SHAH v. SHAH
Filing
45
OPINION re 41 . Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 10/28/2013. (dmr)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
(Doc. No. 41)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
___________________________________
:
OLGA SHAH,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
v.
:
:
:
ASHOK SHAH,
:
:
:
Defendant.
:
___________________________________ :
Civil No. 12-4648 (RBK/KMW)
OPINION
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is Plaintiff Olga Shah’s (“Plaintiff”) motion “to prevent defendant’s
efforts to hide/reduce his income.” The Court interprets this motion as a motion for injunctive
relief or a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) against Ashok Shah (“Defendant”). 1 For the
reasons set forth below, this motion will be DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This matter arises out of pro se Plaintiff’s claim for enforcement of an Affidavit of
Support Form I-864 (“Form I-864”), against her husband, Ashok Shah. Plaintiff and Defendant
are evidently involved in pending divorce proceedings after being married in 2010. Pursuant to
the Form I-864, Defendant promised to maintain Plaintiff at an income equal to at least 125
1
Because this motion is construed a non-dispositive motion for injunctive relief or a TRO, the Court does not
resolve it on the grounds of being filed out of time, as Defendant argues. The date of May 17, 2013 was set by the
Court as a deadline for filing dispositive motions. It is similarly not time-barred by the deadline for discovery
motions.
percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines in order to secure her legal immigration status in the
United States prior to their marriage. Because of the limited scope of the instant motion, it is not
necessary for this opinion to recount the factual background of this matter in further detail. 2
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
In order to be granted the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that (1) he is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) denial will result in irreparable
harm to the plaintiff; (3) granting the injunction will not result in irreparable harm to the
defendant; and (4) granting the injunction is in the public interest. Maldonado v. Houston, 157
F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1988), cert denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999). Essentially the same standard
applies to temporary restraining orders. See Ballas v. Tedesco, 41 F. Supp.2d 531, 537 (D.N.J.
1999). A plaintiff must show that all four factors weigh in favor of an injunction or TRO.
Opticians Ass’n of Am. v. Indep. Opticians of Am., 920 F.2d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1990). The
standard for a permanent injunction is the same as for a preliminary injunction, except that the
plaintiff must show actual success on the merits, and not merely a likelihood of success. See
Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 392 (1981).
III. DISCUSSION
Because this matter is still pending, Plaintiff cannot show actual success on the merits.
Therefore, a permanent injunction is not appropriate. For this reason, the Court construes the
motion as one for a temporary injunction or alternatively for a TRO. Plaintiff has not made an
adequate showing to obtain either form of preliminary relief.
If Plaintiff succeeds in this suit, she will be entitled to a judgment for money damages
against Defendant. Plaintiff’s motion fails because it does not meet the “irreparable harm”
2
For more detail on the factual background, see the Court’s opinion of this date in Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment (Docket No. 33).
2
factor. Maldonado, 157 F.3d at 184. In her motion, Plaintiff appears to demonstrate that
Defendant has advertised on the Internet that he has a residential property in Gloucester City,
New Jersey available to rent. Pl. Br. at 1. She characterizes this as an effort to “hide/reduce his
income from [the] rental property” in Gloucester City. Id. However, she has not explained why
Defendant’s efforts to rent this property should be considered an effort to conceal or hide assets.
For example, she has not demonstrated that he is concealing any proceeds from the rental of this
property in a location or medium that would make them unavailable to satisfy a judgment.
Further, documents previously filed in this litigation indicate that Defendant owns a significant
amount of real estate and other assets. For example, the prenuptial agreement submitted as an
exhibit to Plaintiff’s complaint (Docket No. 9) indicates that Defendant owns five pieces of real
estate valued in 2010 at over $1.3 million, and subject to mortgages totaling only $220,000. The
prenuptial agreement also lists other assets owned by Defendant with a total value of over
$500,000. Even if Defendant were in some way concealing rent proceeds received from the
Gloucester City property, Plaintiff has not shown that Defendant’s other assets would be
unavailable to satisfy any judgment she might obtain against him. Because Plaintiff has not
shown that Defendant has taken any actions to make his assets unavailable to satisfy a judgment,
she has not shown that any danger of “irreparable harm” exists. Because she has not satisfied
this factor, it is not necessary to discuss the other factors necessary to obtain injunctive relief or a
TRO.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s motion will be denied. An appropriate order
shall issue.
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Dated: 10/28/2013
/s/ Robert B. Kugler
_
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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