BROWN v. NEW JERSEY DOC et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/2/2014. (nz, )n.m.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JERRY BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW JERSEY DOC, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 12-5069(NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Jerry Brown
Mid-State Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 866
Wrightstown, NJ 08562
Plaintiff pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Jerry Brown, a prisoner confined at Mid-State
Correctional Facility in Wrightstown, New Jersey, seeks to bring
this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging violations of his constitutional rights. 1
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When Plaintiff originally submitted his Complaint, he neither
prepaid the filing fee nor submitted an application for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis. Accordingly, this Court ordered the
matter administratively terminated and granting Plaintiff leave
to apply to re-open by either prepaying the filing fee or
submitting a complete application for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted a new application and
this Court ordered this matter re-opened for consideration of
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in
forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison
conditions).
I.
BACKGROUND
The following factual allegations are taken from
Plaintiff’s Complaint and are accepted as true only for purposes
of this review.
Plaintiff alleges that on July 16, 2012, the plastic chair
in which he was sitting broke and he fell to the floor, hurting
both his arm and back.
He reported the incident to Correctional
Officer John Doe Horner, who immediately sent him to the medical
department.
There, he was seen by nurse Jane Doe, who referred
the new application. The application remains deficient, in that
it includes a certification as to the authenticity of the
“attached” institutional account statements, but no such account
statements were attached. As this appears to be a clerical
error, and in order to address the merits of the Complaint, this
Court will provisionally grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in
forma pauperis, for purposes of conducting the screening
required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
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his injuries to the facility physician.
As of August 7, 2012,
Plaintiff had not been seen by a physician.
Plaintiff names as
defendants the New Jersey Department of Corrections, John and
Jane Doe correctional officers, and nurse Jane Doe.
The Court construes these allegations as an attempt to
state a claim for denial of medical care in violation of the
Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment.
II.
STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
Every complaint must comply with the pleading requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires
that a complaint contain “a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
“Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give
the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests.’”
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
93 (2007) (citations omitted).
While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the
“grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do ... . Factual allegations must be enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level
... .
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citations omitted).
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That is, a complaint must assert “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. at 570.
“A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556).
The determination of whether the factual
allegations plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief is
“‘a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.’”
Bistrian v.
Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to accept its factual allegations as true,
see James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 679 (3d Cir.
2012), and to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); United States
v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992).
Where a complaint can be remedies by an amendment, a
district court may not dismiss the complaint with prejudice, but
must permit the amendment.
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34
(1992); Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d
Cir. 2002) (dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)), cited
in Thomaston v. Meyer, 519 F. App’x 118, 120 n.2 (3d Cir. 2013);
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 2000) (dismissal
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pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)); Urrutia v. Harrisburg
County Police Dept., 91 F.3d 451, 453 (3d Cir. 1996).
III.
SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ... .
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
IV.
A.
ANALYSIS
The New Jersey Department of Corrections
Plaintiff’s claim against the New Jersey Department of
Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution, which provides that, “The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
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States by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State.”
The Eleventh Amendment protects states and their agencies
and departments from suit in federal court regardless of the
type of relief sought.
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984).
Section 1983 does not
override a state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
In addition, neither states, nor governmental entities that
are considered arms of the state for Eleventh Amendment
purposes, are persons within the meaning of § 1983.
Will v.
Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70-71 and n.10
(1989); Gravow v. Southern State Correctional Facility, 726
F.Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (the New Jersey Department of
Corrections is not a person under § 1983).
For all the
foregoing reasons, the Complaint fails to state a claim against
the New Jersey Department of Corrections and the deficiency
cannot be cured by amendment.
B.
The Claims Against Correctional Staff
Plaintiff also names as defendants correctional officers
John Doe Horner, correctional officers John Doe (1-10) and Jane
Doe (11-20), as well as nurse Jane Doe.
The only factual
allegation regarding a correctional officer, however, is the
allegation that Correctional Officer John Doe Horner immediately
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sent Plaintiff to the medical department after his fall.
The
only allegation regarding nurse Jane Doe is that she referred
Plaintiff’s injuries to a physician.
These allegations are not
sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment medical-care claim.
The Eighth Amendment proscription against cruel and unusual
punishment, applicable to the individual states through the
Fourteenth Amendment, is violated when prison officials are
deliberately indifferent to a prisoner’s serious medical needs.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 344-46 (1981); Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976).
To set forth a cognizable
claim for a violation of his right to adequate medical care, an
inmate must allege facts demonstrating: (1) a serious medical
need; and (2) behavior on the part of prison officials that
constitutes deliberate indifference to that need.
Estelle, 429
U.S. at 106.
To satisfy the first prong of the Estelle inquiry, the
inmate must demonstrate that his medical needs are serious.
Because society does not expect that prisoners will have
unqualified access to health care, deliberate indifference to
medical needs amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation only if
those needs are serious.
(1992).
Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9
Serious medical needs include those that have been
diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or that are so
obvious that a lay person would recognize the necessity for
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doctors attention, and those conditions which, if untreated,
would result in lifelong handicap or permanent loss.
Monmouth
County Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988),
cited in Brown v. Rozum, 453 F.App’x 127, 128 (3d Cir. 2011).
The second element of the Estelle test requires an inmate
to show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference
to his serious medical need.
Deliberate indifference is more
than mere malpractice or negligence; it is a state of mind
equivalent to reckless disregard of a known risk of harm.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1994).
Furthermore, a
prisoner’s subjective dissatisfaction with his medical care does
not in itself indicate deliberate indifference.
Andrews v.
Camden County, 95 F.Supp.2d 217, 228 (D.N.J. 2000); Peterson v.
Davis, 551 F.Supp. 137, 145 (D. Md. 1982), aff’d, 729 F.2d 1453
(4th Cir. 1984).
See also Winslow v. Prison Health Svcs., 406
F.App’x 671, 675 (3d Cir. 2011) (“because the complaint pleaded
only that Winslow was subjectively dissatisfied with his medical
treatment ..., the District Court properly dismissed his
claims”).
Similarly, mere disagreements over medical judgment
do not state Eighth Amendment claims.
White v. Napoleon, 897
F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990); Inmates of Allegheny County Jail
v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979). “Where prison
authorities deny reasonable requests for medical treatment, ...
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and such denial exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the
threat of tangible residual injury, deliberate indifference is
manifest.
Similarly, where ‘knowledge of the need for medical
care [is accompanied by the] ... intentional refusal to provide
that care,’ the deliberate indifference standard has been met.”
Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,
346-47 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988)
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s vague allegation that he hurt his arm and back
when he fell from a broken chair is not sufficient to
demonstrate a “serious medical need.”
Cf. Tsakonas v. Cicchi,
308 F.App’x 628, 632 (3d Cir. 2009) (“In order to be considered
‘serious,’ ‘[t]he detainee’s condition must be such that a
failure to treat can be expected to lead to substantial and
unnecessary suffering, injury, or death.” (citation omitted));
Makenson v. Luzerne County Correctional Facility, Civil No. 132204, 2014 WL 3829894, *4 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2014) (holding that
multiple bruises do not constitute a serious medical need);
Stroud v. Boorstein, Civil No. 10-3355, 2014 WL 2115499, *9
(E.D. Pa. May 20, 2014) (noting that mild discomfort resulting
from bruises and bleeding is not generally considered a serious
medical need) (collecting cases).
Even if Plaintiff could amend to allege a “serious medical
need,” however, the facts alleged regarding the behaviors of
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Correctional Officer John Doe Horner and nurse Jane Doe indicate
that they responded timely and appropriately to Plaintiff’s
needs.
Accordingly, the Complaint fails to state a claim
against either of these defendants.
With respect to the remaining fictitious defendant
correctional officers, Plaintiff has failed to allege either any
identifying characteristics or any facts suggesting “deliberate
indifference.”
Although fictitious defendants “’are routinely
used as stand-ins for real parties until discovery permits the
intended defendants to be installed,’”
Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d
148, 155 (3d Cir. 1998) (citations omitted), the complaint must
contain factual allegations describing the fictitious defendants
and their actions.
See Kates v. Bridgeton Police Department,
Civil Action No. 10-6386, 2011 WL 6720497, *1 n.1 (D.N.J. Dec.
21, 2011); Smith v. Creative Resources, Inc., Civil Action No.
97-6749, 1998 WL 808605, *1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998).
See
also Beale v. Department of Justice, Civil Action No. 06-2186,
2007 WL 327465, *8 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2007) (noting that a
plaintiff cannot maintain an action solely against unnamed
parties where the plaintiff has failed to describe the
fictitious defendants, or their actions, sufficiently to enable
naming them at a later date).
For all the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails
to state a claim against any defendant, named or fictitious.
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V.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the claim against the New
Jersey Department of Corrections will be dismissed with
prejudice pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
All remaining
claims will be dismissed without prejudice, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c), for failure to state a claim.
However, because it
is conceivable that Plaintiff may be able to supplement his
pleading with facts sufficient to state a claim, the Court will
grant Plaintiff leave to file an application to re-open
accompanied by a proposed amended complaint. 2
Any application to
re-open must also be accompanied by a complete application for
leave to proceed in forma pauperis, including certified
institutional account statements for the six-month period
preceding the submission of the application to re-open.
An appropriate order follows.
At Camden, New Jersey
Dated:
s/ Noel L. Hillman
Noel L. Hillman
United States District Judge
October 2, 2014
2
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is filed,
it supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect,
unless the amended complaint specifically refers to or adopts the
earlier pleading. See West Run Student Housing Associates, LLC v.
Huntington National Bank, 712 F.3d 165, 171 (3d Cir. 2013)
(collecting cases). See also 6 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1476 (3d ed. 2008). To
avoid confusion, the safer practice is to submit an amended
complaint that is complete in itself. Id.
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