JONES v. LAGANA et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 2/25/2015. (drw)n.m.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RONALD JONES,
Petitioner,
v.
PAUL K. LAGANA, et al.,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil Action No. 12-5823 (NLH)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Ronald Jones, SBI #954731A/67483
Northern State Prison
P.O. Box 2300
Newark, NJ 07114
Plaintiff Pro Se
HILLMAN, District Judge:
Petitioner Ronald Jones (“Petitioner”), a prisoner confined
at Northern State Prison in Newark, New Jersey, files the
instant petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”), challenging a sentence imposed for a
state conviction of rape and kidnapping in 1981.

For the

reasons stated below, the Petition will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
I.

BACKGROUND

This is at least the ninth petition the Petitioner has
filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.

The Court will very briefly

summarize the eight known prior petitions for the purposes of
this Opinion.
The first two petitions filed by Petitioner, Jones v.
Beyer, No. 93-0164 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 8, 1993) and Jones v.
Morton, No. 95-1296 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 28, 1995), were dismissed
for failure to exhaust state court remedies.

During the

pendency of the second petition, Congress enacted the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which
imposed a one-year statute of limitations on § 2254 petitions.
The third petition, Jones v. Morton, 97-5606 (D.N.J. filed
Nov. 3, 1997), was dismissed both as a successive petition, and
as time barred by AEDPA.
dismissal as time-barred.

The Third Circuit affirmed the
The fourth and fifty petitions, Jones

v. Hendricks, No. 01-0337 (D.N.J. filed Jan. 24, 2001) and Jones
v. Hendricks, No. 02-4612 (D.N.J. filed Sept. 20, 2002), were
both dismissed with prejudice.
The sixth petition, Jones v. Hendricks, No. 03-3927 (D.N.J.
filed Aug. 18, 2003), was transferred to the Third Circuit, and
the Third Circuit denied leave to proceed with a second or
successive petition.

The seventh petition, Jones v. Hendricks,

No. 04-1529 (D.N.J. filed Mar. 30, 2004), was dismissed as a
second or successive petition, which the Third Circuit affirmed
on the same ground.

2

The eighth petition, Jones v. Hayman, No. 06-5725 (D.N.J.
filed Nov. 29, 2006) was initially dismissed as a second or
successive petition.

On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the

dismissal of all claims except one, because the remaining claim
did not challenge the validity of Petitioner’s sentence, but
challenged the status of his parole eligibility.

On remand, the

Court dismissed the remaining claim with prejudice.
Now, Petitioner files his ninth petition.

The instant

Petition challenges solely the validity of his sentence, and
does not contain challenges to his parole eligibility.
II.

DISCUSSION

Title 28, Section 2244(b)(1) of the United States Code
states that “a claim presented in a second or successive habeas
corpus application under section 2254 that was presented in a
prior application shall be dismissed.”

While § 2244 permits a

second or successive petition under certain extremely limited
circumstances, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), before a district
court can entertain such petition, “the applicant shall move in
the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the
district court to consider the application.”

28 U.S.C. §

2244(b)(3); see also Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, Rule 9.
Furthermore, § 2244 imposes a one-year limitations period to
file a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to
the judgment of a State court.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
3

Here, Petitioner does not raise any claims that were not
presented in his prior petitions.

For example, Petitioner

claims that trial counsel erred in not calling key witnesses
whose testimony would “prove” Petitioner’s innocence, that
prosecutors withheld exculpatory medical evidence, and that
trial counsel failed to file a first appeal.

All of these

claims have been adjudicated by state and federal district
courts in the past.

Unlike his eighth petition, where he raised

a claim concerning his parole eligibility, all of Petitioner’s
claims here attack the validity of his state sentence.

As the

Court summarized above, Petitioner has made the same claims
multiple times over the last 20-plus years, and the Third
Circuit has denied at least one of Petitioner’s prior petitions
under the second and successive petition bar.

Accordingly, the

instant Petition is barred by the second or successive petition
bar under § 2244(b)(1).

Even if the Petition can somehow be

construed as presenting a new claim or claim that is or are
permissible under § 2244(b)(2), this Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain such claim or claims because Petitioner has not been
authorized by the appropriate court of appeals under §
2244(b)(3).

However, regardless of whether this Court has

jurisdiction to entertain any claims of the Petition, as the
Third Circuit has already held, the Petitioner is time-barred

4

from seeking collateral review of his sentence by the one-year
statute of limitations under § 2244(d)(1). 1
Lastly, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.
AEDPA provides that an appeal may not be taken to the court of
appeals from a final order in a § 2254 proceeding unless a judge
issues a certificate of appealability on the ground that "the
applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

In Slack v.

McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), the United States Supreme
Court held that “[w]hen the district court denies a habeas
petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's
underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the
prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it
debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason

1

The Court hereby give notice to Petitioner that, given his
repeated frivolous filings, any further attempts to raise the
same meritless claims with the Court will result in the Court
considering the issuance of an injunction barring and enjoining
Petitioner from filing any document or pleading of any kind in
this District as a pro se litigant, except in pending
litigation, unless Petitioner (1) first seeks leave of the Court
granting Petitioner written permission to file any such document
or pleading, and (2) a judge of the Court grants Petitioner
leave to file such document. See Hallett v. New Jersey State,
No. 09-3704, slip op. at 19 (D.N.J. Sept. 1, 2009); Brow v.
Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
district courts may enjoin a pro se litigant from further
filings through an injunction order as long as there is good
cause and the injunction is narrowly tailored).
5

would find it debatable whether the district court was correct
in its procedural ruling."
Here, the Court denies a certificate of appealability
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) because jurists of reason would
not find it debatable that dismissal of the Petition is correct.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition will be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The Court also denies a

certificate of appealability.

At Camden, New Jersey

Dated:

s/ Noel L. Hillman
Noel L. Hillman
United States District Judge

February 25, 2015

6