissal is without prejudice to Clifton McMillan’s filing of a civil complaint executed on his
own behalf, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8, as detailed herein, and without any
resort to “Marrakush” argot, any references to the Barbary Treaties or any other references to
irrelevant legal sources or “Marrakush”-type rights. Such properly executed complaint must be
accompanied by the applicable filing fee of $350 or by Clifton McMillan’s duly executed
in forma pauperis application; and it is further
ORDERED that the submission docketed as Docket Entry No. 1 in Mohammedan Consul
Es Lamont Durell Belton v. Malfeasance Task Force, Civil Action No. 12-3520 (RBK) (D.N.J.),
is analogously dismissed for Mohammedan Consul Es Lamont Durell Belton’s lack of standing.
Such dismissal is without prejudice to Drexel McMillan’s filing of a civil complaint executed on
his own behalf, in accordance with the requirements of Rule 8 and without any resort to
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“Marrakush” argot, references to the Barbary Treaties or any other references to irrelevant legal
sources or “Marrakush”-type rights. Such properly executed complaint must be accompanied by
the applicable filing fee of $350 or by Drexel McMillan’s duly executed in forma pauperis
application; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate each of the above-captioned
actions without filing the submissions received and without assessing a filing fee, by making a
new and separate entry on the docket of each of the above-captioned actions, reading “CIVIL
CASE TERMINATED”; and it is further
ORDERED that administrative termination is not a dismissal on merits, and Clifton
McMillan and/or Drexel McMillan may have their respected matters reopened in the event they
submit, within sixty days from the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, their
own duly executed civil complaints and accompany each of these complaints by the filing fee of
$350 (or by their own, duly executed under penalty of perjury, applications to proceed in their
respective matters in forma pauperis); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve this Memorandum Opinion and Order upon the
addressee designated in the submissions made in the above-captioned matters; and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall include in the said mailing: (a) two blank application
form for the individuals wishing to prosecute a civil complaint in forma pauperis; (b) two blank
civil complaint forms (which the Court strongly urges Clifton McMillan and/or Drexel McMillan
to utilize in preparation of their pleadings, that is, in the event Clifton McMillan and/or Drexel
McMillan elect to file a civil complaint); (c) copies of the docket sheets created in these two
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matters.
s/Robert B. Kugler
Robert B. Kugler
United States District Judge
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