SIMMS v. SHARTLE
Filing
6
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: ORDERED that the Clerk shall reopen this matter; ORDERED that Petitioner's applications docketed as Docket Entries Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 are dismissed; ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminat e this matter subject to reopening in the event Petitioner submits, within sixty days from the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, his re-amended petition, etc. (Petitioner's original Petition sent). Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/27/2012. (tf, n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
________________________________
:
:
:
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
:
:
J.T. SHARTLE,
:
:
Respondent.
:
________________________________:
WILLIE THOMAS SIMMS,
Civil Action No. 12-5012 (RMB)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before this Court upon Petitioner's
payment of the applicable filing fee of $5.00, which: (a) was
preceded by his submission of a Section 2241 habeas petition
(“Petition”), see Docket Entry No. 1; and (b) was followed by
Petitioner’s filing of his amended Section 2241 petition
(“Supplement”) and, shortly thereafter, a letter operating as an
additional supplement (“Letter”), see Docket Entries Nos. 4 and
5, and it appearing that:
1.
Since the Petition arrived unaccompanied by Petitioner’s
filing fee or his in forma pauperis application, this Court
denied Petitioner in forma pauperis status and directed
Petitioner to cure that deficiency of his application.
Docket Entry No. 3.
Petitioner duly complied by paying the
applicable $5.00 filing fee.
17, 2012.
See
See Docket Entry dated August
2.
The Petition, a 140-page submission, see Docket Entries Nos.
1, 1-1 and 2, asserts a panoply of challenges.
generally, id.
See,
The best this Court can gather from that
initial voluminous submission, it appears that Petitioner –
being a federal prisoner serving his term at the F.C.I.
Fairton, Fairton, New Jersey – had been, at some point in
time, admitted to the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) Substance
Abuse Treatment Program administered at the F.C.I. Fairton,
which program is commonly referred to as “Residential Drug
Abuse Program” (“RDAP”), but – as a result of a certain
development, which might or might not have been a result of
Petitioner’s commission of a certain infraction or the
prison officials’ concerns about Petitioner’s mental health
– Petitioner was evaluated by medical mental health
professionals and, being found unsuitable for RDAP, was
expelled from that program prior to his completion of it.
See, generally, Docket Entry No. 1.
3.
In addition, the Court surmises from the content of the
Petition that Petitioner’s alleged efforts to exhaust his
challenges administratively is nowhere recorded in the BOP
system, be it in terms of Petitioner’s filings or BOP’s
review/denial of his challenges.
4.
Notably, Petitioner’s challenges to his removal from RDAP
are coupled with several conditions-of-confinement-type
2
claims asserting denial of access to the courts,
retaliation, violation of his First Amendment rights, and
violation of his Equal Protection rights.
5.
Petitioner’s Supplement, styled as an “amended petition,”
arrived after Petitioner’s filing of his filing fee, alleges
the same or similar claims (i.e., retaliation, tampering
with legal mail, etc.). See Docket Entry No. 4.
Petitioner’s latest submission, a letter inquiring about the
status of this case, further elaborated on the same civil
rights challenges, re-asserting undue tampering with
Petitioner’s legal mail.
6.
See Docket Entry No. 5.
“Habeas corpus petitions must meet heightened pleading
requirements,” McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 856 666
(1994), because Habeas Rule 2(c) requires a petition to
“state the facts supporting each ground” and “state the
relief requested.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 2(c), applicable
to § 2241 through Rule 1(b).
Importantly, pro se litigants
are: (a) not expected to make legal arguments (especially if
such arguments strive to teach the courts law) because
Habeas Rule 2(c) merely requires a petition to “specify all
the grounds for relief,” id.; and (b) not allowed to submit
voluminous filings asserting multitudes of claims “conflated
into numerous Hydra-like umbrella challenges.”
Samha v.
Lagana, Civil Action No. 11-4943 (SRC) (DNJ), Docket Entry
3
No. 2, at 1 (quoting Murakush Caliphate of Amexem Inc. v.
New Jersey, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51887, at *69 (D.N.J. May
13, 2011)
Therefore, Petitioner’s original 140-page
Petition, being unduly voluminous, violates the requirements
of Rule 2(d).
His supplement, too, fails to meet the
pleading obligations under Rule 2(c).
7.
In addition, to the extent Petitioner wishes to assert
claims alleging retaliation, denial of access to the courts,
tampering with legal mail, violation of his Equal Protection
rights, etc., none of these challenges can be litigated in
the habeas proceedings at bar.
Federal law provides two
avenues of relief to prisoners: a petition for habeas corpus
and a civil rights complaint.
U.S. 749, 750 (2004).
See Muhammad v. Close, 540
“Challenges to the validity of any
confinement or to particulars affecting its duration are the
province of habeas corpus . . . [while] requests for relief
turning on circumstances of confinement [fall within the
realm of] a § 1983 action.”1
Id.
The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit explained the distinction between the
availability of civil rights relief and the availability of
habeas relief as follows:
1
In a series of cases beginning with Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973), the Supreme Court analyzed the intersection
of civil rights and habeas corpus.
4
[W]henever the challenge ultimately attacks the
“core of habeas” - the validity of the continued
conviction or the fact or length of the sentence a challenge, however denominated and regardless of
the relief sought, must be brought by way of a
habeas corpus petition. Conversely, when the
challenge is to a condition of confinement such
that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not
alter his sentence or undo his conviction, an
action under § 1983 is appropriate.
Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002).
Therefore, a prisoner is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
only if he “seek[s] to invalidate the duration of [his]
confinement - either directly through an injunction
compelling speedier release or indirectly through a judicial
determination that necessarily implies the unlawfulness of
the [government's] custody.”
U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
See Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
In contrast, if a judgment in the
prisoner’s favor would not affect the fact or duration of
the prisoner’s incarceration, habeas relief is unavailable
and a civil complaint is the appropriate form of remedy.
See, e.g., Ganim v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 235 F. App’x
882 (3rd Cir. 2007) (holding that district court lacks
jurisdiction under § 2241 to entertain prisoner's challenge
to his transfer between federal prisons); Bronson v.
Demming, 56 F. App’x 551, 553-54 (3rd Cir. 2002) (habeas
relief was unavailable to inmate seeking release from
disciplinary segregation to general population).
5
Correspondingly, because Petitioner’s successful completion
of the Fairton RDAP could allow Petitioner a speedier
release (by reducing his term of imprisonment), that – but
only that – aspect of Petitioner’s challenges can be
litigated in the instant habeas matter.
All other
Petitioner’s claims, be they based on his allegations about
retaliation or violation of his Equal Protection rights, or
if they assert denial of access to the courts, or tampering
with his legal mail, etc., should be raised by means of a
new and separate action commenced by Petitioner’s filing of
a civil complaint accompanied by Petitioner’s $350 filing
fee or his duly executed in forma pauperis application.2
All Petitioner’s pleadings in this matter, including
Petitioner’s re-amended petition, which Petitioner will be
allowed to file, had to be and – in the future – should be
limited solely to clear and concise statements of the facts
related to Petitioner’s expulsion from the Fairton RDAP.3
2
No statement made in this Memorandum Opinion and Order
shall be construed as expressing this Court’s opinion as to
substantive or procedural validity or invalidity of such civil
challenges, if raised.
3
At this juncture, it appears that Petitioner’s habeas
challenges might have been striving to assert that the BOP
unreasonably applied Program Statement (“P.S.”) 5330.11 to
Petitioner by expelling Petitioner from the Fairton RDAP on the
basis of Petitioner’s certain actions/statements. Yet, none of
Petitioner’s submissions appears to dispute that Petitioner
actually committed the actions and/or made the statements which,
6
8.
Finally, this Court, taking notice of Petitioner’s
statements (seemingly suggesting Petitioner’s position that
his grievance filed with the BOP Central Office is contained
nowhere in the BOP’s records) finds it warranted to clarify
to Petitioner the following:
a.
The BOP Administrative Remedy Program is a three-tier
process that is available to inmates confined in
institutions operated by the BOP for “review of an
issue which relates to any aspect of their
confinement.”
28 C.F.R. § 542.10.
An inmate must
initially attempt to informally resolve the issue with
institutional staff.
See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a).
If
informal resolution fails or is waived, an inmate may
submit a BP-9 Request to “the institution staff member
designated to receive such Requests (ordinarily a
correctional
counsel)” within 20 days of the date on
which the basis for the Request occurred, or within any
extension permitted.
See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14.
An
inmate who is dissatisfied with the Warden's response
under the BOP findings, led to his expulsion. Hence, Petitioner’s
sole habeas claim, stripped from the civil rights assertions,
seems to allege unreasonableness of BOP’s application of P.S.
5330.11 to Petitioner’s actions/statements. However, granted the
sheer volume and patchiness of Petitioner’s submissions, the
Court cannot determine the exact nature of Petitioner’s
challenges. Petitioner, therefore, shall focus on clarifying the
same in his re-amended pleading.
7
to his BP-9 Request may submit a BP-10 Appeal to the
Regional Director of the BOP within 20 days of the date
the Warden signed the BP-8 response.
542.15(a).
See 28 C.F.R. §
The inmate may appeal to the BOP’s General
Counsel on a BP-11 form within 30 days of the day the
Regional Director signed the BP-9 response.
See id.
Appeal to the General Counsel is the final
administrative appeal.
See id.
If responses are not
received by the inmate within the time allotted for
reply, “the inmate may consider the absence of a
response to be a denial at that level.”
28 C.F.R. §
542.18.
b.
The above-detailed administrative exhaustion
requirement applies to all inmates’ challenges to
administrative determinations.
See Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004); Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d
289 (3d Cir. 2000).
While this exhaustion requirement
is not a jurisdictional bar to litigation, the
requirement is strictly enforced by the courts.
This
rigorous enforcement is mandated by a fundamental
recognition that exhaustion requirement of § 1997e
promotes important public policies.
Appeals noted:
8
As the Court of
Courts have recognized myriad policy
considerations in favor of exhaustion
requirements. They include (1) avoiding
premature interruption of the administrative
process and giving the agency a chance to
discover and correct its own errors; (2)
conserving scarce judicial resources, since
the complaining party may be successful in
vindicating his rights in the administrative
process and the courts may never have to
intervene; and (3) improving the efficacy of
the administrative process. Each of these
policies, which Congress seems to have had in
mind in enacting the PLRA, is advanced by the
across-the-board, mandatory exhaustion
requirement in § 1997e(a) . . . . [A]
comprehensive exhaustion requirement better
serves the policy of granting an agency the
“opportunity to correct its own mistakes with
respect to the programs it administers before
it is haled into federal court.” Moreover,
“even if the complaining prisoner seeks only
money damages, the prisoner may be successful
in having the [prison] halt the infringing
practice” or fashion some other remedy, such
as returning personal property, reforming
personal property policies, firing an abusive
prison guard, or creating a better screening
process for hiring such guards. And when a
prisoner obtains some measure of affirmative
relief, he may elect not to pursue his claim
. . . . In either case, local actors are
given the chance to address local problems,
and at the very least, the time frame for the
prisoner's damages is frozen or the isolated
acts of abuse are prevented from recurring.
An across-the-board exhaustion requirement
also promotes judicial efficiency . . . .
Moreover, even if only a small percentage of
cases settle, the federal courts are saved
the time normally spent hearing such actions
and multiple appeals thereto . . . . In
cases in which inmate-plaintiffs exhaust
their remedies in the administrative process
and continue to pursue their claims in
federal court, there is still much to be
gained. The administrative process can serve
9
to create a record for subsequent
proceedings, it can be used to help focus and
clarify poorly pled or confusing claims, and
it forces the prison to justify or explain
its internal procedures. All of these
functions help courts navigate the sea of
prisoner litigation in a manner that affords
a fair hearing to all claims.
Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 75-76 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted).
c.
Correspondingly, courts impose a procedural default
component on this exhaustion requirement, holding that
inmates must fully satisfy the administrative
requirements of the inmate grievance process before
proceeding into federal court.
218.
See Spruill, 372 F.3d
The courts have concluded that inmates who fail
to fully, or timely, complete the prison grievance
process are barred from subsequently litigating claims
in federal court.
See, e.g., Booth v. Churner, 206
F.3d 289 (3d Cir. 2000); Bolla v. Strickland, 304 Fed.
App’x 22 (3d Cir. 2008); Jetter v. Beard, 183 Fed.
App’x 178 (3d Cir .2006).
Therefore, an inmate cannot
excuse a failure to timely comply with these grievance
procedures by simply claiming that his efforts
constituted “substantial compliance” with the statutory
exhaustion requirement.
See Harris v. Armstrong, 149
F. App’x 58, 59 (3d Cir. 2005).
10
Nor can an inmate
avoid this exhaustion requirement by merely alleging
that the BOP’s policies were not clearly explained to
him.
See Davis v. Warman, 49 F. App’x 365, 368 (3d
Cir. 2002).
Furthermore, an inmate’s confusion
regarding these grievances procedures does not,
standing alone, excuse a failure to exhaust.
v. Smith, 71 F. App’x 916 (3d Cir. 2003).
See Casey
In addition,
an inmate cannot cite to alleged staff impediments to
grieving a matter as grounds for excusing a failure to
exhaust, if it also appears that (s)he did not pursue a
proper grievance once those impediments were removed.
See Oliver v. Moore, 145 Fed. App’x 731 (3d Cir. 2005)
(failure to exhaust not excused if, after staff
allegedly ceased efforts to impede grievance, prisoner
failed to follow through on grievance).4
4
This broad rule, however, admits of one exception, albeit
a very narrow one. If the actions of prison officials in some
fashion contributed to inmate's procedural default on a
grievance, the inmate will not be held to strict compliance with
this exhaustion requirement. See Camp v. Brennan, 219 F.3d 279
(3d Cir. 2000). However, courts have recognized a clear
“reluctance to invoke equitable reasons to excuse [an inmate's]
failure to exhaust as the statute requires.” Davis, 49 F. App’x
at 368. Thus, an inmate's failure to exhaust will only be
excused “under certain limited circumstances,” and an inmate can
defeat a claim of failure to exhaust only by showing “he was
misled [by the prison officials as to his obligation to exhaust]
or that there was some extraordinary reason he was prevented from
complying with the statutory mandate.” Harris, 149 F. App’x at
59; Davis, 49 F. App'x at 368.
11
d.
Here, the content of the Petition merely hints that he
filed “some” grievances with “some” BOP officials
challenging “some” developments.
If, on the basis of
Petitioner’s exhibits, this Court were to hypothesize
that Petitioner’s discussion of his exhaustion was
intended to relate to his removal from the Fairton
RDAP, it appears that Petitioner failed to meet the
exhaustion requirement since he merely claims that a
certain grievance was not docketed in the BOP
electronic system, but offers not a shred of proof that
he was subjected to extraordinary circumstances
preventing exhaustion by, e.g., simple re-filing upon
finding that his grievance was lost/not mailed/not
received by the addressee.
However, out of an
abundance of caution, the Court will allow Petitioner
an opportunity to detail the facts of his exhaustion
efforts.
IT IS, therefore, on this 27th day of September 2012,
ORDERED that the Clerk shall reopen this matter by making a
new and separate entry on the docket reading, “CIVIL CASE
REOPENED”; and it is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s applications docketed as Docket
Entries Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5 and dismissed; and it is further
12
ORDERED that Petitioner’s civil rights challenges are
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Such dismissal is conclusive
for the purposes of the proceedings at bar.
Such dismissal,
however, is without prejudice to Petitioner’s raising these
challenges by means of a civil complaint submitted in a new and
separate civil matter duly commenced by Petitioner; and it is
further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s challenges to his expulsion from
the Fairton RDAP are dismissed for failure to comply with the
requirements posed by Habeas Rule 2.
Such dismissal is without
prejudice to Petitioner’s filing of a re-amended petition,5
stating, clearly and concisely, and without undue discussions of
law, the facts of Petitioner’s expulsion-from-the-Fairton-RDAP
challenges (and the nature of his challenges, i.e., whether his
challenges are based on his position that the BOP
unreasonably/frivolously applied P.S. 5330.11 to Petitioner’s
acts and statements, or whether Petitioner’s claims ensue from a
different legal position) and, in addition, the facts of
5
Such re-amended petition shall not exceed ten pages,
single-sided, double-spaced. Petitioner may, if he so desires,
add exhibits to his re-amended submission, provided that such
exhibits are relevant. Petitioner shall not resubmit the
exhibits already submitted. In the event Petitioner wishes to
make references to his already-submitted exhibits, he shall
designate them by the docket number and page number. To
accommodate Petitioner’s endeavors to that effect, the Clerk will
be directed to serve Petitioner with a copy of his original 140page Petition, Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 1-1.
13
Petitioner’s administrative exhaustion of these particular
challenges with all three levels of the BOP, including the
Central Office;6 and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this
matter, subject to reopening in the event Petitioner submits,
within sixty days from the date of entry of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, his re-amended petition executed in accordance
with the guidance provided to him herein;7 and it is further
ORDERED that administrative termination is not a dismissal
on the merits, and no statement in this Memorandum Opinion and
6
The Court was able to locate, among Petitioner’s
exhibits, a response from Petitioner’s warden suggesting that
Petitioner was expelled from the Fairton RDAP for disruptive
behavior, unsatisfactory progress and violations of
confidentiality requirements inherent to the RDAP; the Court was
also able to locate a response from the BOP Regional Office
(making statements to the same effect). See Docket Entry No. 11, at 36-37. Therefore, the Court presumes – without making a
factual finding to that effect – that Petitioner’s exhaustion-ofadministrative-remedies dispute is limited solely to Petitioner’s
filing made with the BOP Central Office.
7
The Court allows Petitioner extra time to execute his reamended petition. The Court stresses that the legal system
neither allows nor rewards “everything-but-the-kitchen-sink”
submissions striving to confuse the judiciary and/or the
litigant’s adversaries, see Tilbury v. Aames Home Loan, 199 F.
Appx. 122, 124 (3d Cir. N.J. 2006) (stressing that “everything
but the kitchen sink” applications are neither allowed nor
rewarded by victories), and another submission of such document
by Petitioner might be construed as indicative of his litigation
in bad faith, and sanctions might be applied to Petitioner, if
appropriate.
14
Order shall be construed as withdrawal of the Court’s
jurisdiction over this matter; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order upon Petitioner by regular mail.
The Clerk
shall include in said mailing a copy of Petitioner’s original
140-page Petition (docketed in this matter as two docket entries,
i.e., Docket Entries Nos. 1 and 1-1); and it is finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter a new and separate entry
on the docket reading “CIVIL CASE TERMINATED.”
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENEE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
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