JONES v. LAGANA et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/3/2016. (tf, n.m.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
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Petitioner,
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v.
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PAUL K. LAGANA, et al.,
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Respondents.
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___________________________________:
RONALD JONES,
Civ. No. 12-5823 (NLH)
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Ronald Jones, #67483/854731A
121 N. Poplar St.
Apt. C-4-1
Wilmington, DE 19801
Petitioner pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter is presently before the Court upon receipt of a
motion (ECF No. 12) by Petitioner Ronald Jones, seeking relief
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
For the
reasons that follow, the Motion will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On or about September 10, 2012, Petitioner Ronald Jones, an
inmate formerly confined at Northern State Prison in Newark, New
Jersey, filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his state criminal conviction. (ECF
No. 1).
On February 25, 2015, this Court entered an Order (ECF
No. 3) dismissing the Petition as “second and successive.”
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal (ECF No. 5), which was
dismissed on February 16, 2016 by the Third Circuit for lack of
jurisdiction under appellate docket number 15-3185 (ECF No. 9).
Petitioner then filed a Motion to Reopen Case (ECF No. 7)
before this Court.
In an Opinion and Order dated March 14,
2016, this Court determined that because the Petition had been
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as second and successive in
an Order dated February 25, 2015, any request to reopen
impliedly sought reconsideration of the Court’s February 25,
2015 Order.
Therefore, this Court construed the Motion to
Reopen Case as a motion for reconsideration.
Additionally,
because Petitioner specifically referred to FED. R. CIV. P. 60 in
his motion (Mot. to Reopen 2, ECF No. 7), the Court evaluated
his motion under that statute.
The motion was denied on March
14, 2016. (ECF No. 11).
Petitioner has now filed a “Motion for Relief from Order”
and he relies on Rule 60(b)(6). (ECF No. 12).
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard for Rule 60(b)(6) Motions
“Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final
judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set
of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered
evidence.” Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528, 125 S. Ct.
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2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005).
Specifically at issue in this
case is Rule 60(b)(6), which “is a catch-all provision that
authorizes a court to grant relief from a final judgment for
‘any ... reason’ other than those listed elsewhere in the Rule.”
Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub
nom. Wetzel v. Cox, 135 S. Ct. 1548, 191 L. Ed. 2d 663 (2015)
Rule 60(b) motions are left to the sound discretion of the
trial court, consistent with accepted legal principles applied
in light of all relevant circumstances. Pierce Assoc. Inc. v.
Nemours Found., 865 F.2d 530, 548 (3d Cir. 1988).
“A court may
grant a Rule 60(b) motion only in extraordinary circumstances,
and a Rule 60(b) motion is not appropriate to reargue issues
that the court has already considered and decided.” Weber v.
Pierce, No. 13-283, 2016 WL 2771122, at *2 (D. Del. May 13,
2016) (citations and footnote omitted); see also Cox, 757 F.3d
at 120 (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d
Cir. 1993)).
Further, where, as here, a district court is presented with
a motion for reconsideration after it has denied a petitioner's
§ 2254 application, the court must first determine if the motion
constitutes a second or successive application under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b).
The Third Circuit has explained that,
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in those instances in which the factual predicate of a
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the manner in
which the earlier habeas judgment was procured and not
the underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) motion may
be adjudicated on the merits. However, when the Rule
60(b) motion seeks to collaterally attack the
petitioner’s underlying conviction, the motion should
be treated as a successive habeas petition.
Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 727 (3d Cir. 2004); see also
Parham, 496 F. App'x at 184 (citing Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 524,
530) (explaining that a 60(b) motion should be treated as a
second or successive habeas petition if it “seeks vindication”
of a “claim” defined as “an asserted federal basis for relief
from a state court’s judgment of conviction”).
Here, Petitioner relies on Rule 60(b)(6) and asserts that
he should be permitted to advance his claims of “actual
innocence.”
In his motion, Petitioner explicitly attacks the
validity of, and presents substantive challenges to, his
underlying state conviction and sentence.
Because the instant
motion does not attack the manner in which the decision denying
petitioner’s first habeas application was procured, Petitioner’s
motion is not a “true” Rule 60(b) motion; and it should be
construed as a second or successive habeas petition pursuant to
§ 2254. See Gonzalez, 545 U.S. 524; Pridgen, 380 F.3d at 727;
Evans v. Pierce, 148 F. Supp. 3d 333, 337 (D. Del. 2015), aff'd
(June 16, 2016) (holding that a motion which did not challenge
the way in which a petitioner’s claim was adjudicated was more
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appropriately construed as a second or successive habeas
petition).
Petitioner does not assert that the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals has authorized the filing of a second or successive
habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
Accordingly,
this Court is without jurisdiction to address Petitioner’s
claims of actual innocence.
B. Timing of Rule 60(b)(6) Motions
Pursuant to Rule 60(c)(1), motions which rely on grounds
(1), (2), or (3) of Rule 60(b) must be made within one year
after the judgment which is being challenged.
However, motions,
such as the instant motion, which are filed pursuant to ground
(6), are subject only to the rule’s general requirement that
such a motion be made “within a reasonable time.” FED. R. CIV. P.
60(c)(1).
Although there is no specific time limit for motions
filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6), the general one-year time limit
remains applicable unless “extraordinary circumstances” excuse
the delay in filing. See Gordon v. Monoson, 239 F. App'x 710,
713 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“A motion under Rule
60(b)(6) filed more than a year after final judgment is
generally untimely unless “extraordinary circumstances” excuse
the party's failure to proceed sooner.”); Tokley v. Ricci, No.
09-4546, 2015 WL 3875694, at *3 (D.N.J. June 23, 2015).
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Here, Petitioner filed the instant motion on May 26, 2016.
Although in his motion Petitioner repeatedly requests
reconsideration of this Court’s March 14, 2016 Order denying his
first motion to reopen, the crux of Petitioner’s argument is
that his Petition should not have been dismissed as second or
successive.
Therefore, the Order for which Petitioner truly
seeks reconsideration is this Court’s February 25, 2015 Order
dismissing the Petition as second or successive.
Accordingly,
the instant motion was filed more than one year after the
judgment which Petitioner challenges, and Petitioner has not
shown any “extraordinary circumstances” which would excuse his
delay. See Gordon, 239 F. App'x at 713.
Moreover, Petitioner
filed a separate motion to reopen during this time period, which
further suggests that no extraordinary circumstances existed to
prevent him from filing the instant motion sooner.
C. Other Arguments
Finally, this Court notes that at various points in his
motion, Petitioner refers to procedural default, and cites to
Christy v. Horn, 115 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 1997) in support of his
assertion that his petition should not have been considered
second or successive.
The Court takes this opportunity to
remind Petitioner that, as explained in this Court’s February
25, 2015 Opinion (ECF No. 2), his Petition was dismissed as
second or successive because the challenges raised therein had
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been previously presented in other petitions filed pursuant to §
2254.
Therefore, the issues of procedural default and
exhaustion of state remedies — which were at issue in Christy v.
Horn — are inapplicable to the instant motion and do not provide
a basis for reconsideration of the Court’s February 25, 2015
Order dismissing the Petition as second or successive.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
To the extent one may be necessary, the Court declines to
issue a Certificate of Appealability because Petitioner has not
made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); FED. R. APP. P. 22(b)(1).
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s Motion for Relief
From Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) (ECF No. 12) will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and, alternatively, as timebarred.
The case will be reclosed.
An appropriate Order follows.
___s/ Noel L. Hillman_____
NOEL L. HILLMAN
United States District Judge
Dated: August 3, 2016
At Camden, New Jersey
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