RANSOME v. HOLMES, et al.
Filing
23
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 12/2/2013. (TH, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_________________________________________
KYLE S. RANSOME,
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
CHRISTOPHER HOLMES, et al.,
:
:
Respondents.
:
_________________________________________ :
Civ. No. 12-4889 (RBK)
OPINION
ROBERT B. KUGLER, U.S.D.J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner is a state prisoner currently incarcerated at the South Woods State Prison in
Bridgeton, New Jersey. He is proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of aggravated manslaughter,
possession of a handgun for an unlawful purpose and unlawful possession of a handgun. He is
currently serving a twenty-five year sentence with an eighty-five percent period of parole
ineligibility. For the following reasons, the habeas petition will be denied as it is time-barred.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner was sentenced in the New Jersey Superior Court, Gloucester County on June
22, 2001. The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed the judgment and
conviction on direct appeal on June 21, 2004. (See Dkt. No. 19-5 at p. 1-12.) The New Jersey
Supreme Court denied certification on petitioner’s direct appeal on September 29, 2004. (See id.
at p. 18.)
1
On October 4, 2005, petitioner filed his first post-conviction relief (“PCR”) petition in the
New Jersey Superior Court. 1 (See Dkt. No. 19-6 at p. 43.) On August 20, 2007, the Superior
Court denied petitioner’s first PCR petition. (See id. at p. 60.) Thereafter, petitioner filed an
appeal to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of petitioner’s first
PCR petition on May 8, 2009. (See Dkt. No. 19-9 at p. 3-9.) The New Jersey Supreme Court
denied petitioner’s petition for certification on his first PCR petition on July 20, 2009. (See id. at
p. 59.)
Petitioner then filed a brief in the Appellate Division on October 8, 2010, which
constitutes his second PCR petition. (See Dkt. No. 19-10 at p. 1-39.) In that brief, petitioner
alludes to a motion seeking to reduce his sentence that he filed in the Superior Court on
September 2, 2009, that was purportedly denied by that court. (See id. at p. 13.)
In dismissing petitioner’s second PCR petition, the Appellate Division noted that
petitioner had not included the Superior Court Order denying his motion and that, “[w]ithout the
order, [it] had no way of confirming that the motion was actually filed with, and then considered
by, the court.” (See Dkt. No. 19-12 at p. 25 n.3.) The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal
due to petitioner’s blatant disregard for that court’s rules of procedure. (See id. at p. 26-27.) The
1
Pursuant to the prisoner “mailbox rule,” a petitioner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date he
delivered it to prison officials for mailing. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71 (1988).
When a court is unable to determine the exact date that a prisoner handed his petition to a prison
official for mailing, it will look to the signed and dated certification of the petition. See Terrell
v. Benfer, 429 F. App’x 74, 75 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (using date prisoner signed
complaint as date he handed it to prison officials for mailing); Maples v. Warren, No. 12-0993,
2012 WL 1344828, at *1 n.2 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (“Often times, when the court is unable to
determine the exact date that a petitioner handed his petition to the prison officials for mailing, it
will look to the signed and dated certification of the petition.”). When this Court cannot
determine when petitioner handed his court filing to prison officials for mailing, it will use the
signed and dated certification of the document, as logically, that is the earliest date the document
could have been delivered to prison officials for mailing.
2
New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on petitioner’s second PCR petition on June 8,
2012. (See Dkt. No. 19-14 at p. 4.)
Petitioner filed the instant federal habeas petition in this Court on July 25, 2012. (See
Dkt. No. 1-2 at p. 2.) Respondents filed an answer on July 13, 2013, arguing in part that the
habeas petition is untimely. Petitioner filed a reply on October 1, 2013. The matter is now ready
for adjudication.
III.
DISCUSSION
The statute of limitations for this § 2254 petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which states:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from
the latest of –
(A) The date on which the judgment became final
by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) The date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in violation
of the Constitution or laws of the United States
is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) The date on which the constitutional right
asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or
(D) The date on which the factual predicate of the
claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State
postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted
toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
3
Evaluating the timeliness of this habeas petition requires a determination of when the state court
judgment became final. The judgment is determined to be final by the conclusion of direct
review, or the expiration of time for seeking such review, including the ninety-day period for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. See Swartz v. Meyers,
204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000); Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 337 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting
that state supreme court’s decision became final after ninety days because the time for seeking
certiorari expired).
The statute of limitations is statutorily tolled during the time in which a properly filed
state PCR petition is pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). A prisoner’s application for state
collateral review is ‘“properly filed’ when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the
applicable laws and rules governing filings[,]” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000) (emphasis
omitted), including “time limits, no matter their form[.]” Pace v. DiGigulielmo, 544 U.S. 408,
417 (2005). Thus, if a state court determines that an application is untimely, that is the end of the
matter for purposes of statutorily tolling of the AEDPA limitation period, “regardless of whether
it also addressed the merits of the claim, or whether its timeliness ruling was entangled with the
merits.” Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226 (2002). However, “if a state court fails to rule
clearly on the timeliness of an application, a federal court ‘must . . . determine what the state
courts would have held in respect to timeliness.” Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands,
705 F.3d 80, 85-86 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 198 (2006)).
As previously stated, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied petitioner’s request for
certification on direct appeal on September 29, 2004. Petitioner did not file a petition for writ of
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Therefore, his judgment became final ninety days
after the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on petitioner’s direct appeal. See
4
Morris, 187 F.3d at 337 n.1. Accordingly, his AEDPA statute of limitations began to run on
December 29, 2004.
Petitioner filed his first PCR petition in state court on October 4, 2005, after 280 days had
run on his AEDPA statute of limitations period. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied
certification on this PCR petition on July 20, 2009. Petitioner’s AEDPA statute of limitations
was statutorily tolled during the pendency of his first PCR petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner next filed a second PCR petition in the Appellate Division on October 8, 2010.
However, the filing of this PCR petition did not statutorily toll the AEDPA statute of limitations.
After petitioner’s first PCR petition was denied, he had eighty-five days left on his AEDPA
statute of limitations period. As petitioner did not file his second PCR petition until more than a
year after his first PCR petition was denied, it did not statutorily toll the AEDPA statute of
limitations because his AEDPA statute of limitations had already expired by October 8, 2010.
See Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 394-95 (3d Cir. 2004) (state post-conviction relief petition had
no effect on tolling because the limitations period had already run when it was filed). Therefore,
the instant habeas petition is untimely.
Petitioner asserts three central points in arguing that his petition is in fact timely;
specifically: (1) the date on which his judgment became final should be moved to a later date in
light of Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009); (2) additional statutory tolling applies; and
(3) equitable tolling applies. Each of these arguments is considered in turn.
A. Jimenez v. Quarterman
Petitioner relies on Jimenez to argue that his judgment became final well after December
28, 2004 (or ninety days after the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on his direct
appeal). In Jimenez, the petitioner was granted leave by the state appellate court to file an out-
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of-time direct appeal from his criminal conviction. See 555 U.S. at 116. The issue before the
United States Supreme Court was whether the petitioner’s direct review became final when his
conviction initially became final or when the out-of-time appeal granted by the state appellate
court became final. See id. at 119. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court held that:
Where a state court grants a criminal defendant the right to file an
out-of-time direct appeal during the state collateral review, but
before the defendant has first sought federal habeas relief, his
judgment is not yet “final” for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A). In
such a case, “the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review” must reflect the conclusion of the out-of-time
direct appeal, or the expiration of the time for seeking review of
that appeal.
Id. at 121. Contrary to petitioner’s arguments, a state court did not grant him an out-of-time
direct appeal. Indeed, petitioner proceeded with an in-time direct appeal that was denied by the
Appellate Division and then by the New Jersey Supreme Court on September 29, 2004. Thus,
Jimenez does not apply to change the date upon which petitioner’s judgment became final as it is
factually distinguishable from petitioner’s case.
B. Additional Statutory Tolling
Petitioner also argues that he actually filed his second state court PCR petition on
September 2, 2009, in the Superior Court. As previously stated, the Appellate Division stated in
deciding petitioner’s second PCR petition that there was no way to confirm that petitioner had
actually filed such a second PCR petition in the Superior Court. (See Dkt. No. 19-12 at p. 25
n.3.) Petitioner has not come forward with evidence that he in fact actually filed such a PCR
petition in the Superior Court on September 2, 2009. Nevertheless, the record that respondents
have filed in this case includes petitioner’s second PCR brief that he filed with the Appellate
Division on October 4, 2005. In that brief, petitioner states that he did file a second PCR petition
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in the Superior Court. (See Dkt. No. 19-10 at p. 10.) Furthermore, the record includes a motion
and memorandum to correct an unsound sentence addressed to the Superior Court that petitioner
swore to a notary on September 2, 2009. (See Dkt. No. 19-10 at p. 90-109.)
There is nothing to indicate that petitioner actually handed this document dated
September 2, 2009 to prison officials for mailing for it to be considered filed. However, even if
the Court were to assume that petitioner did in fact file this document with the Superior Court,
and it was a “properly filed” PCR petition, it would still not make the instant federal habeas
petition timely for the reasons that follow.
Petitioner’s judgment became final on December 28, 2004 and the AEDPA statute of
limitations began running the following day. He did not file his first state court PCR petition
until October 4, 2005, or after 280 days had run on his AEDPA statute of limitations. His
AEDPA statute of limitations was statutorily tolled while his first PCR petition was pending,
from October 4, 2005 until July 20, 2009. Petitioner does not indicate that he filed a petition for
writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court on his first PCR petition. Assuming for
purposes of argument that petitioner filed a second PCR petition on September 2, 2009, an
additional forty-four days ran on his AEDPA statute of limitations as the ninety-day period that
petitioner had to file a petition for writ of certiorari on the denial of his first PCR petition does
not toll the applicable statute of limitations for filing his federal habeas petition. See Stokes v.
Dist. Attorney of Cnty. of Phila., 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 2001) (stating that the time that a
state prisoner may file a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court from
the denial of his post-conviction petition does not toll the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2)). Accordingly, 324 days of the AEDPA limitations period had run by September 2,
2009.
7
Assuming arguendo that the AEDPA statute of limitations was statutorily tolled during
the pendency of petitioner’s second PCR petition, then the AEDPA statute of limitations would
have begun to run again after the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on petitioner’s
second PCR petition on June 8, 2012. Petitioner did not file the instant federal habeas petition
until July 25, 2012, or forty-seven days after his second PCR petition was denied. When these
forty-seven days are added to the 324 days that had already run on the AEDPA statute of
limitations, over one year had run on petitioner’s AEDPA statute of limitations (371 days).
Therefore, giving petitioner every benefit of the doubt for statutorily tolling purposes, his federal
habeas petition would still be untimely by a few days.
C. Equitable Tolling
Finally, petitioner argues that he should be entitled to equitable tolling; specifically he
claims as follows:
Petitioner asserted on the record his limited education and status as
a lay-person, with no knowledge in the area of law, nor criminal
court procedures, yet to the best of his ability through the exercised
of due diligence sought to exhaust all his state remedies in a timely
manner. The impediments to this effort were beyond the scope of
mere negligence, but are indeed exceptional circumstances to
overcome when put in proper perspective. The inability to gain
meaningful access to a law library, legal books, time to conduct
legal research and or legal counsel while incarcerated at
Southwoods State Prison is an on going impediment created by the
state, that only exasperate an already daunting task.
(Dkt. No. 22 at p. 6.)
The Supreme Court has stated that, “[g]enerally, a litigant seeking equitable tolling [of
the AEDPA statute of limitations] bears the burden of establishing two elements: (1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his
way.” Pace, 544 U.S. at 418; see also United States v. Bass, 268 F. App’x 196, 199 (3d Cir.
8
2008). “Equitable tolling is a remedy which should be invoked ‘only sparingly.’” Bass, 268 F.
App’x at 199 (quoting United States v. Midgley, 142 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Irwin
v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990))).
With respect to the diligence that is necessary for equitable tolling, the Third Circuit has
stated:
The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable
diligence, not maximum, extreme, or exceptional diligence.
Holland [v. Florida], 130 S. Ct. [2549,] at 2565 [(2010)]. “This
obligation does not pertain solely to the filing of the federal habeas
petition, rather it is an obligation that exists during the period
appellant is exhausting state court remedies as well.” LaCava v.
Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Jones [v. Morton,
195 F.3d [153,] 160 [(3d Cir. 1999)]. A determination of whether
a petitioner has exercised reasonable diligence is made under a
subjective test: it must be considered in light of the particular
circumstances of the case. . . . The fact that a petitioner is
proceeding pro se does not insulate him from the “reasonable
diligence” inquiry and his lack of legal knowledge or legal training
does not alone justify equitable tolling. See Brown v. Shannon,
322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 2003).
Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 799 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and footnote omitted).
Extraordinary circumstances may be found where: (1) the petitioner has been actively misled by
respondent; (2) the petitioner has in some extraordinary way been prevented from asserting his
rights; or (3) where the petitioner has timely asserted his rights in the wrong forum. See Fahy v.
Horn, 240 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 159 (3d Cir.
1999)). However, “[i]n non-capital cases, attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or
other mistakes have not been found to rise to the ‘extraordinary’ circumstances required for
equitable tolling.” Id. (citations omitted).
Petitioner bases his equitable tolling argument in part on his lack of requisite legal
knowledge. “The fact that a petitioner is proceeding pro se does not insulate him from the
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‘reasonable diligence’ inquiry and his lack of legal knowledge or training does not alone justify
equitable tolling.” Ross, 712 F.3d at 799-800 (citations omitted). Thus, this argument alone
does not merit equitably tolling the statute of limitations. Accord Dixon v. Bartkowski, No. 113213, 2013 WL 5730152, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2013) (“[La]ck of legal knowledge or legal
training does not alone justify equitable tolling.”) (citations omitted).
Furthermore, petitioner’s allegation that he lacked meaningful access to the law library
also does not merit equitably tolling the AEDPA statute of limitations. He does not explain how
his limited access occurred or how these circumstances prevented him from filing his federal
habeas petition. See Shabazz v. Hastings, No. 12-3487, 2013 WL 3201275, at *5-6 (D.N.J. June
24, 2013) (finding that petitioner failed to demonstrate that equitable tolling should apply where
he did not explain when limited access to the library occurred nor how those circumstances
affected his ability to file federal habeas petition); Gonzalez v. United States, 918 F. Supp. 2d
287, 290 (D. Del. 2013) (“[A] prisoner’s limited access to a law library is a routine aspect of
prison life, and is generally insufficient to trigger equitable tolling absent a causal relationship
between the limited library access and the prisoner’s late filing.”) (citations omitted). Indeed,
petitioner pursued his first state PCR petition while his AEDPA statute of limitations had not yet
expired.
Accordingly, for these reasons, equitable tolling is not appropriate and will not be
applied.
D. Request for the Appointment of Counsel
Petitioner has also requested the appointment of counsel. (See Dkt. No. 18.) He does not
have a constitutional right to counsel in habeas proceedings. See Reese v. Fulcomer, 946 F.2d
247, 263 (3d Cir. 1991), superseded on other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. However,
10
18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) provides that the court has discretion to appoint counsel where “the
court determines that the interests of justice so require . . .” In Reese, the Third Circuit explained
that in determining whether counsel should be appointed, a court “must first decide if the
petitioner has presented a nonfrivolous claim and if the appointment of counsel will benefit the
petitioner and the court. Factors influencing a court’s decision include the complexity of the
factual and legal issues in the case, as well as the pro se petitioner’s ability to investigate facts
and present claims.” Reese, 946 F.2d at 263-64. In this case, the Court finds that the
appointment of counsel is not warranted as the petition is time-barred.
IV.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of
appealability, an appeal may not be taken from a final order in a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. §
2254. A certificate of appealability may issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “A petitioner satisfies
this standard by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are
adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003). Applying this standard, the Court finds that a certificate of appealability shall not issue
in this case.
V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the habeas petition will be denied and a certificate of
appealability shall not issue. An appropriate order will be entered.
DATED: December 2, 2013
s/Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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