DICKERSON v. BANK OF AMERICA

Filing 20

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 3/19/2013. (tf, n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

(Doc. Nos. 6, 7, 18)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :

RITA DICKERSON,

Civil No. 12-03922 (RBK/KMW)
OPINION

KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Bank of America, N.A.
(“Defendant”) to dismiss the complaint of Rita Dickerson (“Plaintiff”). Defendant moves to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and
12(b)(1), respectively. In addition to her complaint, Plaintiff has filed a motion to stay
foreclosure pending the outcome of trial and a motion for pro bono counsel. For the reasons
expressed below, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
I.

BACKGROUND
On March 15, 2006, Plaintiff entered into a mortgage loan with Precision Financial, Inc.

and used the loan proceeds to refinance her house in Chesilhurst, New Jersey. Unfortunately,
Plaintiff defaulted in her mortgage payments and on May 17, 2010, a foreclosure complaint was
filed for the property in the Camden County Chancery. On August 10, 2010, a default was

entered against Plaintiff. The foreclosure action remains pending before the Superior Court of
New Jersey and final judgment has not yet been entered.
Plaintiff now asserts claims against Defendant, demanding relief in the form of “a clear
title to the property in question, compensatory damages in the amount of $77,680 in lower
modified payments and 5.7 Million dollars from Bank of America for punitive damages.” Pl.
Compl. at 1. Plaintiff has also filed a motion to stay the foreclosure pending the outcome of trial.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). “When a motion under Rule 12 is based on more than one ground, the court should
consider the 12(b)(1) challenge first because if it must dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, all other defenses and objections become moot.” In re Corestates Trust Fee
Litig., 837 F. Supp. 104, 105 (E.D. Pa. 1993). Because the Court concludes that the doctrine of
Younger abstention compels dismissal, further discussion of the legal standard for Rule 12(b)(6)
is unnecessary.
A district court may treat a party’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) as either a facial or factual challenge to the court’s jurisdiction.
Gould Elecs., Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). “In reviewing a facial
attack, the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced
therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citing PBGC v.
White, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)). “In reviewing a factual attack, the court may
consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. (citing Gotha v. United States, 115 F.3d 176, 17879 (3d Cir. 1997)); see United States ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506, 514

(3d Cir. 2007). A district court has “substantial authority” to “weigh the evidence and satisfy
itself as to the existence of its power to hear the case.” Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 549 F.2d 884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977). “[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff’s
allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts will not preclude the trial court from
evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Id.
Although courts generally treat a pre-answer motion under Rule 12(b)(1) as a facial
challenge, see Cardio-Med. Assoc., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Med. Ctr., 721 F.2d 68, 75 (3d Cir.
1983), a “factual challenge under Rule 12(b)(1) may be made prior to service of an answer” if
the defendant contests the plaintiff’s allegations. Knauss v. United States DOJ, No. 10-26-36,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108603, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 7, 2010) (citing Berardi v. Swanson Mem’l
Lodge No. 48 of Fraternal Order of Police, 920 F.2d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 1990)). When a defendant
raises a factual challenge to jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing
jurisdiction. Gould Elecs. Inc., 220 F.3d at 176-77.
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has fashioned her complaint to seek compensatory and punitive damages for
Defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct. However, even a cursory inspection of the pleading
reveals that Plaintiff actually petitions this Court to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings and force
Defendant to lower her monthly mortgage payment. On this basis, Defendant challenges the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction and contends that the Court is barred from proceeding under
the doctrine of Younger abstention. The Court agrees and will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
Under the Younger doctrine, espoused in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) and its
progeny, federal courts are generally prohibited from enjoining pending state proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances. Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457

U.S. 423, 431 (1982). The doctrine only applies if the Court determines that: 1) there are state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; 2) the state proceedings implicate important state
interests; and 3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims.
Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 101, 106 (3d Cir. 1989). If these requirements are established, the
federal court, out of “a proper respect for state functions,” must abstain from hearing the case.
See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431.
The three Younger requirements are satisfied in this case. The pending foreclosure action
is certainly judicial in nature and the Superior Court of New Jersey provides an adequate forum
for review of whatever federal claims Plaintiff may intend to assert. The state foreclosure
proceedings also implicate important state interests. See Gray v. Pagano, 287 Fed. Appx. 155,
157 (2008) (finding Younger abstention appropriate because “any relief that could be granted by
the district court would directly impact [the state’s] interest in protecting the authority of its
judicial system.”). If the Court permitted Plaintiff’s claim to proceed, the Court would
essentially be “substituting itself for the State’s appellate courts” and would undermine the
notion of comity that underlies the Younger abstention doctrine. Gray, 287 Fed. Appx. at 157;
see also Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 431. Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaint must be dismissed for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. 1

1

Under Younger, a Court may interfere with state court proceedings that satisfy the doctrinal elements only if one
of four exceptions are met: 1) great and immediate irreparable injury; 2) the state law is flagrantly and patently
violative of express constitutional prohibitions; 3) there is a showing of bad faith or harassment; or 4) some other
unusual circumstance demands equitable relief. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972) (citing Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46-54 (1971). None of these exceptions apply to this case.

III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s

motion to stay foreclosure and motion for pro bono counsel are DENIED. An appropriate order
shall issue today.

Dated: 3/19/2013

/s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge