GRANT v. REVERA INC./REVERA HEALTH SYSTEMS et al

Filing 106

MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Chief Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/8/2015. (dmr)(n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

FRANCIENNA GRANT,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 12-5857 (JBS/KMW)

v.
REVERA INC./REVERA HEALTH
SYSTEMS, PRISCILLA MILLER, IN
HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS
REHABILITATION DIRECTOR,
PREMIER THERAPY SERVICES, and
JOHN OR MARY DOES,

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Defendants.
SIMANDLE, Chief Judge:
In this employment litigation, pro se Plaintiff Francienna
Grant (hereinafter, “Plaintiff”) moves for “reconsideration” of
the Court’s February 24, 2015 decision denying Plaintiff’s
motion for “reargument” of the Court’s December 23, 2014
decision, which denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment,
granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed
Plaintiff’s Complaint.

[Docket Item 102.]

The Court finds as

follows:
1.

Plaintiff filed the initial Complaint in this action

in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on June 15, 2012.

See

generally Grant v. Revera Inc./Revera Health Sys., No. 12-5857,
2014 WL 7341198, at *6 (D.N.J. Dec. 23, 2014).

The Eastern

District of Pennsylvania transferred this action to this Court

on August 20, 2012 and, following pretrial factual discovery in
this District, the parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment.
2.

See id.
In a forty-six page decision dated December 23, 2014,

the Court discussed, at great length, Plaintiff’s claims that
Defendants: (1) failed to accommodate her disability; (2) failed
to accommodate her religion; (3) failed to intervene in the face
of workplace harassment; (4) subjected Plaintiff to unequal
terms and conditions of employment; (5) wrongfully terminated
and retaliated against Plaintiff in violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112-12117 (hereinafter,
“ADA”); (6) breached Plaintiff’s employment contract; and (7)
committed fraud by terminating Plaintiff under false
allegations.

See generally id.

Following a comprehensive

discussion of the record evidence, the Court concluded that
Plaintiff failed to exhaust her religious accommodation claims,
id. at *9, and adduced no, or insufficient evidence, in support
of any legally cognizable claims for breach of contract, for
fraud, and/or for ADA discrimination under multiple theories.
Id. at *10-*15.

The Court, accordingly, denied Plaintiff’s

motion for summary judgment, granted Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment in its entirety, and dismissed Plaintiff’s
Complaint.

Id. at *16.

2 

3.

On January 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed her first motion

for “reargument of dispositive motions.”

[Docket Item 96.]

Plaintiff’s first motion contained no reference to the Court’s
prior Opinion, nor any specific challenges to the Court’s prior
findings.

[See generally id.]

Rather, Plaintiff appended

various briefs and documents substantively identical to those
reviewed by the Court in connection with Plaintiff’s earlier
motion for summary judgment.
4.

[See generally id.]

In the Court’s February 24, 2015 decision on

Plaintiff’s first motion, the Court found that Plaintiff’s did
not identify a basis for reconsideration under Local Civil Rule
7.1(i).
2015).

See Grant, 2015 WL 794992, at *3 (D.N.J. Feb. 24,
Rather, Plaintiff merely “recapitulate[d], in

substantively identical fashion,” all of her “prior arguments
concerning the record evidence in support of her various
claims.”

Id.

For that reason, the Court concluded that

Plaintiff’s motion amounted to “little more than an expression
of disagreement with the Court’s prior decision, a ground
patently insufficient for purposes of reconsideration.”1

Id.

Nevertheless, the Court proceeded to briefly address each of

1

The Court further noted that Plaintiff failed to file her
motion within the timeframe provided by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 6(d) and Local Civil Rule 7.1(i). See Grant, 2015 WL
794992, at *2. Despite this fatal deficiency, the Court still,
however, considered the merits of Plaintiff’s motion. See id.
at *4-*5.
3 

Plaintiff’s claims anew, and found that none warranted
reconsideration.
5.

Id. at *3-*4.

In her second motion, Plaintiff now asserts that

reconsideration is warranted because the Court purportedly
failed to “render a ruling” on Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment, and because the Court deprived Plaintiff of her
“constitutional right” to be “heard through oral argument.”
[Docket Item 102-1 at 1-8.]

The Court will deny Plaintiff’s

motion on two grounds.
6.

First, Local Civil Rule 7.1(i) provides no mechanism

for reconsideration of an order denying reconsideration.

See

Mitchell v. Twp. of Pemberton, No. 09-810, 2010 WL 2540466, at
*7 n.12 (D.N.J. June 17, 2010) (finding successive motions for
reconsideration prohibited under the Local Rule); Caldwell v.
Vineland Police Dep’t, No. 08-4099, 2010 WL 703179, at *2
(D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2010) (same).

Rather, the appropriate

procedure for challenging this Court’s decision to enter
judgment in Defendants’ favor and to deny reconsideration is an
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

See FED.

R. APP. P. 4(a).
7.

Second, even if Plaintiff's motion could be brought

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), Plaintiff has failed to
identify an intervening change in controlling law, the presence
of new, previously unavailable, evidence, nor the need to
4 

correct a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.
See Max’s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc., v. Quinteros, 176
F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).

Rather, Plaintiff merely

reiterates her contrary view of the record evidence considered
by the Court in its December 23, 2014 decision, and revisited in
its February 24, 2015 decision.2
1 at 1-2, 7-8.]

[See generally Docket Item 102-

Plaintiff’s disagreement with the Court’s

resolution of the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment,
however, fails to make a case for reconsideration under Local
Civil Rule 7.1(i).3

See Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d

511, 532 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that a motion for reconsideration
constitutes an extremely limited procedural vehicle, and does
“not provide the parties with an opportunity for a second bite
at the apple”); see also Schiano v. MBNA Corp., No. 05–1771,
2006 WL 3831225, *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 28, 2006) (finding that mere
disagreement “should be dealt with through the normal appellate
process”).

2

Indeed, Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s second motion on
precisely that basis. [See Docket Item 103 at 4 (arguing that
Plaintiff “continues to pursue the same arguments” and to
express the “same general disagreement” with the Court’s prior
Opinions).]
3 Despite Plaintiff’s assertions, the Court’s December 23, 2014
decision plainly reflects a detailed consideration of
Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. See generally Grant,
2014 WL 7341198.
5 

8.

Nor can the Court find any merit to Plaintiff’s

position that the Court’s decision to deny oral argument
amounted to a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional due
process rights.

Indeed, “[t]here is no constitutional right to

oral argument on a summary judgment motion.”

United States v.

One 1974 Porsche 911-S, 682 F.2d 283, 286 (1st Cir. 1982).
Rather, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires
that parties at the summary judgment phase be afforded “[a]n
opportunity to submit written evidence and argument,” but
imposes no obligation upon the Court to conduct an “oral
hearing” prior to the entry of judgment.

Anchorage Assocs. v.

Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Review, 922 F.2d 168, 176-77 (3d Cir.
1990).
9.

Here, Plaintiff had ample opportunity to submit

written evidence and argument.

Indeed, the Court received

hundred pages of submissions from Plaintiff, and reviewed and
re-reviewed these voluminous submissions in connection with the
parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment and Plaintiff’s
first motion for reconsideration.
86, 88.]

[See, e.g., Docket Items 78,

The Court, accordingly, acted well within its

discretion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78 to decide
the motions without oral argument, see FED. R. CIV. P. 78(b) (“By
rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and
determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings), and
6 

Plaintiff has provided no support for her position that oral
argument would have “reminded” the Court or “made [it] aware” of
any genuine issues of material fact.
6.]

[Docket Item 102-1 at 5-

Rather, the material facts in this litigation should be

have been, and were, presented in the robust record amassed by
the parties in connection with the summary judgment briefing.
10.

For all of these reasons, and those expressed in the

Court’s December 23, 2014 and February 24, 2015 Opinions,
Plaintiff’s second motion for reconsideration will be denied.4
To the extent Plaintiff wishes to challenge any of these
decisions, Plaintiff must, to the extent permitted by applicable
law, file a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit.
11.

See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a).

An accompanying Order will be entered.

July 8, 2015
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Chief U.S. District Judge

4

By letter dated April 8, 2015, Plaintiff accused Defendant of
“recidivistic Ex Parte Communication[s]” with the Court’s staff.
[Docket Item 104 at 3-4.] No ex parte communication concerning
the merits or substance of this action has taken place. Rather,
the communication solely concerned a procedural inquiry into
responding to the pending motion. This communication has,
accordingly, had no impact on the Court’s disposition of the
various motions filed in this action, and gives rise to no
plausible claim of prejudice.
7