MEEHAN v. TAYLOR et al
Filing
72
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 11/5/2014. (TH, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
(Doc. No. 68)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
JOSEPH MEEHAN,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
Civil No. 12-4079 (RBK/KMW)
:
ERIC TAYLOR, et al.,
:
OPINION
:
Defendants.
:
___________________________________ :
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Defendants for summary judgment
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 (Doc. No. 68). The subject of this motion is
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, in which he alleges violations of Federal and state laws against
Defendants, based on an injury he suffered while in custody at the Camden County Correctional
Facility. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ motion will be granted.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND1
On February 17, 2011, Plaintiff Joseph Meehan (“Plaintiff”) was arrested for a parole
violation by certain members of the U.S. Marshalls Service in Pennsauken, New Jersey. (Defs.’
Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Defs.’ SMF”) ¶¶ 1, 10.) That same day he was
admitted to the Camden County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) as a pretrial detainee, and
When considering a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts underlying the claims in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998
F.2d 1224, 1230 (3d Cir. 1993).
1
charged with drug distribution, possession and distribution in a school zone and receiving stolen
property, as well as a parole violation. (Id. ¶¶ 13-14.) Plaintiff was detained at the CCCF at all
times relevant to this matter.
According to Plaintiff, during his arrest, one of the U.S. Marshals kicked a pair of
crutches out from under Plaintiff’s arm, which caused him to fall to the ground. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 11.)
At that point, the U.S. Marshals repeatedly stomped on his left foot, which was already “swollen
and injured.” (Id. ¶¶ 2, 10, 12.) An x-ray of his left foot, taken later that day on February 17,
2011, showed a fracture. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiff subsequently underwent surgery on his left foot on
March 3, 2011, at Millennium Surgical Center, and was returned to CCCF. (Id. ¶ 16.)
Several months later, on July 25, 2011, Lt. Christopher Foschini (“Foschini”), the Unit
Commander for Internal Affairs at CCCF, received a handwritten note authored by inmate Frank
Batten, who was housed in the same unit as Plaintiff. (Id. ¶ 17.) Inmate Batten’s note stated that
two of CCCF’s transport officers were in “great danger” because there was an “escape plan in
motion” on an approaching medical trip. (Id. ¶ 18.) After receiving the note, Foschini met with
inmate Batten, who reported what Plaintiff had said to him—that he was going to be transported
to a doctor’s office for a foot examination and treatment, and while at this location, he was going
to escape by using force against an officer, and certain unknown persons on the outside would be
waiting for him. (Id. ¶ 19.) Inmate Batten also told Foschini that Plaintiff was in possession of
two shanks, one of which he kept inside his foot brace, and the other he kept inside his cell. (Id.
¶ 20.)
As a result of this information, Foschini immediately notified Warden Eric Taylor
(“Taylor”) and Captain Michael Murphy (“Murphy”), and Murphy ordered a search of the
medical unit. (Id. ¶ 21.) In Plaintiff’s cell, Officer Louis Kaelin found a seven inch sharpened
2
piece of metal with a piece of cloth wrapped around it, acting as a handle, inside Plaintiff’s
personal belongings. (Id. ¶ 24.) During his search of Plaintiff, in a separate cell, Officer
Kenneth Sweeten (“Sweeten”) found an eight and one-half inch sharpened piece of metal inside
the Plaintiff’s air cast. (Id. ¶ 22.)
The parties disagree over the details of what happened when Sweeten searched Plaintiff’s
medical boot for the weapon, CCCF’s policies, or lack thereof, regarding how officers were to
conduct a search of inmates with medical devices, and any grievance records submitted by
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff contends that, on July 25, 2011, Sweeten forcibly removed him from his
wheelchair while he was in his cell and dragged him into an adjoining cell. (Ex. A to Pl.’s
Opp’n, Joseph Meehan Deposition Testimony (“Meehan Dep.”) at 67:6-10.) While Plaintiff was
held from behind, Sweeten then violently ripped Plaintiff’s air cast off his leg from the front.
(Id. at 70:15-21, 71:11-13.) After finding the shank inside Plaintiff’s cast, Sweeten asked
Plaintiff if he was going to use it to “stab a cop,” and proceeded to use his boot to stomp on
Plaintiff’s injured left foot. (Id. at 67:21-25, 71:7-10.) Following this incident, Plaintiff was
placed into an isolation cell. (Id. at 73:19-21.) Despite Sweeten’s alleged actions, Plaintiff
admits that he suffered no additional broken bones in his foot. (Defs.’ SMF ¶ 28; Pl.’s Response
to Defs.’ SMF ¶ 28.)
Conversely, Defendants assert that Sweeten had Plaintiff remove his own cast, at
Sweeten’s direction. (Ex. B to Pl.’s Opp’n, Kenneth Sweeten Deposition Testimony (“Sweeten
Dep.”) at 30:7-13, 32:8-33:14.) They claim Sweeten never forcibly removed Plaintiff from his
wheelchair, or stomped on Plaintiff’s foot after his cast had been removed. (Id. at 53:17-25.)
Rather, after Plaintiff had removed his cast and Sweeten had secured the knife, Sweeten
3
proceeded to have Plaintiff remove each item of clothing he was wearing to be searched for any
additional weapons, prior to being placed into the isolation cell. (Id. at 33:15-24.)
According to Sweeten, he was unaware of any policy which prohibited corrections
officers from removing medical devices, but he did not recall receiving any formal training
regarding how to remove such devices. (Id. at 26:4-7, 26:13-16.) Prior to the removal of
Plaintiff’s air cast, Sweeten did not ask Plaintiff why he had the cast on, and he had no
knowledge concerning Plaintiffs prior injury. (Id. at 40:23-25, 41:9-11, 42:12-15.) He also
admitted that it would have been logistically possible to have a medical staff member remove the
air cast, had Plaintiff been restrained, but Sweeten claimed he did not do so because “there was a
potential of a shank and … I’m not going to have anybody in there.” (Id. 39:13-24.) Deputy
Warden Christopher Fosler also testified that the removal of medical devices during inmate
searches at CCCF, and the need for medical staff to assist, was dealt with on a case-by-case
basis, and is left up to the Officers conducting the search. (Ex. D to Pl.’s Opp’n, Christopher
Fosler Deposition Testimony (“Fosler Dep.”) at 51:14-52:10 (“If it’s an emergent case, [the
decision as to how to remove the medical device is left up to the officer]”).)
While Plaintiff had previously relied on the use of inmate grievance forms for filing
grievances, (see Ex. I to Defs.’ Br, CCCF Inmate Grievance Procedure and Inmate Meehan
Grievance Records (“Grievance Procedure” and “Grievance Records,” respectively)), he claims
he was not provided with a grievance form after he requested one on July 25. (Meehan Dep. at
114:6-18.) Instead, within days of the incident, Plaintiff apparently sent “grievance” letters to
Taylor and CCCF Nurse Melanie Julie (“Julie”). (Ex. E to Pl.’s Opp’n, Letters to Warden Taylor
and Nurse Julie (“Taylor Letters” and “Julie Letter,” respectively).)2 Plaintiff’s letter to Julie,
While there are two letters addressed to Taylor included in Exhibit E, Plaintiff’s deposition testimony indicates that
the second, printed letter (stamped with the word “Received” in reverse), was the only letter actually sent to Taylor
2
4
dated July 27, 2011, was titled “Grievance Form” and mentions that “[t]he E.T.V. team (c/o
Sweeton & his band of corrupt cops) smashed [Plaintiff’s] already injured left foot while shaking
down.” (Julie Letter.) In that letter he went on to complain that he had submitted other
grievance letters to Julie requesting medical treatment, yet the medical staff continued to refuse
to look at or treat his injury. (Id.) In his July 31, 2011, letter written to Taylor, Plaintiff
complained that inmate Batten had lied about the alleged escape plan, and was trying to extort
certain inmates. (Taylor Letters.) Plaintiff also protested that he did not have access to a pen to
write and sign “legal documents.” (Id.) Defendants admit that Plaintiff sent Taylor a letter, but
deny receiving the letter addressed to Julie. (Defs.’ Response to Pl.’s Statement of Undisputed
Material Facts ¶ 26.)
CCCF’s inmate handbook provides that “[a] grievance may be initiated for … a. An
alleged violation of civil, constitutional or statutory right or policy.” (Grievance Procedure.)
Importantly,
8. Inmates are encouraged to resolve grievances informally by
voicing their grievances to any staff member. … When presented
with an informal grievance, the staff member may initiate
corrective action if the action is within the normal scope of the
employee responsibility. However, if the inmate grievance is
beyond the scope of the staff member, he shall notify their
supervisor as soon as practical. All reasonable steps will be taken
to resolve the grievances informally within the approved discretion
by Plaintiff. (See Meehan Dep. 116:12-117:14 (describing the first letter, titled “Exhibit A,” to be a rough draft of
the letter actually sent to Taylor).) Because the one letter submitted to Taylor is the only letter relevant for purposes
of determining whether Plaintiff complied with the grievance procedures, all further references to the “Taylor
Letters” relate only to the language in the second letter.
The Court also notes that the document included in Exhibit E, titled “Statement of Facts,” was apparently never
submitted to CCCF officials, and is not properly considered as evidence of Plaintiff’s attempts to file grievance
reports. (See Meehan Dep. 85:7-9, 89:4-90:2, 90:21-91:8 (indicating that the document labeled “Statement of Facts”
was prepared around the time of the incident, as was the draft letter written to Taylor, labeled “Exhibit A”).) While
Plaintiff may have written this detailed document shortly after the incident which precipitated this matter, there is no
testimony or evidence suggesting that CCCF officials ever received this information prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s
lawsuit.
5
of the Shift Commander. If the matter cannot or should not be
resolved the inmate may initiate a formal grievance.
9. An inmate at [CCCF] may file a formal, written grievance
anytime within 15 days after any event has occurred where a
grievance may be warranted. … [T]he inmate may use plain paper,
if no grievance forms are available. If a plain piece of paper is
used, the paper should be clearly labeled “inmate grievance” near
the top, informing the grievance officer of the formal grievance. …
10. All grievances will be collected daily and time stamped and
logged by the Department’s Grievance Officer. The grievance
officer will review all grievances to assure that the complaint can
be grieved.
11. If the grievance meets our guidelines, it will be forwarded to
the appropriate Shift Commander for possible resolution within 72
hours of an investigation.
12. If the grievance is not resolved in 72 hours it will be return
[sic] to the grievance officer for review and resolution within 10
days. If the inmate is not satisfied with the grievance officer’s
decision, He/She may appeal to the Warden (or his designee) in 10
days in writing.
(Id.)
On July 2, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint, and on December 20, 2012,
Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Taylor, Foschini, Sweeten, Julie, CCCF, the State
of New Jersey Department of Corrections, Camden County, the United States of America, John
Does I-V, and Jane Does I-V (Doc. No. 37). In his Amended Complaint Plaintiff alleges that all
Defendants engaged in conduct against Defendant constituting: cruel and unusual punishment, in
violation of the New Jersey State Constitution (Count I); cruel and unusual punishment, in
violation of the Federal Constitution (Count II); recklessness or gross negligence, in violation of
New Jersey law (Count VI); a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count VII), and; a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1985 (Count VIII). Additionally, Plaintiff alleged a state law claim for intentional torts
(Count III) against Defendants Taylor, Foschini, Sweeten, and the unnamed John and Jane Does;
6
a state law claim for negligence (Count IV) against Defendants Foschini, Sweeten, Julie, and the
unnamed John and Jane Does; a state law claim for negligent supervision (Count V) against
Defendants Taylor, CCCF, Camden County, the State of New Jersey Department of Corrections
and the United States of America, and; a claim arising under the Federal Tort Claims Act (Count
IX) against Defendants Taylor, Foschini, Sweeten, Julie, and the unnamed John and Jane Does.
On February 28, 2013, this Court entered a stipulation and order of dismissal for
Defendant CCCF (Doc. No. 51), and on March, 19, 2013, this Court did the same for Defendant
Julie (Doc. No. 56). Then on August 26, 2013, this Court issued an order dismissing Plaintiff’s
claims against the United States of America for lack of jurisdiction (Doc. No. 62). The
remaining Defendants filed this present motion for summary judgment on April 4, 2014.
Plaintiff apparently does not contest Defendants’ motion with respect to Defendants Taylor,
Foschini, and the State of New Jersey Department of Corrections, (see Pl.’s Opp’n at 1), so the
Court will dismiss all claims against those Defendants.3 In fact, Plaintiff only opposes
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as it relates to his § 1983 claim against Defendants
Sweeten and Camden County (Count VII), and his claims for intentional torts and recklessness
and gross negligence against Defendant Sweeten (Counts III and VI). (Id. at 7-17.)
Accordingly, the Court will also dismiss Counts I-II, IV-V, and VIII-IX against Sweeten and
Camden County, as well as Count VI against Camden County. As discussed herein, because
“Although ‘[u]se of John Doe defendants is permissible in certain situations until reasonable discovery permits the
true defendants to be identified,’ these parties must be dismissed if such discovery does not reveal their proper
identities.” Cordial v. Atl. City, No. 11-1457, 2014 WL 1095584, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 19, 2014), recons. den., 2014
WL 2451137 (D.N.J. June 2, 2014) (citing Blakeslee v. Clinton Cnty., 336 F. App’x 248, 250 (3d Cir. 2009)
(affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal of fictitious parties that were not identified after discovery)). “This
may be done upon motion of a party or the Court.” Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the
court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party.”)). Here, Plaintiff has failed to amend his Complaint or
otherwise identify any of these fictitious defendants despite the fact that discovery has now closed. Thus, these
parties shall be dismissed.
3
7
Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, his § 1983 claims will be dismissed
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), and the Court will dismiss his remaining state law claims.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
The Court should grant a motion for summary judgment when the moving party “shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “material” to the dispute if it could alter
the outcome, and a dispute of a material fact is “genuine” if “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (“Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party,
there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Az. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391
U.S. 253, 289 (1968)). In deciding whether there is any genuine issue for trial, the court is not to
weigh evidence or decide issues of fact. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Because fact and credibility
determinations are for the jury, the non-moving party’s evidence is to be believed and
ambiguities construed in its favor. Id. at 255; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587.
Although the movant bears the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the non-movant likewise must present more than mere allegations or denials to
successfully oppose summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party must
at least present probative evidence from which the jury might return a verdict in his favor. Id. at
257. The movant is entitled to summary judgment where the non-moving party fails to “make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986).
8
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants contend that, because Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies
regarding his § 1983 claims for cruel and unusual punishment or municipal liability, his
remaining federal claims must be dismissed pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. See
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under
section 1983, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other
correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”); see also
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006) (“Prisoners must now exhaust all ‘available’
remedies.”) Plaintiff claims his letters to Taylor and Julie were sufficient to exhaust his
administrative remedies.
Whether Plaintiff properly exhausted his claim is a determination made by evaluating
compliance with CCCF’s specific grievance procedures. Drippe v. Tobelinski, 604 F.3d 778,
781 (3d Cir. 2010). Additionally, “[t]he level of detail necessary in a grievance to comply with
the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the
prison's requirements and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). While the Third Circuit has yet to address the issue of the
specificity with which a prisoner must present an administrative grievance in a comprehensive
manner, it has noted generally that “[t]he primary purpose of a grievance is to alert prison
officials to a problem.” Williams v. Beard, 82 F.3d 637, 640 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 219 (2007)). Such language has led at
least one court in this District to embrace the standard adopted by six circuit courts: that a
grievance “suffices if it alerts the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought.”
Olivares v. United States, No. 07–3476, 2010 WL 5251429 at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 15, 2010) (citing
9
Griffen v. Arpaio, 557 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir.2009)) (quoting Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650
(7th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases from the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit
Courts)). Under this interpretation, the Court looks to the grievances filed by Plaintiff to
determine whether they provided CCCF with sufficient notice of the “nature of the wrong” for
which Plaintiff now seeks redress. See Olivares, 2010 WL 5251429 at *4.
First, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not follow or exhaust the available grievance
procedures available to inmates at CCCF. Plaintiff’s official grievance record contains no
records of grievances submitted on or after July 25, 2011. (See Grievance Record.) Instead,
Plaintiff apparently submitted letters, which he claims were sent to Warden Taylor and Nurse
Julie at CCCF on July 31 and July 25, 2011, respectively. Plaintiff attempted to file a grievance
“informally,” by use of a plain sheet of paper labeled “Grievance Form,” but he did not properly
submit his letters according to CCCF’s grievance procedures. According to the CCCF Grievance
Procedure, where inmates first attempt to address their grievances informally, they may always
also submit formal, written grievances. (Grievance Procedure ¶¶ 8-9.) This includes writing out
a grievance on plain white paper, if no grievance form is available. (Id. ¶ 9.) To submit a formal
grievance on his own paper, Plaintiff was also required to title the paper “inmate grievance,” in
order to “[inform] the grievance officer of the formal grievance.” (Id. (emphasis added).) Then,
any formal grievances were collected daily and logged by the “Department’s Grievance Officer.”
(Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added).) Though Plaintiff construes his letters as informal communications,
the use of the words “Grievance Form” at the top of his letter to Julie indicates some intent to file
a formal grievance.4 Plaintiff did not, however, submit this grievance letter to a Grievance
Plaintiff did not add any heading to his letter(s) addressed to Taylor, and only mentions “the incident that took
place on 7-25-11.” (See Taylor Letters.)
4
10
Officer.5 Even if Plaintiff believed he was in fact attempting to resolve his grievance informally,
he did not follow his letters to Taylor or Julie up with any formal grievance submission, as
detailed in paragraph 9 of the grievance procedures. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227 (3d
Cir. 2004) (“In Nyhuis, 204 F.3d 65, we held that an inmate seeking relief that the prison's
administrative grievance system cannot provide (in Nyhuis, it was money damages) must
nonetheless pursue the grievance process to its end before coming to federal court. We
concluded that the PLRA ‘make[s] exhaustion of all administrative remedies mandatory.’”)
(emphasis in original). The Court does not find that Plaintiff exhausted his administrative
remedies within the parameters of what was made available to him in the CCCF Grievance
Procedure.
Secondly, even assuming Plaintiff properly exhausted all of his available administrative
remedies for filing grievances, his two letters do not contain enough factual specificity to “[alert]
the prison to the nature of the wrong” for which Plaintiff sought redress. (Griffin v. Arpaio, 447
F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Williams, 482 F.3d at 640. The letter addressed to
Taylor did not address any conduct related to Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim for cruel and unusual
punishment or municipal liability. Instead it mentioned an alleged scheme by inmate Batten,
claimed Plaintiff possessed the prohibited knives for “personal protection,” and complained of
his lack of a pen with which to write certain legal documents. (See Taylor Letters.) There is no
mention in that letter of the supposed injury to Plaintiff’s foot caused by Sweeten or any
defective policies or procedures which could establish municipal liability. Plaintiff also attached
Plaintiff acknowledged in his letter to Julie that he had previous submitted his grievances to a “grievance
coordinator,” but asserted that those grievances were merely being thrown away once they were forwarded to Julie.
(See Julie Letter.) Regardless of Plaintiff’s accusations concerning what happened to the grievances he had
supposedly previously submitted, this statement indicates that Plaintiff was aware of the process in place for
submitting formal grievances.
5
11
a letter that he allegedly wrote to Julie, which was primarily a complaint about the lack of
medical treatment he had received following the incident. (See Julie Letter (“I sent you a
grievance yesterday … in regards to the incident and your staff has continuously refused to treat
my injury. … You need to fire Dr. Pomerantz, but on the other hand, your [sic] responsible for
the doctors under you, your [sic] the boss!”).) In that letter he also mentions that Sweeten
“smashed [Plaintiff’s] already injured left foot while shaking down [Plaintiff],” as the cause of
the pain in his left foot. (Id.) In the context of a letter addressed to Julie, a member of the CCCF
medical staff, primarily concerning the lack of medical treatment Plaintiff was receiving for his
sore foot after the incident, the Court finds that this single reference to the actions of Sweeten
was insufficient to alert CCCF officials to a possible Eight Amendment claim. Nor do Plaintiff’s
complaints about deficient medical treatment bear on the municipal liability claim against
Camden County, as they do not mention any details concerning the alleged improper actions
taken by Sweeten in removing Plaintiff’s medical device during the search. Plaintiff makes no
mention of the Eight Amendment, his constitutional rights, or even any allegedly illegal or
wrongful actions on behalf of Defendants. It is entirely possible that the injury complained of
was caused during the course of a lawful “shake down,” and Plaintiff does not suggest otherwise
in this letter. See Olivares, 2010 WL 5251429 at *6 (“The point of the grievance is to alert
prison officials to a problem, so they have an opportunity to correct it. The wrong to which a
prisoner must alert the prison officials cannot be construed so broadly as to undermine the basic
purpose of the grievance process.”) (internal citations omitted) (citing Jones, 549 U.S. at 218;
Williams, 482, F.3d at 640). Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the
Court concludes that the letters submitted by Plaintiff could not reasonably be construed as
alerting CCCF of claims for cruel and unusual punishment or municipal liability under § 1983.
12
Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, his § 1983 claims against
Defendants Sweeten and Camden County, in Count VII of the Amended Complaint, will be
dismissed pursuant to § 1997e(a). Counts III and VI against Defendant Sweeten will also be
dismissed.6
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be
GRANTED. All claims against all remaining Defendants will be DISMISSED. An appropriate
Order shall enter.
Dated: 11/5/2014
s/ Robert B. Kugler _____
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
6
It is generally established in the Third Circuit that a court may decline supplemental jurisdiction when federal
claims are dismissed by way of summary judgment. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir.
1976) (“if it appears that the federal claim . . . could be disposed of on a motion for summary judgment under F.R.
Civ. P. 56, then the court should ordinarily refrain from exercising jurisdiction in the absence of extraordinary
circumstances”); Simmerman v. Corino, 804 F. Supp. 644, 658 (D.N.J. 1992) (“[W]here a party’s federal claims are
disposed of on a summary judgment motion, the court should generally refrain from exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state claims.”), aff’d, 16 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 1993). Because this Court grants
summary judgment in favor of Defendants on all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over all remaining state law claims and is therefore dismissing them.
13
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?