SIMMS v. SHARTLE

Filing 9

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER: ORDERED that the Clerk shall reopen this matter; ORDERED that Petitioner's amended pleading, 7 is dismissed; ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this matter subject to reopening in the event Petitioner submits, within sixty days from the date of entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, his second amended petition. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 3/12/2013. (tf, n.m. )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
_______________________________________
:
WILLIE THOMAS SIMMS,
:
:
Civil Action No. 12-5012
(RMB)
Petitioner,
:
:
v.
: MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
:
J.T. SHARTLE,
:
:
Respondent.
:
_______________________________________
:
This matter comes before this Court upon Petitioner's filing
of his amended pleading, and it appearing that:
1.

Petitioner’s original pleading (which arrived unaccompanied
by his filing fee or in forma pauperis application) was a
140-page submission and asserted various challenges.
see Docket Entries Nos. 1, 1-1 and 2.

See

The Court, therefore,

denied Petitioner in forma pauperis status and, pursuant to
Habeas Rule 2(d), directed re-pleading.
Nos. 2 and 6, 7.

See Docket Entries

In conjunction with the foregoing, the

Court explained to Petitioner that: (a) his habeas
challenges had to be exhausted administratively; and (b) his
civil rights claims asserting denial of access to the
courts, tampering with legal mail, retaliation, and other
claims could be raised only in a civil complaint filed in a
separate matter.

See Docket Entry No. 6 (relying on

Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004, and Leamer v.
Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 542 (3d Cir. 2002)).

In response,

Petitioner submitted his filing fee and his amended
pleading.

See Docket Entry No. 7 and Docket Entry dated

8/17/2012.
2.

Petitioner’s amended pleading suggests that his challenges
might have been duly exhausted at all three levels of the
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), although it is unclear whether
the last step (exhaustion with the BOP Central Office) was
duly taken.

For the purposes of the analysis at hand, the

Court presumes, without making a factual finding to that
effect, that Petitioner’s challenges were properly exhausted
administratively.
3.

The facts underlying Petitioner’s challenges are not totally
clear.

The best this Court could surmise, it appears that

Petitioner – being a federal prisoner – had been, at some
point in time, admitted to the BOP’s Residential Drug Abuse
Treatment Program (“RDAP”).
Nos. 1, 4 and 7.

See, generally Docket Entries

It also appears that Petitioner

formed

certain negative perceptions of the RDAP, its administering
staff and its benefits.

See id.

Petitioner shared these

negative perceptions with his in-prison mentor, detailed
these perceptions in his emails to his girlfriend
(indicating that he was inclining to serve his full prison

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term instead of attempting to complete the RDAP so to obtain
the sentence-reduction incentive allowed under the RDAP)
and, in addition, expressed these negative perceptions in a
grievance form which he left in public view in the prison
library.

See id.

Apparently, Petitioner’s negative

perceptions of the RDAP were noted by his prison officials
and the prison’s psychiatrist, and Petitioner was directed
to confront his negative perceptions by discussing them
during a RDAP group meeting with the inmates of his RDAP
group.

See id.

Petitioner, however, refused.

Upon his

refusal, the entire Petitioner’s RDAP group was informed
that its completion of the RDAP requirements might be
delayed as a sanction for Petitioner’s refusal to confront
his negative perceptions.

See id.

Petitioner remained

adamant and was expelled from the program; no sanction of
any kind was applied to the remainder of his RDAP group.
See id.

Thus, Petitioner became ineligible for the sentence

reduction allowed to those who successfully complete their
RDAP requirements.

See id.

See id.

Petitioner expended

considerable efforts attempting to re-enroll into the RDAP,
but his requests were denied.

See id.

The instant matter

followed.
4.

In addition to a habeas claim, Petitioner’s amended pleading
re-raises multiple civil rights challenges (asserting denial

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of access to the courts, tampering with legal mail,
retaliation, etc.).

The Court is without jurisdiction to

entertain these challenges in the instant action: as the
Court already explained, such claims should be raised in a
civil complaint filed in a separate matter.1
540 U.S. at 750; Leamer, 288 F.3d at 542.

See Muhammad,

Therefore, these

challenges will be dismissed without prejudice.
5.

Petitioner’s habeas challenge appears to be limited to the
claim that the BOP violated his due process and/or equal
protection rights by expelling him from the RDAP (and
denying him re-enrollment) on the basis of his expressed
negative perceptions about the program, its staff and its
benefits.

If such challenges were intended, they are

without merit.
6.

In the prison context, the Due Process Clause operates only
where a prison action has “implicated or infringed” upon a
prisoner’s “liberty interest.”
215, 223 (1976).

Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S.

However, it is well established that

“inmates do not have a protected liberty interest in either
RDAP participation or in the associated discretionary early

1

Petitioner also asserts ethical violations by the prison staff: he believes that the prison
officials and the psychiatrist committed such violations by allowing other inmates access to the
grievance Petitioner left in public view in the library and by disclosing to other inmates the
negative perceptions Petitioner shared with his in-prison mentor and Petitioner’s girlfriend.
However, ethical violations cannot form a viable basis for either civil rights or habeas claims.
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release benefit.”

Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1229 n.4

(9th Cir. 2012); see also Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88
(1976) (federal prisoners have no constitutional or inherent
right to participate in rehabilitative programs while
incarcerated or to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence); accord Greenholtz v.
Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7
(1979) (same); Richardson v. Joslin, 501 F.3d 415, 419 (5th
Cir. 2007) (“The Due Process Clause does not itself confer a
liberty interest in a sentence reduction for completion of
an RDAP”).

“The BOP has plenary control, subject to

statutory constraints, over ‘the place of a prisoner’s
imprisonment,’ § 3621(b), and the treatment programs (if
any) in which he may participate, §§ 3621(e), (f); §
3624(f).” Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2390-91
(2011).

Therefore, “[t]here is nothing in the statutory

mandate for residential drug treatment that gives rise to a
protected interest in remaining in a RDAP group,” Roberts v.
Feather, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180680, at *10 (D. Or. Dec.
18, 2012) (citing Santiago-Lebron v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 767
F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1351 (S.D. Fla. 2011)), since the
opportunity to obtain a reduced sentence by participating in
the RDAP is, ab initio, not a “fundamental right.” Rublee v.
Fleming, 160 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1998).
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7.

That leaves the Court only with Petitioner’s equal
protection challenge. To assert an equal protection claim
triggering strict scrutiny analysis, Petitioner must allege
that the law or regulation, or a certain governmental
decision intentionally discriminates against him based on
his membership in a protected suspect class.

See, e.g.,

King v. Caruso, 542 F. Supp. 2d 703, 727 (E.D. Mich. 2008)
(citing Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th
Cir. 1990)).

Prisoners, however, are not considered members

of a protected class.

See Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615,

619 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Handley v. Chapman, 587 F.3d
273, 280 & n.5 (5th Cir. 2009) (prisoners do not constitute
a “suspect class”).

Absent Petitioner’s membership in a

suspect class, a classification scheme will be upheld if it
is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.2

See

City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Rublee,
160 F.3d at 217.

Where a rational-basis review is

appropriate, a litigant may prevail only by negating “any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification” made by the BOP’s
2

Petitioner is an African-American. See <<http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/InmateFinder
Servlet?Transaction=IDSearch&needingMoreList=false&IDType=IRN&IDNumber=84193-054
&x=131&y=31>>. However, no statement in his original or amended pleading indicates that his
expulsion from the RDAP was race-based, and that other African-American inmates held in his
prison facility or participating in his RDAP group were prevented from enrollment or expelled
on the basis of their race.
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exclusionary action.

Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala.

v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
this burden.

Here, Petitioner failed to meet

Nothing in his original or amended pleading

establishes that his expulsion or denial of his request for
re-enrolment was arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of the
BOP’s broad discretion.

See Jupiter Energy Corp. v.

F.E.R.C., 407 F.3d 346, 349 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).

Moreover, Petitioner’s pleadings

themselves supply the Court with a set of facts warranting
classification: (a) Petitioner expressed his negative
perceptions about the RDAP, its staff and its benefits; (b)
these perceptions entered the public domain of the general
prison population and the inmates participating in the RDAP;
(c) the perceptions were harmful to the administration and
goal of the program; and (d) Petitioner refused to face his
errors and to engage the affected inmates in a public
discussion of these errors.

Therefore, the BOP’s decision

to expel Petitioner and to deny his request for reenrollment was rationally related to a legitimate
penological interest.

Correspondingly, Petitioner’s due

process and equal protection claims discernable from his
amended pleading fail to state a cognizable claim.
7

However,

out of abundance of caution and taking notice of the
convoluted nature of Petitioner’s allegations, the Court
finds it warranted to allow him one final opportunity to replead his habeas claim.
IT IS, therefore, on this 12th day of March 2013,
ORDERED that the Clerk shall reopen this matter by making a
new and separate entry on the docket reading, “CIVIL CASE
REOPENED”; and it is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s amended pleading, Docket Entry No.
7, is dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s civil rights challenges are
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without prejudice to
Petitioner’s raising these challenges by means of a civil
complaint submitted in a new and separate civil matter; and it is
further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s habeas challenge is dismissed
without prejudice to Petitioner’s filing of his second amended
petition, stating only his habeas claim, if any, that is
cognizable in light of the guidance provided herein; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall administratively terminate this
matter, subject to reopening in the event Petitioner submits,

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within sixty days from the date of entry of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order, his second amended petition; and it is further
ORDERED that administrative termination is not a dismissal
on merits, and no statement in this Memorandum Opinion and Order
shall be construed as withdrawal of the Court’s jurisdiction over
this matter; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Memorandum
Opinion and Order upon Petitioner by regular mail; and it is
finally
ORDERED that the Clerk shall enter a new and separate entry
on the docket reading “CIVIL CASE TERMINATED.”

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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