MARR v. CAPE MAY COUNTY CORRECTIONAL CENTER
Filing
6
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/23/2013. (nz, )N.M.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
FREDERICK MARR,
Civil No. 12-4445 (NLH)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
CAPE MAY COUNTY CORREC. CENTER, et
al.,
Respondents.
APPEARANCES:
FREDERICK MARR, #43245
Cape May County Correctional Center
4 Moore Road
Cape May Courthouse, NJ 08270
Plaintiff Pro Se
HILLMAN, District Judge:
Frederick Marr, a pretrial detainee incarcerated at Cape May
County Correctional Center (“CMCCC”), filed a paid Complaint against
CMCCC, the Warden of the facility, nurse Douglas Wyth, Dr. Wynn, nurse
Toni Tees, nurse Joy Mitchel, Lori Rosf, and Dr. Santillio. 1
This
Court will dismiss the federal claims in the Complaint without
prejudice, as required by 28 U.S.C. 1915A, and decline supplemental
jurisdiction over claims arising under New Jersey law.
1
Plaintiff initially paid only $160. After this Court notified
Plaintiff that the Clerk could not file the Complaint unless he either
paid the remainder of the $350 filing fee or he applied for and was
granted in forma pauperis status, Plaintiff paid the additional sum
of $210. This Court will direct the Clerk to refund $20 to Plaintiff.
I.
BACKGROUND
On July 13, 2012, the Clerk received from Frederick Marr a
Complaint for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against CMCCC and its
Warden.
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2-3.)
Mr. Marr asserts that he is
a 72-year old diabetic, who needs to use a wheelchair due to a prior
back injury, and requires medical staff to check his blood sugar two
to four times each day.
Mr. Marr alleges that the Warden was
in the position . . . to promptly investigate plaintiff’s
complaints regarding injuries and pain . . . and to
authorize plaintiff’s supervised release to hospital for
treatment [but the Warden] ignored or did not respond to
plaintiff’s several formal and informal complaints
regarding his non-treatment (medical treatment),
therefore depriving plaintiff [of] medical
care/treatment, thereby inflicting cruel and unusual
punishment.
Id. at 3.
He seeks “adequate medical treatment to diagnose and
remedy his injuries – which are prevailing and have worsened as a
result of delayed treatment[,]” and damages.
Id. at 4.
Mr. Marr later filed six forms labeled “Motion to Add Party”
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21.
He seeks to add nurse
Douglas Wyth, Dr. Wynn, nurse Toni Tees, nurse Joy Mitchel, Lori Rosf,
and Dr. Santillio as defendants.
Each form states that this is an
“action based on negligence,” the named defendant “is also liable
to plaintiff because [he or she committed] medical malpractice,” and
the claims to be asserted against this defendant arise out of the
2
same occurrences as are presently before the Court, and will raise
common issues of law or fact. 2
II.
(ECF Nos. 3, 4, 5.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) (“PLRA”),
district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in
which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental employee or
entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim with respect to
prison conditions, see 28 U.S.C. § 1997e.
The PLRA directs district
courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.
This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A because Plaintiff seeks redress against a
governmental entity (CMCCF) and employee (the Warden).
“[A] pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
To survive
sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must
2
This Court will consider the complaint as naming these additional
defendants. However, Plaintiff did not file an amended complaint
asserting additional facts against these new defendants.
3
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is facially
plausible.
Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (citation omitted).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”
Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17
(3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Moreover, while
pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still
must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
III.
Federal
courts
are
DISCUSSION
courts
of
limited
jurisdiction.
See
Mansfield, C. & L. M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 383 (1884).
“[T]hey have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the
Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.”
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986).
A.
Federal Claims
Section 1983 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides in
relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
4
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
To recover under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show two
elements:
(1) a person deprived him or caused him to be deprived
of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States,
and (2) the deprivation was done under color of state law.
v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
See West
As an initial matter, this Court
notes that Plaintiff sues CMCCC as defendant, but a county jail is
not a “person” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to
Monell v. Dept. of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658,
688-90 (1978).
See Russell v. City Of Philadelphia, 428 F.App’x 174,
177 (3d Cir. 2011); Powell v. Cook County Jail, 814 F. Supp. 757,
758 (N.D. Ill. 1993); McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center, 788
F. Supp. 890, 893-894 (E.D. Va. 1992).
Because a jail is not a person
subject to suit for violation of constitutional rights, this Court
will dismiss all federal claims against CMCCC with prejudice.
Pretrial detainees are protected from punishment without due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
See Bell v. Wolfish,
441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979); Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 373-74 (3d
Cir. 2012).
Amendment
That inquiry involves application of the Eighth
deliberate
indifference
standard,
insofar
as
“the
Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections ‘at
5
least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a
convicted prisoner.’”
Natale v. Camden County Corr. Facility, 318
F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
To state a claim, inmates must
satisfy an objective element and a subjective element.
v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
See Farmer
Specifically, inmates must
"demonstrate (1) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent
to their medical needs and (2) that those needs were serious."
v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
Rouse
To establish
deliberate indifference, a prisoner must show that the defendant was
subjectively aware of the unmet serious medical need and failed to
reasonably respond to that need.
Natale, 318 F.3d at 582.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837;
Deliberate indifference may be found where
the prison official (1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical
treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) intentionally
delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason;
or (3) deliberately prevents a prisoner from receiving needed medical
treatment.
See Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197.
In this case, Plaintiff’s factual allegations do not show that
each (or any) individual defendant intentionally refused to provide
needed medical treatment, intentionally delayed treatment for a
non-medical reason, or knowingly prevented him from receiving needed
or
prescribed
medical
treatment.
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“To
act
with
deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a
substantial risk of serious harm.”
330 (3d Cir. 2009).
Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318,
“Where a prisoner has received some medical
attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment,
federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical
judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort
law.”
Positano v. Wetzel,
F. App’x
, 2013 WL 3481727 (3d
Cir. July 8, 2013) (quoting United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette
Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, the “Eighth Amendment does not guarantee an
inmate’s medical treatment of his choice.”
Pennsylvania Healthcare Service Staffs,
Colon-Montanez v.
Fed. App’x
, 2013
WL 3481811 (3d Cir. June 27, 2013) (citing Chance v. Armstrong,, 143
F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998)).
Although Plaintiff asserts that he needs to use a wheelchair
as a result of a prior back injury and that, as a diabetic, he needs
his blood sugar checked several times a day, he does not allege that
any defendant intentionally refused to allow him to use a wheelchair
or intentionally disregarded his needs as a diabetic.
In addition,
Plaintiff asserts that he complained to the Warden regarding
“injuries,” “pain,” and the deprivation of medical treatment, but
he does not assert facts showing the nature of his untreated injuries,
pain, and medical needs.
(Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.)
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Moreover, his
own allegations admit that he asserts a negligence and malpractice
claim sounding in state tort law and therefore not cognizable as a
constitutional claim.
Because Plaintiff does not assert facts
showing that he has unmet medical needs and that any person was
deliberately indifferent to those medical needs, his allegations
have not “nudged [his] claims” of deliberate indifference “across
the line from conceivable to plausible,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted), and the claim for
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs does not state
a claim under the Constitution.
This Court will dismiss the § 1983
deliberate indifference claim for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
B.
Amendment
A
district
court
generally
grants
deficiencies in a complaint by amendment.
leave
to
correct
See DelRio-Mocci v.
Connolly Properties Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2012); Shane
v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).
Because it conceivable
that Plaintiff may be able to assert facts showing that a prison
official at CMCCC was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs, this Court will grant him 45 days to file an amended complaint
that (1) is complete on its face and (2) asserts facts showing that
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each named defendant(s) was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights. 3
C.
Supplemental Jurisdiction
"Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear and
decide state-law claims along with federal-law claims when they are
so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy."
Wisconsin
Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Where a district court has
original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 over federal
claims and supplemental jurisdiction over state claims pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the district court has discretion to decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);
Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009);
Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 983 F.2d
1277, 1284-1285 (3d Cir. 1993).
In this case, the Court is
dismissing every claim over which it had original subject matter
jurisdiction at an early stage in the litigation and declines to
3
Plaintiff should be aware that he must plead facts showing that each
“Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 676; see also Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d
Cir. 1988) (“A defendant in a civil rights action must have personal
involvement in the alleged wrongs.”)
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exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
III.
CONCLUSION
This Court dismisses the federal claims and declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
The Court will grant Plaintiff 45 days
to file an amended complaint consistent with this Opinion.
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
DATED:
October 23
, 2013
At Camden, New Jersey
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